

THE THIRD
Salisbury Administration,
1895-1900.

BY
H. WHATES.


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AUTHOR'S NOTE.



On the death of a distinguished man it is customary to write the story of his life. Why should not a like narrative be produced on the passing of a Ministry, the Dissolution of a Parliament?

In this book an effort is made to record the life history of the Third Salisbury Administration—to tell of its failures and its successes, its merits and its shortcomings; to trace its achievements in Foreign Policy, in Colonial Administration, in Domestic Legislation.

The facts are taken from official sources. Statements bearing upon Foreign and Imperial Affairs have been verified by reference to Ministerial and other Despatches. The opinions are the Author's; and for them neither value nor interest is claimed, except for any approval or criticism they may excite in the mind of the reader.

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CONTENTS.



INTRODUCTION.

THE VICTORY OF 1895.

	PAGE
Mr. Gladstone's Pair—Discipline Relaxed—The Duke of Cambridge—War Office Reorganisation—Mr. Brodrick's Motion—"A Vote of Censure, Petty but Fatal"—Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's Annoyance—The Seals Incident—The New Ministry—Conservative Grumbling—Conclusion of the Session—Dissolution Manifestoes—Home Rule—The House of Lords—Lord Rosebery's Leadership—Divided Radical Councils—The General Election—A Unionist Triumph—The New Parliament	1

BOOK I.

ENGLAND AND THE ARMENIANS.

CHAPTER I.

THE CRIMES OF ABDUL HAMID.

Lord Salisbury and the Sultan—A Solemn Warning—Abdul Hamid's Appeal—Preceding Massacres—The Sassoon District—The Number of the Slain—Lord Kimberley's Protest—The Sultan's Defence—An Argument from Europe—The Commission of Inquiry—Lord Kimberley creates the Concert—Conclusions after the Inquiry—A Scheme of Reforms—The Right of Interference by England—Russia hesitates—Lord Kimberley proposes Coercion—Prince Lobanoff takes Fright—The Concert inoperative—A Forty-eight Hours' Ultimatum—The Fall of the English Ministry ...	18
---	----

CHAPTER II.

SOME PAPER CONCESSIONS.

Lord Salisbury's Demands—The Question of Compulsion—Should England Act Alone?—The State of Public Opinion—Counsels of the Extremists—Lord Salisbury maintains the Concert—Agreement upon Reforms—Acceptance by the Sultan—Lord Salisbury's Victory—Was Abdul Hamid Sincere?—The Vizerial Order	31
---	----

CHAPTER III.

A YEAR OF BLOOD.

The Massacres of '96-'97—The Official Record—Complicity of the Authorities—The Sultan's Policy—Evasion and Delay—Indifference of the Powers—The "Stationnaires"—A Question by Abdul Hamid—Lord Salisbury in Manacles—The Sultan Unrepentant—Prince Lobanoff's Excuses—The Christians desperate—Attack on the Ottoman Bank—The Constantinople Massacres—An Inactive Concert—A Terrible Indictment—The Sultan Insolent—A Demand upon the Powers—Lord Salisbury's Failure ...	37
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

CRETE AND THE WAR IN GREECE.

The Civil War in Crete—Lord Salisbury leads the Concert—A Scheme of Reforms—Intervention by Greece—The Vassos Raid—Interference by the Powers—Lord Salisbury proposes Autonomy—The Powers and Coercion of Greece—A Turkish Army on the Greek Frontier—Greek Raids across the Border—The Sultan declares War—Localising the Conflict—Collapse of the Greek Army—Mediation of the Powers—The Terms of Peace—Autonomy for Crete—The German Emperor “lays down his flute”—Turkish Troops in Crete—The Fighting at Candia—Admiral Noel’s Action—An Ultimatum to the Sultan—Prince George of Greece appointed Governor—Peace restored to Crete	PAGE 47
---	------------

BOOK II.

ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER I.

THE GUIANA-VENEZUELA BOUNDARY.

Mr. Cleveland’s Message—An Unheeded Warning—Arrogant Interference—Public Bewilderment—Mr. Olney’s Despatch—The Monroe Doctrine—Republican Horror of Monarchies—Lord Salisbury’s two Despatches—Rejection of the American Demand—A Justification of England’s Policy towards Venezuela—A Serious Deadlock—Coolness of the English People—The Violence of the American Press—A Panic in Wall Street—Subsidence of American excitement	64
--	----

CHAPTER II.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE.

The Guiana Coast—Early Dutch Visits—Seventeenth Century Settlements—The Spaniards of the Orinoco—The Franciscan and Capuchin Missions—Father Strickland’s Researches—Extent of Dutch Occupation—Area of the Spanish Missions—British Acquisition from the Dutch—Sir R. Schomburgk’s Travels—The Provisional Boundary—Diplomatic Negotiations—The Agreement of 1850—Venezuelan Violations—Wrongful Concession to American Adventurers—The Story of the Negotiations—Diplomatic Relations with Venezuela Suspended—American Intervention	74
---	----

CHAPTER III.

ARBITRATION ACCEPTED.

Jingoism in the States—The American Commission of Inquiry—Efforts towards a Settlement—Conditional Acceptance of Arbitration—Lord Salisbury at the Guildhall—The Treaty of Washington—The Rights of Settlers—Meeting of the Arbitration Tribunal—The Effect of the Award—The Loss of Barima Point—The New Boundary—Navigation Stipulations—A Satisfactory Conclusion... ..	85
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS.

	PAGE
A Treaty of Arbitration—The Queen's Speech—Revolt of the Senate—Mr. Sherman as Mischief Maker—The Sealing Question—Conference of Experts—Why Prohibition was Wanted—Yukon Gold Fields—Alaska Boundary Question—The Spanish-American War—Friendship for England—The Joint Commission—Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825—The Canadian Contention—Breakdown of the Commission—Death of Lord Herschell—Arbitration Refused—A <i>Modus Vivendi</i> —The Samoan Islands—A Free Gift to the United States—The Nicaragua Canal—Clayton-Bulwer Treaty—Another Free Gift—Anglo-American Amity	91

BOOK III.

THE GOVERNMENT AND CHINA.

CHAPTER I.

A DIPLOMATIC SKIRMISH.

The Powers and Japan—The Victors Ousted—Russia's Secret Understanding with China—A Polite Denial—Lord Salisbury's Optimism—An Invitation to Russia—The Stewart Murders—The British Ultimatum—Major Macdonald's Appointment—The Condition of China—Russian Railway Plans—Designs on Manchuria—The North China Railways—The Question of Mr. Kinder—A Diplomatic Skirmish—M. Pavloff temporarily Silenced	106
--	-----

CHAPTER II.

A FEW RUSSIAN SUBTERFUGES.

The Russian Aim—German Seizure of Kiao Chau—Speech by the Emperor William—The German Michael and the Mailed Fist—Port Arthur—The Chinese "Invitation"—Visit of H.M.S. Daphne—Russian Explanations—The Vladivostock Ice-breaker—British Men-of-War at Port Arthur—Russian Complaints—Lord Salisbury's Excuses—The Question of the Loan—Anti-British Intrigues—Winter Anchorage at Port Arthur becomes a Right of Exclusive Use—The Russian Claim to Talienwan—Count Mouravieff's Pledges—A British Warship Ordered out of Port Arthur—Lord Salisbury's Renewed Excuses—The Position of the Yamên—The Loan Question—Russian Threats to China—Decision of the Yamên—A British Warning—Success of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank—Port Arthur and Talienwan—Lord Salisbury and M. de Staal—The Russian Minister's Pledges—The <i>Times</i> Reports of a Lease—Wei-hai-wei Offered to England—Signature of the Russian Lease—The Shuffling of Count Mouravieff—The Czar's Assurance as to both Ports—Lord Salisbury Accepts the Situation—An Important Qualification—Lord Salisbury on Port Arthur—The Balance of Power—Russia asked to Abandon her
--

	PAGE
Claim—Count Mouravieff Angry—Lord Salisbury gives way—A Retaliatory Policy—The Lease of Wei-hai-wei—The Russian Assurances—An Important Difference—Talienwan only to be an Open Port	111

CHAPTER III.

SOME DIPLOMATIC MANŒUVRES.

Further Russian Intrigues—Japan Rejects the Russian Overtures—Her Support of England—Lord Salisbury wins Germany over—The Pledge to that Power in Shantung—Why it was Criticised—The Wei-hai-wei Lease—Is there a Russo-Chinese Treaty of Alliance?—The <i>Times</i> Reports—The Official Evidence—Sir Claude MacDonald's Views—His Interview with Prince Ching—The Wei-hai-wei Lease Granted—Renewed Russian Hostility in North China—The Passports Question—The Imperial Order as to Talienwan—Another attempt to Oust Mr. Kinder—British Warning to Russia—The Northern Railways Extension Loan—A Dead-Lock—The Peace Imperilled	127
--	-----

CHAPTER IV.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT.

North China and the Yangtze Basin—China's Pledge of Non-alienation of the Yangtze Region—Internal Navigation—The Inspector-Generalship of Customs—Russian and British Spheres of Influence—The Limitations of British Policy—Lord Salisbury Not Prepared to Fight—The Northern Railways Wrangle—Mr. Balfour at the Foreign Office—His Complaint to M. Lessar—Some Very Plain Speaking—The Russian Suggestion of "Hands Off" in the Respective Spheres—The Policy of "Spheres of Interest"—The Draft Railway Agreement—Efforts to Wreck the Arrangement—The Half-a-Loaf Principle—Lord Salisbury Grumbles, but Accepts—The Railways Loan—Foreign Office Pledge to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank—Supplementary Notes to the Anglo-Russian Agreement—The "Primordial Interests of China"—A Few Questions—Lord Salisbury's View of the Agreement—Russia seeks English Friendship—M. de Witte on the Financial Necessity of a Good Understanding—The Shanghai Settlement—French Extension Claim—Lord Salisbury's Pledge of Material Support to China—M. Delcassé's Tact—A Satisfactory Solution—The United States and the Open Door—A Belated Support—Formal Adoption of Lord Salisbury's Policy—Assurances by the Powers—The Chinese <i>coup d'état</i> —The State of China—Disturbances at Wei-hai-wei—The "Boxer" Rising	134
---	-----

CHAPTER IV.—Continued.

THE SIEGE OF THE LEGATIONS.

The Evidence of Disorder—Murder of Mr. Fleming—Piracy on the West River—The Banditti of Manchuria—Sir Claude MacDonald's Leave—Murder of Mr. Brooks—Alarm of the Chinese Government—The Boxers in Shantung—Action of the Yamén—Warning from the Legations—Naval Demonstration Asked For—Lord Salisbury Deprecates such an Extreme Measure—
--

M. Delcassé's Views—The Imperial Decree—Change in the Succession to the Imperial Throne—Further Boxer Ravages—Massacres of Native Christians—Combined Action by the Legations—Lord Salisbury Agrees to a Naval Demonstration—The Immediate Future—M. Pichon's Fears—Optimism of Russia—Guards for the Legations—The Late Baron Ketteler's Views on the Situation—The Yamèn Aroused—Chinese Evasion on the Question of Guards—Arrival of Troops at the Legations—The Situation in June—Attitude of the Empress—Preparations for Flight—Boxer Attack on Belgians near Tientsin—The Murders of Mr. Robinson and Mr. Norman—Alarm at the Legations—A Siege Feared—Appeal to Admiral Seymour—The Danger at Tientsin—The Attitude of Prince Ch'ing—Audience of the Emperor Demanded—Lord Salisbury gives our Minister a Free Hand—A Composite Force for Pekin—The Boxer Movement more Menacing—Abandonment of the Missions in Pekin—The British Legation a House of Refuge—Sir C. MacDonald Appeals for Immediate Help—Admiral Seymour takes Action—The Legations Besieged—The Railway Destroyed—Admiral Seymour's Force Cut Off from the Base—Chinese Attack on Tientsin—Bombardment of the Taku Forts—Relief of Tientsin—Admiral Seymour's Retreat—A Disastrous Failure—Our Interests in the Yangtze Valley—Consul Warren's Understanding with the Viceroy—The Chinese Government and the Legations—Troops Ordered from India—Japanese Intervention Invited—Attitude of Russia and Germany—Murder of the German Minister—The Dilemma of the Powers—Sir R. Hart's Message: "Hasten Your Coming"—International Troops Poured into China—News from the Legations—Dr. Morrison's Message—The Policy of the British Government Defined by Mr. Brodrick—Advance of the Second Relief Force—Relief of the Legations—The New Political Situation—Proposed Evacuation by Russia—The Russian Note—Reply of the United States Government—Attitude of the Powers—The Chinese Peace Commissioners—Revolting Murders of Missionaries—Work of the Next Administration	145
---	-----

CHAPTER V.

CONCESSIONS TO GREAT BRITAIN.

The Hong Kong Extension—The Opening of Nanning—The Berthollet Murder—Railway Concession to France—Mr. Hosie's Report on Nanning—Other Ports Opened—The Advantages Gained—A Port in Hunan—The Battle for Railway and Mining Concessions—The Shansi Area—Baron Richtofen on its Mineral Wealth—The Honan Rights—Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Concessions—The Anglo-German Syndicate—Jardine-Matheson Syndicate—The Anglo-American Syndicate—Franco-Belgian Syndicate—The Commercial Community's Debt to Sir Claude Macdonald	161
--	-----

BOOK IV.

THE NILE AND THE NIGER.

CHAPTER I.

RECONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN.

	PAGE
An Air of Mystery—The Italians at Adowa—General Baratieri's Defeat—Kassala and the Dervishes—An Egyptian Advance Ordered—Mr. Curzon's Explanation—Attitude of the Opposition—Our Relations with Italy—The <i>Caisse</i> Advance—French Objections—The Sirdar Acts—Mr. Morley's Vote of Censure—An "Infatuated" Policy—Mr. Chamberlain's Statement—The Mixed Tribunals and the <i>Caisse</i> —The Parsimony of the Government—Indian Troops for Suakim—A Shabby Act—The Battle of Ferkeh—Cholera and Sand Storms—A long Delay—Occupation of Dongola Town—The Gunboats in Action—A Province at a Stroke—A Halt Called—Lord Salisbury's Reasons—Khartoum the Objective—French Remonstrances to Egypt—Sir Michael Hicks Beach's Speech—England would not be worried out of Egypt—The Work for 1897—A Parliamentary Grant in Aid—Opposition Speeches—M. Hanotaux and the English Challenge—Abu Hamed taken by Assault—The Work for 1898—The Queen's Speech—British Troops for the Soudan—Lord Kimberley's Pronouncement—Lord Salisbury's Reply—The Battle of the Atbara—Province of Berber Recovered—Completion of Railway to El Obeid—The Movement towards Khartoum—Omdurman Bombarded—The Battle of September 2nd—Capture of the Khalifa's Capital—Enthusiasm of the Empire ...	165

CHAPTER II.

FRANCE AND THE NILE VALLEY.

The Marchand Expedition—Sir Edward Grey's Statement in 1895—An Unfriendly Act—"A Painful Impression" in France—M. Hanotaux's Declaration—The Anglo-German Agreement—The Rights of Egypt—France in the Nigerian Soudan—Lord Salisbury's Instructions to Sir E. Monson—The Niger Commission—An Offer about Lake Chad—M. Hanotaux's Reply—Statement of Policy to the Sirdar—His Orders Concerning the White Nile—M. Delcassé's Dilemma—Marchand as "An Emissary of Civilisation"—Vigorous Action by Sir E. Monson—His Denial of the French Claim to send the Expedition—Plain Language to France—"No wish to Pick a Quarrel"—No Hope of Compromise—The Sirdar Saves the Marchand Party from Massacre—His Relations with Captain Marchand—Marchand's Account of His Instructions from the French Government—Shilluk Country Occupied by the Anglo-Egyptians—Alleged Shilluk Treaty with Marchand—A Free Passage Down the Nile Offered to the French Expedition—M. Delcassé Withholds the Order to Retire—A Dangerous Deadlock—Lord Salisbury and Baron de Courcel—Lord Salisbury Immoveable—The Prime Minister's Arguments—A Second Interview—Baron de Courcel as Diplomatic Explorer—Lord Salisbury Holds His Ground—The French Demand for Access to the Nile—Baron de Courcel Waxes Rhetorical—Lord Salisbury's Satirical Description of the Conversation—
--

CONTENTS.

xi

England United—Lord Rosebery Supports the Government—An Eloquent Passage—Public Feeling on the French Policy of "Pin-pricks"—M. Delcassé and French Opinion—Sir Michael Hicks Beach's Warning to France	177
--	-----

CHAPTER III.

THE PARTITION OF THE SOUDAN.

France and the Lake Chad Region—The Invasion of Nigeria—French Occupation of Boussa and Nikki—A Critical Situation—The Convention of June, 1898—A Re-adjustment of Frontiers—Relation of the Fashoda Incident to the Niger Convention—The Question of the Central Soudan—Secret Negotiations—Partition of the Central Soudan with France—The Addition to Article IV. of the Niger Convention—Its Terms Explained—Political Effect of the Settlement—The Treaty with Menelik—The Mission of Prince Henri d'Orleans—The Nile Valley from Uganda—Colonel Macdonald's Expedition—The Soudanese Revolt—Failure of the Expedition to Reach the Nile—Why England was Forestalled by M. Marchand—General Considerations	190
--	-----

BOOK V.

INDIA, MINOR COLONIES AND PROTECTORATES.

CHAPTER I.

THE TROUBLES IN INDIA.

Chitral—Retention or Abandonment—Lord Rosebery's Views—Lord Salisbury's Decision and the Reasons thereof—The Ameer of Afghanistan—His Violation of the Durand Agreement—Retirement of the Afghan Army—Rising in the Tochi Valley—The Swat Valley Rising—Peace Patched Up—The Kyber Pass Blocked—A Formidable Rising—The Ameer and the Afridis—A British Army set to Work—The Earlier Operations—Sir William Lockhart in Command—Invasion of the Afridi and Orakzais Country—The Battle of Dargai—Charge of the Gordons—Terms of Submission Dictated—Withdrawal to Winter Quarters—The Tribesmen Defeated, but Unsubdued—Eventual Submission—Another Patched-up Peace—Policy of the Cabinet—Lord George Hamilton's Despatch—The Opposition and the War—The "Breach of Faith" Controversy—Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry Fowler—Plague and the Famines—Indian Sugar Duties—The Gold Currency... ..	200
---	-----

CHAPTER II.

THE GOLD COAST AND SIERRA LEONE.

The Gold Coast Hinterland—The Overthrow of the Ashanti Power—The Arrangement with France—Samory and the Sofas—Lieut. Henderson at Wa—Samory's Attack on the British—The Prospects of the Colony—Railway and Mining Outlook—The Insurrection in Sierra Leone—The New Protectorate—The Hut Tax Scheme—Bai Bureh's Revolt—Sir D. P. Chalmers as Royal Commissioner—Summary of his Recommendations—Their Effect	219
--	-----

THE ROYAL NIGER COMPANY.

Revocation of the Charter—Why Imperial Rule was Substituted—An Outline of Earlier History—The Work of Sir George Goldie—An English Monopoly on the Lower Niger—The Anglo-French Agreement of 1890—The Say-Barua Line—The Emir of Bida—A Mahomedan Plot—The Nupé and Ilorin Campaign—Assurances to France—Foreign Office Sanction of War—The March to Kappa—Blockade of the Niger—The Battle of Bida—A Critical Moment—Political Effect of the Victory—The Capture of Ilorin—French Invasion of Borgu—Occupation of Ilo, Boussa and Nikki—Relation of the Nupé-Ilorin Campaign to the French Invasion—Lord Salisbury's Views—The Niger Delta—Benin Massacre—Admiral Rawson's Expedition—Capture of Benin—Extension of British Authority from the Coast to the Soudan

... .. 227

UGANDA AND THE RAILWAY.

The Condition of Uganda—The Railway from the Coast—Its Bearing upon Slave Trade and Administrative Problems—The Crisis in the Protectorates—Expedition against Kabarega—Mwanga threatened with Deposition—A “Catholic” Conspiracy—Revolt in Buddu—Flight of Mwanga—Reappearance of Kabarega—The Macdonald Expedition to the Soudan—Revolt of his Soudanese Troops—Grievances of the Men—Extension of the Rebellion—Murder of Major Thurston, Mr. N. A. Wilson and Mr. Scott—British Attack on Fort Lubwas—A long Blockade—Escape of the Soudanese—The Rebels driven to the Kioga Swamps—The Waganda Rising—Timely Help from Germany—Success of British Arms—Criticism of the Officials—Responsibility of the Imperial Government—A Cheese-paring Policy—Appointment of Sir H. H. Johnston—Work for the Incoming Administration 238

UNDEVELOPED ESTATES.

Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonies—Neglected Estates of Empire—The Plight of the West Indies—Sugar Planters' Views—Countervailing Duties—Class *versus* Common Interests—Appointment of a Royal Commission—Verdict against Countervailing Duties—Sir H. W. Norman Dissents—Conditions of the Problem—Special Responsibility of the Imperial Government—Action taken on the Report—Brussels Conference on Sugar Bounties—Why it Failed—Remedial Measures for the Islands—The Hurricanes—Grants from the Imperial Exchequer—Mr. Chamberlain as Administrator—Influence of the Sugar Planters—The Colony of Jamaica—The Railway Contract—Tariff Legislation—The Colonial Secretary and the Elective Members—Sir David Barbour's Report—Newfoundland—The Reid Contract—Mr. Chamberlain's acrid Criticisms—The Question of Disallowance—The Principle of Imperial Sanction—A Royal Commission Asked for and Refused—The French Shore Question—Royal Commission Granted—The Report Withheld 244

BOOK VI.

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

CHAPTER I.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE BOERS.

	PAGE
The Overthrow of the Boer Republics—Issue on which the War was Fought— Sand River Convention—Did it confer Independence?—The Orange River Convention—Sir George Grey's Warnings—Stupidity in High Places—The Diamond Discoveries—Territory Filched from the Orange Free State— Lord Carnarvon's Federation Scheme—Miscarriage of the Proposals—The Sekukuni Peril—Annexation of the Transvaal—Mr. Kruger as Delegate— The Kaffir and Zulu Wars—Mr. Gladstone and Retrocession—Sir Bartle Frere and the Boer Demand for Independence—The Revolt in the Transvaal—Bronkhorst Spruit, Majuba Hill—The Pretoria Convention— Rights Retained by the Imperial Power—Revision Promised—Legislation Depriving British Subjects of Equal Rights in the Transvaal—The Negotiations with Lord Derby—Failure of the Chief Aim of the Boer Delegates—The New Convention—Omission of the word "Suzerainty"— The Delegates' False Report—The Final Position of the Disputants ...	259

CHAPTER II.

A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.

Mr. Chamberlain's Early Relations with Mr. Kruger—Closing of the Drifts—The Colonial Secretary's Threat—Mr. Kruger Gives Way—The Johannesburg Uitlanders—Racial and Political Animosity—The Great Conspiracy—Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Beit—The "Jumping Off" Place—Dr. R. Harris and the Colonial Office—What Passed or did not Pass in Downing Street—A Question of Veracity and Personal Honour—Transfer of the Bechuanaland Strip—Progress of the Conspiracy—Mr. Rhodes and Sir Graham Bower— An Astonishing Pledge—Mr. Newton's Silence—How the High Commis- sioner was Kept in Ignorance—The British Public Tricked—A Fraudulent Letter—The Signatories Thereto—The Compact on the Flag—When Conspirators Fall Out. . . —Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Leonard—according to Mr. Leonard—Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Harris and the Colonial Office—Dr. Jameson Instructed to Wait—He Refuses, and Cuts the Wires—Sir Graham Bower's Belated Confession—The High Commissioner's Action—Mr. Rhodes' Advice Rejected—The Fraudulent Letter Published in England— A Lady's Part in the Plot—The Intrigue Against the High Commissioner— Mr. Chamberlain's Action—Dr. Jameson Refuses to Return—Dr. Jameson Defeated at Krugersdorp—A Humiliating Surrender—The Invaders in Pretoria Gaol—A Befeared Public's Excitement—The Re-action—The Floundering of the Reform Leaders in Johannesburg—The High Commis- sioner, Mr. Kruger and the Johannesburg Capitalists—An Unconditional Surrender—Sir Jacobus de Wet—The Reform Leaders and the Safety of their own Skins—The Alleged Pledges of the British Agent—Transfer of Dr. Jameson—Arrest of the Reform Ringleaders—The German Emperor's Message—Mr. Kruger's Reply—Exasperation in England at German
--

	PAGE
Interference—A Flying Squadron Ordered—The Danger Passes—Mr. Kruger's Assurances to the Uitlanders—Their Limitations—The High Commissioner's Attitude—Mr. Chamberlain's Disappointment—"The Root Causes Remain"—The High Commissioner Declines to Go On—His Reasons for Inactivity	269

CHAPTER III.

SOME EFFECTS OF FAILURE.

The Queen's Speech—The <i>London Gazette</i> Despatch—"A Clear and Unequivocal" Declaration—Self-Government for the Rand—Mr. Chamberlain's Arguments—Invitation to Mr. Kruger—Krugerian Sensitiveness—Mr. Rhodes' Flying Visit to England—The Matabele Rising—Cause and Effect—The Trial of Dr. Jameson and his Officers—Verdict and Sentences—No Raid no War—No Raid no Matabele and Mashona Rising—Massacres of White Settlers—The Matoppo Hills—Mr. Rhodes in Rhodesia—His Negotiations with the Natives—The Inquiry into the Raid—Report of the Select Committee—Censure of Mr. Rhodes—Was Mr. Chamberlain Privy to the Raid?—Missing Telegrams—Mr. Hawkesley's Refusal to Produce—The Conclusions of the Committee—Mr. Labouchere's Dissenting Report—Is Mr. Rhodes a Statesman?—Some Considerations bearing upon that Question—Mr. Chamberlain's Certificate of Character—A List of Questions—The <i>Independence Belge</i> Letters—A Conclusion—subject to the Production of New Evidence—The Trial of the Reformers—The Sentences and Fines—Mr. Kruger's Attitude towards Johannesburg—Retirement of Sir Jacobus de Wet—Death of Lord Rosmead—Appointment of Sir Alfred Milner as High Commissioner	285
--	-----

CHAPTER IV.

AGGRESSIVE DIPLOMACY.

Quarrelsome Boer Secretaries—A Policy of Patience—The State of Public Opinion in England—A Striking Change of Tone—Mr. Kruger's Misuse of his Years of Grace—Secret Alliance with the Orange Free State—A Duel by Despatches—The Superficial Issues—The Real and Fundamental Contention—Sovereignty the Boer Aim—Mr. Kruger's "Little Bill"—A Fraudulent Claim—Lord Rosmead's Views—Mr. Chamberlain's Repudiation—Sir A. Milner's Instructions—A Franchise Policy—A Boer Confederacy—Mr. Kruger's "Secrets"—The Cape General Election of 1898—Rand Industrial Commission—The Report Burked—Mr. Kruger's Re-Election—An Uphill Task for Mr. Chamberlain—The South African League—Mr. Chamberlain Assumes the Offensive—His Attack on the Dynamite Monopoly—The Attack Developed—The Edgar Incident—Excitement in Johannesburg—Petition to the Queen—Sir A. Milner's Review of the Situation—"Ineffectual Nagging"—A Call for Imperial Intervention—Mr. Chamberlain's Reply to the Petition—A Suggestion for a Conference with Mr. Kruger—Preliminaries Arranged—A Pot-house Conspiracy—The Conference at Bloemfontein—Franchise or Municipal Rights—The Motives of the Imperial Government—The Motives of Mr. Kruger—His Attitude at the Conference—Mr. Kruger tries to Bargain a Franchise for Foreign Arbitration—Incorporation of Swaziland—Break-down of the Conference	300
---	-----

CHAPTER V.

THE EVE OF WAR.

	PAGE
Mr. Kruger's Franchise Law—Cape Ministry's Views—The Draft Law and the "Irreducible Minimum" of the British Government—The Boers and Foreign Arbitration—A Tricky Proposal—Energetic Remonstrance by Mr. Chamberlain—Joint Examination of the Franchise Law Proposed—Arbitration Proposals Rejected—Refusal to appoint Delegates—Modified Franchise Proposals—Unacceptable Conditions Attached—Qualified Acceptance of the Boer Offer, but Rejection of the Conditions—The Boers Withdraw their Offer—The New Deadlock—Mr. Kruger Responsible—The Cabinet Meeting of September 8th—The Despatch of that Date—Proposals <i>De Novo</i> —The Boer Reply—A Charge of Bad Faith—Mr. Chamberlain's Answer—The Old Issue of Sovereignty—British Proposals Promised—The Door Left Open—How it was Closed—Intervention of Mr. Steyn—His Supercilious Patronage and Insolent Dictation—The Cape Ministry and the Importation of Arms—Mr. Steyn and the Free State Volksraad—A Fatal Resolution—A Pretence of Ignorance—The First Act of War—Natal Communications Cut—Troops Ordered from India—Expulsion of British Subjects from the Republics—Mr. Steyn's <i>Rôle</i> as Fomentor of Rebellion amongst Dutch-British Subjects—The Ultimatum of October 9th—The Reply of England—Mr. Steyn Questioned—An Answer for Dutch Consumption in Cape Colony and Natal—Public Opinion in England—Some Views upon Mr. Chamberlain as a Diplomatist—Sir Edward Clarke's Attitude—The Public Swing Into Line with the Government—Attitude of the Opposition Leaders—The October Session—Lord Kimberley's Attack on Mr. Chamberlain—Lord Salisbury's Defence—A Motion in the Commons—The Colonial Secretary's Speech—Sir Edward Clarke Justifies His Attitude—Expectations of an Easy Victory—A Gross Miscalculation—A Ludicrous Financial Forecast 	313

CHAPTER VI.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR.

Isolation of Kimberley and Mafeking—The Ladysmith Entanglement—An Egregious Estimate—What the Late Sir W. Penn Symons Thought—A Conference with the Natal Government—Northern Natal Overrun by the Boers—The Battle of Talana Hill—A Retirement to Dundee—The First British Disaster—A Retreat to Ladysmith—The Disaster of Nicholson's Nek—Investment of Ladysmith—The Attitude of the Foreign Press—Home Criticism of the Government—A Lane Defence by Lord Salisbury—A Warning to the Powers—"We Seek Neither Gold Nor Territory"—Sir Redvers Buller at the Cape—Methuen's Victory at Belmont—His Disaster at Magersfontein—General Gatacre at Stormberg—The Moonlight March—Retreat to Molteno—Another Battalion for Pretoria—Lord Roberts's Views on the Disaster—Sir Redvers Buller's Turn—The Colenso Defeat—Loss of Eleven Guns and a Thousand Men—A Stream of Troops for Africa—Lord Roberts accepts the Supreme Command—State of Public Feeling—A Proposed Day of Humiliation 	330
---	-----

CHAPTER VII.

THE TURN OF THE TIDE.

	PAGE
The Peril of Ladysmith—Fierce Boer Attack—"Very Hard Pressed"—A Dramatic Situation—Buller's Army almost Inactive—Sir George White Repulses the Attack Unaided—Disaster to the Suffolks—Buller and Ladysmith—"There will be no Turning Back"—Spion Kop—Buller's Army does Turn Back—"A Masterly Retreat"—Opening of the New Session—The Queen's Speech and the War—Debate on the Address—Lord Kimberley's Criticism of the Government—A feeble Speech by Lord Salisbury—He complains of the Treasury and the Constitution—Lord Lansdowne takes cover behind the "Best Military Advice"—The Debate in the Commons—Mr. Balfour's Excuses for the Government—Lord E. Fitzmaurice's Amendment to the Address—"The Man in the Street"—Paltriness of the Debate—Mr. Wyndham comes out into the Open—A Series of Admissions—One Hundred and Eighty Thousand Men and Four Hundred and Ten Guns against Fifty-One Thousand Boers and a Hundred and Ten Guns—Sir R. Buller's Third Failure to Relieve Ladysmith—The Vaal Krantz Retirement—Military Proposals of the Government—Plans for Home Defence—Sir A. Acland-Hood's Caustic Comment—The Government Attitude towards Conscription—Lord Roberts at Work—Relief of Kimberley—Cronji Caught at Paardeberg—An Armistice Asked for and Refused—A Week's Bombardment—An Unconditional Capitulation—Effect of Paardeberg on the Ladysmith Investment—Sir R. Buller's Advance—Withdrawal of the Besieging Force—Relief of Ladysmith—Lord Roberts's Dash upon Bloemfontein—Boer Concentration at Kroonstadt—Pretended Submission of the Free Staters—Boer Overtures for Peace—"In the Name of the Triune God"—The Boer Despatch—Lord Salisbury's Reply—Boer Appeal for Mediation by the United States—A Polite but Firm Refusal by Lord Salisbury—Promises of Further Support from the Colonies—A Lull in the War—Events Pending a Further Advance—The Queen and the Shamrock—Royal Visit to London—Issue of Correspondence with Germany relating to Contraband—German Brusqueness and Ill-will towards England—Publication of the Spion Kop Despatches—Lord Roberts's Report—The Censure of Sir Charles Warren and Sir Redvers Buller—The War Office and the Despatches—Lord Lansdowne's Proposal—Sir R. Buller declines to Re-write his Report—Criticism of Lord Lansdowne—Lord Portsmouth's Attack—The War Secretary's Reply—Lord Rosebery's Comments—Debate in the Commons—The Red Herring of "Personal Honour"—Mr. Balfour's Speech ...	340

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ARMY AT ITS GOAL.

The Question of Remounts—The Military Position—A Long Wait—The Disaster at Sanna's Post—The Reddersburg Disaster—The Siege of Wepener—A Message to Mafeking—The Boer Commandoes South and East of Bloemfontein—A Relief Column for Mafeking—Advance on Kroonstadt—Retreat of the Boers—Buller Moves North of Ladysmith—Assault on Mafeking—Relief of the Town—Public Rejoicings—Baden-Powell a Popular Hero—An Imperial Tribute—Flight of Mr. Steyn to Heilbron—Boer Retreat to the Vaal River—Evacuation of their Positions—Lord Roberts Crosses the Vaal—A Spring at Germiston—Advance Against Johannesburg—General

	PAGE
Ian Hamilton's Battle—Lord Roberts's Compliment to the City Imperial Volunteers—Boer Retreat from Johannesburg—The Negotiations for Surrender—Lord Roberts's Entry—The Forts and the Guns—The British Army Encamped on the Road North to Pretoria—Continuation of the Advance—A Battle at Six Miles Spruit—Pretoria Almost Surrounded—A Summons to Surrender—The Boers Propose an Armistice—Unconditional Surrender Demanded—Commandant General Botha's Decision—Escape of the Boer Army and the Two Presidents	361

CHAPTER IX.

AFTER PRETORIA.

Was the War Over?—Optimism Dispelled—The British Army Again Stationary—Disposition of the Boer Forces—Mr. Kruger's New "Capital"—The Enemy in the Orange River Colony—The Rise of De Wet—Capture of Imperial Yeomanry at Lindley—Communications Cut near Kroonstad—Capture of a Militia Battalion—Lord Roberts Resumes the Offensive—Northern Natal Cleared by Roberts—Buller's March to Standerton—The Boer Forces Reduced to Two Bodies—The Johannesburg-Standerton Line—Two Aspects of the War—The Question of the Sick and Wounded—Mr. Burdett-Coutts' Charges—Sir William McCormac and Mr. Treves—Their Eloquent Panegyric of the Army Medical Service Corps—The War Office and Mr. Burdett-Coutts—Publication of Correspondence—Lord Roberts's Statement of the Facts—He Suggests a Small Committee—Mr. Balfour Promises an Independent Inquiry—Mr. Wyndham's Reply—Mr. Balfour's Speech—He Makes it a Party Question—The Point at Issue—Responsibility of Lord Roberts <i>versus</i> that of the Government—Mr. Balfour's Charge—The Committee of Inquiry—Men of "Sound Common Sense" desired—The Protection of Witnesses—Mr. Balfour and Mr. Burdett-Coutts—Fall of the Schreiner Ministry—Treatment of the Rebels—Ten Thousand in the Field—How the Loyalists were Served—Views of the Schreiner Ministry—The Clemency Minute—The Prolongation of the War—Mr. Chamberlain's Views—"Justice to Loyalists"—Sir A. Milner's Plain Hint to the Schreiner Ministry—Resignation—A New Ministry under Sir Gordon Sprigg—The Cape Treason Bill—The Natal Rebels—The State of the War—Another Long Wait—The Chase of De Wet—Renewed Activity of the Enemy—The Disaster of Nital's Nek—The British Army Moves—Lord Roberts to the East, Sir R. Buller to the North—Surrender of Prinsloo and Five Thousand Men in the Orange River Colony—Lord Kitchener sent after De Wet—Escape of De Wet—His Commando Broken Up—The Pretoria Plot—Execution of Hans Cordua—A New Proclamation—Annexation of the Transvaal—The Operations against Louis Botha's Force—Flight of Mr. Kruger—An Ignominious Ending—Lord Roberts's Proclamation of September 13th	368
--	-----

BOOK VII.

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATION.

CHAPTER I.

PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE.

	PAGE
The Social Programme at the 1895 General Election—Simultaneity of Important Foreign Affairs—The <i>Inertia</i> of Governments—Sectional Interests in Parliament—The Weakness of Party Allegiance—Composition of the House of Commons—Class and Private Interests Superior to the Public Weal—The Average Member of Parliament—The House of Lords—The Attitude of the Rich—Content of the Well-to-do—The Ministry Controlled by the Character of its Following—Prosperity of the Working Classes since 1895—Strikes on a Rising Market—The Wants of the Workmen—Neglect of the Politician by the Proletariate—Loss of Interest in Social Questions—Need of Amelioration of Social Conditions less Urgent	385

CHAPTER II.

THE FIRST SESSION.

An Indifferent Start—An Unacceptable Education Bill—The Voluntary Schools—A Financial Bill—Provisions of the Bill—The Religious Difficulty—Mr. Asquith Moves the Rejection of the Bill—Attitude of the Church Party—A Hopeless Tangle of Amendments—The Business of the Commons in Confusion—Mr. Balfour's Responsibility for this—A Hotch-Potch Measure—Ministerial Dislike of the Bill—Sir John Gorst's Attitude—Mr. Balfour Throws Over the Vice-Presidency—The Committee of Education—Carlton Club Meeting—Mr. Balfour's Speech—Two Lines Passed in Five Nights—Abandonment of the Bill—Effect of the <i>Fiasco</i> —The Naval Works Act—The Navy Estimates—Mr. Goschen's Statement—Public Satisfaction at the Naval Increases—No Additional Taxation—The Budget Statement—The Agricultural Lands Rating Act—Attacks by the Opposition—Royal Commission on Local Taxation—The Irish Land Act—The Irish Land-owning Peers—Lord Londonderry's Revolt—Employers' Liability Bill Deferred—Minor Measures by the Government—Minor Legislation—Quarrels of the Irish Party—Mr. Justin McCarthy's Resignation	392
--	-----

CHAPTER III.

THE OUTPUT FOR '97, '98, '99.

Points of the Queen's Speech—Voluntary Schools Bill—Necessitous Board Schools— <i>Hansard</i> : A Rubbish Heap—Silence of Sir John Gorst—Workmen's Compensation—Abolition of Common Employment—War Office Reorganisation—Some Justified Criticisms—Military Works Act—Increase of the Army—The Budget—Minor Legislation—The Jubilee Address—Lord Rosebery's Resignation—The Session of 1898—Queen's Speech—Points of Irish Local Government Bill—Mr. Morley's Criticisms—Revolt of Irish Peers—Lord Londonderry Becomes Postmaster-General—Benefices Act—Anti-Ritualist Speeches—Sir Wm. Harcourt's Attack: "Living Lie"—Vaccination Act—Criminal Evidence Act—The Vagrancy Act—The Prisons Act—Inebriates' Act—London University Act—The Budget—Session of 1899—Education Act—London Government—Department of Agriculture for Ireland—Mr. Plunkett's Work—School Attendance Act—Mr. Robson's

CONTENTS.

xix

	PAGE
Success—Raising of School Age—Colonial Loans Act—Minor Legislation of the Year—Working Class Dwellings (Acquisition) Act—The Budget Statement—The Chancellor's Warning—New Taxation—The Autumn or War Session—A Margin of a Million at the Close of the War! ...	402

CHAPTER IV.

THE SESSION OF 1900.

Commonwealth of Australia—Royal Proclamation—The Duke and Duchess of York to Inaugurate the Commonwealth—The Draft Bill in Parliament—The Appeal Clause—The Australian Delegates—Mr. Chamberlain's Speech—The Companies' Acts—A Blow at Fraudulent Promotions—The Money-Lenders' Bill—Housing Legislation, Amendment Act—Agricultural Holdings Act—Workmen's Compensation Act—Minor Acts—The Budget Statement—The Cost of the War—Increase in the Income Tax—Dissolution of Parliament—The Queen's Proclamation ...	417
Summary and Conclusions ...	423

APPENDICES.

The Queen's Speeches, 1895-1900...	431
Turkey and Greece—	
The Peace Treaty...	447
Loan (Indemnity) Convention between United Kingdom, France, Greece and Russia ...	450
Treaty between Great Britain and the United States of Venezuela respecting the Settlement of the Boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela ...	451
The Guiana-Venezuela Boundary—The Arbitrators' Award ...	454
Alaska—The <i>Modus Vivendi</i> ...	455
Convention between Her Majesty and the United States of America supplementary to the Convention of April 19, 1850, relative to the establishment of a communication by ship canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans	456
The Samoa Convention ...	458
China—Leases and other Diplomatic Documents—	
Yangtze Region (Non-Alienation of) ...	459
The Wei-hai-Wei Lease ...	459
Hong Kong Extension (Mirs Bay) ...	460
The Russo-Chinese Agreement ...	461
Russian Declaration as to Talienwan ...	462
The Anglo-Russian Railway and Spheres of Interest Agreement ...	462
The Anglo-Egyptian Soudan Convention ...	463
Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia ...	465
Annexes to Treaty signed at Adis Abbaba on the 14th May, 1897, by His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, and by Mr. James Rennell Rodd ...	466
Convention between the United Kingdom and France for the delimitation of their respective possessions to the west of the Niger, and of their respective possessions and spheres of influence to the east of that river ...	469
Financial Statements, 1895-1900 ...	476
The War in South Africa—	
The Uitlanders' Petition ...	505
The Spion Kop Despatches ...	509
The West Indies Royal Commission—Summary of Conclusions ...	516
Maps.	

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Second Issue. Session 1900.

By H. WHATES.

A Review and Digest of the State Papers, Diplomatic Correspondence, Reports of Royal Commissions, Select Committees, Treaties, Consular Reports, &c.

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The Publishers have still a few copies of the 1899 Edition, which can be obtained at the same price.

THE THIRD SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION.

INTRODUCTION.

THE VICTORY OF 1895.

Mr. Gladstone's Pair—Discipline Relaxed—The Duke of Cambridge—War Office Re-organisation—Mr. Brodrick's Motion—"A Vote of Censure, Petty but Fatal"—Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's Annoyance—The Seals Incident—The New Ministry—Conservative Grumbling—Conclusion of the Session—Dissolution Manifestoes—Home Rule—The House of Lords—Lord Rosebery's Leadership—Divided Radical Councils—The General Election—A Unionist Triumph—The New Parliament.

ON the reassembling of Parliament after the Whitsuntide recess of 1895 Lord Rosebery's friends as well as his foes hurried the Liberal Ministry to their doom. Mr. Gladstone deprived the Government of his vote and moral support by cancelling his pair with Mr. Villiers. Elaborate explanations were offered that this did not imply either criticism or censure. But the only interpretation given to it was that the ex-Prime Minister did not desire further to be associated with the farce of "filling up the cup," or, as the performance was known on the Opposition side of the House, "ploughing the sands of the seashore."

Though Mr. Gladstone may not have intended to help to bring about the downfall of the Ministry, this was the effect of the revocation of his pair. Meanwhile, both within and without the House of Commons, supporters of the Government failed to respond to the crack of the party whip. The Irish members had exhausted a copious vocabulary of passion in opposing the vote for a statue to Oliver Cromwell; and Mr. Morley bore with meekness the humiliation of rescinding the vote on Report of Supply. Reparation

had been made for the "insult" to Irish feeling; but the sense of annoyance remained, and was displayed in the Government lobby on critical divisions. The seat for Inverness-shire, which had been vacated by Dr. Macgregor, who marched out of the House in righteous anger and disgust because Sir William Harcourt's enthusiasm for the Scotch crofters was less fervent than his own, was carried triumphantly by a Conservative. In the contest for West Edinburgh there was a marked falling off in the Home Rule vote. The Government were so uncertain of their majority that they dared not closure the debate on the Welsh Disestablishment Bill. In the last division taken on that measure a downfall was averted by only seven votes. While thus staggering under a succession of blows Mr. Brodrick gave the push which sent the Government down the abyss.

The circumstances were dramatic. When the House went into Committee of Supply on the Army Estimates, on the afternoon of June 21st, Mr. (now Sir Henry) Campbell-Bannerman made the announcement that the Duke of Cambridge would retire from the position of Commander-in-Chief and that the Government would proceed with the re-organisation of the War Office. This important secret had been scrupulously kept. It came upon the House as a pleasant surprise. Though there was no disposition to underrate the abilities of the Duke, or the value of the life-long services he had rendered to the State, it was felt that an opportunity had arrived to carry out a reform too long delayed. No one begrudged the Ministry the chance that had so luckily presented itself of getting to close quarters with work likely to be useful to the country. Except to Mr. Balfour, Mr. Brodrick, and the Opposition whips, the interest excited by the announcement distracted attention from the precarious position of the Government. Everyone was charmed by the mellifluous speech of the Secretary for War, the tact and warmth of his eulogy of the Commander-in-Chief, the roseate prospect of reform in a department that stood low in public estimation. There were no signs of a coming storm. All the portents were in favour of a peaceful night. Thrown off their guard by the friendliness with which the speech had been received the Government Whips released a number of members who would otherwise have garrisoned the Ministerial fort. They went away to dinner, to the drawing rooms of London hostesses, and to the theatre, confident that a quorum of "bores" would discuss technical details

without making any breach in the Government defences, and that non-expert members on the Opposition side would be equally glad to escape the infliction of military oratory. They were deluded by a feeling of false security. The Opposition whips kept a proportionately larger number of men about the House, or within easy reach. But even when Mr. Brodrick had made his complaint of the insufficient supply of cordite for small arms ammunition, and had moved the reduction of Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's salary by £100, there seemed little prospect of anything more serious than an affair of outposts. A sharp debate ensued only when it became clear that the Secretary for War had no effective defence to make and was blissfully content with the facts and figures with which the permanent officials had provided him. The attack upon the Government was developed. It was apparent that Mr. Campbell-Bannerman had a bad case, and, what was far worse, it became a little doubtful what the result might be if the motion were pressed to a division. The Opposition were in no mood to forego their tactical advantage. A division was called. It was seen that the members who went into one lobby were about equal to those who entered the other. When the tellers and whips ranged themselves at the table in front of the Speaker's chair, there was a scene of hesitation and perplexity. The interchange of figures between Mr. Ellis and Mr. Akers Douglas was not plainly heard by the latter, who thought he had been told that the votes against the Government were one hundred and twenty-two. But he took the paper from Mr. Ellis, and the Opposition, believing that this signified a victory for them, broke into an excited cheer; as he handed it back, the cheer was cut short by a still sharper and more triumphant outburst from the Government side. But before that had spent itself, Mr. Ellis had pressed the paper again upon Mr. Akers Douglas. Both sides were silent with amazement. Then Mr. Akers Douglas read out the figures—one hundred and thirty-two for the reduction of the salary, and one hundred and twenty-five against: a majority of seven against the Government. The Ministerialists were dumb with vexation; the Opposition gave unrestrained expression to their delight. For two or three minutes the House was in a state of unwonted excitement.

As Lord Rosebery afterwards said, it was "a vote of censure, petty, but fatal." Mr. Campbell-Bannerman did not exhibit the philosophic indifference of a hardened politician. He regarded the vote as a personal affront, as an impeachment of his honour

and veracity. He was deeply annoyed and imprudently allowed his irritation to become known. His supporters went further. They declared that "a dirty trick" had been played; that an informal arrangement binding in honour—according to the unwritten etiquette of party life in the House—had been entered into behind the Chair by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, to the effect that the items of the Army Estimates would not that evening be challenged seriously. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's attitude on the subject gave colour to that suggestion. The public, with robust disregard for the niceties of party warfare, and, in the main, exultant at the downfall of the Ministry, laughed at Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's discomfiture and at the accusation of his friends. The Opposition press was brutally unsympathetic and treated the sensitiveness of the Secretary for War with ribald scorn. The country clamoured for an immediate Dissolution. Some members of the Ministry saw no reason why they should resign, while "the cup" was yet unfilled, because of a snatch vote, obtained by what they preferred to think was rather sharp practice. But Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, smarting under a feeling that a personal indignity had been put upon him by the reduction of his salary, was obdurate. Whatever others might do he was determined to give up his portfolio. As the Cabinet would have fallen to pieces without him resignation was the only course for all. Meetings were held the same night. On the following day Lord Rosebery went to Windsor, and the Queen accepted the resignation of the Government.

Her Majesty sent for Lord Salisbury, who, in the meantime, had had consultations with the Duke of Devonshire and Mr. Chamberlain; but at the audience with the Sovereign, on Monday the twenty-fourth, he appears to have expressed only a conditional readiness to accept office, being desirous of obtaining an assurance from Lord Rosebery that the Liberal majority in the Commons would co-operate in completing the urgent business of the Session, and make ready the way for an early dissolution. Subsequent events showed that these assurances were accorded. On the evening of the twenty-fourth, Lord Rosebery in the Lords, and Sir William Harcourt in the Commons, announced that the Government held office only until the appointment of a new set of Ministers. Mr. Balfour criticised them for not having advised Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament. He complained that it was not in accordance with constitutional practice for an outgoing Government to impose the burden of office upon

Ministers who would not have a majority in the Commons. But from the situation created by resignation instead of dissolution there was no escape, and Lord Salisbury went again to Windsor and received the Royal command to form a Government. The amateur Cabinet makers thereupon busied themselves with the appointments. They advised Lord Salisbury to confine himself to the duties of Prime Minister, to give the Duke of Devonshire the post of Foreign Minister, and to inter Mr. Chamberlain in the War Office, where his somewhat inconvenient energies would be absorbed in overcoming official obstruction to reform. Had Mr. Chamberlain become War Minister the course of history might have been changed. With a man of less aggressive temper at the Colonial Office the fire that smouldered in South Africa would have been damped down. Even had it burst into flame the likelihood is that the War Office would have been administered by Mr. Chamberlain with such energy and resource that the conflagration would have been extinguished without serious difficulty. But events must not be anticipated. Lord Salisbury did not follow the course marked out for him. He reserved the seals of the Foreign Office for himself; the Duke of Devonshire became President of the Council, Mr. A. J. Balfour First Lord of the Treasury, Sir Michael Hicks Beach Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. G. J. Goschen First Lord of the Admiralty, and Mr. Chamberlain Secretary for the Colonies. The last appointment surprised the public. No one knew that Mr. Chamberlain had taken any special interest in colonial affairs, or had any particular capacity for the control of them; still less did anyone appreciate the opportunities the office gave to a man of Mr. Chamberlain's ability and ambition, or foresee that he could make such use of them as to become as important a member of the Cabinet as Lord Salisbury himself.

Pending the re-election of those members of the Commons who had taken office, the public were diverted by a further display of pique by the outgoing party. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman had another grievance besides that relating to the stock of cordite. Lord Salisbury had sent his private secretary, Mr. Schomberg McDonnell, to inquire when it would be convenient to hand over the Seals of the War Office. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman took offence at the suggestion that direct transference of the Seals might be made. He would deliver them to none but the Sovereign, from whose hands they had been received. There the matter should have ended; but Lord Rosebery complained

that a slight had been put upon the ex-Minister for War. Lord Salisbury made light of the incident and assured Lord Rosebery that he had discovered a mare's nest. He had merely made a courteous request through his secretary for the Seals to be handed over, in order that there should be no avoidable interregnum at the War Office and to save Mr. Campbell-Bannerman an unnecessary journey to Windsor. It had been the practice to hand over the Seals of office in the way suggested by Mr. McDonnell, and he had not the slightest intention of being discourteous to Mr. Campbell-Bannerman. Lord Kimberley thereupon improved upon Lord Rosebery's protest by the use of a phrase discourteous to private secretaries. He charged Lord Salisbury with having sent Mr. McDonnell to ask for the Seals "very much as he might have sent his footman"—a view of the case which showed how deeply the feelings of Mr. Campbell-Bannerman had been wounded. In vain did Lord Salisbury represent the matter as trivial. An expression of extreme regret, if it were thought that rudeness to Mr. Campbell-Bannerman had been meant, drew from Lord Rosebery the sarcasm that it was not a good augury that the new Government should have to begin with an apology. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman added to the fuss by writing a letter, describing what had occurred at the interview with Mr. McDonnell; but the attempt to exploit the incident for electioneering purposes was unsuccessful. The public were amused, and refused to believe that Lord Salisbury had meant any affront, or that any had, in fact, been given. It seemed the fate of the outgoing party to attract ridicule to themselves. Lord Rosebery's honours' list excited almost as much laughter as indignation. Four new Peers were created, notwithstanding the threats to demolish the House of Lords; and of the four, only one—Sir Henry Loch—had earned the distinction. The possession of wealth, and liberality in the disposal of it for party purposes, were the sole merits of two of the new Peers. These creations were received by the country with derision; but anger was reserved for a baronetcy conferred upon a wealthy politician, since dead, who was rewarded for apostacy alone, and was held in no greater favour in the party he had joined than in that which he had deserted.

Meanwhile the Prime Minister had completed his Cabinet, which consisted of the unprecedented number of nineteen. The new Ministry—the third formed by Lord Salisbury—was as follows:—

Office and Salary.	Lord Salisbury's Third Administration (formed June 29th, 1895).
Prime Minister	*Marquis of Salisbury.
First Lord of the Treasury, £5,000	*Mr. Balfour.
Lord Chancellor, £10,000	*Lord Halsbury.
Lord President of the Council, £2,000	*Duke of Devonshire.
Lord Privy Seal, £2,000	*Viscount Cross.†
Chancellor of the Exchequer, £5,000	*Sir M. Hicks Beach.
Home Secretary, £5,000	*Sir M. White Ridley.
Foreign Secretary, £5,000	*Marquis of Salisbury.
Colonial Secretary, £5,000	*Mr. Chamberlain.
Secretary for War, £5,000	*Marquis of Lansdowne.
Secretary for India, £5,000	*Lord George Hamilton.
First Lord of the Admiralty, £4,500	*Mr. Goschen.
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, £20,000	*Earl Cadogan.
Lord Chancellor of Ireland, £8,000	*Lord Ashbourne.
Chief Secretary for Ireland, £4,425	Mr. Gerald Balfour.
Secretary for Scotland, £2,000	*Lord Balfour of Burleigh.
Chancellor of the Duchy, £2,000	*Lord James of Hereford.
President of Board of Trade, £2,000	*Mr. Ritchie.
President of Local Government Board, £2,000	*Mr. Chaplin.
President of Board of Agriculture, £2,000	*Mr. Walter Long.
Postmaster-General, £2,500	Duke of Norfolk.
Vice-President of the Council (Education) £2,000	Sir J. E. Gorst.
First Commissioner of Works, £2,000	*Mr. Akers-Douglas.
Junior Lords of Treasury, £1,000 each	{ Mr. Anstruther. Mr. Hayes Fisher. Lord Stanley.
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, £2,000	Mr. Hanbury.
Patronage Secretary to the Treasury, £2,000	Sir W. Walrond.
Paymaster-General (unpaid)	Earl of Hopetoun.
Judge-Advocate-General	Sir F. Jeune.
Naval Lords of the Admiralty	{ Adm. Sir F. W. Richards, G.C.B. Rear Adm. Sir F. G. D. Bedford, K.C.B. Rear Adm. Sir J. A. Fisher, K.C.B. Capt. Gerard H. U. Noel.
Civil Lord of the Admiralty, £1,000	Mr. Austen Chamberlain.
Secretary to the Admiralty, £2,000	Mr. W. E. Macartney.
Under-Secretary Home, £1,500	Mr. Jesse Collings.
Under-Secretary Foreign, £1,500	Mr. Curzon.

NOTE.—The names of Cabinet Ministers are indicated by an asterisk (*).

† Lord Cross received no salary as Lord Privy Seal, but continued to draw his Civil List Pension.

Office and Salary.	Lord Salisbury's Third Administration (formed June 29th, 1895).
Under-Secretary Colonial, £1,500 . . .	Earl of Selborne.
Under-Secretary for War, £1,500 . . .	Mr. St. John Brodrick.
Under-Secretary for India, £1,500 . . .	Earl of Onslow.
Secretary to the Board of Trade, £1,200	Earl of Dudley.
Secretary to Local Government Board, £1,200	Mr. T. W. Russell.
Financial Secretary to War Office, £1,500	Mr. Powell Williams.
Attorney-General, £7,000 . . .	Sir Richard Webster.
Solicitor-General, £6,000 . . .	Sir R. B. Finlay.
Lord Advocate, £3,237 10s. . . .	Sir C. Pearson.
Solicitor-General for Scotland, £955 . .	Mr. Graham Murray.
Attorney-General for Ireland, £5,000 . .	Mr. Atkinson.
Solicitor-General for Ireland, £2,000 . .	Mr. W. Kenny.

The Household appointments were distributed as follows:—

Lord Steward, £2,000	Earl of Pembroke.
Lord Chamberlain, £2,000	Earl of Lathom.
Master of the Horse, £2,500	Duke of Portland.
Master of the Buckhounds, £1,500 . . .	Earl of Coventry.
Treasurer of the Household, £904 . . .	Marquis of Carmarthen.
Comptroller of the Household, £904 . . .	Lord Arthur Hill.
Vice-Chamberlain, £900	Mr. Ailwyn Fellowes.
	{ Earl Waldegrave.
	{ Earl of Ranfurly.
	{ Lord Churchill.
Lords-in-Waiting, £702 each	{ Lord Harris.
	{ Lord Henniker.
	{ Lord Lawrence.
	{ Earl of Clarendon
Captain of the Yeomen of the Guard, £1,200	Earl of Limerick.
Captain of the Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, £1,200	Lord Belper.
Mistress of the Robes, £500	Duchess of Buccleuch.

Among the rank and file of the Conservatives there was audible grumbling at the number and importance of the offices that had fallen to Liberal Unionists. It was felt that Mr. Chamberlain had driven too hard a bargain with Lord Salisbury, that the Prime Minister had too easily yielded to importunity. Among the Radicals it was confidently predicted that the coalition would soon break down. It was asserted that there was an inherent incompatibility of temperament between the aristocratic and democratic elements in the Ministry, which would sooner or later lead to disruption. The country was sagely reminded that "England does

not love coalitions," and in that phrase the defeated party found much comfort. But in the inner circles of Unionism there was an absence of jealousy, and an assured confidence that, notwithstanding differences upon minor matters of domestic policy, an extreme social reformer like Mr. Chamberlain would work smoothly with men of a more cautious and less sanguine mind. Both sections had, in fact, come to a working agreement as to the distribution of the spoils of office, long before the defeat of the Rosebery Government. They had agreed upon their course of action, and were as little affected by the mutterings of the old Tories, who could not forget that Mr. Chamberlain had been likened by Lord Salisbury to Jack Cade, as they were by the prophecies of political opponents that a team so oddly assorted was certain to overturn the coach of State into the ditch. The alliance was based upon a frank recognition of the necessity of the one set of men to the other, and of the different tendencies which each represented. The principle that united them was that of the integrity of the Empire and the supremacy of Parliament. Outside this fundamental issue there was nothing in the political aims of Conservatives which excluded the co-operation of Liberal Unionists; and nothing in those of the Unionists that made the assistance of the Conservatives impracticable. Both wings of the party had learned in opposition to act together, and—at least so far as the more prominent and influential members were concerned—thoroughly to trust each other.

Their relations had reached this stable and well defined stage before the cordite vote. It was announced to the public, in clear terms, by the Duke of Devonshire, at a banquet given on June 14th to him and Mr. Chamberlain by the National Union of Conservative Associations. The responsibilities and duties of power would, he said, be shared between the two sections of the Unionist party; whether there would be alliance, fusion, coalition, was a verbal nicety unimportant in relation to the fact it represented. Mr. Chamberlain also sharpened the point of the Duke's observations. Had the Gladstonians accepted the verdict of the constituencies in 1886, and abandoned Home Rule, the Liberal Unionists would have rejoined them, for on many questions they were nearer the party they had left than that which they joined; but action in defiance of that verdict had resulted in an offensive and defensive alliance between Liberals and Conservatives. He denied that there had been any friction with the Conservatives. On no single occasion, whether

under the leadership of the late Mr. W. H. Smith, or "the brilliant leadership of my friend, Mr. Arthur Balfour," had there been "any difference whatsoever as to the policy to be pursued or the Parliamentary procedure to be adopted." The new Ministry was formed on the foundation of mutual friendship and loyalty.

Parties changed sides in the House of Commons on July 1st. The policy of the Government, at the moment, was immediate Dissolution. With this object the imperative business of the Session was concluded, or, in the horrible jargon of the House of Commons, "wound up." Parliament was prorogued on July 9th. A successful effort was made to save the Factories Bill—an effort in practical social legislation on which there were no vital differences of opinion. It was certainly in the interests of the Unionists to pass the Bill, if for no higher motive than that of demonstrating to the working class electorate that they were as sincere as their opponents in the desire for legislation in further protection of the industrial classes. Apart from this, the only interest in the proceedings is to be found in electioneering speeches made in the House of Lords. The Duke of Argyll, on the second reading of the Factories Bill, denied Lord Rosebery's accusation that the Upper Chamber rejected legislation passed by the Liberal party. Though not a Conservative himself, he testified to the fact that working class legislation had been mainly due to the Conservatives; and he stoutly maintained that the House of Lords had always given favourable consideration to Bills which aimed at social improvement. Lord Rosebery had, on the previous night, delivered a speech which amounted to a party manifesto. He asked for a majority to deal with the domination of the House of Lords—a domination which relegated the Liberal party to impotence in the councils of the nation. Did they want Irish Home Rule? They would never get it through the House of Lords as then constituted. And the same might be said of all the other great Liberal measures—"they can only pass the portals of the Constitution and become law over the body of the House of Lords. . . . But if you carry the annihilation of the House of Lords, as regards its legislative preponderance, which keeps our party in manacles, you will have gone, not half, but three-quarters the way to carrying your other reforms." It was this speech, and others like it, that the Duke of Argyll had in mind. Lord Salisbury answered Lord Rosebery in the Lords on the last day of the Session. It was flagrantly absurd to ascribe "legislative

preponderance" to a House which had no part either in framing the votes by which Governments were displaced, or in providing supplies. He invited Lord Rosebery to define what he meant by the phrase and to show how the Lords kept the Liberal party in "manacles." The real crime of the House of Lords, he said, was that they had thrown out Home Rule. Having made it clear that the Lords were unrepentant, he commented upon the list of revolutionary changes with which the Radical party had threatened the country—changes which would embitter class against class, perpetuate disastrous conflicts verging upon civil war, and arrest social progress. From this point his speech was an outline of the programme the new Government would submit to the electors. Their energies would be directed to a solution of the problems connected with agriculture, the overcrowding of large towns, the distress entailed upon the masses by the vicissitudes of trade. The stability of the Constitution might be increased by giving facilities to the people to become the freeholders of their own dwellings. The new Government would avoid all ambitious programmes and subversive projects, and would apply their energies to alleviate the miseries of the poor. The policy thus foreshadowed was that of maintaining the constitutional status of the House of Lords and the integrity of the United Kingdom, of resistance to Home Rule and other subversive schemes with which the fortunes of the Gladstonian party were allied, and of development on the lines of constructive social legislation. This speech was the only manifesto to the country. Lord Rosebery remarked that the hand that framed it was that of Mr. Chamberlain. While promising support to any acceptable projects for raising the social life of the people, he said the Liberal party would not abandon "the long vista of revolutionary changes," as Lord Salisbury had described their programme; it was the essential policy of the party to overcome the hereditary and insurmountable obstacles presented to Liberal legislation by the House of Lords. As to Lord Salisbury's challenge to define what was meant by "legislative preponderance," it meant that there were five hundred peers fixed in the House in order to arrest Liberal legislation. "Lord Salisbury had a fixed band of followers there, through whom he could always exercise his veto, and that fact amounted to legislative preponderance."

Thus far the issue on which the General Election would be fought seemed to be clear. The Liberals were to go to the country on the cry of "Down with the Lords," or, as Lord Rosebery put it—

and there is an important qualification in his clumsy euphemism—"the annihilation of the House of Lords as regards its legislative preponderance." But other leaders entered the arena, each with a different cry. The right of Lord Rosebery to give the party a key note and a policy was directly challenged by Sir William Harcourt and Mr. Morley, as well as by lesser lights of the Radical groups. His advice to avoid a many-headed programme, such as would confuse the electors, and to concentrate attention upon a single clear issue, was flagrantly disregarded. Sir William Harcourt was enamoured of Local Veto. His heart was set upon the principle of the Bill he had introduced to the House in April. The defeat of the Government had been the death of his legislative offspring. He ignored the fact that very few, even of those on his own side of the House, shared his enthusiasm for the measure, or thought the principle of local control would make a good electioneering cry. Addressing his constituents at Derby, he described it as the most urgent of all reforms. Speaking as though he were the real leader of the Liberal party, and Lord Rosebery's attacks on the Upper House, with the implied direction in them as to the line of controversy to be pursued in the constituencies, were of secondary importance, he asked for a mandate on Local Veto. But, apparently for the sake of formal agreement with his chief, he admitted that this and other items of the Newcastle programme could not be carried until the House of Lords was dealt with. To Mr. Morley the question of Home Rule was of paramount importance. He went back to the pledges of 1892, and declared that Home Rule must still lead off the programme. To Lord Rosebery the House of Lords was "the permanent and primary question"; to Sir William Harcourt, Local Veto; and to the ex-Chief Secretary for Ireland, Home Rule. The inharmonious trio was taken up by Liberals throughout the country, with the result that there was a discordant babel of voices which told the astute of the coming discomfiture of the Radical party at the polls.

This spectacle of divided leadership and consequent confusion among the rank and file gave new encouragement to the supporters of the Government. No formal manifesto was issued to the electorate; but the speeches of prominent members of the party showed a complete unity of purpose. Mr. Chamberlain, at a great meeting in London, agreed with Mr. Morley that the issue to be fought was that of Home Rule. He gave this subject the first

place and invited the country to decide between Separatists and Unionists. The old names of Liberal and Tory had, he declared, lost their meaning and were no longer applicable. The country had to choose between Home Rulers and those who were not Home Rulers; and what Home Rule meant as affecting the security and interests of the Empire he showed by a merciless analysis of the Irish proposals of the late Government. Having demonstrated that the policy of the new Administration was that of an inflexible opposition to Home Rule, he denounced the late Government as a sham and an imposition, described the attack on the House of Lords as a mere party move, and subjected the Local Veto Bill to vigorous destructive criticism. As for the constructive policy of the Ministry, he mentioned four domestic questions—the completion of the system of local government of London by enlarging the powers of the parochial authorities; the housing of the working classes; the question of employers' liability; and provision for the aged. The Liberal Unionists followed Mr. Chamberlain's lead and enlarged upon the beneficial work that could be done in social legislation; the bulk of the Conservatives followed Mr. Balfour in confining themselves to a single issue—"Were the electors for Lord Rosebery and the Home Rulers, or for Lord Salisbury and the Unionists?" In the heat of the campaign, promises that were somewhat too lavish were made by Mr. Chamberlain's henchmen and by Conservatives who called themselves Tory Democrats; but the Radicals, realising the desperate nature of their position, made still more flagrant bids for popular support. Cool observers foresaw the result of the conflict in the fact that no fewer than one hundred and twenty-four seats, in England, Scotland and Wales, were uncontested by the Liberals, and in the difficulty the party had experienced of getting men of means and of standing to fight for them even in constituencies where the chance of victory was good. Neither Conservatives nor Liberal Unionists, however, believed that a crushing defeat would be inflicted. Each wing of the Unionist party preserved its separate electioneering organisation; and though the chief of each staff was reasonably confident of a Unionist majority a sweeping revulsion of feeling such as occurred throughout the country was scarcely expected.

The first series of engagements was fought in twenty-one borough constituencies, on Saturday, July 13th—a day which the Radicals thought peculiarly advantageous for themselves, their

theory, which was frankly avowed, being that the half holiday would give them a fuller working-class vote than it was possible to obtain on an ordinary week day. The advantage, if any, was reaped by their opponents, for the Unionists won seven seats. And there was a special significance in some of the victories. Sir William Harcourt was ejected from Derby, for which he had sat for fifteen years; and with him went Sir Thomas Roe, who had been sent to Westminster by the borough in 1883. So decisive a condemnation of Local Veto, as well as of Home Rule, resounded throughout the country. The London elections, and those of the provincial boroughs, were also full of surprises. Mr. John Morley, the one ex-Minister whose convictions on the subject of Home Rule were not open to suspicion, was rejected by the electors of Newcastle-on-Tyne. The blow to Home Rule was as great as was that to Local Veto in Derby. Other ex-Ministers were also thrown out of seats which seemed to be secure. Mr. Arnold Morley, Sir John Hibbert and Mr. Shaw-Lefevre shared the fate of more distinguished colleagues. In London and in Wales there was a Radical overthrow on an unexpected scale; and in Scotland the tide of Unionist success flowed with a strength that converted a Radical defeat into a rout. In Ireland there was no change that indicated any falling off in the popular demand for Home Rule; and the chief features of the election were the large number of uncontested seats, the capture of three anti-Parnellite seats by the Parnellites, and the return of John Daly, then a Fenian convict, for Limerick—an election summarily declared to be void as soon as the new Parliament met. The result of the conflict was that of the six hundred and seventy members of the Commons, three hundred and forty were Conservatives, seventy-one Liberal Unionists, one hundred and seventy-seven Radicals or Home Rule Liberals, seventy anti-Parnellites, and twelve Parnellites. The Unionist party in the House of Commons thus consisted of four hundred and eleven members, and the three sections of the Home Rule party of two hundred and fifty-nine—a Unionist majority of one hundred and fifty-two.

So splendid a triumph had not been known since 1832, when, as the first result of the Reform Bill, the Liberals were returned to power with a majority of three hundred and seventy. A victory so complete had not been looked for even by sanguine Conservatives. Such is the pettiness of political human nature,

that mutinous complaints were again made that the Liberal Unionists should have received so generous a share of the spoils of office. Those who pointed to the fact that even without the Liberal Unionist vote the Conservatives had a good working majority of seventy-one, chose to ignore or forget that, but for the fidelity of the Liberal Unionist allies since 1886, and the magnificent work they had done in the constituencies, not alone by their eloquence but by their self-sacrifice in not contesting seats against their Tory friends, the General Election would not have had so signal a result. The grumblers, who for the most part vented their displeasure in anonymous letters to the newspapers, were, however, soon silenced. The distribution of offices had been made. There was no going back upon accomplished facts. The country was of opinion that Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues had earned the posts that had been allotted to them. Sensible people were content to disregard the mutterings of the meaner sort of partisan. They were only too glad to know that at length the country had succeeded in giving birth to a powerful Government; that, for several years at least, Home Rule was placed upon the shelf; and that an opportunity had been created for dealing with those social issues which Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain had set in the forefront of the common programme. These were the all-important matters pressed upon the attention of the electorate. It is singular that so little should have been said on matters of foreign policy, even on the Armenian question. The constituencies were fed with generalities rather than definite statements. They asked for nothing better, putting an implicit faith in the sagacity and experience of Lord Salisbury. By the irony of events Foreign affairs and Colonial questions in which other Powers were more or less interested proved to be those which engrossed the attention of the new Government, to the partial exclusion of social questions on which so much stress was laid in the speeches of Unionist leaders and the addresses of candidates. But it was not foreseen that this would be the case. Even the few who discerned the gathering of clouds abroad took comfort in the thought that with so large a majority at Lord Salisbury's call the interests and the honour of the Empire would be upheld whatever international complications might arise.

The character as well as the number of the majority contributed to this feeling of security. Numerical superiority was not the only

advantage enjoyed by the Unionists. Apart from voting power they were richer in ability than their opponents. The standard of social position and achievement was higher. The party contained the best men and the best minds the country could produce—or the best from among those who devote themselves to public affairs. The proportion of men of distinction other than that of birth and inherited position was unusually high; that of cranks, faddists and bores remarkably low. The representative and working value of a member of the House of Commons is measured by the possession of one of two qualities, or by a nice combination of both: if without a large material stake in the country a man must needs have conspicuous intellectual ability, or special knowledge; if blessed—or cursed—with great wealth and responsibilities, and no exceptional natural endowment or expert knowledge he must have good sense. Judged by this standard, the Unionists were the superior of the Liberals in those elements which make a powerful party and are independent of mere numbers. It would be invidious to give names; but a comparison of the life histories of an equal number of Unionists and Liberals in the new Parliament suggests that the moral force attaching to the votes of the former was greater than that which belonged to the latter. It is true that the General Election had swept away a number of Radical charlatans, whose presence in the Parliament of 1892-95 was explicable only on the theory that some of the constituencies had played practical jokes upon the country. But men of position and character had also met with defeat. Able men in the rank and file, as well as fussy nobodies who had gained notoriety either by their garrulity or the extravagance of their opinions, had been rejected by the country. Those who did get in were, in the main, respectable mediocrities. To study the list of names is to be impressed by the absence of conspicuous talent. It is not disrespectful to Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and Sir Henry Fowler to say that the only men of ripe distinction available for the work of the party in the Commons were Sir William Harcourt and Mr. Morley; and these, as has been said, had sustained humiliating defeat. A constituency was found for Sir William Harcourt, amid circumstances not flattering to his pride, for he had to cross the "Celtic fringe" to reach the House of Commons; and later on Mr. Morley was able to rejoin his colleagues. Except for these two, the Radicals were singularly destitute of able men. The election had broken the party to pieces. When

ERRATUM.

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read “Ministry.”

Parliament re-assembled, on August 12th, the overwhelming preponderance of the Unionists was not more remarkable than the absence of an effective Opposition, and of Radicals who, by their ability and debating power, made up for the disparity of numbers.

The fact was not a good omen for the success of the new Administration. It gave the majority an overweening self-confidence and imbued the minority with a feeling of depression fatal to the effective discharge of the functions of political criticism. It meant the concentration of power in the hands of the Ministry. With so large a majority the Cabinet could afford to disregard not only the attacks of the Opposition but also any dissatisfaction their management of affairs might excite among any section of their own supporters. While there was no danger of punishment for error by an adverse vote there was less necessity for vigilance in the avoidance of mistakes. Electoral circumstances had unfortunately deprived the minority of the tonic effect of vigilant criticism whether from their opponents or from men of independent spirit on their own side of the House.

BOOK I.

ENGLAND AND THE ARMENIANS.

CHAPTER I.

THE CRIMES OF ABDUL HAMID.

Lord Salisbury and the Sultan—A Solemn Warning—Abdul Hamid's Appeal—Preceding Massacres—The Sassoon District—The Number of the Slain—Lord Kimberley's Protest—The Sultan's Defence—An Argument from Europe—The Commission of Inquiry—Lord Kimberley creates the Concert—Conclusions after the Inquiry—A Scheme of Reforms—The Right of Interference by England—Russia hesitates—Lord Kimberley proposes Coercion—Prince Lobanoff takes Fright—The Concert inoperative—A Forty-eight Hours' Ultimatum—The Fall of the English Ministry.

WHEN the new Parliament assembled in the second week in August the Armenian question filled the public mind in England and throughout the civilised world. The crimes of Abdul Hamid and his subordinates had sent a thrill of horror wherever the story of them had penetrated. Notwithstanding the cold-hearted cynicism of a few publicists, who sought to persuade the people to regard the slaughter of the Armenians with indifference and did not scruple to garble the facts to suit the line of controversy which they thought it politic for England to pursue, a wave of indignation against the Sultan swept over the country. The question was outside the region of party strife. Lord Salisbury accepted the policy of his predecessors, which was defined in a passage in the Queen's Speech on August 15th, insisting upon the necessity of reform in the administration of the Asiatic provinces of Turkey. This had been urged upon the Porte with courage and persistence by Sir Philip (now Lord) Currie, our Ambassador at Constantinople: and Lord Kimberley, Foreign Minister in the Rosebery Government, had supported his representations and protests in firm language. Indeed, a rumour, which was neither proved nor denied, was current that on the very day on which the cordite vote was taken,

the Rosebery Cabinet had decided upon sending an ultimatum to the Sultan. Whether this was true or not, it is certain that Lord Salisbury took over the subject at a most critical stage. The point at issue was that of obtaining adequate guarantees from the Sultan against the recurrence of atrocities inconceivable to those who had not marked the previous history of the Turks in their treatment of non-Mohammedan peoples.

Lord Salisbury, in his speech in the House of Lords on the Address, regretted that the Government had not received the necessary guarantees of reform, and addressed a solemn warning to the Sultan. He confessed that it appeared more doubtful to him than it did twenty years before how long the then state of things would go on. "If, generation after generation," he continued, "cries of misery come up from various parts of the Turkish Empire, I am sure the Sultan cannot blind himself to the probability that Europe will at some time or other become weary of the appeals that are made to it, and the factitious strength that is given to his Empire will fail it. . . . The Sultan will make a grave and calamitous mistake if, for the sake of maintaining a mere formal independence, for the sake of resisting a possible encroachment on his nominal prerogative, he refuses to accept the assistance and to listen to the advice of the European Powers in extirpating from his dominions an anarchy and a weakness from which no treaties and no sympathy will prevent from being fatal in the long run to the Empire over which he rules." At the Guildhall Banquet, on November 9th, he recurred to the matter in language in which there was less menace, much caution, and not a little pessimism. The guarantees were still to seek. He had proposed that the Mohammedan machinery of administration should be supervised by a Mixed Commission provided by the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia. What the three ambassadors had demanded was that a proportional number of Christians should be employed in the administration of provinces inhabited by large numbers of Armenians. This demand had been substantially accepted. But the substitution of Christian for Moslem officers by the Powers was exceedingly dangerous, lest the Powers appeared in those regions as the partisans of one religion rather than another. The Queen was the Mistress of more Mohammedans than the Sultan; he would have preferred the negotiations to have been divested of an appearance of partiality to our Mussulman fellow subjects, who were among the most loyal and orderly in the Queen's dominions. But

the form of the reforms was largely immaterial. If the Sultan did did not heartily resolve to give justice to the Armenians, the most ingenious constitution that could be devised would not avail to protect them. The measure of the influence of the Powers of Europe was that of the effect they could produce upon the mind of Abdül Hamid. So long as the Ottoman Empire stood upright, it was only through the Sultan that real and permanent reforms could be accomplished for any portion of his people. Suppose the Sultan would not be persuaded? The question led him into a train of pessimistic reflections. He was bound to say that the news from Constantinople did not give the Government much cheerfulness. "Above all treaties and all combinations of external powers, 'the nature of things,' if you please, or 'the providence of God,' if you please to put it so, has determined that persistent and constant misgovernment must lead the Government which follows it to its doom; and while I readily admit that it is quite possible for the Sultan of Turkey, if he will, to govern all his subjects in justice and in peace, he is not exempt more than any other potentate from the law that injustice will bring the highest on earth to ruin." Beyond the action of this law there was the authority of the Great Powers. "Turkey is in the remarkable condition that it has now stood for half a century mainly because the Great Powers have resolved that for the peace of Christendom it is necessary that the Ottoman Empire should stand. They came to that conclusion nearly half a century ago. I do not think they have altered it now. The danger, if the Ottoman Empire fell, would not merely be the danger that would threaten the territories of which that Empire consists; it would be the danger that the fire there lit should spread to other nations, and should involve all that is most powerful and civilised in Europe in a dangerous and calamitous contest." Two illusions he set himself to dispel. One was that some one Power would try to settle the matter in its own way. He saw no prospect of such an issue. The other was that those who advised the Sultan, to his hurt, should imagine that no abuse "could ever receive the natural punishment which, in the ordinary course of the world's affairs, attended upon gross mismanagement." The Sultan's honour was wounded by this speech. Addressing a meeting at Brighton, ten days later, Lord Salisbury wished to "say a word in answer to a very distinguished and distant correspondent, if I may term him so, who has requested me to make a statement in a speech in this country." The Sultan had

written to him to say he had been pained at his want of confidence that the proposed reforms would not be executed. He was anxious to execute them quickly. "I have already repeatedly told my Ministers so. The only reason why Lord Salisbury should thus throw doubt on my good intentions must be the intrigues of certain persons here, or else that false statements have been made the cause of such opinion. I repeat, I will execute the reforms. I will take the paper containing them, place it before me, and see that every article is put in force. This is my earnest determination, as to which I give my word of honour. I wish Lord Salisbury to know this; and I beg and desire his lordship, having confidence in these declarations, will make another speech by virtue of that friendly feeling and disposition he has for me and for my country. I shall await the result of this message with the greatest anxiety." Lord Salisbury laconically added that as Great Britain formed part of the Concert of Europe it would not be seemly to comment upon the Sultan's words. "Whatever was done must be done with unanimity."

This was the position shortly after the Government took office. It will be desirable to give a narrative of preceding events. The first series of massacres occurred in the summer of 1894, in the Sasoon district, which is included in the Sandjaks of Mush and Ghendj, in the Vilayet of Bitlis. The town of Mush lies at the edge of a plain at the foot of a chain of mountains, joined by a series of heights and ravines to the great range of the Antok-Dagh. In these valleys and ravines nestled the Armenian villages of Kavar, Shalak and Talori, and the villages of Shatak, Ghehéguzan, and several others. In all there were approximately five hundred houses and an Armenian population of five thousand souls. Higher up in the mountains were the villages of the Kurds, who levied irregular tribute upon the Armenians. Hostility, traced to obscure religious causes, developed itself early in the nineties. Which side began the quarrel is not established, but in 1893 an Armenian agitator, named Damadian, incited his fellows to resist payment of tribute to the Kurds. The result was seen in an attack upon the Kurdish tribes in the neighbourhood of the Talori village, in that part of the range facing the plain near the mountains of Mush. Another agitator, Murad, carried the propaganda further. His object was political—that of inciting disturbances between Kurds and Armenians; but by whom he was instigated does not appear. With a small armed band he roamed about the

country committing excesses. Reprisals followed. The Kurds assembled in force, and seem to have attacked the Armenian villages indiscriminately. Regular Turkish troops were sent into the region. These at times remained passive while the Kurds inflicted punishment on the Armenians, and at others joined the Kurds. A column of infantry, with a detachment of dragoons and two mountain guns, and thirty Zaptiehs, was moved from Mush, in August, to reinforce the troops in the mountains. The Armenians had fled into the great range of the Antok-Dagh. Their retreat was cut off by the Kurds and they fell an easy prey to the Turkish soldiery. Entire villages were burned and terrible slaughter occurred. It suited the Turkish authorities to regard the Armenians as in open revolt against the Government. Even if that were so, and the evidence does not establish either the will or the possession of means to revolt, the measures taken by the soldiers and their allies the Kurds, were totally unjustifiable. Men, women and children were slaughtered indiscriminately. Rape, the ripping up of pregnant women, the tearing of children limb by limb, the burning of people too feeble to leave their houses, were common incidents of the days of massacre, which numbered about twenty-three.

The conduct of the Turkish authorities was abominable, that of the troops fiendish. The Kurds were given to understand that they could wreak their will upon the Armenians. When it was proved that the latter could hold their own against their traditional enemies, the troops entered the Passes ostensibly for the purpose of protection and occupied some of the villages. What happened was, no doubt, grossly exaggerated. It was stated that in the night they rose and slaughtered all the inhabitants, without regard to age or sex. At Ghehéguzan, it was said, the young men were bound hand and foot, placed in a row, covered with brushwood, and burned alive. At another, several men were stated to have been captured and killed, and their priest tossed upon bayonets stuck in the ground. At another, sixty women and girls were reported to have been driven into a church, and the soldiers told to do what they liked with them, and kill them afterwards—an order said to have been fulfilled. Some villagers fled to a peak near Talori; there they were believed to have been killed almost to a man. The largest number of fugitives collected in the Valley of Talvorecy. Hemmed in by soldiers and Kurds, they were said to have been first thinned out by rifle shots, and then despatched by the

sword and the bayonet. In all, the number of the slain was variously computed at from five to eight thousand; but, in the absence of trustworthy statistics, no figures can implicitly be accepted. Subsequent inquiry showed that, as several thousand Armenians returned to their villages, the total number of victims in these preliminary massacres, including those who died from exposure and want, was probably not more than nine hundred. Of the grosser cases of wholesale butchery by Turkish soldiers there was no evidence available. On the other hand, it was conclusively proved that Armenians were hunted like wild beasts, both by the Turks and Kurds, and killed wherever found, without distinction of rank, age or sex. But for the facilities of escape afforded by the mountainous country, the slaughter would have been far greater. Apart from the wanton destruction of life and some cases of unspeakable atrocity upon women and children, the whole inhabited region was devastated. Not an Armenian house was left standing; not a field was left with its growing crops. With such ruthless cruelty had the military and their Kurdish associates done their work, that wherever the rifle, the sword and the bayonet failed to kill, famine was deliberately prepared to add to the number of the dead. The object of Hassam Tahsin Pasha, Vali of Bitlis, was to destroy the semi-independence of the Armenians of the Sasoon district; and this was accomplished with a thoroughness and brutality for which, even when liberal allowance is made for exaggeration, parallels can be found only in the history of Turkish rule.

When these facts, in their originally inflated and distorted form, came to the knowledge of Sir Philip Currie, he protested energetically to the Porte, and his protest was supported in strong terms by Lord Kimberley. The Sultan took a firm line, declaring that the Armenians had been in revolt against his Government; that no measures of undue severity had been employed in the suppression of the rebels. "Just as there are in other countries Nihilists, Socialists and Anarchists," he wrote, "endeavouring to obtain from the Government concessions and privileges which it is impossible to grant them, and just in the same manner as steps have to be taken against them, so it is with the Armenians." But he yielded to Lord Kimberley's demand for an inquiry, though at the same time preventing our Consul from visiting the scenes of the massacres. This concession he nullified by decorating the Mufti of Mush,

who had incited the troops against the Armenians, and Zeki Pasha, the Commander of the forces, who had shared the slaughter with the Kurds; and he dismissed the Mutessarif of Mush, who had protested against their conduct. At the same time the official notification of the Commission of Inquiry stated that the Commission was sent to inquire into the criminal conduct of Armenian brigands. It denied the truth of the massacres. Lord Kimberley declared that the matter could not possibly be left in that position. He instructed Sir Philip Currie to put himself in communication with the French and Russian Ambassadors, and to enter a formal protest against such an inquiry as the Sultan evidently contemplated. In view of the engagements entered into by the Porte, under the XL1st Article of the Treaty of Berlin, and in presence of the grave situation thus created, Her Majesty's Government "reserved to themselves entire liberty of action with regard to the whole matter." This had some effect upon the Porte, who suggested that a British Consular officer should join the Commission. Lord Kimberley also invited the co-operation of the Powers in an arrangement by which not only a British but also a French and Russian Consul should join the Commission, these three Powers alone having consular officers at Erzeroum. Austria "entirely agreed" with this course, but pointed out that there was no Austro-Hungarian Consul in the region. France consented, if the Sultan agreed to a joint examination. Italy agreed unconditionally. Germany replied that, though only indirectly interested in the question, their Ambassador at Constantinople had already been instructed to advise the Sultan to appoint a Commission satisfactory to the Great Powers. Russia stated that their Ambassador had been requested to confer with Sir Philip Currie, and that the Government wished their Consul at Erzeroum to participate in the inquiry. "But they were most adverse to raising any political question," and they wished it to be clearly understood that "they were actuated by no '*arrière-pensée politique*.'"

In this way the Concert of the six Powers was called into being by Lord Kimberley. But the idea that the Consuls at Erzeroum should share in the inquiry underwent modification. The Ambassadors of the other Powers urged upon Sir Philip Currie that it would be better that the Consuls should not accompany the Commission themselves, but should send delegates. As Consuls they would be forced to take a more active part than was desired. Delegates

would feel this difficulty less. For the sake of unity of action Lord Kimberley agreed. The Powers having thus shown the Sultan that they were more fearful of raising the Eastern Question than anxious to protect the Armenians against him, the Commission was set to work. Our representative upon it was Mr. H. S. Shipley, and the first sitting was held at Mush, on January 24th, 1895. It is evident, from the joint report of the delegates—M. Vilbert representing France and M. Prjevalsky Russia—that the Turkish authorities were in a conspiracy to render investigation abortive. The depositions made by the officials as to the disposition of troops, and the nature of the conflicts between them and the Armenians, were in many cases demonstrably false. The inquiry was so conducted as to conceal, or, where concealment was not possible, to obscure rather than to discover the truth. Obviously, witnesses would not come before a Turkish Commission to depose against the misdeeds of the Turkish Government; the only persons heard were accused suspects and informers. Consequently it was not possible to arrive at certain results in specific cases of outrage, murder and pillage. The stories of many of the witnesses on the Government side had been concocted beforehand. Three conclusions were, however, apparent: first, that there was no Armenian revolt against the Turkish Government; secondly, that, whatever the merits of quarrels between the Armenians and Kurds, the troops sent into the mountains were not despatched there to keep the two races under control; and, third, that when they found that the Armenians could hold their own against the Kurds, they joined with the latter in the partial slaughter of the Armenian population of the Sasoon district, behaving with shocking barbarity.

The problem before the Powers was to agree upon some course of action which would prevent a recurrence of these events, and secure for the Armenians such measures of administrative reform as would give them the security obtained for them—on paper—by the signatory Powers to the Treaty of Berlin. Under Article LXI. of that instrument, the Porte undertook “to carry into effect, without delay, the improvements and reforms required by local wants in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians.” The Sultan had evaded this obligation while pretending conformity. The Powers had addressed a Collective Note to him in 1880 and had let the matter drift. Upon this note Sir Philip Currie based a memorandum of reforms. It suggested the appointment of a Vali for five years, with

the approval of the Powers, and removable only by Commission, *ad hoc*, approved by them; the creation of a Council General of delegates from the sandjaks, communities to be represented according to their numbers; the division of vilayets into sandjaks, the Mutessarifs to be both Moslem and Christian, in proportion to the respective numbers of those communities; the sub-division of sandjaks into cazas, and cazas into nahiés, on the same principle of the proportional representation of Moslem and Christian; a Court of Assize for each vilayet, composed of two Moslems and two Christians; a mixed gendarmerie of Christians and Moslems; and special measures for the protection of Armenians against Kurdish incursions and tribute levying.

This was submitted to the other Ambassadors at Constantinople. The Sultan failed to see the necessity of these reforms, and meanwhile continued a repressive policy against the Armenians, large numbers of whom were cast into prison. He complained that England should vilify Turkey, her traditional friend and ally, and seemed to think that Lord Kimberley should gag the English press, and prevent it from saying uncomplimentary things about him and his Government. The late Rustem Pasha, Turkish Ambassador, gave forcible expression to these sentiments, in an interview with the Foreign Minister in March, 1895. Lord Kimberley told him that whatever exaggeration there had been in the press, there was only too much foundation for the belief that terrible atrocities had been perpetrated; whereupon his Excellency asked on what grounds England based her claim to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey. Lord Kimberley expressed his astonishment at this inquiry, and referred him to the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Treaty as not only giving a right, in common with the other signatory Powers, but as laying upon us most serious obligations. Meanwhile Sir Philip Currie had a long interview with the Sultan, who posed as a man whose natural inclinations to clemency were grossly misunderstood. That he would allow Armenians to remain in prison without trial, was a libel on his administration. When assured that the prisons were full of Armenians, who were in durance because of their nationality alone, he was "lost in astonishment, and felt it was like a dream." To Sir Philip Currie's protest, he replied that of late years the Armenians had not behaved well, and gave a warning that if false and exaggerated reports continued to be circulated in England it would be fatal to the continuance of good relations between the two

Powers. "His Mussulman subjects could not remain indifferent to the injuries they received at the hands of Armenians, encouraged and protected, as it seemed, by England." The existing laws, he declared, were amply sufficient to ensure good government, and he urged that as he was prepared gradually to increase the number of Armenian functionaries, there was no need to demand reforms from the Porte.

Further pressure having been applied to him by England, he appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of Armenia, with Turkhan Pasha, a former Vali of Crete, at its head. In view of this, he asked that England should not prepare an independent scheme of reforms, but should communicate direct with the Commission. But while he was thus endeavouring to satisfy Sir Philip Currie, the violence of the Turkish authorities in Armenia was increased, not only in the Bitlis Vilayet, but in that of Erzeroum and throughout Asia Minor. Consequently the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France and Russia proceeded to draw up a project of reforms for the Armenian provinces, on the basis of Sir Philip Currie's memorandum already outlined. Lord Kimberley tried to stiffen the guarantees for the execution of the reforms, in the sense of making all the important appointments subject to the approval of the Powers, and including the Province of Lebanon in the scheme; but France and Russia hesitated to go so far as Lord Kimberley. Prince Lobanoff, on behalf of Russia, though leaving large powers of discretion to M. de Nelidoff, the ambassador at Constantinople, did not conceal his opinion that the project was open to objections, and was unlikely to obtain the consent of the Sultan, who had meanwhile received the recommendations of the Commission, of which Turkhan Pasha was president. When the elaborate scheme of the three ambassadors was presented—a plan consisting of forty articles, and covering administrative, financial and judicial matters—the Sultan naturally required time for its consideration. Unfortunately for confidence in his good faith, the interval was marked, not by a relaxation of oppression in the vilayets of Asia Minor, but by the recurrence of barbarities. In the Vilayet of Diarbekir it was the boast of the Kurds that they had the permission of the authorities to exterminate the Christians. Whatever truth there may have been in the statement, it is certain that the Turkish Government did not bestir itself to prevent the committal of Kurdish and other Moslem crimes. Renewed warnings were offered to Abdul Hamid; but,

meanwhile, a fresh difficulty occurred. Prince Lobanoff was informed that there was great agitation among the Armenians in Russian territory, on the borders of Turkey in Asia, and that these were purchasing arms and acting in concert with Armenian revolutionary committees in London and elsewhere. This was sufficient to intensify the caution of Russia, who had already shown that she was not nearly so much in earnest as England. The scheme of reforms had been submitted on May 11th, and nothing but an evasive delay on the part of the Porte having resulted by the 27th, Lord Kimberley, in view of the rising tide of indignation in England at stories of renewed atrocities, urged the Powers to agree to insist upon a categorical reply by the 30th. He informed the Russian Ambassador in London that in the event of further delay by the Porte, England "would be compelled to have recourse to measures of restraint." Prince Lobanoff, fearing a general rising of Armenians, Russian as well as Turkish, took fright at this intimation, and instructed M. de Nelidoff "that in no case would the Russian Government associate itself with such measures."

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the Sultan, who knew perfectly well that England alone was desirous of taking strong measures, obtained a further delay in giving his answer to the scheme, and that when he did reply, on June 3rd, he rejected the project almost entirely. He refused all the proposed guarantees for the execution of the reforms—the appointment of a High Commissioner, a Commission of Control, the veto on the Valis. The only important concession he made was the inclusion of a further Armenian element in the administrative posts. He declined to accept the proposals as to reform of the tribunals, the gendarmerie and police, the judicial commissions, reparation to victims of the massacres, inspection of prisons, and ignored that part of the scheme relating to taxation and finances. His answer did not admit the principles upon which the project of reforms was based, and the minor points that he did accept were therefore of little, if any, value. In effect the Ambassadors had their project contumeliously returned to them. Instead of strengthening their hands, Prince Lobanoff weakened them. He instructed M. de Nelidoff to take no steps until further advised. To our Ambassador at St. Petersburg he said he had never looked upon the presentation of the scheme of reforms as equivalent to an ultimatum to the Sultan, or considered that, in the event of its rejection by him, the ambassadors would be justified in using

threatening language. Russia "would certainly not join in any coercive measures." But, while saying this, Prince Lobanoff was very anxious to know what steps Lord Kimberley proposed to take, and to be consulted upon any fresh move. Russia would not, he said, consent to the creation in Asia Minor of a district in which the Armenians would have exceptional privileges, and would constitute the nucleus of an independent kingdom of Armenia—evidently, he said, the object the Armenian Committee had in view.

This was early in June. Sir Philip Currie and Lord Kimberley—between them the motive power of the Concert—therefore found themselves in a difficult position. On the one hand, the Sultan was determined to deny effective reforms; on the other, Russia had made up her mind not to compel him—or to suffer him to be compelled—to grant such reforms. Great Britain stood practically alone as the friend of the Armenians, for France, in any event, would support the policy of Russia; and Germany and Austria, whose part in the Concert was merely nominal, and was limited to a sympathetic interest in whatever the Ambassadors of the three Powers might accomplish, were, to all appearances, prepared to see the Armenians exterminated by the Turks rather than do anything which might result in war against Turkey, and—in all probability also—between the Powers of Europe. In these trying circumstances, of which the Sultan took full advantage by strenuously asserting that he would do nothing which in any way seemed to him to be derogatory to the independence of Turkey, it is greatly to the credit of Lord Kimberley that he maintained a firm and courageous attitude. It would appear that so far as he was personally concerned—and in this matter there is reason for the belief that his colleagues in the Cabinet were heartily with him—he was prepared to go forward, with unflinching resolve, in the application of coercive measures. Rustem Pasha, one of the ablest diplomatists the Porte had ever sent to this country, and a man whose representations had peculiar weight, because he was himself a Christian, and had been brilliantly successful in compelling Christians and Moslems alike to keep the peace in the Province of Lebanon, exhausted the arts of persuasion upon Lord Kimberley without effect. The Foreign Secretary was immovable. While asserting that the British Government had no designs upon the independence of Turkey, he refused to budge from the position that Great Britain had the right, either with or without the other Powers, under the Treaty of Berlin, to insist upon the scheme of

reforms, and that what had actually occurred and was occurring in the Armenian provinces amply justified interference. On June 19th, notwithstanding that Prince Lobanoff had shown great activity and insistence in pressing his views upon the British Government, Lord Kimberley proposed that the Sultan should be called upon to state clearly, within forty-eight hours, what his intentions were with regard to the scheme, in order that a decision should be taken as to what course should be pursued. Prince Lobanoff referred this point to the Emperor. While his Majesty was considering it the cordite vote was taken. On the day succeeding the defeat of the Government, M. de Staal informed Lord Kimberley that the Emperor was unable to agree to the forty-eight hours' demand, "especially in view of the consequences that might result if the reply of the Turkish Government should prove unfavourable." Lord Kimberley could do nothing but inform Sir Philip Currie that the Ministry had resigned, and that he must leave it to his successor to decide what course should be followed.

It was at this dramatic stage that Lord Salisbury took up the question. As will have been seen from the opening paragraph of this chapter he accepted the policy of the outgoing Cabinet; but at first he did no more than keep the subject going. Pending the general election, the lead of the Concert was temporarily left to M. Hanotaux, who took a middle course between the inflexible demands of Lord Kimberley and the reluctant and ineffective pressure exercised upon the Sultan by Prince Lobanoff. The incidental effect of the fall of the Rosebery Cabinet, therefore, was that war was postponed, if not averted, for it is humanly certain that if Lord Kimberley had remained in office coercion would have been applied by England to the Sultan. Abdul Hamid might have given way at the last moment; but, in view of the attitude of Russia, it is far more likely that he would not have done so. The country was never nearer war in the East than when the Government was overturned on a trumpery question of ammunition. But the fact that this was the case is no reflection upon the outgoing Ministry. Rather is it a tribute to the consistency with which Lord Kimberley upheld the treaty rights of this country to interfere on behalf of the Armenians, and the unfaltering courage with which he stood his ground, notwithstanding the defection of Russia from the Concert and the clear prospect that that Power would actively resist any coercive measures that might be applied to the Sultan.

CHAPTER II.

SOME PAPER CONCESSIONS.

Lord Salisbury's Demands—The Question of Compulsion—Should England Act Alone?
—The State of Public Opinion—Counsels of the Extremists—Lord Salisbury
maintains the Concert—Agreement upon Reforms—Acceptance by the Sultan—
Lord Salisbury's Victory—Was Abdul Hamid Sincere?—The Vizerial Order.

WHILE the General Election was being fought in July, the diplomatic fusillade at Constantinople slackened; but uncertainty as to what his majority would be did not prevent Lord Salisbury from speaking to Rustem Pasha with vigour and plainness. He repudiated the idea of autonomy for the Armenians as absurd; he asked no privileges for them; but he demanded that provision should be made for securing just government. Warning the Ambassador of the extreme danger the Sultan was incurring, and the growing volume of discontent throughout his dominions, the new Foreign Secretary urged that the largest possible concessions should be made and informed Rustem Pasha that in any event he "supported entirely the policy which the present Government had inherited from their predecessors." The Sultan's reply to this was a memorandum, purporting to be the report of the Palace Commission he had created to consider the proposals of reform. In reality it expressed in a new form his earlier rejection of the reform project, and was nothing but an elaborate criticism of and attack upon the requirements of the Ambassadors. By this time, however, Lord Salisbury had a large majority at his back and could speak with greater moral authority than was possible before the polls had disclosed their secrets. Russia and France having expressed their willingness to march with England—apparently for the purpose of pulling England back—Lord Salisbury inquired, on August 5th, how far the Russian Government were willing to proceed in putting pressure on the Porte. The Powers, he pointed out, could not withdraw without loss of credit; and Her Majesty's Government believed that in consenting to co-operate with them, "their two allies contemplated the possibility of being

driven to more energetic measures in the event of the Sultan declining to take any action." Prince Lobanoff's reply was that Russia still desired to act in concert with Great Britain, so long as nothing in the shape of an autonomous State in Armenia should be attempted. Lord Salisbury assured him that in his view it was impossible to establish such a state. The problem before the Concert was to devise some machinery to give effective surveillance, such as the Powers had the right to exercise under the LXIst Article of the Treaty of Berlin—a surveillance which "did not consist in an Ambassador residing at Constantinople and looking on, but involved some more active and effectual form of vigilance."

This was exactly what the Sultan resisted. His memorandum asserted that it was undesirable to appoint Christian Valis; it refused to countenance appointments for five years, the appointees to be approved by the Powers; to re-organise the Councils by the formation of a Council-General; to give the people a voice in the election of Communal Councils and of Mudirs; to create such a police force as would maintain public security; to recast the system of tax collection; to make such regulations as would bring the Hamidié cavalry under control; to reform the judicial system in such a way as to give the Christian population a reasonable certainty that the Courts would give them justice. It is true that minor points of reform were admitted, and a willingness was expressed—on paper—to give civil employment to Armenians; but study of the documents shows that the Sultan was still determined to admit no European surveillance—that he insisted upon his prerogative of independence, contending that it was unaffected by Article LXIst; and that, in the main, the existing laws for the government of the Armenian provinces—the very laws under which the Sasoon massacres were possible—were sufficient. The choice seemed to lie between acceptance of these minor reforms and the application of compulsion. Confronted anew with that issue, Prince Lobanoff declared that both the Emperor and himself "were strongly against force being used by any or all the Powers." As for France, M. de Courcel blandly told Lord Salisbury that the position of his Government was that of an intermediary: whatever the British and Russian Governments agreed upon, in that France would concur. Thus politely was the Concert brought to a standstill.

Should England act alone? There were people who said "Yes"; there were others who, with equal emphasis, said "No"; but the

majority did not care. Though the country, as a whole, would loyally have supported Lord Salisbury in however bold a course it seemed expedient to him to pursue, public opinion was strangely indecisive. Those who would have had England punish the Sultan by deposition, and engage not only the Turkish armies but also those of any Power disposed to assist him, were in a small minority; the majority of intelligent observers knew by this time that the outrages had been exaggerated, and felt that, atrociously bad as the Turkish Government was, steady diplomatic pressure was by far the preferable course. Lord Salisbury resisted the extremists. He had no mind to wage war with the Turkish Empire and half of Europe. The Concert had been formed, not alone for ameliorating the lot of the Armenians, but also for preventing the question of their treatment assuming such a form that European Powers would be set by the ears; and with the Concert Lord Salisbury determined to continue to work. Like a man with a difficult colleague in a partnership it would be undesirable to dissolve, he made the best of the situation. He knew the dangers far better than anyone outside the Foreign Office could know them; and though his interest in and sympathy for the Armenians suffered no diminution, he refused to commit the chivalrous madness of wrecking—or running the risk of wrecking—the British Empire for their sake. He had received, moreover, from the Porte a threat that if European surveillance of Armenian reforms were insisted upon by England, Turkey would place herself entirely in the hands of Russia. The Sultan followed this intimation by communicating to the Embassies a “*Resumé du Contre-Projet du Gouvernement Impérial*,” which withdrew the minor reforms already conceded, and abrogated existing regulations in the interests of the Armenians—which regulations had, however, been a dead letter. So far from giving Christians a larger share in administration, there was formally reserved to Moslems an exclusive control. The reluctance of Russia to proceed to extremities being perfectly well known to the Porte, the Sultan proceeded to make the last state of the Armenians worse than the first. Agreeable as it would have been to meet this insolent move by an ultimatum, Lord Salisbury still held his hand. He had proposed a Mixed Commission of Surveillance, consisting of three Europeans and four Turks. Discussion continued on this point. The Commission was to be distinct from and to supersede the committee of control suggested in the Ambassadors’ project of reforms. The consent of the

Porte was offered, together with certain points allowing communications from the Embassies to such a Commission, the appointment of rural police, and the inclusion of Christians in that force and in the gendarmerie. The effect of this would be to perpetuate the existing Mussulman administration of the six vilayets, under the inspection of a Commission seated therein, and partly composed of Europeans—a vastly different thing from the comprehensive and sweeping reforms originally proposed by the Ambassadors.

Lord Salisbury was not disposed to be put off with this trumpery concession. He informed the Turkish Ambassador in London that the Porte must give assurances in writing that concessions would be made in the machinery of government in the vilayets, including the admission of Christians to a share of all offices below that of vali down to the rural police. Negotiations on this basis were resumed at Constantinople; and the more closely the Porte considered the proposal for the Mixed Commission, the less they liked it. The three Powers showed, however, that they were solid in requiring either that and sundry concessions, or the principal concessions originally demanded by the ambassadors in May, for which the Mixed Commission was in part a substitute. Lord Salisbury had so managed the matter as to bring the Powers into line. Concluding that it was imperative to do one thing or the other, the Sultan at last made up his mind to accept a fairly liberal measure of reforms—which needed only to be carried out partially—rather than a Mixed Commission, sitting in the heart of his dominions, and keeping the ambassadors informed of everything that went wrong. A scheme on paper was obviously a far more manageable thing than three active and incorruptible Europeans, armed with authority to supervise his administration; so he accepted the project of reforms of May 11th, having, in the meantime, sent Shakir Pasha and a commission of Moslems and Christians to reorganise the government of the provinces. The project comprised the following points:—

- I.—A Christian assistant to Shakir Pasha, whose name was to be unofficially submitted to the Powers.
- II.—Posts of vali and mutessarif to be open to Christians, and participation of Christians in the administration to be specified.
- III.—Dragomans to have the right of addressing any complaint or information to the Commission of Control, but to be debarred from asking for any reforms additional to those now granted.

- IV.—The number of Christian functionaries to be fixed by the Commission, in proportion to the population for each vilayet.
- V.—Christian assistants to be attached to Mohammedan valis and mutessarifs.
- VI.—The right of the Ambassadors to remonstrate against the appointment of incapable, dishonest or fanatical valis to be reserved in a note to the Porte.
- VII.—The number of rural guards to be fixed by the vali on the recommendation of the mudir, and in conformity with local requirements.
- VIII.—A note to be addressed by the Ambassadors to the Porte, taking act of the promises made respecting prisons, arbitrary arrests, amnesty, reinstatement of emigrants, regulations for the Hamidié cavalry, and insisting upon their complete and immediate execution.
- IX.—A stipulation that the principles of the reform scheme will be applied to all the sandjaks and cazas of Asia Minor, where the Christians form a notable part of the population.

These reforms were to be formulated in a General Act drawn up in agreement with the Powers. The wording of such an Act having been settled, an Imperial Iradé was issued, on October 17th, sanctioning the reforms, its terms communicated to the six vilayets, and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs instructed to superintend their execution. The three ambassadors thereupon sent a Collective Note to the Porte, reserving the right of calling the attention of the Porte to any appointments of unfit persons in the provincial administration, and taking cognisance of the application of the reforms, not only to the Vilayets of Erzeroum, Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Kharpout and Diarbekir, but also to all the cazas of Anatolia, where the Armenians form a considerable part of the population.

The triumph of the ambassadors was apparently complete. Lord Salisbury's caution and patience had been justified by results. He had taken up the thread of the negotiations at a moment when the Liberal Ministry were on the very verge of war, because of this same scheme of reforms. Lord Kimberley seems, indeed, to have made up his mind that coercion was inevitable, and to have been quite prepared to apply it; it was Lord Salisbury's task to maintain that attitude, so far as his language to the Porte was concerned, yet so to conduct the negotiations that war might be averted, and effective measures of reform, nevertheless, be introduced. He

was twice within an ace of total failure—once, when Russia declared that in no event would she use force; and again, when the Sultan rejected his alternative proposal of a Mixed Commission of Surveillance. But by avoiding precipitate action after the defection of Russia he succeeded in keeping the Concert together; and by suggesting the Mixed Commission he provided the means of keeping a continuous pressure upon the Sultan, practically compelling him to do one thing or the other—either to accept the reforms or the Commission. Having regard to the preceding negotiations, the Sultan had committed an astonishing change of front by promulgating the Ambassadors' project. How far he was sincere will become apparent in the next chapter; but, so far as words went, the three Powers could not complain. The Vizerial order of October 20th spoke of His Majesty's "high solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, without distinction of race or religion," and made it appear that because of this quality the reforms had been granted. It set free all Armenian prisoners whose offences were political; it invited exiled Armenians to return to the Turkish dominions; and it solemnly affirmed that the comfort and happiness of all his subjects was Abdul's one desire. In an interview with Sir Philip Currie, on October 24th, he observed that he hoped Her Majesty's Government would now consider the question finally closed. To His Excellency's remark that that would largely depend on the manner in which the reforms were carried out, he gave an assurance of the faithfulness of his intentions, and invited Her Majesty's Government to show their goodwill towards him by publicly expressing their approval of his conduct, and thus modify the hostility of the English press, of which he again bitterly complained. No one was misled by these protestations, Lord Salisbury least of all. The Prime Minister showed plainly what he thought of them, by the renewed warning he addressed to the Sultan at the Guildhall Banquet on November 9th. Instead of giving Abdul Hamid the public approval for which he had asked, he told the world that he had scant confidence that the reforms would be executed: and to the almost pathetic personal letter of protest which the Sultan addressed to him in consequence of that remark, he made but the single comment that whatever was done must be done with unanimity by the Powers.

CHAPTER III.

A YEAR OF BLOOD.

The Massacres of '96-'97—The Official Record—Complicity of the Authorities—The Sultan's Policy—Evasion and Delay—Indifference of the Powers—The "Stationnaires"—A Question by Abdul Hamid—Lord Salisbury in Manacles—The Sultan Unrepentant—Prince Lobanoff's Excuses—The Christians desperate—Attack on the Ottoman Bank—The Constantinople Massacres—An Inactive Concert—A Terrible Indictment—The Sultan Insolent—A Demand upon the Powers—Lord Salisbury's Failure.

THE pessimism with which Lord Salisbury spoke of the accepted scheme of reforms and of the probabilities that good results would follow, was justified by the terrible events that succeeded the issue of the Sultan's decree. Blood flowed freely in Asia Minor from end to end. Twenty-five thousand persons were known to have lost their lives; and this figure relates only to massacres which came to the knowledge of the Consuls of the Powers. Could those be added for which no details could be collected the list would be still more appalling. It is no part of the purpose of this book to give a narrative of events in Turkey; but to reveal the nature of the work which had to be undertaken afresh by Lord Salisbury it is necessary to give an outline—drawn from official sources alone—of the new disturbances in the Sultan's dominions. While the scheme of reforms, discussed in the preceding chapter, was being negotiated, the Hintchak, an Armenian revolutionary society, the real extent of whose operations throughout the Turkish Empire has never been accurately determined, exhibited active hostility against the Government in the capital itself. The articles of this association were, in spirit, not dissimilar from those of the Clan-na-Gael in Ireland and America, and its objects were those of Nihilism and Anarchism. It worked through secret agents, and its organisation comprised a "chief executioner," with a corps of *aides*, whose duty it was to carry out sentence of death upon any person declared to be obnoxious by the inner group. Its plan was to terrorise by murder and the use of dynamite and bombs. In September, 1895, disturbances broke out in Constantinople, and the police, acting under the belief that they

were dealing a blow at the Hintchak, suppressed them with great violence, many innocent Armenians being killed and wounded in the streets. Like measures of repression were ordered to be exercised throughout the provinces. Thus it came about that at the very time the Sultan accepted the scheme of Armenian reforms, Armenian blood was fertilising the plains of Asia Minor and the valleys of the mountain ranges. In Trebizond, on October 8th, the Mussulman population rose and attacked and pillaged the Christian quarters, slaying nearly six hundred Armenians. At Gumush-Hane, Samsun, Aghdja-Guney, and other villages, there were premeditated massacres in which over two hundred persons were murdered by the Moslems. In the vilayet of Erzeroum villages were sacked by the score, and Armenians killed by the hundred. In the town itself four hundred were slain in their houses and in the streets on October 30th, and several hundreds were killed at Erzendan. At Baiburt the total of the killed was one thousand three hundred and fifty: at Bayazid nearly five hundred. In the vilayet of Bitlis nearly eight hundred Christians were slaughtered in the town on October 25th. In the vilayet of Van over two hundred Christian villages were sacked, many Armenians slain, hundreds compelled to accept Mohammedanism, and ten thousand reduced to destitution. At Kharpout (vilayet of Mamuret-ul-Aziz) more than five hundred were killed, the occupants of numerous villages massacred, and Armenian churches, buildings and houses robbed and then destroyed. In the vilayets of Diarbekir and of Sivas the slaughter went on throughout November and December. At the town of Diabekir there was a three days' orgy of blood, in which one thousand one hundred and ninety-one Christians were killed; and at the town of Sivas the victims numbered about one thousand five hundred. At Gurun there was a terrible massacre on November 12th, and on the 28th it was computed that there were several thousand corpses lying unburied in the streets. In the district of Shabin-Kara-Hissar-Sharki three thousand met their death; at Amasea about one thousand, at Vezir-Keupru two hundred. Like enormities occurred in the vilayets of Aleppo (one thousand were killed at Aintab alone, and nearly one thousand four hundred at Marash, and several hundreds at Orfa), Adana and Angora.

No good purpose would be served by describing the scenes. They have a harrowing uniformity. Whoever is curious as to the details will find tales of butchery in the Consular reports which make

the blood run cold. It is more to the point of this narrative to say that in almost every case there is evidence of premeditation on the part of the Moslem population; that the signal for the slaughter was given by bugle call; that soldiers, disguised and undisguised, took part in the pillage and murder; and that in too many instances the authorities either remained passive or were the instigators of the Moslem rising. Even where officers tried to stem the torrent they were often baulked by their superiors. When this was not the case appeals for reinforcements to higher quarters were wilfully neglected. One conclusion alone is possible—that for political reasons the Sultan and his advisers countenanced, if they did not in reality instigate, a Moslem movement throughout Asia Minor, for the extermination of Armenians who would not embrace Mohammedanism.

Urgent representations were made to the Porte from time to time, and protests that were intended to be impressive were framed by the Sultan and his ministers in reply. Their invariable explanation was that the Armenians were engaged in a revolutionary movement; that the Mussulman population had become excited against them because of it, and by reason of the support given the Christians by the Powers; and that the Porte was doing its utmost—a palpable falsehood—to suppress disorder by whomsoever caused. The necessity of restoring order was used by the Sultan as an excuse for not publishing a hatt promulgating the reforms. Sir Philip Currie pressed him to issue the hatt and thus convince the Powers of his sincerity; the Armenians should be shewn that they were really to have the reforms and the Moslems that the reforms were not injurious to their interests. But while His Majesty was willing to discuss these matters with our Ambassador “as a friend,” he invented an array of reasons for not publishing the hatt. The other Powers were not inclined to bestir themselves in the matter. The one point upon which their activity could be enlisted was in demanding firmans for additional “stationnaires” to pass through the Dardanelles, for the protection of the Embassies and foreign colonies. The Sultan denied that there was any reason for this, which the Powers had the right to claim under the Treaty of Berlin. Order had been restored in Constantinople and even in the vilayets. “Has even one foreigner’s nose bled either in the capital or the provinces?” he asked Sir Philip Currie—a question that would seem to suggest that special instructions had been issued that in the attacks upon the Armenians particular care should be taken that subjects of the Powers should

not be harmed. Sir Philip Currie hinted at the likelihood of a revolt in Constantinople and the consequent appearance of the fleets, which would not be necessary if the armed "stationnaires" were admitted through the Dardanelles. Finding that the Powers were really acting in Concert for the protection of their subjects, the Sultan sanctioned the passage of the vessels through the Straits, one by one, at different times, and without prejudice to his right to keep the Dardanelles closed against foreign ships of war. This point being conceded, the Powers relapsed into indifference. Russia considered that the Sultan should have time to restore order in Asia Minor, and was in favour of "as little interference as possible in Turkish affairs at the present moment"—that is in mid-December, when the massacres were still going on, and when several thousands of Armenians were in absolute destitution, dying of hunger and cold in the mountains, many stripped so bare of their belongings that they had not clothes with which to cover their nakedness. When it was hinted at Vienna that Her Majesty's Government would have to make coercive proposals to the Sultan, Count Goluchowski replied that the situation was far from demanding the consideration, much less the adoption, of any measures of the kind. Sir Philip Currie tried, and failed, to induce his colleagues to move, and suggested an International Commission, partly to designate the persons responsible for the massacres; but the proposal was coldly received.

Meanwhile the condition of Constantinople was going from bad to worse. Between three and four thousand additional Armenians had fled there from the provinces; panics occurred, with the invariable result of adding to the numbers of Armenians in prison, where those who were supposed to have knowledge of the revolutionary movement were subjected to torture and otherwise so ill-treated that deaths were alleged to have been caused. But, as it was held in St. Petersburg, Vienna and Berlin that the wisest thing to do was to do nothing except to provide for the protection of European subjects, Lord Salisbury was manacled. Unwilling to act in any way which would have broken up the Concert he suggested that steps should be taken to induce the Sultan to appoint a responsible Ministry; but here again the Powers were unsympathetic. As for the Sultan he continued unrepentant, having grasped only too well the significance of Russia's reluctance, and the nervous dread of Austria lest the Eastern Question should be

re-opened among the Powers. With unwearied patience Lord Salisbury urged that the Concert should not remain powerless. He instructed the Embassy at St. Petersburg to inform Prince Lobanoff that "the responsibility incumbent upon the Powers of Europe is very great if they do not make some effort to amend the calamitous state of things in the Turkish Empire. . . . Our recent experience indicates that pressure on the part of only some of the Powers, if any one is known to be dissentient, has no influence whatever on the Sultan's counsels. He feels himself safe, and he will not give way. On the other hand, he has not yet resisted any advice heartily tendered to him by the unanimous voice of the Powers. It is, therefore, of great importance that the Russian Government, if it can be induced to do so, should instruct M. de Nélidoff to co-operate with his colleagues in their efforts to find a remedy for these evils." Prince Lobanoff's answer to this appeal was that he felt assured the Sultan was doing his best, and to point out what a hopeless and impossible task it would be to impose a system of government on Turkey different from the present one. What the Sultan's "best" was, appeared wherever Armenians were to be found in the provinces—in heaps of corpses, cast into newly-dug pits outside the towns and villages; in unburied bodies rotting on the hillside, in the valley, and on the plain; in wandering bands of half-naked fugitives, for whom death by starvation or the sword was the one alternative to apostacy. In a formal memorandum, Prince Lobanoff attempted to justify the brutal indifference of Russia by an ingenious argument that any further pressure upon the Sultan, beyond that of friendly advice, would be an infraction of those Articles of the Treaty of Berlin which forbade interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. That wholesale slaughter should proceed unchecked was a matter of small moment, in comparison with any "infringement of the principles of European public law." The result of such an interference would, he pointed out, only weaken the authority of the Sultan. Lord Salisbury was reluctantly compelled to acknowledge that in this attitude Russia did not stand alone. He told M. de Staal that he was "fully convinced that the evils which would result from any interruption in the harmonious relations of the Powers would far outweigh any advantage that could possibly be expected from isolated action." But he added that "little could be hoped from the negative and expectant policy on which the Russian Government relied."

The position in the early part of 1896, therefore, was that though the Powers were united on the principle of guarding their own subjects in collecting facts about the massacres—in settling the disputed question whether the official record of the slain should be twenty thousand or thirty thousand—and in offering Abdul Hamid good advice, Lord Salisbury stood alone, as Lord Kimberley had done before him, in urging that means should be devised for compelling the Sultan to act upon the counsel tendered to him. In these circumstances murder and persecution of the Armenians continued throughout the winter, the spring and the summer, mitigated only by such relief as could be furnished by private charity. Here and there the Armenians arose in futile revolt. And there were other internal disorders. The Druses in the Hauran threw off the Turkish yoke, but were defeated after a sanguinary struggle; Persian inroads into Turkey were repelled; Russo-Armenian revolutionists who crossed the frontier were driven back; the sword of the Moslem was everywhere triumphant.

For every hopeless blow struck for liberty by the desperate Christian population, a fearful retribution was exacted. Convinced that the Powers were determined not to interfere collectively, and that Lord Salisbury was reduced to helplessness by the negative policy of Russia, France, Austria and Germany, the Armenian Revolutionary Society determined upon desperate measures. On Wednesday, August 26th, a party of them went in twos and threes to the head office of the Ottoman Bank at Galata, and, on a prearranged signal, threw bombs and discharged revolvers. Having thus scared the officials out of the offices, they barricaded themselves there. At other points in Constantinople bombs were thrown. The military were called out; an armed Turkish mob swarmed out of the lower quarters of the town and an indiscriminate slaughter of Armenians began. The Moslem populace killed and pillaged without let or hindrance. From midday onwards through the night, and again on Thursday till after sunset, the butchery went forward unchecked, even at the very doors of the European Embassies. Between five and six thousand people were killed, mostly by the bludgeons of the Turkish mob. The authorities made no attempt to restore order until the fury of the populace had spent itself. Meanwhile the holders of the bank, many of whom had been killed or wounded by the discharge of their own bombs, could not well be dislodged. They demanded reforms under the threat of

blowing up the bank and themselves. Eventually they offered to leave, on the guarantee of the Sultan and the Ambassadors that their lives would be spared. As they were in possession of the securities and cash in the bank, and held as hostages officials who had no part or lot in their fiendish enterprise, these terms were conceded. Fifteen unwounded men marched out, leaving behind them a stock of bombs and dynamite, and were escorted to a yacht, and there guarded by the British "stationnaires" and Turkish warships until they could be taken out of the country. Upon these men, and others like them, rests the responsibility for the awful massacre that occurred in the city. They had hoped to terrorise Europe into putting an end to the Sultan's reign, and the domination of the Turk. Language is too feeble to describe and condemn their insensate wickedness; but it is necessary to distinguish between the suppression of their movement and the connivance of the Turkish authorities with the Moslem mob in converting the city into a slaughter house. So far from the raid on the bank bringing the Powers to the immediate help of the Armenians, it stereotyped their attitude of non-interference. The Ambassadors met at once to confer upon the situation; but they were paralysed by the difficulties with which the revolutionists had encumbered their path. They could but point out to the Sultan that he was endangering his empire by suffering the blood of the Armenians to continue to flow; and to mark their sense of his iniquity, and that of his advisers, in permitting the Moslem mob to murder and sack as they pleased, they refused to illuminate and decorate their embassies on the occasion of his birthday.

The frightful events in Constantinople had placed a weapon in the hands of the Sultan which could not easily be wrested from him. Whatever might be the degree of his personal responsibility for the massacres in the capital, there was the patent fact that the immediate cause was a daring revolution, commenced by an act of almost incredible wickedness. Armenian interests received incalculable injury. The principle of keeping the Concert together, whatever suffering to the Armenians might accrue from its ineffectiveness, was recognised even by those who would have had Lord Salisbury break away from it, and act alone, whatever the consequences. Those who would have preferred the alternative of an European war to a continuance of the Turkish process of exterminating the Armenians, were silenced by the

revelation of Armenian Nihilism. From the impotence imposed upon the Powers only a feeble attempt at escape could be made. This took the usual form of a Collective Note, signed by the six ambassadors at Constantinople. It solemnly called the attention of the Sultan to "an exceptionally serious side of the disorders which have recently stained with blood the capital and its environs"—namely, the evidence that the authorities participated in the massacres. Their points were: (1) The simultaneous rising of bands, armed and dressed in the same manner, in various parts of the town, before the police or an armed force appeared at the Bank; (2) They were led or accompanied by softas, soldiers, and even police officers, who not only looked on at their excesses unmoved, but at times shared in them; (3) The cudgels and knives were distributed among these Bashi-Bazouks by several heads of the detective police; (4) That the mobs committed their crimes with impunity, under the eyes of the troops and their officers, even in the vicinity of the Imperial Palace; (5) That an assassin, arrested by the dragoman of one of the embassies, on being taken to Yildiz Kiosk, was received by the attendants as one of their acquaintances; (6) That two Turks in European employ declared on their return, after the two days' massacre, that they had been requisitioned and armed with knives and cudgels in order to kill Armenians. The Note demanded that the origin of this organisation should be sought out, and the instigators and principal actors punished with the utmost rigour. The reply of the Porte was, of course, a denial that the Mussulman mob had been instigated by Government agents; but a special Tribunal was appointed to try all persons concerned in the riots. The special Tribunal set to work and proved that its real purpose was not to deal even-handed justice between Moslem and Armenian, but to cloak the former and punish the latter.

The effect of the abortive revolution in the capital showed itself in the provinces, in the form of renewed attacks upon the Christian population. At Eghin, a couple of thousand Armenians were slain, and in nearly all the old centres of disorder ferocious attacks were made anew on the Christian survivors of the butcheries of the previous year. The Armenians would have been less than human had they not sought to avenge their dead. Is it surprising that they resorted to bomb throwing, to revolver shooting from places of concealment, and to the propaganda of Anarchistic doctrines? In vain did the high Armenian ecclesiastics and notables

beseech the Sultan to discriminate between the authors of these deeds and the mass of the oppressed. The retributive hand of the Turk fell upon innocent and guilty alike ; and the Powers did nothing. Towards the end of September the Porte condescended to acquaint the Ambassadors with the views of the Sultan. After enlarging upon the beneficial character of Turkish rule, and the superior privileges enjoyed by the Armenians in comparison with subject populations in other parts of the world, the Note contended that the Armenians did not desire the reforms which His Majesty, in his great clemency, had accepted and put into operation, but sought administrative autonomy—a fact for which there is not the least vestige of authority, other than that furnished by the Hintchak. To such a dismemberment of the Turkish Empire the Sultan could never consent ; and, added the Note—with a sarcasm which should have made even continental diplomatists wince—"it is evident that the Great Powers could never give their consent to it." The Porte had a special reason for this communication. Its object was to induce the Powers, "in consideration of the reforms undertaken by the Imperial Government," to expel Armenian agitators from their territory. Under the pretence of acquainting Europe with his humanitarian sentiments, the Sultan complained to them of harbouring Armenian conspirators and refugees. A few days after the dispatch of this Note, in late September, further raids were made upon Armenian dwellers in Constantinople. Bombs and infernal machines were found and more Armenians arrested. These discoveries naturally stimulated Moslem fanaticism in the capital ; and the Porte, on October 6th, again urged the Powers to take steps against Armenian conspirators in their respective capitals—a representation directed against England in particular.

The Sultan defied the Concert, knowing it was content to be treated with insolence and insincerity, and that he was quite safe so long as the Powers found it impossible to agree upon a policy of coercion. Such an agreement was still more unlikely at the end of 1896 than at the beginning. Lord Salisbury had inherited not only the policy but also the failures of the previous Cabinet. The Ministry had enjoyed eighteen months of power ; and though the representations of Sir Philip Currie, and the activity of our Consuls in Asia Minor, mitigated the horrors of life in the Asiatic Provinces, nothing had been done to secure to the Armenians the benefit of the scheme of reforms—or, to be quite accurate, only

just so much had been done as seemed advisable to the Sultan. The results of English policy had been negative; the principal credit that attached to it was that, up to this stage, the Eastern Question had been prevented from leading to war in Europe.

CHAPTER IV.

CRETE AND THE WAR IN GREECE.

The Civil War in Crete—Lord Salisbury leads the Concert—A Scheme of Reforms—Intervention by Greece—The Vassos Raid—Interference by the Powers—Lord Salisbury proposes Autonomy—The Powers and Coercion of Greece—A Turkish Army on the Greek Frontier—Greek Raids across the Border—The Sultan declares War—Localising the Conflict—Collapse of the Greek Army—Mediation of the Powers—The Terms of Peace—Autonomy for Crete—The German Emperor “lays down his flute”—Turkish Troops in Crete—The Fighting at Candia—Admiral Noel’s Action—An Ultimatum to the Sultan—Prince George of Greece appointed Governor—Peace restored to Crete.

THE cowardice of the Concert of Europe enabled the Sultan to produce in Crete a condition of things that bade fair to become every whit as bad as that prevailing throughout the Armenian provinces. But the Cretan Christians proved themselves to be as courageous and as well armed as the Moslems. Here the warfare between the Cross and Crescent was waged upon less unequal terms. The mountain heights held no hordes of Kurds whom the Turkish authorities could let loose upon the peasantry. The Christians of Crete, unlike the Armenians, had been conquered by the Turk but never subdued. For centuries they had been accustomed to give blow for blow, and even to take the aggressive on an organised scale whenever the least chance presented itself of throwing off the Ottoman domination. In many parts of the interior the Mussulman population was in a minority and but for the Turkish troops would have been cruelly oppressed. In conditions such as these local disorders were of constant occurrence and transition from village feuds to a state of civil war was easy and swift. In 1894 the movement among the Cretans took the form of an insurrection, which was temporarily suppressed in 1895 by the Turkish forces, whose victories were accompanied by the usual excesses. For a time the Christians accepted their defeat, but in the summer of the following year they rose again, and the island became a bloody cockpit—the Turkish troops and Mussulman population on the one side, and the Cretan Christians on the other. Mutual extermination would have followed; but it was foreseen that as the Turks could

throw a practically unlimited number of fresh troops into the island, the Christians would eventually be crushed as completely as was the case thirty years before.

Lord Salisbury thought there was an opportunity of doing for Crete what it had not been practicable to do for the Armenians. On the principle that the root cause of the troubles in the island was the incompetence and cruelty of the Turkish administration, he urged the claims of the Christians upon the sympathies of the Concert. There is no need to follow, except in general terms, the interminable negotiations that ensued, or to attempt to reduce within the compass of a chapter a mass of diplomatic correspondence, comparable in bulk and human interest with that on the subject of Armenia. The Christians demanded from the Powers the appointment of a Christian governor, with the assent of Greece, and under the special guarantee of Europe; the establishment of a native militia; the restriction of the Turkish troops to the forts at Canea, Retimo and Heraklion; the economic independence of the island, subject to a yearly tribute of £T10,000; and certain other reforms, which would give them a share in administration proportionate to their numbers—a share which, in fact, would be predominant. The essential justice of these requirements was admitted by the Powers, owing chiefly to the arguments of Lord Salisbury and Sir Philip Currie. After tedious negotiation, the obstinacy of the Porte was so far overcome that a Convention was agreed upon. It provided that the Governor-General of Crete should be a Christian, and be appointed for five years by the Sultan, with the assent of the Powers. The higher officials were to continue to be appointed by the Sultan. Two-thirds of the public posts were to be given to Christians, and the remaining third to Moslems. The Turkish troops were to be kept in the ordinary garrisons, but employed in the interior at the will of the Governor-General. The Assembly was to be elected every two years; Crete was to enjoy half her Customs revenue; a Commission, comprising European officers, was to reorganise the constabulary; and another Commission, with foreign jurists, was to reorganise the administration of justice. The General Assembly was to be convoked within six months, and the Powers were to satisfy themselves that the Convention was carried out. The Porte had already sent a Christian governor—Georgi Berovitch Pasha, but had ingeniously continued the former Moslem governor, Abdullah Pasha, in office as commander-in-

chief and, as Abdullah was superior to Berovitch in rank, the real authority was vested in him. Just as acceptance of the scheme of reforms for the Armenians had been followed by massacres excelling in horror those which had led to the inception of the project, so the Cretan Convention was succeeded by disorders surpassing those which had arisen in 1895. Wherever the Turks were in a majority, there Christians were slain; wherever the converse was the case, Turks were murdered. From one end of the island to the other murder and pillage prevailed. Government was at an end. Anarchy took its place.

The embarrassment these events caused to the Concert was increased by excitement in Athens, and by appeals made by the Christian insurgents for Greek intervention on their behalf. On January 8th the insurgents proclaimed the union of the island with Greece, and two days later Prince George was sent with a torpedo flotilla to the island, to cover a raid by Colonel Vassos, aide-de-camp to the King. With Colonel Vassos were fifteen hundred men and two batteries of artillery. He effected a landing at Crete with his forces on February 14th, and detachments from the fleets of the Powers at the same time occupied Canea.

The calculation of the Greek Government was that this daring movement for the annexation of Crete would be acquiesced in by the Powers; whether or not it would lead to war with Turkey they were comparatively indifferent, for such was the conceit of both rulers and people, that an easy victory over the Ottoman Power was expected. They had traded on the fears of the Powers lest the Cretan question should lead to war between them, as the Armenian troubles had threatened to do; and by invading Crete they seized the chance presented to them by the failure of the Concert to checkmate their designs by establishing a naval cordon round the island. Count Goluchowski had proposed this measure, which would have had the effect of leaving the two elements of the population to fight out their differences to the death, neither the Turkish troops being reinforced, nor the Christians receiving the aid from Greece for which they had successfully intrigued. Lord Salisbury had declined to countenance such a cordon. His object was the restoration of order and the establishment of good Government, on the lines of the autonomous *régime* wrung from the Sultan in 1896. He refused to be a party to a course under which both sides would be at liberty to fight until

the population was annihilated. And, in the main, Lord Salisbury was right; though, on the other hand, had the cordon been drawn, the expedition led by Colonel Vassos could not have landed. Being thus powerfully reinforced, the Cretan Christians had matters very much their own way. The Sultan's troops and the Mussulman population were massed in the towns on the coast; the Christians had the interior and held it inviolate against the Ottoman forces.

At the time of the dispatch of the flotilla, under Prince George, the Greek Government sent a Note to the Powers, in justification or excuse for its action. The intention of the Porte to send fresh troops to the island had, said the Note, made it certain that the scenes of rapine, bloodshed and incendiarism, in which the Turkish troops had lent willing aid to the Moslems, would be repeated on a larger scale. The Greek Government could not remain indifferent, and, therefore, had decided upon preventing the landing of troops at all costs. The Cretans had declared their determination to effect their union with Greece, and the Greek Government regarded this consummation as the only solution of the Cretan question. And their acts were as good as their words. Fire was opened on a Turkish transport at Candia, and she was compelled to return to the harbour.

The Powers were thus forced into activity. After the occupation of Canea by detachments from the foreign warships, the admirals issued a joint memorandum, requiring Prince George to withdraw from Cretan waters; but at the very time the composite force was going ashore, Colonel Vassos, with his men and batteries, were landing undisturbed. The object of the Greek Government having thus been obtained, Prince George withdrew his flotilla. Colonel Vassos issued a magniloquent proclamation, to the effect that he was bringing "peace and legality" to the island, and promptly followed it by an attack upon the Turkish fort of Aghia, which he captured, taking about four hundred Moslem prisoners, among whom were a hundred Turkish soldiers. Retimo, Heraklion and Sitia having been occupied by the Powers, in addition to Canea, the Greek commander was warned against attacking these places, and was informed that the Powers were concerting measures against Greek interference. He replied that he had been sent to occupy Crete, and would continue to do so. From Athens the Greek Government scouted the representations of the Powers, and aggravated the situation by the rapid dispatch of troops to the Thessalian frontier.

The Porte decided to leave Crete alone for the present. Berovitch Pasha, whose proceedings throughout had been marked by a singular lack of courage, had fled from Crete; as the Powers had accepted responsibility for the affairs of the island, by jointly occupying the towns, to send troops there would have been useless—particularly in view of the likelihood that the transports would be captured or sunk by the Greek fleet. An army was, however, mobilised and dispatched to the Turkish side of the Thessalian frontier, and the chief command given to Edhem Pasha. There was already a strong force within easy call, for it had been necessary to suppress a somewhat formidable rising in Macedonia, and to guard against the growing unrest in the Balkan States. While matters were in this stage active negotiations proceeded among the Powers, and a stop was temporarily put to hostilities on the part of Colonel Vassos by opening a brisk fire from the warships. The Continental Powers—Germany in particular—were anxious to take forcible steps against Greece forthwith, in order to compel her to evacuate the island; but Lord Salisbury made it an essential preliminary that the Powers should settle the future of Crete. In this he had the support of Italy, and to some extent that of Russia, which, since the death of Prince Lobanoff, had shown less disinclination to follow the lead of England in the Concert, and, in any case, was loth to take coercive steps against Greece. Lord Salisbury's argument was that the reforms agreed upon in the previous year were inadequate for the present situation, and suggested autonomy. Here the Prime Minister won a diplomatic success. On March 2nd a Note was presented to Greece by the Powers, informing the King that they had agreed upon these points: “(1) Crete cannot in any case, under present circumstances, be annexed to Greece. (2) In view of the delays caused by Turkey in the application of the reforms agreed upon in conjunction with the Ottoman Government, the Powers are resolved, while maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to confer upon Crete an absolutely autonomous *régime*, intended to assure the island a separate government under the high suzerainty of the Sultan.” The withdrawal of the Greek troops and ships was, therefore, demanded, and Greece was warned that, “in case of refusal, the Powers are irrevocably determined to hesitate at no measure of compulsion if, on the expiry of a period of six days, the withdrawal of the ships and troops has not been effected.” At the same time a Collective Note was handed

to the Porte, demanding complete autonomy for Crete, and giving assurances that the island would not be handed over to Greece. The Porte accepted this proposal under reservations, but Greece showed that she was in no hurry to be equally complaisant. By an unexpected chain of events the ironical situation was thus created that the Sultan had the Concert of Europe ostensibly with him in the prospect of coercing a Christian people. The Government and people of Greece, inflated with conceit and self-sufficiency, believing that they were more than a match for Turkey on sea and on land, and feeling sure that even if they were not, the Powers would not allow them to be again ruled from Constantinople, openly defied the Concert. A proposal made by M. Skouzes, that Colonel Vassos' force should be used as the nucleus of a new gendarmie, having been rejected by the Powers—though Lord Salisbury would have accepted it—an identic Note was sent out refusing to withdraw from Crete.

By this time Turkey had an army of fifty-five thousand men on the northern frontier of Greece, and the Greeks a somewhat larger force at the edge of the Thessalian Plain, and a fleet which, though small, was believed to be capable of clearing the seas of Turkish craft, and destroying any coast town within range of modern guns. Intoxicated by their own folly, the Athenians received the refusal of their Government to clear out of Crete with frantic approval and clamoured to be led against the Turk. The Powers, meanwhile, deliberated with the object of averting the impending war, or, if that became impossible, of localising the conflict. Lord Salisbury announced in the House of Lords that they had resolved upon a blockade of Crete, and associated himself with statements made the previous day by M. Hanotaux in the French Chamber. From this it appeared that the Powers were convinced of the necessity of maintaining the Concert; were agreed upon autonomy for Crete, under the suzerainty of the Sultan; the withdrawal of the Greek force; the concentration of the Turkish troops to the coast towns, and the reinforcements there of the detachments of European troops already landed. Each Power sent six hundred men to the island, and a strict blockade—which, it was understood, would be extended to the coast of Greece if desirable—was established. The admirals of the international fleet issued a proclamation to the Cretans, announcing the "irrevocable" decision of the Powers to grant complete autonomy, and ordering them to lay down their

arms. Neither side, however, did this. The Cretans did not want autonomy, but union with Greece; and until the arrival of further European troops, it was impossible to prevent the Turkish forces sallying out of the towns and giving battle. The most surprising feature of a confused situation was the coolness of the Sultan and the restraint he imposed upon his army and people. Though the Greeks were in a fever of excitement, the Turks maintained a significant calm. In the last week in March rifles went off more or less accidentally on the Greek frontier, and it became clear that a collision between the forces could not be averted. Turkey, however, seemed determined not to be the aggressor. On April 5th the Powers addressed a formal warning to the Greek Government and to the Porte, declaring that if either country took the aggressive it would be held responsible, and would not be allowed to derive any advantage from the results of the war. The warning had no effect upon Greece, who had the bit between her teeth. On the 8th a body of Greek irregulars crossed the frontier near Krania. Other bands followed and incursions into Epirus were made. They were driven off Turkish soil; but as the Greek army, under the Crown Prince Constantin, was in occupation of the Milouna Pass, the Sultan, on April 17th, declared war. He rightly placed responsibility on the shoulders of Greece, and, declaring that Turkey had no idea of conquest, offered to withdraw his troops if Greece would recall hers from the frontier and from Crete. In reply, the Greek Government ingeniously complained of Turkish aggression on the frontier, and sought to fasten responsibility for the rupture upon the Porte.

The Concert had failed to prevent war; but it had succeeded in making arrangements between the Powers by which the disturbance of the peace should be localised, neither the parties nor any other State derive advantage from the conflict, and by which Crete, in any event, should be relieved of the Turkish yoke. On the Opposition side of the House there was a strong feeling in favour of Greece, and a fatuous message, signed by one hundred members of the Liberal party, in and out of Parliament, was sent to the King, egging him on to war. On the motion for adjournment over the Easter vacation, Sir Wm. Harcourt, then leader of the Opposition in the Commons, criticised the Government for its part in the Concert. It appeared to him that its policy was to endorse whatever was decided upon by a majority of the Great Powers, and he complained

that the policy of this country should thus be placed in commission. Mr. Balfour replied that the central question was whether this country had done more for the interests of freedom and peace by associating itself with the rest of the Powers than it would have done had it remained in strict isolation. He claimed that it had, and pointed to the new era opened to Crete. If Sir Wm. Harcourt thought that the Government ought to have pursued a policy absolutely irrespective of the views, the wishes, or the interests of the Powers, the course was open to him to embody that opinion in a vote of censure. The challenge was declined.

Little attention was paid to Parliamentary discussions on the eve of war, and the extravagant sympathy of a section of the Opposition with Greece excited derision rather than approval. No one was satisfied with the Concert, under whose inability to control events the state of Crete had gone from bad to worse, notwithstanding the nominal concession of autonomy; but the majority believed that Greece had behaved with extreme foolishness and deserved to be chastised for rejecting the counsels of her friends. The punishment that befel her came quickly. In the first battle, on April 18th, her army was driven out of the Milouna Pass. Edhem Pasha encamped in the Plain of Thessaly. The valiant Greeks thereupon began to run. In hot haste they poured out of Larissa. The retreat became a rout, the army a panic-stricken mob. On Sunday morning, April 24th, the Turks entered the deserted city. The Greeks paused at Pharsalos and were there reorganised. At Velastinos they were in a strong position and ably commanded by General Smolenski—the one Greek commander who possessed the courage of a soldier and a grain of military ability, qualities in which the Crown Prince showed himself to be lamentably deficient. The Turkish forces, on April 30th, blundered here. Such was their confidence and impetuosity that a reconnaissance developed into a general attack. They expected the Greeks to flee like sheep, as they had done across the Larissa plain, but Smolenski handled them too well, and the Turks were repulsed. Then came a slight pause in the war. On May 4th, Edhem Pasha advanced on Pharsalos and Velestinos. Dividing his army into several divisions, he attacked the Greek line, which extended about thirty miles, from Volo to Pharsalos, by Velestinos. Only at the latter place was there anything deserving the name of a battle. The Turks were successful. The army at Pharsalos, under the Crown Prince, turned its back upon

the enemy, and retreated to Domokos. The advance guard of Edhem Pasha's forces punished the rear guard of the Greeks, but did not succeed in cutting off the Crown Prince's retreat. The Greeks were able, therefore, to take up their third line, from Domokos, on the southern road to Lamia, to Halmyros, near the sea. Domokos was a strong position, and the troops were well entrenched, but the incapacity of the generals, and the indiscipline of the forces, cost them another defeat. They abandoned their trenches, and fell back on a low ridge of hills a few miles south of Lamia. In Epirus they had done almost as badly as in Thessaly, and the fleet from which so much was expected achieved nothing more than an ineffective bombardment of Prevesa, Platamona and Katerina. Salonica, a city which ranks next in importance in the Turkish Empire to the capital, was unmolested, though absolutely at the mercy of the Greek vessels. Why it was not attacked is a conundrum none outside the palace at Athens and its habitual frequenters can answer. On May 19th the Turks engaged the enemy south of Lamia. The battle had not proceeded far when the Crown Prince saved his army the unnecessary fatigue of running away again by hoisting the white flag, and sending a flag of truce into the Turkish lines. On the 20th a fifteen days' truce was arranged.

While Greece was taking her necessary punishment Lord Salisbury watched and waited for an opportunity to intervene in the interests of peace. The King of Greece paved the way by getting rid of M. Delyannis and the War Ministry, and the new Government, under M. Ralli, intimated to the Ambassadors that the Greek troops in Crete would be withdrawn, and that the mediation of the Powers would be acceptable. His Majesty having complied as far as was then practicable with the essential preliminary of recalling the forces from Crete, Lord Salisbury undertook negotiations for an armistice. The Powers were in accord with him, with the exception of Germany, who had taken a more severe view of the Greek transgression than her colleagues in the Concert. The German Emperor demanded that Greece should bind herself, as a condition on which mediation on her behalf should be exercised by the Powers, to accept autonomy for Crete. Lord Salisbury, and with him Italy, Russia and France, did not think this necessary, and the Greek Government declined to comply. The effect was to produce delay in the negotiations, and to bring the Turkish army further south. The German Emperor, however, would not budge, and the Powers had to

persuade Greece to give the pledge. On May 10th, therefore, the German Minister at Athens was informed that the King accepted the autonomous constitution for Crete, as settled by the Powers. On the succeeding day the formal offer of mediation was made and accepted. On May 12th the Powers sent a Collective Note to the Porte, setting forth the fact that the Cabinet at Athens had confided Hellenic interests to the Concert, would evacuate Crete and recognise the autonomous *régime*. The Powers, therefore, requested a suspension of hostilities, with a view of settling the basis of an armistice. They made an "appeal to the pacific sentiments of the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan," and hoped that immediate orders would be given to the Ottoman commanders to arrest all offensive movements. Though joining in this humble request to the Sultan, Lord Salisbury instructed Sir Philip Currie not to take part in any arrangement under which Greek communities would be placed under the Sultan's Government. This reservation did not, he explained, exclude a strategical rectification of the frontier; but it did exclude "any plan for leaving Greek communities, conquered in this war, as a pledge for the payment of any indemnity."

The Sultan asked more than he expected to get. He demanded free communication with the Turkish forces by sea, *via* Volo and Preveza; restoration of the old frontier line, Turkey thus recovering what she had been compelled to present to Greece under the Treaty of Berlin; an indemnity of ten million liras; treaty revision between Turkey and Greece; and an extradition treaty for criminals at common law. The terms were entirely inadmissible. Even in Berlin they were regarded with disfavour. Russia, whose policy since the death of Prince Lobanoff had been far less obstructive, found herself in complete accord with Lord Salisbury in the view that Thessaly—the fairest portion of Greece—should not be suffered to pass to Turkey, and that the indemnity was utterly disproportionate to the financial ability of the country. Turkey, when declaring war, had affirmed that she had no idea of conquest, and to that pledge the Concert was determined she should rigidly be held. The Porte was informed that in no case would anything more than a strategical rectification of the frontier be allowed, and that no indemnity could be imposed impracticable for Greece to discharge. Finding that on this occasion there was no member of the Concert who could be played off against the others, the Sultan gave way to the extent of ordering a cessation of hostilities. An armistice

was arranged on June 4th, and nearly a month was spent in haggling at Constantinople about the amount of the indemnity. It was found impossible to induce the Sultan to accept less than £T4,000,000, and this sum was eventually agreed upon. The next step was to provide the money. A Commission was appointed by the Powers for the hypothecation of Greek revenues, and another for the delimitation of the new frontier. Finally, a definitive Treaty of Peace was signed at Constantinople, on November 22nd; and in March of the following year, the Powers guaranteeing the independence of Greece—Great Britain, France and Russia—signed a Loan Convention with Greece, providing for the payment of the indemnity. Turkey had obtained an advance on account from the Ottoman Bank, and made arrangements to spend it on ironclads and war material; but Russia interposed, and warned the Sultan that if any part of the money were spent on new armaments, the arrears of the Russo-Turkish war indemnity would be demanded.

While these matters were being arranged, the Powers proceeded in a half-hearted way with the pacification of Crete. The Greek troops had been entirely withdrawn by the end of May. The first need of the island was a Governor-General, capable of putting the promised autonomous *régime* into operation. The Powers developed a strange indisposition to come to terms, either upon the person to be appointed or the conditions under which he should work. Lord Salisbury was prepared to agree upon anybody acceptable to the other Powers, provided that an Ottoman subject was not chosen; but Germany and Austria were indifferent upon that point, and inclined to favour the views of the Sultan, to whose mind autonomy meant something very different from what it signified to Lord Salisbury and the Czar. France put forward the late M. Numa Droz, a former president of the Swiss Confederation; but when this candidature was almost agreed upon, M. Droz withdrew, partly from a disinclination to undertake so thankless a task and partly from reasons of health. Then Colonel Schäfer, a native of Luxembourg, was put forward by Austria, and after interminable debate was not chosen. Meanwhile the deportation of the Greek forces had given Christians and Turks alike an opportunity to renew their old feuds. Our consul, Sir Alfred Bilotti, who, throughout the Cretan troubles, displayed remarkable energy, ability and personal courage, urged that the withdrawal of the Turkish troops would alone bring peace to the island.

Turkey, on the other hand, proposed to put an end to the recrudescence of disorder, since the Powers had not done so, by sending strong reinforcements to the Ottoman garrisons. The Powers protested against this. The Sultan naturally demanded an immediate settlement of the future of Crete. As the Concert made no progress to this end, rumours of the despatch of fresh Turkish troops became current. Lord Salisbury acted for himself, and risked the disapproval of the Concert by instructing the British Admiral to oppose the landing of Turkish troops by force. The other Powers approved of what he had done, and issued like instructions to their admirals. August and September were fruitless, if not idle, months, so far as Crete was concerned, the settlement of the Treaty of Peace between Turkey and Greece absorbing the energies of the Powers. The only point to notice—and it is significant, in view of subsequent events—is the acceptance of autonomy by the Christian Cretans, subject to the total withdrawal of the Turkish forces. Not until the end of October was the question of the choice of a governor again attacked. Russia took the lead by proposing Caratheodores Bey, Turkish Minister at Brussels; or Mavroyem Bey, a former Turkish Minister to the United States; or Bojo Petrovitch, cousin of the Prince of Montenegro. Lord Salisbury demurred to the Ottoman subjects but was willing to accept the Montenegrin. Bojo was, however, too useful to the Prince of Montenegro, and the candidature fell through.

Finally, on December 29th, Russia made a proposal, which for obvious reasons she had hesitated to put forward while a Turkish army was encamped on the soil of Greece, within striking distance of Athens. She proposed Prince George of Greece. Not only, she argued, would the aspirations of the Cretans be fulfilled, but a stop be put to the agitation in Greece. Lord Salisbury had "much pleasure in supporting the candidature." France and Italy had no objections to make; but Germany and Austria strongly disagreed. The German Emperor had not forgiven Greece for the Vassos raid, and for flouting the Powers. He could not, he said, conceive a worse candidate than the Prince, who had aimed at the annexation of Crete to Greece. The appointment would lead to annexation; and then the Balkan States—which had only been kept quiet during the Turko-Greek war by fear of the Powers—would demand compensation. Germany thought—or found it in the interest

of her growing friendship with the Sultan to pretend to think—that the candidature would thus produce exactly those complications which it had been the aim of the Concert since 1895 to prevent. Austria, too, was “strongly convinced that it would certainly not be accepted by the Porte,” and should on that account be dropped. The prospects of agreement were then hopeless. The year closed with “the incoherent federation of Europe”—as Lord Salisbury had called the Concert at the Guildhall Banquet—powerless to act. In that speech the Prime Minister had made a caustic apology for its failures. That it did so little was no one’s fault. The responsibility was with its construction and nature, not with any individual Government. The history of the past year was that they had failed to prevent Greece from going to war; but, with that unlucky exception, they had succeeded in preserving the peace of Europe. Had the Concert not existed the small Slavonic States would have rushed in and joined the war; the correctness of their behaviour was due to the co-operation of the Powers. He pleaded for patience with regard to Crete. If the Concert had not been formed and if it had not held together no single Power could have done its work. “If any one European Power had tried, in the teeth of all the others, to settle by itself the problem which the Concert undertook, the only result would have been a bloody and desolating war.” In this opinion the country at large had shared. There were no serious attacks upon the slow and cautious policy of the Ministry. Lord Salisbury had settled the public mind at the annual demonstration of the Primrose League in May, when he described the main purpose of the Concert as the prevention of any territorial conflict between the Great Powers in South Eastern Europe. Again, in a speech at the Junior Constitutional Club, while condemning those members of the House of Commons who had signed the address to the King of Greece and declaring them to be deeply guilty of the blood that had been shed, he showed that while his sympathies were with Christians so far as refusing to sanction Christian communities falling under the government of the Sultan, the guiding principle of his policy was to subordinate personal predilections to the maintenance of the peace of the world. The public knew that it was not Lord Salisbury’s fault that the Concert had not been more effective. They were satisfied with his explanations of its object and were content to trust to his judgment that the wisest course was to work with the other Powers

rather than independently of them. Opposition politicians did not therefore arouse enthusiasm in the country by their complaints that Lord Salisbury had allowed England to be dragged at the heels of the three Emperors. They were hopelessly divided, and though Mr. Morley, later in the year, made a vigorous attack upon Lord Salisbury, pointing to the state of Armenia and "crushed and ruined Greece" as the outcome of "one of the most unfortunate and deplorable chapters in the whole history of British diplomacy," he dissociated himself from those of his party who had encouraged Greece "to fling herself into war with the Turk." Sir Edward Grey—the one man in the Liberal Party in the Commons who has won a reputation by the exercise of a broad and sagacious judgment on questions of foreign policy—declined to follow Mr. Morley. He was not one of those who thought Lord Salisbury should have left the Concert. He believed that the autonomy of Crete would in time be attained. He did justice to Lord Salisbury's efforts within the Concert to help the weaker and Christian races, and though he complained that the results had not been adequate to their hopes, and that Lord Salisbury had too easily reconciled himself to a pessimistic view of the situation, he found no serious fault with the Government.

At the beginning of 1898 the Concert was still stationary. Turkey had cleared out of Thessaly and endeavoured to tighten her grip of Crete. In view of the strongly hostile feeling of the Sultan, Russia was not prepared to enforce her candidature of Prince George. In February Sir Philip Currie summed up the situation by saying that unless Russia employed stronger pressure upon the Sultan or encouraged the Cretans to set the Turkish Government at defiance and proclaim Prince George or annexation, it seemed likely that the Cretan Question would drag on indefinitely. It did so until March 11th, when the German Emperor walked into the British Embassy at Berlin to "lay down his flute." He conversed with his usual charm on many subjects, wrote Sir F. Lascelles, and then declared that he would play no longer in the orchestra. Asked whether he withdrew entirely from the European Concert on the Cretan Question he replied in the affirmative. He had made proposals and they had been disregarded—had not even been considered—and the dignity of Germany did not permit her to continue discussions that led to no results. He had no interests in the Mediterranean and the Powers that had might make any

arrangements they pleased. He would neither oppose nor approve the candidature of Prince George, nor any other. A year before he had proposed the blockade of the Piræus, which would have prevented the war. This idea had been rejected. Then again he had suggested that the matter should be left to the decision of two of the Powers; and this had been disregarded. Hence he wished to have nothing more to do with the subject. Eight days later Count Deym called upon Lord Salisbury and informed him that in view of the deadlock Austria-Hungary had reconsidered her position. Having regard to the conflicting views on the subject of the choice of a Governor for Crete and the promotion of the candidature of Prince George, Austria-Hungary had decided to withdraw her military contingent from Crete and retire from active participation in the Concert.

The Concert was thus reduced to four. It became moribund. The Sultan took advantage of its lethargy to protest with renewed energy against the selection of Prince George. Meanwhile the state of the island again became worse and the Admirals of the remaining Powers called for an immediate augmentation of their land forces, which then stood at two thousand five hundred. They urged the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, of whom there were four thousand five hundred in Canea alone, and the immediate withdrawal of half of them, with their commander, Djevad Pasha, pointing out that if this were not done they would probably find themselves in conflict with the Ottoman forces. The reduced Concert thought over this from April to June and then instructed the Admirals to proceed to apply the principles of autonomy to the island. The Porte had, of course, declined to recall the troops and wished to send reinforcements. The Admirals set to work upon the seemingly hopeless task of organising the administration of the island on an autonomous basis. Matters dragged on in a deplorable manner until September 6th, when a British force was attacked by the Mussulmans at Candia, an officer and seven privates of the Highland Light Infantry being killed, two officers and twenty-seven privates wounded, and four men of H.M.S. Hazard killed and fifteen wounded. The attack led to general fighting in the town, and as the Moslems were enormously in the majority, hundreds of Christians were slain. Admiral Noel courageously took the initiative, acting with a sailor-like decision and thoroughness that shocked the diplomatists and delighted the English people.

He bombarded the town and thus restored order; and he delivered an ultimatum to the Turkish Governor demanding the removal of the troops and the disarmament of the Mussulmans.

Lord Salisbury immediately sent reinforcements to Crete, and informed Russia that if the Powers took no effective action England would act alone. Russia had no desire that she should do so and promptly agreed to insist upon the withdrawal of the Turkish forces. The Concert was thus revived and compelled by events to take the problem in hand. Lord Salisbury presented it with Admiral Noel's ultimatum to the Sultan, and suggested as a method of coercion that each of the four Powers should if necessary remove the Turkish troops from the district assigned to its control. The Powers agreed. On October 4th a Note was signed by the Ambassadors, at Constantinople, and delivered to the Porte the following day, demanding the withdrawal of the Turkish forces and functionaries, and the entrustment of the island to the four Powers, who guaranteed the suzerain rights of the Sultan, and the lives and interests of both Christians and Mussulmans. The Porte was warned that if these demands were not complied with other steps would be taken. Eight days were given to the Porte for an unqualified adhesion to the conditions of withdrawal, which were that the deportation of the troops was to begin within a fortnight from the day the Note was presented, and be completed within a month. The Porte pleaded for the retention of a few Turkish battalions in fortresses near the coast—merely as an emblem of the sovereign rights of the Sultan; but no heed was paid to this. On October 14th the Sultan replied to the Collective Note in evasive generalities, insisting upon the right of leaving garrisons in the fortified towns. The Powers demanded a reply without reservations, but hesitated to proceed to extremities. On October 20th the Sultan yielded, adding an expression of confidence that the Powers would maintain the sacred rights of Turkey over the island and protect the rights and interests of the Mussulmans. The deportation of troops forthwith commenced. On November 5th Admiral Noel took over the civil administration of Candia; and, as the Turkish troops still lingered, announced that force would be used against them at noon. The Commander gave in at that hour, and his men were escorted by British troops to the harbour.

The Admirals of the four Powers were now the provisional governors of the island and the Turkish flag on the fortifications was the only sign of Ottoman ownership. Russia forthwith revived

the candidature of Prince George, "for," wrote Count Lamsdorff, "it would give satisfaction to the Cretans and he is the only candidate they are likely to accept." Moreover the Cretans would probably themselves proclaim the Prince as Governor. The Powers agreed and the Porte made ineffectual protest. Tewfik Pasha recalled the circumstances of Prince George's raid on the island at the head of a Greek squadron, and declared that the Porte's acceptance of autonomy had been conditional on the similarity of the new *régime* to that at Samos and in the Lebanon, and that the Governor, "who, in any case, must be some other than Prince George," should be appointed by the Sultan with the consent of the Powers. This perversion of the facts was repudiated and the Sultan was informed that the Governor would be the Commissioner of the four Powers. In order to provide Crete with funds for the installation of a Governor, and the initiation of an autonomous Government, Russia proposed that each of the four Powers should set apart a thousand francs. This being agreed to, the appointment was offered to Prince George, and accepted by him. The conditions were that the appointment was for three years, that the suzerainty of the Sultan should be recognised, that the National Assembly should be convoked and an autonomous government established, and a gendarmerie and militia organised capable of guaranteeing order. A million francs were advanced on the security of the Cretan revenues for the initial expenses, and the salary was fixed at a hundred and fifty thousand francs annually.

The news of these events was received with delight by the Christians and distrust by the Moslems in the island. Large numbers of the latter left. Prince George arrived on December 21st, 1898, and was received with every demonstration of joy. With the formal transfer of the administration to him, the task of the Powers proved to be at an end. Peace fell upon the distracted population. The Moslem emigration gradually ceased, many of the fugitives being glad to return, and the island entered upon an era of political liberty and general prosperity such as it could never have enjoyed under Ottoman rule. Failure to secure reasonably good government for the Armenians had in part been compensated for by success in Crete. And for this result greater credit attaches to Lord Salisbury and the English Cabinet than to all the other parties to the proceedings of the Concert.

BOOK II.

ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER I.

THE GUIANA-VENEZUELA BOUNDARY.

Mr. Cleveland's Message—An Unheeded Warning—Arrogant Interference—Public Bewilderment—Mr. Olney's Despatch—The Monroe Doctrine—Republican Horror of Monarchies—Lord Salisbury's two Despatches—Rejection of the American Demand—A Justification of England's Policy towards Venezuela—A Serious Deadlock—Coolness of the English People—The Violence of the American Press—A Panic in Wall Street—Subsidence of American excitement.

ON the morning of December 18th, 1895, the public were dazed by the astounding news that the United States—of all nations in the world—had threatened England with war. A greater shock of surprise had never come upon the people since they had learned to depend upon the Press for knowledge of the course of diplomacy. Yet the strange and offensive message of Mr. Cleveland, and the still more singular and objectionable Despatch by Mr. Richard Olney, the State Secretary, which was at the same time communicated to Congress, had been preceded by a warning of sufficient significance to the few who knew anything of the boundary dispute between us and the Venezuelan Republic. In his ordinary Message to Congress, earlier in the month, Mr. Cleveland had referred to the question in language of much gravity. He told the world that in the preceding July a Despatch had been sent to the British Government, distinctly setting forth the attitude of the United States; and he defined his position as one of firm opposition to the forcible increase by any European Power of its territorial possessions on the American continent. The United States, he said, were bound to protest against any enlargement of the area of British Guiana in derogation of the rights of Venezuela; and

that, considering the disparity of strength between Venezuela and Great Britain, the dispute could only be settled by arbitration. Therefore the British Government had been called upon for a definite answer to the question whether they would submit the territorial controversy to impartial arbitration, and a reply to this demand was shortly expected.

The impertinent assumption in this deliverance that England was in the wrong, and that she had endeavoured to wrest territory from Venezuela in defiance of justice and of right, the assertion of a United States claim to intervene between us and Venezuela simply because we as well as that Republic were the owners of South American territory, and the menace implied in the demand that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration would have imperilled the peace had they appeared in an official statement from the head of any other nation. But coming from the then President of the United States they passed almost unnoticed. Such attention as was paid to them was not untinged by contempt. It was felt that this was another move in the sordid game of American domestic politics, that President Cleveland was making a party bid for the Irish-American vote in the forthcoming Presidential Election, and that for this reason he was once more engaged in the harmless pastime of twisting the lion's tail. Very few knew anything of the subject of which he spoke. Men of culture remembered that Guiana was intimately associated with the brilliant life and tragic death of Raleigh; the public had a vague idea that it was a tropical land where sugar was grown; and the average politician was no better informed. Nor was the acquisition of knowledge greatly stimulated by Mr. Cleveland's original reference to the controversy. His sentences were read by careless eyes; his warning fell upon ears that had been deafened by the hostile screeching of the American eagle, and had learned by experience that the best way of treating United States politicians, whenever they had anything to say on English policy, was to ignore them: they were certain to be wrong in their appreciation of our intentions, and their bluster was equally sure to be harmless.

By his Special Message of December 17th President Cleveland showed that whether he was right or wrong in his facts and assumptions he was determined that on this occasion attention should be paid to his arrogance. Lord Salisbury had declined to submit the controversy to arbitration—for reasons which shall be

set out later. He had denied the applicability of the Monroe doctrine to the dispute with Venezuela. He had, in effect, told the United States that the matter was not one in which they were concerned and that their claim to interfere was inadmissible. His answer was precisely what Mr. Cleveland wanted, if it be assumed that the desire of the latter was to provoke an acute controversy with England in his own political interests, in those of the Democratic party, and for the benefit of American concessionaires who had been presented with tracts of British Guiana territory by the Venezuelan Government, and for whose enterprises large financial support had conditionally been obtained in the United States. The President therefore set forth a new and extended version of the Monroe doctrine, and finished his Message in paragraphs of unexampled menace from the head of a kindred State, against which no offence had been committed. Being now finally apprised of Great Britain's refusal to submit the dispute to arbitration, "nothing remained but to accept the situation, to recognise its plain requirements, and to deal with it accordingly. . . . The dispute has reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its justification what is the true divisional line between Venezuela and British Guiana. An inquiry to that end should, of course, be conducted carefully and judicially, and due weight should be given to all available evidence, records and facts in support of the claims of both parties. In order that such examination should be prosecuted in a thorough and satisfactory manner, I suggest that Congress make an adequate appropriation for the expenses of a Commission, to be appointed by the Executive, who shall make the necessary investigation, and report upon the matter with the least possible delay. When such report is made and accepted it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands, or the exercise of Governmental jurisdiction over any territory, which, after investigation, we have determined of right to belong to Venezuela. In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realise all the consequences that may follow. I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that, while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being other-

wise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilisation, and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which follows supine submission to wrong and injustice, and a consequent loss of national self-respect and honour, beneath which are shielded and defended the peoples' safety and greatness."

The English people were bewildered by the mingled insolence and unction of these passages. What had Lord Salisbury done to be flouted thus by Mr. Cleveland—the creature of a Caucus, the fleeting phantom of the American system? What in the name of common sense, not to speak of statesmanship, had the United States to do with a paltry and vexatious boundary dispute with a petty Republic of half-breeds south of the Isthmus? Whence did they derive the right to interfere in our affairs and settle them over our heads? The practical instincts of our people drove them to the despatches for a key to the puzzle. They found a document of appalling length from Mr. Richard Olney and two from Lord Salisbury. The composition of the first must have occupied Mr. Olney from the time he became State Secretary, on June 7th, until the eve of its transmission, on July 20th. New brooms sweep clean. This was the first important despatch he had had to write in his life, the first which offered an opportunity to carry the name of Olney into the Courts and Chancelleries of Europe and set at work the tongues and pens of the peoples of the old world and the new; and he had determined that his task should be superlatively well done. The most voluminous despatch in the history of modern diplomacy sufficiently attests his industry and gives him a title to remembrance outside the United States. But, in comparison with the work of the great despatch writers of our time, every line of the document reveals the amateur at statecraft. Half of it purports to be an account of the dispute—an unravelling of the tangled skein of claims and counter claims and successive offers by Great Britain of a basis of settlement. Though there is a laborious attempt at impartiality, the narrative of the origin and cause of the quarrel discloses a pronounced bias against England. Written as it was under Venezuelan inspiration, and largely upon data furnished by that Republic, this was but natural and to some extent excusable. As an exposition of the case the first portion of the despatch is historically worthless. Professionally accustomed as he is to the sifting and weighing of evidence, Mr. Olney, if he has mastered the

proceedings of the Arbitration Tribunal, will probably admit that this verdict is not unjust. Time need not, therefore, be wasted upon his version of the controversy. What is of moment is the reasoning by which he brought it within the compass of the Monroe doctrine.

Before, however, we come to that, let us see exactly what the Monroe doctrine is. It was borrowed by President Monroe from George Canning's idea of opposing the Holy Alliance of the Catholic Powers in Europe against the revolted Spanish colonies. In a farewell Message to Congress in 1823 the President pointed out that the political system of the allied Powers was essentially different from that of America, and that this difference proceeded from that which existed in their respective Governments. And he continued: "We owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." The policy of the United States towards the Powers of Europe was "frank, firm, and manly"; but circumstances in regard to the continents of Europe and America were eminently and conspicuously different. "It is impossible that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

That is the Monroe doctrine—a pious opinion by Mr. Monroe, in 1823, that any extension of the existing possessions of the Monarchical Powers of Europe on the American continent would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. An interesting pronouncement, no doubt, but not a canon of inter-

national law. This is what Mr. Olney tried to make of it. American non-intervention in European affairs, he said, (the States had not then interfered in the affairs of Spain) necessarily implied European non-interference in American affairs. Our efforts to get Venezuela to agree upon a definitive boundary he treated as such an interference—as an extension of a Monarchical system of Government to territory intended by Providence for a Republican system. This appeared to be the real ground for intervention—not so much that England was doing Venezuela an injustice, though that was assumed, but that England was a Monarchy, and that in the American hemisphere Monarchies were in conflict with the laws of the universe. Why a Monarchical Power should not own territory in America Mr. Olney did not say; but he was sure that an effort to define existing possessions, such as England was making, was an attempt at extension, and that extension was against the Monroe doctrine, to which there belonged a peculiar sanctity and as much elasticity of interpretation as any American Administration cared to give it. Residents in Monarchical countries will find some difficulty in appreciating Mr. Olney's horror lest Monarchical Powers already established in South America—and Holland has no inconsiderable colony next door to our own—should consolidate, or, as he would have said, extend their rule over unpeopled forests and savannas; but the feeling is to be comprehended if an effort is made to estimate the lofty scorn with which the American variety of Republican regards Monarchical institutions. Another line of Mr. Olney's argument is quite as hard to follow. It was that British Guiana should be entirely differentiated from Great Britain, and that if the boundary question could not be settled otherwise than by force, British Guiana, of her own resources, should be left to make terms with Venezuela. A point like this gives the true measure of Mr. Olney's intellectual capacity. He had not grasped the principle that British Guiana or any other colony is as much a part of the British Empire as the County of Middlesex, and that a colony is entitled to the benefit of the entire resources of the Mother country in any just cause even as any part of Great Britain would be. Having made these and other points, and having shown plainly enough that he believed Great Britain to be land-grabbing at the expense of Venezuela, he demanded a definite decision whether the British Government would submit the question of the boundary to arbitration, and

concluded with a clumsily veiled threat that a negative answer would greatly embarrass the future relations between the United States and Great Britain.

Lord Salisbury seems to have been in no hurry to reply to this blundering and dictatorial communication. Whatever official or unofficial negotiations may have taken place, it was not until November 26th that a formal answer was sent. This took the form of two despatches—one dealing with the United States claim to interference on the basis of the Monroe doctrine, and the other with Mr. Olney's errors in the presentation of the facts of the dispute, and declining to consent to arbitration. During his career at the Foreign Office Lord Salisbury has produced many despatches remarkable for their lucidity, their closeness of reasoning, the power and dignity of their language; but there are few better examples than are furnished by these two documents. In the first Lord Salisbury pointed out that the Monroe doctrine had in Mr. Olney's hands undergone a very notable development. It had no applicability to the state of things at the present day. There was now no danger of any Holy Alliance imposing its system of government upon any part of the American Continent. No European State regarded America as a fit object of European colonisation—a point that scarcely fitted with the facts of German ambition to acquire the southern portion of Brazil. The United States had no apparent practical concern in the boundary dispute, which affected only Venezuela and Great Britain. The sole issue was the determination of the frontier of a British possession which belonged to England years before the Republic of Venezuela came into existence. Lord Salisbury quoted passages from Mr. Olney's despatch to the effect that the three thousand miles of ocean between Europe and America made political union between Europe and portions of American territory unnatural and inexpedient; that thus far the United States had been spared the burdens and evils of immense standing armies, but that "with the Powers of Europe permanently encamped on American soil the ideal conditions we have thus far enjoyed cannot be expected to continue." To these extraordinary and singularly shortsighted views—having regard to the effects upon American policy of the war with Spain—Lord Salisbury made answer that the necessary meaning of Mr. Olney's words was that the unions between Great Britain and Canada and Great Britain and her Colonies in the Western Hemisphere were "inexpedient and unnatural." President Monroe, he

continued, expressly disclaimed such an inference; he excluded from consideration the existing possessions of European Powers; but Mr. Olney "lays down that the inexpedient and unnatural character of the union between a European and American is so obvious that it 'will hardly be denied.' Her Majesty's Government are prepared emphatically to deny it on behalf of both the British and American people who are subject to her Crown. They maintain that the union between Great Britain and her territories in the Western Hemisphere is both natural and expedient. They fully concur with the view which President Monroe apparently entertained, that any disturbance of the existing territorial distribution in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions on the part of any European State would be a highly inexpedient change. But they are not prepared to admit that the recognition of that expediency is clothed with the sanction which belongs to a doctrine of international law. They are not prepared to admit that the interests of the United States are necessarily concerned in every frontier dispute which may arise between any two of the States that possess dominion in the Western Hemisphere; and still less can they accept the doctrine that the United States is entitled to claim that the process of arbitration shall be applied to any demand for the surrender of territory which one of those States may make against another."

In the second despatch the Prime Minister set Mr. Olney right as to facts and inferences other than those relating to the Monroe doctrine, and proceeded to say that when the internal policies of Venezuela were settled on a more durable basis (there had lately been another revolution), Her Majesty's Government hoped to be able to adopt a more conciliatory course than that of their predecessors. They were sincerely desirous of being on friendly relations with Venezuela, and "certainly have no design to seize territory that properly belongs to her, or forcibly to extend sovereignty over any portion of her population." On the contrary they had repeatedly expressed their willingness to submit the conflict of claim to arbitration. "But"—he went on—"they cannot consent to entertain, or to submit to the arbitration of another Power, or of foreign jurists, however eminent, claims based on the extravagant pretensions of Spanish officials in the last century, and involving the transfer of large numbers of British subjects, who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of a British colony, to a nation of different race and language, whose

political system is subject to frequent disturbance, and whose institutions as yet too often afford inadequate protection to life and property. No issue of this description has ever been involved in the questions which Great Britain and the United States have consented to submit to arbitration, and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that in similar circumstances the Government of the United States would be equally firm in declining to entertain proposals of such a nature."

The deadlock was thus of a most serious nature. The United States had gratuitously interfered in a matter in which it had no direct concern, except in so far as it was the business of the Government to protect the legitimate interests of American adventurers who had been given worthless concessions by the Venezuelan authorities. It had cloaked that interference by a version of the Monroe doctrine for which justification cannot be found in the language of its author and the circumstances of the time in which it was uttered. Great Britain had been treated as though her superior strength was to be used against Venezuela to make good a theft of Venezuelan soil, and impose the hateful sovereignty of a Monarchy upon free Republicans—of the South American variety, to whom politics is synonymous with revolution, and office depends upon the successful employment of the revolver of the bravado and the knife of the assassin. A certain course had been demanded—that of arbitration—and a clumsy threat made that dire consequences would ensue if that demand did not meet with compliance. Lord Salisbury had rejected the demand and by ignoring the threat had invited the consequences. That being the position, Mr. Cleveland had in a special Message committed anew the faults of reasoning and of manner in Mr. Olney's despatch, and had stated the menace in a fresh and more pointed form.

The English people preserved an admirable and, to fire-eating Americans, an exasperating coolness. Though angered and annoyed at the dictatorial insolence of Mr. Olney and Mr. Cleveland, they resolutely refused to excite themselves or to believe that blood must be spilled. They recoiled with horror from the thought of a fratricidal struggle which would be due to nothing but the base suspicions, the incompetence, and the unmannerly language of American politicians. Unfortunately, their mood was not shared by the bulk of the American people. The cheers which greeted the reading of the special Message in the Senate were taken up

outside and developed into yells of execration of the English. No State in the world possesses a Press so enterprising, and withal so contemptible, as that of America. With a few honourable exceptions the newspapers of the States pandered to the passions of the ignorant and piled fuel upon the flames of anti-English sentiment. For a few days it seemed that the majority of Americans had gone mad with hatred of the people from whom many of them had sprung. But the voice of reason was heard above the din, and the cautious and reflective condemned the Message in decisive terms. Business fell off alarmingly; and on Friday, December 20th, a panic occurred in Wall Street, which brought the depreciation of American securities to a level lower by eighty millions sterling than that at which they had stood before Mr. Cleveland's blunder. From that moment there commenced a startling transformation of American opinion, and the prospect of war receded almost as suddenly as it had advanced.

CHAPTER II.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE.

The Guiana Coast—Early Dutch Visits—Seventeenth Century Settlements—The Spaniards of the Orinoco—The Franciscan and Capuchin Missions—Father Strickland's Researches—Extent of Dutch Occupation—Area of the Spanish Missions—British Acquisition from the Dutch—Sir R. Schomburgk's Travels—The Provisional Boundary—Diplomatic Negotiations—The Agreement of 1850—Venezuelan Violations—Wrongful Concession to American Adventurers—The Story of the Negotiations—Diplomatic Relations with Venezuela Suspended—American Intervention.


UNLESS there chanced to be men of our race aboard the Dutch vessels that sailed along the northern coast of South America at the dawn of the sixteenth century, Raleigh was the first Englishman whose eyes rested upon the muddy seas and black and forbidding line of Courida bush where Guiana merges into the ocean. Anything more dismal and repelling than the first sight of the mainland can hardly be imagined. The golden brilliancy of the tropical sunlight does but intensify the dreary monotony of the scene. One marvels that the Dutch navigators should have had the courage to discover the river mouths and pass beyond the malarious swamps—that they did not turn the bows of their vessels and tack away from the ugly shores and dirty seas to the opalescent waters and forest-clad mountains of the Antilles. A glorious land of mountain and valley beyond rewarded the perseverance of the early adventurers. With the aborigines they opened up a trifling trade in forest products. The Spaniards were doing much the same at and above the mouth of Orinoco. In 1596 they settled at an Indian village on the south bank, near the mouth, to which they gave the name of Santo Thomé. When the Dutch navigators first established settlements is an obscure and unimportant point; but they appear to have frequented the coast towards the end of the century. Spanish documents show that there were three or four Dutch settlements south of the Orinoco in 1613—apparently on the Essequibo river. At any rate, in 1621, when the Dutch West India Company

was formed for the colonisation of the Indies, these settlers were made the nucleus of the colony. During the Thirty Years' war the Dutch dominated the Guiana coast. Their settlements were undisturbed by the Spaniards, who remained stationary at St. Thomé; and they had a fort at the confluence of the Mazurini and Cuyuni with the Essequibo, which they named Kijk-over-al—"See-over-all." From this stronghold they penetrated into the country towards the Orinoco and the sea, and established such relations of alliance with the Indians that they twice attacked St. Thomé—on the second occasion sacking it—and also raided the island of Trinidad, burning the Spanish settlements there. These and other acts of war were terminated by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648; and by the Treaty of Munster the Netherlands obtained recognition of their independence, and were confirmed in their colonial possessions and any extensions they might acquire in unappropriated regions. The Dutch strengthened their hold upon Guiana, establishing further forts on the coast. A settlement on the Pomeroon was created, with a separate Government; and from this point jurisdiction was exercised over the country as far as the mouth of the Orinoco. Meanwhile there had been an advance in territory between the Orinoco and Essequibo. Periodical visits were made to the Savannah country in the upper reaches of the Cuyuni; tribal quarrels in these far-off regions were interfered with in the name of the Dutch Government, and trade was conducted with the Indians. There is documentary evidence that in 1703 the Dutch had a post up the Cuyuni six weeks' journey by boat from Kijk-over-al Fort. From barter with the natives they proceeded to lay down plantations, and during the seventeenth century the settlement of small agricultural communities considerably increased, the whites working by the aid of negro slaves.

Throughout these years the Spaniards still remained at St. Thomé. Even as late as 1720 an official Spanish account shows that "there were but twenty or twenty-five houses occupied by as many inhabitants, deprived of all human assistance, and with no means whatever to clear the dense forest that surrounds the place." The Spanish authorities knew, of course, of the Dutch settlements; Spanish documents speak of Dutch colonies named after the principal rivers—the Essequibo, the Demerara and the Berbice. But it was not until 1734 that the Spaniards on the Orinoco sought, through the agency of the Franciscan Fathers and the Capuchins, to establish

settlements towards the Dutch sphere south of the Orinoco. This was an absolutely unknown land to them, as it was also to the Dutch, who had not penetrated farther than the Cuyuni basin, where, however, as has been seen, they had established a post. The unexplored territory was roughly divided between the two Orders. The Franciscans were to push from the Orinoco towards the upper waters of the Amazon; while the Capuchins were to work away from them in the direction of the sea. Thus the first extension of Spain south of the Orinoco was begun. Nineteen years passed, and so little had been done that a Spanish Commissioner charged with the duty of marking out a frontier between the Guayana province and the Portuguese possessions on the Amazon had an enquiry made by one of his staff, a Spanish colonel, as to the distance between the Capuchin missions and the Dutch settlements. Colonel Alvarado reported that he could find no Spanish settlements in the intervening tract, that he had searched rivers flowing into the Yuruari, but that, for political reasons, and lest he should arouse the suspicions of the Dutch, he did not attempt to penetrate the country as far as the Cuyuni. Clearly, therefore, the Spaniards of 1755 regarded the Dutch settlements as rightfully extending into the Cuyuni basin. Spanish records confess an entire ignorance of the interior accessible from the right bank of the Orinoco. Indeed as late as 1761 an official report to Spain declared that no intelligent person had gone into its fastnesses and that even the Capuchin Fathers of Catalonia—who eventually came into contact with the Dutch—had only entered a very small part of the country.

It follows therefore that not until half a century after the the Dutch had established a post up the Cuyuni, six weeks' journey from the Essequibo confluence, did the Spaniards, through the missionary Fathers, move out from St. Thomé to meet them. As to their doings there is a vast mass of evidence, which has been mastered by the Rev. Joseph Strickland, S.J., who brought much learning and industry to his task and had the inestimable advantage of freedom of search in the Capuchin archives in Rome. He thus describes those of the documents which bear upon the extent of Spanish colonisation: The Capuchins "first chose appropriate sites on which to establish villages, and a few families of trusted Indians were taken from other missions and brought over to the new village. Then the President of the New Mission, with a guard of soldiers and some trusted Indians, set



Compiled from a Map published by the Province Publishing Company, British Columbia

V. & S. Lith.

out towards the woods or up the course of the numerous rivers, in search of the Indians who had no fixed habitation and either invited them or gently forced them to follow him to the new village, where every one was provided with a home and with food, till the fields began to yield a sufficient crop for their sustenance. This was called making an '*entrada*.' . . . The system was effective but necessarily slow, a circumstance which explains why the extent of country actually occupied by the Spaniards was so small, when the English succeeded the Dutch, in the Dutch part of geographical Guiana. The Capuchins extended their missions in two directions: along the banks of the Yuruario and its affluents and along the banks of the Parana, an affluent of the Caroni, which flows into the Orinoco. For the question of boundary the only important point is, strictly speaking, the location of the missions on the Yurnario and its affluents; but numerous documents [are printed in an appendix] relating to the missions on the Parana, because they illustrate the efforts of the Spanish Commanders to find Lake Parime, or the far-famed El-Dorado, and get behind the Dutch at the sources of the Mazaruni and Essequibo. It will be seen from these documents that the Spaniards failed completely in the attempt and that at the sources of the Parana the Spanish expeditions were repeatedly repulsed by the Indians, whom the Dutch supplied with firearms. This fact is of itself sufficient to show that the Dutch had been ahead of the Spaniards, in taking advantage of the clause in the Treaty of Munster by which they were allowed to establish themselves in the country not occupied by the Spaniards. Indeed, it is more than probable that the Dutch had reached the source of the Mazaruni in the neighbourhood of the so-called Lake Parime or El-Dorado long before the Treaty of Munster, since the supposed Lake of Parime is marked on the Dutch map of 1648 and it is near the frontier claimed at that time by the Dutch."

Up to 1796, when the British first took over the Dutch possessions in Guiana, the Capuchins established twenty-nine missions in the region between the Cuyuni watershed and the Orinoco. The last was located at Tumeremo, in 1788, on the left bank of the Yuruario, and in proximity to the Dutch outpost. Now as the sole Spanish occupancy in this region was through the Capuchins, the limits of their missions mark the limits of Spanish ownership. Capuchin maps and documents thus give

evidence of what at the time was the extreme Spanish claim from the south bank of the Orinoco.

The evidence as to Dutch occupation is furnished by the forts and trading posts. Anyone who has the patience to read through the Dutch and Spanish documents relating to Guiana during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries will be amply rewarded by a series of quaint and interesting pictures of pioneering in a primeval world—on the one hand by the Capuchin Fathers with a few Spanish soldiers and friendly Indians and on the other by Dutch officials who had no religious aims in view and whose sole purpose was trade. If the matter fell within the scope of this work vivid descriptions could be extracted from the documents, showing the nature of the Dutch alliance with the Indians and its political effect upon the Spanish advance towards the outer limits of Dutch expansion towards the Caroni and the Orinoco. To avoid burdening this chapter with historical detail it must be sufficient to say that alike at Barima Point on the mouth of the Orinoco and in the far-off valley of the Cuyuni the Dutch kept the Spaniards out of their territory. They did more than that, for at Dutch instigation the Caribs raided the Spanish missions on the Pariac and the Savannah. Retaliation followed. In 1758 the Spanish authorities sent a secret expedition to the Dutch Cuyuni post and destroyed it. They retreated post haste and the Dutch re-established their station and formally remonstrated with the Court of Spain. This is the only case of Spanish penetration into the extreme area of Dutch influence and it is as clear as anything can be that no Spanish sovereignty was ever exercised nearer to the Dutch colony than Tumerero, the final Capuchin mission station. And, though there was a somewhat similar conflict at Moruka, near the sea, it is equally demonstrable that while the Spaniards claimed Barima as theirs, they never exercised authority between the Imataka range and the ocean.

This, in crude outline, was the position of affairs when the British occupied the Colony of Essequibo in 1781. They were expelled by the French in the following year, and the French handed it back to the Dutch. The British again took over the Dutch colonies in 1796, restored them to the Dutch at the Peace of Amiens, repossessed them at the renewal of war, and obtained formal cession of them by the general peace of 1814. In the meantime no extension of the Spanish missions had been effected.

Tumeremo in the open Savannahs of the Yuruario represented the Spanish limit towards the Cuyuni watershed.

Throughout this time there was, of course, no accepted boundary. Each side had pushed into territory unoccupied by the other, as each had a perfect right to do, such a right being expressly reserved to the Dutch by the Treaty of Munster. The British continued the Dutch system of hinterland control by means of postholders. No objection was raised by Spain—no point as to limits was mooted—when the Convention was arranged by which the Dutch colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice passed to Great Britain. During the early decades of the century, however, an economic change passed over the three colonies—now formed into one of three counties, and administered from the old Dutch capital, to which the name of Georgetown was given. The planters gradually ceased cultivation of the interior plantations and found it more profitable to grow sugar on the alluvial mud flats along the coast and river foreshores than cocoa, coffee and such like crops inland. This did not, however, imply abandonment of sovereignty over the hinterland. A Penal Settlement, for example, was established on the site of the old Mazaruni Post; British soldiers penetrated as far beyond it to Pirara on the undefined Brazilian frontier; a superintendent of rivers and creeks was appointed whose officers made periodical visits through the hinterland districts. During the thirties Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Schomburgk thoroughly explored the upper waters of the Essequibo. In 1840 he was invited by the British Government to make a provisional survey for the purpose of delimitating the boundaries. He began on the sea coast and worked inland from Barima Point through the forest to the Cuyuni; then up the Essequibo and along the Rupunini to Pirara on the Brazilian frontier, from there up the Cotinga to Mount Roramia, and, finally along the mountain ridge which divides the basin of the Essequibo from that of the Amazon. The four journeys occupied three years, and he marked the vestiges of former Dutch occupation, notably at Barmia. It was in consequence of these surveys that the Venezuelans, who in 1810 had declared their independence of Spain, opened diplomatic discussion by sending a gunboat into the Barmia as far as the Mora passage and protesting against posts having been placed by Mr. Schomburgk on the Amakura, which the British claimed as their boundary in that part of Guiana. Lord Aberdeen, apparently for no other

purpose than that of saving himself trouble, agreed that the posts should be removed, but without prejudice to the British claim. Meanwhile the mission territory south of the Orinoco had practically been abandoned. But about 1849, when Venezuela began to recover from the troubles by which she had gained her freedom from the Spanish Crown, gold was discovered and people flocked into the territory anew. A rumour arose that Great Britain intended to seize the whole country up to the Orinoco. Venezuelan soldiers were sent into the Canton of Upata and an intention announced not only to send a detachment as far down the former mission territory as Tupuqueen but also establish a fort at Barmia. Lord Palmerston made strong remonstrances and the difficulty was patched up for the time being by an Instrument known as the "Agreement of 1850." This consisted of a British Note (November 18th) declaring that whilst, on the one hand, Her Majesty's Government had no intention of occupying or encroaching on the disputed territory they would not, on the other hand, view with indifference aggression on that territory by Venezuela; and of a Venezuelan Note (December 20th) stating that Venezuela had no intention of occupying or encroaching upon any part of the territory, the dominion of which was in dispute, and that it would not view with indifference that Great Britain should act otherwise.

A gross error was made in not insisting upon a settlement with Venezuela at that time; but the statesmen of one generation are adepts in passing on to their successors difficulties which they themselves should have surmounted. Some excuse can be found for Lord Palmerston in the circumstance that the leading colonists did not care a fig whether their boundaries were definitively arranged or not. All their commercial interests were centred on the coast lands. They looked with disfavour upon anything likely to attract their limited supply of plantation labour into the interior. Consequently matters drifted on until 1881, the only incidents being Venezuelan settlement, notwithstanding the compact of 1850, in the disputed region of the Cuyuni watershed, and a more or less spasmodic administration of British justice throughout the Hinterland. In 1881, however, the Venezuelan Government coolly granted a concession of the entire area in dispute to General Pulgar, a Venezuelan subject. Great Britain objected and the concession fell through. The boundary question again became a subject for diplomatic discussion and at the very time negotiations were going on the

Venezuelan Government granted to two Americans—Mr. C. C. Fitzgerald and Mr. Herbert Gordon—the whole of the territory lying between the Orinoco and the Essequibo. They proposed at the same time to constitute the “Federal territory of the Orinoco,” with a new capital, to be called Manoa. It was in this way that the Manoa Confederacy was brought into existence by the concessionnaires, whose officers entered the British region, assumed ownership and attempted to dispose of British territory. The British Government thought the time had arrived when self-assertion was needed. They sent a magistrate and a force of police into the region and imprisoned a servant of the Manoa Confederacy who had been found guilty of outrage upon British subjects. Matters dragged on until 1886, when Sir Henry Turner Irving, the then Governor of the Colony, acting under instructions from Downing Street, issued a proclamation declaring Venezuelan grants of land in British Guiana to be invalid, setting forth the line drawn by Sir R. Schomburgk after his surveys forty years earlier, to be the provisional boundary and guaranteeing British subjects in their rights within the limits thus laid down. It should be added that early in the sixties British subjects had engaged in a gold mining enterprise on the Essequibo, some distance from the Penal Settlement, but that they had withdrawn from it because the Imperial authorities were anxious that nothing should be done on their side which could be interpreted as a violation of the 1850 Agreement. From 1880 a few coloured men had engaged in placer mining in the interior; and with such satisfactory results that others followed. After the Proclamation of 1886 the industry grew rapidly, and many parts of the region were worked by miners. To provide for this industrial development the Government divided the region into districts and provided it with magistrates, police stations, and a system of administration which put an end to the encroachments of the American concessionnaires.

To revert to the diplomatic aspect of the question. Lord Aberdeen, as has been said, consented in 1842 to the removal of the Schomburgk posts near the mouth of the Orinoco “without abandoning any portion of the rights of Great Britain over the territory which was formerly held by the Dutch in Guiana.” Two years later the Venezuelan Government made a claim to the whole of the country between the Orinoco and Essequibo. The main grounds were that Spain was the first discoverer of the New

World, that the Spanish domination extended as far as the Essequibo and that any Dutch possession to the west of the river was an usurpation. Lord Aberdeen demolished that claim in a learned and cogent despatch, and the matter remained in abeyance until 1850, with what result has been already shown. The only settlement of Venezuela then was at Tumeremo—the farthest point of the Capuchin advance during the eighteenth century. In 1876 negotiations were renewed and the old Venezuelan claim advanced, with the additional circumstance that Venezuela relied on the Bull of Pope Alexander VI. (1496) by which the New World was divided by his Holiness between the Catholic Powers of Spain and Portugal. There were further delays and Venezuela suggested a conventional line to be fixed by agreement. This fell through and in 1879 Venezuela reiterated her original claim.

Lord Salisbury, into whose hands the matter came, in 1880, declined to surrender Essequibo, then inhabited by 40,000 British subjects, but offered to settle the dispute on a basis of mutual concession. In 1881 Lord Granville was Foreign Minister and proposed to Venezuela a line which would have given that State a large area of British territory. This offer was without prejudice to our rights. Venezuela refused it. Her Majesty's Government, in the hope of putting an end to a vexatious question, pressed this line upon Venezuela. But revolutions imposed silence on Venezuelan Ministers and, notwithstanding repeated inquiries from London, no answer could be obtained. Not until 1883 could Venezuela pay any attention to the subject. She then said that her Constitution denied to Ministers any power to cede any portion of the State—a discovery made somewhat late in the day—and suggested arbitration as the only mode of settling the question. Obviously, the constitutional quibble which prevented a settlement by means of a Treaty might also be used as a pretext for not abiding by the award of the Arbitrators. Her Majesty's Government therefore declined the proposal. In 1884 General Guzman Blanco came to London on behalf of the Venezuelan Government to seek a settlement of all questions—others having arisen besides that of the boundary. He suggested that since arbitration was unacceptable reference should be made to a Court of Law, the members of which should be chosen by the respective countries. Lord Granville said there were English constitutional difficulties in the way and urged the fixing of a Conventional line, as had been proposed by Venezuela

seven years before. Then followed abortive negotiations which kept the question dragging along until 1886. Lord Rosebery was now Foreign Secretary. He made a proposal that the territory between the lines respectively suggested by Venezuela and by Lord Granville should be considered as the territory in dispute and that within those lines a boundary should be traced either by an arbitrator or by Joint Commission. General Guzman Blanco refused this and held out for arbitration over the whole territory as far as the Essequibo—the limit of Venezuela's claim. Meanwhile, as has been seen, Venezuela had been giving wholesale concessions to Americans right down to the Essequibo, notwithstanding negotiations with the British Government. Vigorous protests were made at Caracas, and active steps were taken to assert British authority in the region within the Schomburgk line. Finally, in March, 1887, the Venezuelan Government demanded that we should evacuate the territory between the Orinoco and the Pomeroon and submit the whole question to arbitration or cease diplomatic relations. This demand not being complied with the British Minister at Caracas, Mr. St. John, was given his passports.

Great Britain suffered the pin-prick with that equanimity which is so exasperating to Foreign States. Far from retaliating, as she would justly have been entitled to, having regard to the concessions to American subjects, she allowed Venezuela to take her own time for reflection. Venezuelan agents used that time in endeavouring to attract support in the United States and in working up an agitation there which was designed to show that Great Britain was persisting in land piracy and meant to take advantage of the weakness and poverty of a small Republic. Not much encouragement was received at first and Venezuela recognised the fact by seeking for a renewal of diplomatic relations with London. But these *pourparlers* came to nothing, because Venezuela persisted in her claim to all the country as far as the Essequibo. The British Government replied that further examination of the facts showed that this claim was absolutely untenable. Of strict right England was entitled to the whole of the country as far as the highlands of Upata, if not up to the Orinoco; but so desirous were Her Majesty's Government to pursue a conciliatory course that they did not wish to insist upon this extreme claim, though they reserved their rights; they were ready to abandon it and be content with the country within the Schomburgk provisional

line, which was drawn up as the most likely natural boundary. Venezuela still held out and renewed her negotiations with Washington. The results were seen in the intervention of the United States.



CHAPTER III.

ARBITRATION ACCEPTED.

Jingoism in the States—The American Commission of Inquiry—Efforts towards a Settlement—Conditional Acceptance of Arbitration—Lord Salisbury at the Guildhall—The Treaty of Washington—The Rights of Settlers—Meeting of the Arbitration Tribunal—The Effect of the Award—The Loss of Barima Point—The New Boundary—Navigation Stipulations—A Satisfactory Conclusion.

THE position created by President Cleveland's Message was one of great danger—for the United States. He had left himself no loophole of retreat. He had taken the aggressive in a quarrel with which the United States had no direct concern, and had done so in such a way that the only apparent alternative to a humiliating withdrawal from the controversy was a war in which the United States could not hope to be victorious. Such a conflict was certainly not desired in England, where Mr. Cleveland's affront was regarded as a crime against the peace of the world and one which could not justly be charged against the American nation. Nothing could have been more repugnant to English sentiment than the likelihood of being compelled to draw the sword against an Anglo-Saxon people. No advantage could have accrued to us from war. With our immense naval superiority the American fleet could have been destroyed; the foreign commerce of the United States could have been ruined; every coast town within range of our guns could have been wrecked; but a land war would have had to be waged which might have dragged on indecisively for years, exhausting both nations and bringing ruin and desolation over wide areas on both sides of the Canadian border. When the first fever of excitement had spent itself Americans began to realise the absolutely defenceless state of their seaboard, the fruitlessness of war and the iniquity of it for such a cause. A sharp reaction set in on their side of the Atlantic. The hissing storm of anti-English malignity which swept over the States, to the pain and astonishment of the English people, quickly subsided. The saner elements of the nation asserted their right to be heard;

and they spoke with such emphasis and undeniable good sense that the great mass of the Jingoës were shamed into moderation and eventually into silence.

In a few weeks it became evident that there would be no war—or, at least, that the American people were almost as reluctant to go to war with us as we were loth to resist their dictation by force. It remained for the diplomatists to find a formal method by which the dignity of the American President might be saved, and to devise machinery by which the dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela could be terminated, apparently as a consequence of the good offices of the United States on behalf of the Spanish Republic. But this was by no means easy. The United States had demanded arbitration under threat of herself determining the boundary and upholding her decision by war. Acquiescence in such a demand under such conditions was impracticable for a nation with the least self-respect. No way out of the difficulty could therefore be seen. Though strong hopes were entertained on both sides of the Atlantic that one would be found Mr. Cleveland could not stultify himself and expose the United States to the ridicule of the world by leaving the question as it stood when he delivered his Message. He had pledged himself to take action, and there was no escape short of acknowledging that he had blundered. Rather than take that manly course he was apparently willing that the blood of thousands should be shed. Accordingly he appointed a Commission of five gentlemen, one of whom was Mr. David J. Brewer, a Justice of the Supreme Court, to determine a boundary over the heads of the British Government. This Commission began an investigation such as should have been made before Mr. Olney indited his Despatch. Meanwhile the British Government adhered to its attitude of denying the right of the United States or any other country to interfere, and refused to recognise the existence of the Commission. At the same time, at the request of the United States, a mass of documentary evidence in support of the British claim was handed to the Washington Government.

While the Commission was at work the diplomatists on both sides and influential people here and in America endeavoured to find a formula such as both Governments could accept. Official and unofficial negotiations went on, with, it must be admitted, scant prospect of success, until Mr. Chamberlain and the late

Lord Playfair evolved the idea that arbitration could be accepted by the British Government if means could be devised for excluding from its application British settlements within the disputed region. It will have been noticed in the preceding chapter that arbitration in itself was not objected to—that, indeed, at one time the British Government asked that a line within certain limits should be drawn either by an arbitrator or by a Joint Commission. What had been strenuously objected to and consistently refused was unrestricted arbitration over the whole extent of the Venezuelan claim,—arbitration, in fact, which would have imperilled the interests of the forty thousand British subjects in the County of Essequibo. The real difficulty, therefore, lay in inducing the United States to fine down their demand for arbitration to an arbitration that in no case could adversely affect British settlers. It was overcome in the course of the autumn. At the Guildhall Banquet Lord Salisbury announced that a solution of the Boundary question had been reached. The issue, he explained, had not been whether there should be arbitration, but whether the arbitration should have unrestricted application and how to define the settled districts so as to exclude them from the arbitrators.


This agreement having been concluded the United States Commission did not report. Many things had happened in America since these gentlemen were appointed. Anti-English feeling had died away almost entirely and Mr. Cleveland had become a spent force. The Message had ruined his chances for a second term of office and Mr. McKinley had won a great victory over the Democrats. The Venezuelan question was not heard of during the Presidential contest. The American people were only too glad to forget the part they had played in it; and they learned with relief that a solution had been found which imposed no indignity upon them.

The understanding was defined in the Treaty of Washington of February 2nd, 1897. By this instrument a Tribunal of five jurists was constituted—Lord Herschell and Sir Richard Henn Collins of the High Court being the English members and the Hon. Melville Weston Fuller, United States Chief Justice, and the Hon. David Josiah Brewer, of the United States Supreme Court, being nominated respectively by the President of the Republic of Venezuela and the President of the United States. On the death of Lord Herschell his place was taken by Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice. M. Martins, the distinguished Russian jurist, was

selected by them as President of the Tribunal. The Court was to sit in Paris and was empowered to ascertain the extent of the territories belonging to or that might lawfully be claimed by the United Netherlands or by the Kingdom of Spain respectively at the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the Colony of British Guiana, and determine the boundary line. But the rights of either side so far as settlements had been made in the disputed area were safe-guarded by three rules:—

- (a.) Adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good title. The arbitrators may deem exclusive political control of a district, as well as actual settlement thereof, sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to make title by prescription.
- (b.) The arbitrators may recognise and give effect to rights and claims resting on any other ground whatever valid according to International Law, and on any principles of International Law which the arbitrators may deem to be applicable to the case, and which are not in contravention of the foregoing rule.
- (c.) In determining the boundary line, if territory of one party be found by the Tribunal to have been at the date of this Treaty in the occupation of the subjects or citizens of the other party, such effect shall be given to such occupation as reason, justice, the principles of International Law, and the equities of the case shall, in the opinion of the Tribunal, require.

The Tribunal met at Paris and did not finish its work until October, 1899. An enormous mass of documentary evidence was laid before it on behalf of Venezuela and of Great Britain and arguments of portentous length indulged in by counsel. The Award was pronounced on October 3rd. It gave decisions but no reasons, determining the boundary itself in a few clear sentences whose geographical significance can easily be followed on the accompanying sketch map. The effect of the Award is that the Venezuelan claim to the country down to the Essequibo—three-fourths of the entire area of British Guiana—is rejected absolutely; that the extreme limit of the British claim, on which our Government was not prepared to insist is also rejected, the former Venezuelan mission area being retained by the Republic; and that, as regards the provisional boundary suggested by Sir Richard Schomburgk sixty years ago, Barima Point is cut off and a strip of Savannah land between the Upper Cuyuni from the bend at Uruan and the Venamu tributary of the Cuyuni. Now Barima Point was never of the least use to Great Britain. We have no



designs upon the Orinoco River and in all human probability it would never have become worth our while to fortify the point and command the mouth of the stream. Movable forts in the shape of a fleet give us the potential command of the river. The sole use of Barima Point lies in the fact that the Rivers Barima and Amakura flow through it and that these give far easier access to the north-western interior than is afforded by the River Waini and its tributary the Barama. This access the Award secures to us. An important stipulation provides that the Amakura and Barima shall be open to navigation by the ships of all nations in times of peace, subject to the same rates and regulations as we applied to Venezuelan craft, and that no Customs duties shall be charged on goods in transit. Therefore machinery and stores for the goldfields of the Barima and Barama can pass through what has become Venezuelan territory free of Customs dues. Customs imposts only become chargeable on British goods when landed from craft on Venezuelan soil. What the decision amounts to is that Great Britain is relieved of the expense of maintaining police posts and magisterial jurisdiction over this split tongue of land—for the most part valueless marsh—and still enjoys the use of the water highways through it. As for the Wenamu-Cuyuni Savannah strip that is more accessible from the Venezuelan side than from the Guiana rivers and for that reason appears to have been given to Venezuela.

A little reflection will show that the Award was reasonably satisfactory to everybody. Great Britain gained all she cared about—a definitive boundary which included nearly all the territory within the Schomburgk line and all her own settlers; Venezuela obtained Barima Point with—to her—its strategic potentialities, and a strip of Savannah country as an addition to the disputed missions area; and the United States were able to find justification for the fact if not for the manner of their interference in the circumstance that Great Britain had not been awarded everything that she had asked the Tribunal to give her. Some such result was easily foreseen by those who knew the facts of the case and understood the Treaty rules by which the Tribunal was guided. Consequently, as soon as the announcement of the method of arbitration was made, nothing more was heard of English rapacity in the United States. American newspapers ceased to describe the English nation as thieves and bullies, from whose threats Venezuela had appealed for protection

to her Republican neighbour; and they made haste to forget that Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Olney had given them so unfortunate a lead.

There was in reality no quarrel between the two peoples. Save for the sudden ebullition of dislike on the part of excitable and unreflecting Americans no cause for war had arisen; and in so far as this rancour was a cause England resolutely refused to return evil for evil. She did no more than note its sudden rise and swift disappearance. Our own people knew that a mistake had been made. They felt that the pothole was due either to stupidity on the part of Mr. Cleveland or to base party motives; and they leaned to the charitable supposition that aberration of intellect rather than a wicked desire to incite the Americans to hostility against us was the true explanation of the Presidential blunder. They agreed with Mr. Gladstone, in a Message to the American nation, that "only common sense was needed," and were in full sympathy with a communication by the Prince of Wales expressing a desire and a confident hope for a peaceful solution of the trouble. The difficulty had been created by a man in the position of a statesman, and everyone in England was satisfied that he should be helped out of it by Lord Salisbury's concession that arbitration should be resorted to, and by the United States agreement to the very stringent limitations with which that arbitration was surrounded. Once the Treaty was arranged both peoples lost interest in the subject. The Award did not excite them. The trifling loss of territory at Barima Point and in the Savannah lands between the Wenamu river and the Upper Cuyuni was received without a grumble even in the colony of British Guiana. "All's well that ends well" was the universal comment at the termination of an incident that had threatened to force the Salisbury Administration into war with the United States. That calamity was averted by the ingenious manner in which the Cabinet conceded to America the principle of arbitration, and by the repentant willingness with which America agreed to stipulations which could alone make arbitration in this particular case acceptable to the British nation.

CHAPTER IV.

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS.

A Treaty of Arbitration—The Queen's Speech—Revolt of the Senate—Mr. Sherman as Mischief Maker—The Sealing Question—Conference of Experts—Why Prohibition was Wanted—Yukon Gold Fields—Alaska Boundary Question—The Spanish-American War—Friendship for England—The Joint Commission—Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825—The Canadian Contention—Breakdown of the Commission—Death of Lord Herschell—Arbitration Refused—A *Modus Vivendi*—The Samoan Islands—A Free Gift to the United States—The Nicaragua Canal—Clayton-Bulwer Treaty—Another Free Gift—Anglo-American Amity.

ONE result of the negotiations with the United States on the subject of Venezuela was a proposal by Lord Salisbury for a general Treaty of Arbitration, under which all outstanding questions in dispute between London and Washington, and any that might in future arise, could be decided. To the task of arranging such a Treaty, Sir Julian (now Lord) Pauncefote—whose diplomatic skill had largely contributed to the success of the Venezuelan discussions—devoted his energies. Mr. Cleveland agreed in principle to the establishment of a permanent Court to which contentious questions should be referred. The Behring Sea and Alaskan boundary controversies threatened to reach an acute stage and prudent men on both sides of the Atlantic were anxious to avoid a recrudescence of passion such as Mr. Cleveland had so unfortunately excited. The President and Mr. Olney were so deeply pledged to the principle of arbitration that they were morally bound to admit its application to matters of direct concern between the two countries. In his Presidential Message of December, 1896—the last he was to deliver—the Republican Party having been successful in electing Mr. McKinley—Mr. Cleveland announced that the negotiations had reached an advanced stage. A Treaty was signed on January 11th, 1897, and sent forthwith to the Senate, with a letter from Mr. Cleveland advising its ratification and indulging in magniloquent rhodomontade to the effect that it marked a new epoch in civilisation. The Senate, however, set to work to destroy it, being apparently more anxious to snub Mr. Cleveland than to promote peaceful relations with Great Britain;

and strong opposition to ratification was developed outside, the Jingo element in the United States being fearful that the hands of the Government should be tied in dealing with various vexed questions at issue between the two communities. In this country feeling was altogether in favour of the Treaty and the agitation against it on the other side of the Atlantic was noted with regret. The attitude of England was exactly described in the Queen's Speech on January 19th. In that pronouncement Her Majesty said that it was with much gratification that a Treaty for general arbitration had been concluded with the President of the United States by which the peaceful adjustment of all differences might be secured, and expressed the hope that other Powers might be influenced to consider "a principle by which the danger of war may be notably abated." The hopes of Sovereign and Ministers were dissipated at the end of January. The Foreign Relations Committee, to which the Draft Treaty was referred by the Senate, emasculated its chief provisions. By one amendment no question affecting foreign or domestic policy was to be subject to arbitration except by special treaty. There could therefore be no arbitration on questions in which the Monroe doctrine was put forward, or on British rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with regard to the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal. Another amendment rejected the King of Sweden as Umpire and provided that the two Powers should agree on an Umpire as each case arose for reference under the Treaty. And yet another amendment made a special agreement necessary on the principle of any claim before the arbitration tribunal could deal with it. Having thus reduced the Treaty to a sham and justified Lord Salisbury's prescience in declining to discuss it on the first day of the Session because ratification had not taken place, the whole Senate proceeded to improve upon the work of its committee. The Treaty was already scarcely worth having, except as pinning the United States down to a certain method of disposing of disputes; by the time the Senate had done with it it was worthless even for that. They worried the remaining shreds of the Treaty until May 5th, and then refused to ratify by forty-three votes against twenty-six.

The thought and labour Lord Salisbury and Sir Julian Pauncefote had spent upon the subject were wasted. The only effect of the discussions had been a revival of Jingo sentiment in the States.

By this time, however, Mr. McKinley—who, in his inaugural Message on March 4th had urged the Senate to ratify the Treaty—was firmly seated in the Presidency and there were hopes that, notwithstanding the Jingoism of the Senate no question would be allowed to disturb the good relations between the two countries. No one had yet taken account of Mr. Sherman's capacity for making mischief. The new Foreign Secretary began fishing in the troubled waters of the Behring Sea. In a despatch of much rudeness he charged Lord Salisbury's Government with endeavouring to evade the regulations of the Paris Arbitration Court as to pelagic sealing and with a roughness of language unsuitable to the occasion demanded a Conference to reconsider the effects of the decision of the Court. Lord Salisbury, who by this time must have been a little weary of the impertinences of Washington State Secretaries, declined to reopen the question. Mr. Sherman's chagrin at this rebuff took the form of proposals for a Conference which should include Russia and Japan; but Lord Salisbury would not join such a Conference. By the award of the arbitrators the regulations were to continue in force for five years and then be revised if necessary; and the first quinquennial period did not expire until August, 1898. Mr. Sherman's argument was that the herds were being destroyed—and unfairly and irregularly destroyed by Canadian sealers. Lord Salisbury's contention was—and it was based on a careful report by Professor D'Arcy Thompson—that the herds were in no danger of extinction. Our Government declined to anticipate revision of the regulations and Mr. Chamberlain, in a vigorous Despatch, replied to Mr. Sherman's attacks upon the Canadian fishers in a way which showed that gentleman that the interests of Canada would be strenuously championed at the Colonial Office. The tension was, however, relieved by Lord Salisbury agreeing to a Conference of experts from Great Britain, Canada and the United States alone. This met early in October and meanwhile a private Conference, at which there were Russian and Japanese representatives, met at Washington and signed a Convention for the suspension of pelagic sealing if Great Britain consented to that step. This was followed by legislation prohibiting United States citizens from pelagic sealing in the North Pacific, Behring Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, and the importation of seal skins unless they were accompanied by a certificate from a United States Consul declaring that their original owners had not been killed

within the prescribed waters. To carry out this measure it was necessary to confiscate the sealskin jackets of ocean travellers.

Meanwhile the Commission of three experts—Professor D'Arcy Thompson representing Great Britain, Mr. J. Melville Macoun Canada, and Mr. D. Starr Jordan the United States—demonstrated that Mr. Sherman need not have been so precipitate. Their joint conclusions, which were published in January, 1898, showed that the herds were far from any stage threatening extermination of the species and were not likely under then prevailing conditions of protection to reach such a stage. Before these were arrived at an easier situation was produced by the award of the United States and Canadian Commissioners, giving damages to Canadian sealers on account of seizures made by United States cruisers in 1896 and 1897; but this was merely a side issue of the controversy raised by Mr. Sherman. He aimed at the entire prohibition of seal catching in the open sea. By such prohibition the American Company which had the monopoly of the seals on the Pribyloff breeding grounds would have been relieved from Canadian competition. What he asked of the British Government would have amounted to nothing less than the ruin of the Canadian fisheries to the enrichment of this American company, under the pretext of preserving the seals from extermination. The excuse was a little too thin; and in the conviction that this was so Lord Salisbury found full warrant in the joint conclusions of the American, Canadian and British experts. The whole question was, however, left in an unsatisfactory state.

Early in 1898 a far more serious question was brought to the front by the sudden rise of the Yukon gold industry. Relations between Canada and the United States became strained because of the difficulties placed in the way of Canadian traffic along the Stikkeen route to the auriferous area, and by the charges levied by the Canadian Customs on goods other than in British bottoms, entering the region *viâ* the Lynn Canal. Proposals were made in the United States by which the value of this route to Canada would have been nullified. Then there arose a question as to what constituted the boundary between Alaska and that Dominion, the United States complaining that by the presence of Dominion officers on the summit of the White Pass an incursion had been made into United States territory. The war with Spain, however, absorbed the energies of the American people and the Alaskan

question fell for the moment into the background. By the early summer of 1898 the development of the Yukon district had become so great as to give urgency to the boundary question. By this time also American feeling had undergone a sharp reaction in favour of Great Britain. In the war with Spain Great Britain had observed a strict neutrality. But the idea got abroad that the Powers, led by Germany, had contemplated taking action on behalf of Spain and had approached Great Britain with an invitation to bring joint pressure to bear upon the American Government. Great Britain, it was said, had refused to be a party to any proceedings likely to hamper the Americans. Germany had denied that there was ever any movement, initiated either by herself or others, in opposition to the course the United States had thought fit to take in the matter of Cuba; and no official evidence has been made public either in England or America in proof of the contrary. On the other hand it is a fact that our Ambassador at Washington let the favourable disposition of Great Britain be known to the American Executive and that British Consular protection to American citizens within Spanish jurisdiction during the war was a friendly act highly acceptable to the American people. Another circumstance that facilitated friendly relations was the resignation of Mr. Sherman and the substitution of Mr. W. R. Hay as State Secretary, who, in turn was succeeded by Mr. John Hay, who had followed the late Mr. Bayard, and with great advantage to both peoples, as Ambassador to the Court of St. James's.

Whether European intrigues in the interests of Spain really existed when war was imminent and during its course, and, if they did exist, whatever their precise nature and the exact character of the Assurances given by Great Britain, the fact was patent that concurrently with keen hostility against Germany and vulgar ridicule of the Emperor William, there arose a friendship for England and everything English almost as extravagant as was the animosity that had been excited by Mr. Cleveland. Mr. McKinley did his best to foster this new mood and our own statesmen turned it to account by attempting a settlement of all outstanding questions. Informal negotiations took place between Canada and the United States chiefly on tariff reciprocity, and these developed in June into an agreement for the creation of a Joint Commission to consider all subjects of controversy—a decision

noted with some uneasiness by Continental Statesmen, who saw in it the beginning of an Anglo-American alliance which would be a more important factor in the affairs of the world than any existing or probable Continental combination. An opening was thus made for a definitive settlement of the Alaskan boundary, of the seal fisheries dispute, and for the arrangement of an equitable tariff between Canada and the United States.

The Alaskan question was by far the more important. A brief exposition of the dispute is necessary. The United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867 and thus acquired all the rights possessed by that Power under the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825. In addition to the great mass of Alaska proper a strip of Alaskan territory runs along the Canadian coast. Before the Treaty of 1825 Great Britain claimed the territory down to the Pacific, while Russia also made considerably larger claims than were eventually agreed upon. The territory itself was thought to be of scant value except as areas for the operation of the Hudson Bay Company and the Russian fur hunters. Hence a compromise was reached; and in order to keep the rival fur traders apart the narrow strip along the coast of Canada was ceded to Russia. Article III. of the Treaty of 1825 therefore defined the boundary thus: the line of demarcation was to be drawn from the southernmost limit of the Prince of Wales Island (in the parallel of $54^{\circ}4'$ north latitude and between the 131st and 133rd degree west longitude) and ascend to the north along the Great Portland channel to the 56th degree of north latitude; then following the summit of the mountains parallel with the coast as far as the point of intersection of the 141st degree and from that point as far as the frozen ocean formed the limit between the Russian and British possessions to the north-west. And Article IV. provided: "(I.) That Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia; (II.) That wherever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of 141st degree of west longitude shall prove to be at the distance of more than ten marine leagues from the ocean the limit between the British possessions and the line of coast that is to belong to Russia, as above mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings of the coast, and which shall never exceed the difference of ten marine leagues therefrom."

Now the Canadian and British contention was that the ten marine leagues should be measured from the outer line of the archipelago. This would give to Canada various inlets, notably the head of the Lynn Canal, thus affording access by water to the Yukon region. The United States contention was that the measurement must be made from the continental coast line—that the inland boundary followed the exact sinuosities of the coast ten marine leagues from the water. A more knotty question of treaty interpretation could hardly be framed; and but for the gold discoveries in the Yukon it might have lain dormant for centuries. The finds of the precious metal had given great practical importance to the matter and an impetus to American settlement which resulted in the almost instantaneous growth of the towns of Skagway and Dyea on the Lynn inlet.

An agreement for the constitution of a Joint Commission was signed on May 30th and the following subjects for adjustment were referred to it: The Behring Sea Sealing Question, Reciprocal Mining Regulations, the Alaskan Boundary, Restrictive Regulations for the Preservation of the Fisheries of the Great Lakes, the North Atlantic Fishery Question, Alien Labour Laws, and Trade Reciprocity. The Commissioners on the British side were Lord Herschell, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Dominion Premier, Sir Richard J. Cartwright, Minister of Trade for Canada, Sir Louis H. Davies, Canadian Minister of Marine and Fisheries, and Mr. John Charlton, a Member of the Dominion House of Commons. The first meeting was held in Quebec in August and at a public reception Lord Herschell, on behalf of the British Commissioners, and Senator Fairbank, on the part of the American, spoke in terms of sanguine expectation that agreement would be reached and amity and goodwill promoted. On November 1st sittings began at Washington. These were held privately, and though secrecy was maintained within the Commission rumours were current that the difficulties of settling the Alaskan boundary would prove insuperable. Canada's demands, the world was informed by inspired articles in the American Press, were altogether too sweeping. The landing places at the head of the Lynn Canal, giving access to the parallel passes of the Chilcoot and the Skagway, were not only American by right of treaty but also by that of long occupancy and jurisdiction—an occupancy against which Canada had at various times made formal protest. That America should cease jurisdiction and hand over the

inland towns her citizens had built constituted a difficulty that could not be overcome, and until the Dominion liberally moderated its claim no agreement could be possible.

A deadlock had arisen and the Commission adjourned, being as far from agreement as during the preliminary discussions. Then, on March 1st, 1899, Lord Herschell, who had been chosen President of the Commission, died unexpectedly from the result of a fall when entering his carriage. Nothing could exceed the honours paid in the United States to the memory of this distinguished lawyer or the sympathy and consideration shown by the Government and people; but, though there was an added warmth in the cordiality with which the two nations regarded each other, and increasing nervousness in envious quarters at the possibility of an Anglo-American compact, no progress was made with the settlement of the specific questions referred to the Joint Commission. Sir Julian Pauncefote came to England and, as the result of consultations with Mr. Choate, the United States Ambassador, and Lord Salisbury, arrangements were made for the reassembling of the Commission; but these fell through and the Commission was indefinitely adjourned. In June the British Government published the proposals made by the British Commissioners. These disclose the causes of failure. The American Commissioners would not agree to arbitration lest territory which they had regarded as theirs might pass to Canada, and the Dominion thus be given access to the Yukon by sea to the detriment of the American monopoly of the sea route. The British Commissioners had asked that the question should be referred to arbitration on the same conditions as the Guiana dispute had been. An examination of the provisions of this boundary Treaty will show that this was an equitable method of settlement and would have been final. Had it failed in either of these respects the United States, as the champion of Venezuela against overbearing England, would not have signed the document. Why the United States should have refused to apply the principles of a Treaty of their own making in the case of a boundary which was no affair of theirs, to one which was, is a mystery,—unless the self-evident inference be drawn that their Commissioners did not seek a just settlement, but merely one in accord with the existing facts of United States occupancy. Their Commissioners declared that the local conditions in Alaska were different; which is perfectly true inasmuch as Venezuela lies in the tropics and

Alaska in the region of ice; but the two disputes were essentially alike, depending for their settlement upon Treaty interpretation, upon the correct reading of old and imperfect maps, and upon accurate surveys of country hitherto unexplored in detail. The Commissioners wanted a Tribunal of six eminent jurists—three from each side, with an American Umpire, a majority to determine the issue. As this would be equivalent to vesting the decision in a United States Umpire agreement upon it was not possible. Nor was this all that the United States Commissioners desired: they asked that in any reference to arbitration the stipulation should be made that “existing settlements on the tide waters of the coast should in any result continue to belong to the United States.” The splendid effrontery of this request showed that they did not want arbitration at any price. Hence the failure of the Commission.

The breakdown of the negotiations created keen disappointment in Canada and there was a sharp interchange of uncomplimentary reflections in the Canadian and American newspapers. In the Dominion House of Commons Sir Wilfred Laurier stoutly defended the Canadian proposals and spoke with plainness of American obstructiveness, charging the United States Government with wilfully putting off a settlement in order to derive advantage in future discussions from a prolongation of occupancy. So much ill-feeling was engendered that Lord Salisbury, acting through Sir Julian Pauncefote, took up the negotiations. He appears to have suggested the leasing of a port on the Lynn Canal—a method by which Canada would have obtained unfettered access, while United States sovereignty would elsewhere be left intact and even nominally preserved at the port itself. This was understood to have been accepted in principle (there is no official literature published on the later negotiations at the time of writing); but nothing came of it. The efforts of the diplomatists were not, however, entirely barren. In November, 1899, a *modus vivendi* was signed which at least enshrines an undertaking on both sides not to quarrel pending a definitive settlement. By this document—the terms of which will be found in the Appendix—a provisional line is drawn to run round the head of the Lynn Canal so as to leave the towns of Dyea and Skagway in American jurisdiction. The boundary follows the highest peaks of the White Pass and Chilcoot Pass to a station on the Chilkat route to the Yukon just above the Klukwan village,

and thence along the south bank of the Klehini river until it is within ten marine leagues of the sea. Canada is thus denied the necessary access to the Dominion from the ocean inlets, and a solution is still lacking. In his Presidential Address in November, 1899, Mr. McKinley made a cautious allusion to the subject, informing Congress that negotiations for a definitive settlement were still going on, but giving no hint of his views as to the probability of success.

Notwithstanding the irritation in Canada at the refusal of the American Commissioners to arbitrate on a just basis there was no apparent falling off in the amity of our relations with the United States. Until the outbreak of war in South Africa, and until Mr. Chamberlain, later in the year, made an unfortunate speech pointing to the existence of an Anglo-American "alliance"—if not, indeed, an "alliance" in which Germany also was a partner—no discordant notes were heard in the newspaper chorus that sung of the mutual affection of the two peoples. For the purpose, apparently, of showing gratitude to Germany for not intervening in our disputes with the Dutch Republics in South Africa, and of warding off any interference by the United States, Lord Salisbury presented these Powers with the rights we enjoyed equally with them in the Samoan Islands. America had already annexed the Hawaiian group and had long thought that the magnificent harbour of Pago Pago would be a highly desirable acquisition. The Tripartite arrangement had been made unworkable by the mutual jealousy of German and American subjects in the islands. A tribal war broke out in consequence of the election of a King to succeed Malietoa Laupepa, who died in August, 1898. One faction elected Mataafa and another Malietoa Tanu. Both sides appealed to the Courts, and Mr. Chambers, an American who was Chief Justice under the Tripartite agreement, decided that Mataafa was ineligible. Mataafa and his adherents began to fight it out with Malietoa Tanu and his supporters, and Mataafa got the upper hand. It became necessary for the United States warship to bombard the island and for parties from American and English men-of-war to land and restore order. The Tripartite system had broken down and needed strengthening. To devise methods by which this should be done the three Powers sent a Joint Commission to the island, Mr. C. N. E. Eliot representing Great Britain, Mr. Bartlett Tripp the United States and Herr H. Sternburg Germany. The Com-

missioners recommended the abolition of the kingship and of consular jurisdiction and a general reorganisation of the Tripartite system of administration. They drew up an elaborate draft of an Amended Act* to be substituted for the Berlin Act of 1889; but, at the same time, they said that international animosity was so rife among the subjects of the Powers and that the intrigues indulged in had proved so inimical to authority, that the best solution of the difficulties of the group would be government by one Power.

The Commissioners' Report was drawn up in July. On November 14th a Convention was signed by Lord Salisbury and Count Hatzfeldt, by which Great Britain renounced her rights over Upolu and Savaii to Germany and over Tutuila to the United States, subject to freedom of commerce. The Convention will be found in the Appendix and other features of it are discussed elsewhere. For the purposes of the present chapter it is sufficient to note that Lord Salisbury gave away the English right to prevent any other Power from establishing a naval and coaling station in the archipelago, and thus, in effect, made a free gift of the finest harbour in the Pacific to the United States; getting nothing in exchange except such goodwill in other matters as the United States found it in their interests to give. There was no remarkable outburst of gratitude in the United States. The Agreement was ratified in the Senate as though it was quite in the natural order of things that the United States should obtain possession without cost of the finest naval base in the mid-Pacific. Oddly enough, at the very time Lord Salisbury made this important concession to American sentiment influential politicians in the United States attacked Mr. McKinley for his supposed subserviency to British policy.

A further proof of English friendship towards the United States was furnished early in 1900 by a Convention which partially abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. Under the latter instrument the Governments of Great Britain and the United States declared that neither the one nor the other would ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over any ship canal across the Nicaraguan or any other portion of the Central American

* An exhaustive account of the work of the Joint Commission and of the provisions of the proposed Amended Act will be found in the Author's Review and Digest of Current State Papers—THE POLITICIAN'S HANDBOOK, issue for 1900.

Isthmus; and each Power undertook not to erect or maintain any fortifications commanding such a canal, or occupy, colonise, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast or any other part of Central America. It was further provided that in case of war the canal was to be exempt from blockade and vessels of belligerents passing through it should be exempt from seizure or detention; and by a further stipulation Great Britain and the United States guaranteed the neutrality of any canal that might be constructed. The document had come to be regarded in America as a bar to the construction of a canal. It was primarily to the interests of the United States that the waterway should be cut. Those who were prepared to find the enormous capital required for the enterprise demanded that the Treaty should either be annulled by the United States or abrogated by mutual consent. The project was the subject of a series of technical inquiries and a fitful agitation for nearly half a century. The enormous expansion of the United States trade in the Far East and the march of events which made America an important Pacific Power, with great political interests in the Pacific and in distant Asia, gave a renewed stimulus to the plan for uniting the eastern and western coasts. The extremists required that the United States should exclusively construct and maintain the Canal and should be unhampered by restrictive conditions of any sort; more prudent men asked that the Treaty should be so modified that construction by the United States should become more easily practicable as a commercial enterprise.

The result of the negotiations was the Convention of February, 1900, which is printed in full in the Appendix. On the one hand the United States Government turned a deaf ear to those who clamoured for a repudiation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; and, on the other, the British Government made a vital concession while retaining in its entirety the principle of neutralisation. To the United States was conceded the right of construction, directly at its own cost or through individuals or joint stock companies, and exclusive rights of regulation and management, subject to the principle mentioned. Rules are set forth in the Convention similar to those which govern the neutralisation of the Suez Canal. The canal is to be free and open in time of war as in time of peace to the vessels of war and of commerce of all nations, and on terms of entire equality. It is never to be blockaded. No

right of war is to be exercised or act of war committed within it. Vessels of war of a belligerent are not to revictual or take stores except for the purpose of passing through the Canal, and twenty-four hours are to pass before passage is to be given to the vessels of any opposing belligerent. No troops are to be embarked or disembarked in the canal. The waterway and all buildings and plant are to enjoy complete immunity from attack. No fortifications are to be erected commanding the canal or the waters adjacent; but the United States is to be at liberty to maintain military police to preserve the canal against acts of lawlessness.

The arrangement was one satisfactory to both Powers and as creditable to Lord Pauncefote as to Mr. Hay. For England to have refused to give up the first clause of Article I. of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty would, in the circumstances, have been technically correct but perhaps unneighbourly. There was no reason for playing the part of a dog in the manger so long as absolute neutrality and non-fortification of the canal and its approaches could be secured. With these conditions granted there was, on the contrary, every reason why England should facilitate the construction of the canal. As the greatest commercial and maritime nation in the world it was to her advantage that the canal should be constructed—that she should have direct access through the Isthmus to the Pacific ports without the necessity of the long southern detour and the passage of the Straits of Magellan, and that she should obtain an alternative route to the Far East, in war as well as in peace, at the cost of the United States. The investment would be at the expense of the United States; the cost of maintenance would be hers; the commercial advantages would be ours equally with her and with any other maritime Power.

There was opposition to the Treaty on both sides of the Atlantic. There were critics in England who attacked it because they were unable to see that the prospect of getting the canal under the ideal conditions defined in the Convention was worth the surrender of the prohibition against exclusive control. These complained that the waiving of this point was not counterbalanced by a definitive settlement of the Alaska boundary question. They did not sufficiently appreciate the point that the Convention was supplementary to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, not in substitution of it; that the provisions guaranteeing Central America against the exer-

cise of dominion by either Power still held good; that a bone of possible contention between the two Powers would be buried; that Great Britain's readiness to make arrangements about the canal on the strict merits of the question in the circumstances of the time, in reality strengthened her position in requiring a settlement of the Alaskan difficulty, also on its strict merits and in accordance with mutual interests. Nor did they see that the Convention constituted Great Britain and the United States and any other Power which gave adherence to its terms, guardians of the canal against the rest of the world. Any Power which withheld adherence to the Treaty or withdrew from it, and, being at war with England, committed an act of war against the United States if it attacked British property in the canal or the adjacent waters; or against England if engaged in war with the United States. Looked at from this point of view the Convention contained the germs of an offensive and defensive alliance between the two Powers and any others that may subscribe to its conditions. This consideration may be considered as justifying Lord Salisbury in keeping the Alaskan Question distinct from that of Nicaragua, and in not making the one a subject of bargaining about the other. The Convention stands by itself, and the complaint that Lord Salisbury had been needlessly generous to the United States in permitting exclusive construction and police control has little force.

American criticism was based upon the assumption that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty should have been torn up, and the rights of England disregarded, even to the extent of annexing territory for the purpose of the canal. The sacred doctrine of the immortal Monroe was cited against it. There should, it was argued, be no European assistance or supervision whatever in the affairs of the American Continent. These and other equally unwarrantable opinions found expression in the Senate, which proceeded to emasculate the Treaty. The Administration let it be known that that body had to take the Treaty or leave it. Mr. McKinley would neither submit it in any amended form to the British Government, nor would the latter have considered any amendments. As this is not a political history of Mr. McKinley's administration it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further, beyond saying that the time for ratification was extended, and that at the hour of writing the Treaty still awaited the approval necessary under the United States Constitution. In the final

chapter of this work the latest position of the question will be described.

The Samoan and Nicaraguan Conventions furnish the strongest possible evidence of Lord Salisbury's anxiety to live in harmony with the United States. It was, perhaps, politic that a price should be paid for the deaf ear Mr. McKinley turned to those who urged him to intervene on behalf of the Boer Republics; but the payment did not greatly stimulate American fondness for England. The relations between the two Powers were, it is true, better than they had ever been; but the United States took care to correct the rhetorical excesses of Mr. Chamberlain by impressing upon the English mind that their friendship was based upon self-interest and that they did not mean to tie their hands by any formal alliance with us. No one in England expected them to do so; but everyone rejoiced that the United States had reached a saner frame of mind than that exhibited soon after Lord Salisbury took office. The Prime Minister had striven earnestly to establish relations of perfect amity between the two peoples. Though he had failed to obtain a general treaty of arbitration, and, in default of that, a settlement of outstanding questions by means of the Joint Commission, his success in undoing the evil consequences of Mr. Cleveland's Message, and in convincing American statesmen that the interests of the United States were not dissimilar from those of England, was not the least conspicuous feature of his management of our Foreign Policy.

BOOK III.

THE GOVERNMENT AND CHINA.

CHAPTER I.

A DIPLOMATIC SKIRMISH.

The Powers and Japan—The Victors Ousted—Russia's Secret Understanding with China—A Polite Denial—Lord Salisbury's Optimism—An Invitation to Russia—The Stewart Murders—The British Ultimatum—Major Macdonald's Appointment—The Condition of China—Russian Railway Plans—Designs on Manchuria—The North China Railways—The Question of Mr. Kinder—A Diplomatic Skirmish—M. Pavloff temporarily Silenced.

LORD ROSEBERRY'S Government stood aloof from the intrigues which deprived Japan of the principal territorial advantages of her victory over China in the winter of 1894-95, and the Salisbury Administration were therefore confronted with a combination of interests opposed to the maintenance of British rights in the Far East. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 16th, China, in addition to an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels, ceded the Liao-tung Peninsula, the Island of Formosa and the Pescadores Archipelago. Russia, France and Germany protested against the cession of any part of the mainland, and gave Japan to understand that they would compel her to evacuate the peninsula. In her extremity Japan turned to Great Britain for help. It was denied to her. Accepting the inevitable, she made a supplementary treaty with China, by which she accepted an additional 30,000,000 taels and agreed to evacuate Port Arthur and the Liao-tung. But it was stipulated by her that the peninsula should not be occupied by either of the three protesting Powers or given up by China, and that Talienwan should be made a free port. At the very time this arrangement was concluded, rumours were current in the West that Russia had a secret understanding with China by which Port Arthur should pass into her possession and the Siberian railway be carried through Chinese territory, so that the terminus should be at that ice-free outlet.

There can be little doubt that an informal agreement did exist by which Russia was to obtain the rights she has since acquired. Lord Salisbury denied that it existed; politely assuming that the negative information given him was true—a courteous line which may not, however, have prevented him from taking an accurate measure of Russia's ambitions in the Far East. Her influence became paramount at Peking, partly because of the skill with which her financiers floated a heavy loan in Paris to enable the Chinese Government to pay instalments of the indemnity to Japan, which Power, meanwhile, held Wei-hai-wei until the final sum should be paid. Lord Salisbury endeavoured to allay the uneasiness that had been created in London by Russia's use of French gold to further her designs and by the evident hostility of the three Powers to English interests in China. Speaking at the Guildhall banquet he said he had been much struck with the false news—relative to Russia and Port Arthur—which had appeared in the Press; not because he thought the news of particular importance (surely an odd statement to make), but because of the public interest it had excited. He deprecated "unnecessary disturbance or alarm." "I think," he continued—and the words have an optimistic ring which many of his supporters regarded as indicating dullness of apprehension—"we foreshorten time and distance. Depend upon it, whatever may happen in that region, be it in the way of war or in the way of commerce, we are equal to any competition which may be proposed to us. We may look with absolute equanimity at the action of any persons, if such there be, who think that they can exclude us from any part of that fertile and commercial region, or imagine that, if we are admitted, they can beat us in the markets of the world. I should be sorry if we felt any undue sensitiveness in that matter. I cannot forget the great words of Lord Beaconsfield—'in Asia there is room for us all.'"

The passage was meant to be reassuring: it was interpreted in Russia—and not quite without reason—to be tantamount to an invitation to find an ice-free port at Port Arthur and extend the Siberian railway through the Peninsula, or at least to mean that such a project would not be opposed by Great Britain. Meanwhile, the Government had shown that there was some ground for the hope that it would be equal to any exigencies that might arise in the Far East. The war with Japan had resulted in a recrudescence of anti-foreign sentiment among the Chinese. Ugly disturbances

had occurred just before the General Election, and in August a terrible event was reported from the Province of Tokien, the Rev. R. W. Stewart, his wife, two of their children, and five ladies belonging to the Church Missionary Society, being barbarously murdered in their mission quarters near Kuchang, their dwellings being set on fire while the inmates slept, those who escaped the flames being slaughtered by the incendiaries. For this horrible deed and for riots that occurred elsewhere instant punishment and ample reparation were demanded. The Chinese Government did nothing. An ultimatum was therefore sent to the Pekin Government and ships of war to the Yangtse ports with orders to take action should compliance with it be denied at the expiry of the stipulated time. The Chinese Government gave way, executing the murderers, punishing officials, and paying the indemnities demanded. Lord Salisbury had thus displayed both the will and the power of the Government to protect the lives and interests of our subjects in China. His assurances that we could hold our own in war or in commerce against any Powers who strove to exclude us and support the Chinese against us derived a certain strength from this spirited and decisive action.

There was, nevertheless, a keen apprehension that events were moving towards a dismemberment of China and a general break-up of the Empire. Suspicion was rife that in the clash of interests that would then occur British interests would receive a shock which would imperil, if not destroy, our trade supremacy in the Far East. Nor was this uneasiness allayed by the announcement in January, 1896, that Sir Nicholas O'Connor, our Minister at Pekin, was transferred to St. Petersburg, and that a successor had been found in Major Sir Claude Macdonald. Who is Major Macdonald? it was asked. Outside army circles, and the limited class which pays attention to West African questions, there were few who could give an answer. And all that they could say was that he came of a military family, that he had fought with distinction at Tel-el-Kebir, El Teb and Temai, had been Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General of the Oil Rivers Protectorate and Consul in the Island of Fernando Po, had been entrusted with the task of inquiring into complaints made against the Royal Niger Company, and had made a Report which the Government had not seen fit to publish. Since 1891 he had held the dignified position of Consul in the German Colony of the Camaroons. West Africa is not exactly the best

ERRATUM.

Where the name of Her Majesty's Minister at Peking is mis-
printed as "Sir Claude Macdonald," read "Sir Claude MacDonald."

training school for diplomatists; experience in settling the disputes of rival traders in the Gulf of Guinea and managing the degraded savages who live in the swamps of the Niger Delta is hardly a qualification for negotiating with the Tsung-li-Yamên. So surprising an appointment was regarded with distrust even by those who knew that the recently knighted major was a man of resource and energy of character. But Lord Salisbury, as subsequent events were to show, knew what he was doing. He had found a man of talent; and he had the courage to entrust him with work which would develop his latent powers and give the nation the full benefit of his gifts. The murmurs of those who complained that an unknown man had been taken from trivial duties on the West Coast of Africa and promoted over their heads to one of the most coveted posts in the diplomatic service—at a time, too, when there was a likelihood that circumstances would give an able man every chance to distinguish himself—were unnoticed and criticism in the newspapers was ignored. Time has justified Lord Salisbury's selection. Brilliant and successful diplomatists have represented Great Britain in the Chinese capital; but it is questionable whether there is one who has been able to do so much good work and has made a better use of his opportunities than the soldier diplomatist Lord Salisbury found in the Niger Delta.

Sir Claude Macdonald arrived at his post at the end of April. He found China in a deplorable condition. A rebellion in the province of Kansu had been but incompletely suppressed; brigandage was rife on the Russo-Manchurian frontier; in the Province of Yunnan there were riots in which Mission houses were destroyed; in Sze-Chuan an active propaganda went on, with the connivance of the officials and literati, against "the foreign devils," and throughout the interior general unrest prevailed, and life and property were insecure. Meanwhile Peking was a hot-bed of anti-British intrigue and diplomatic successes won by Russia and France were likely to operate to our disadvantage. France obtained the promise of railway connection between Tongking and the Kwangsi province, her object being the diversion of trade from the West River route, which had—nominally at least—been opened in March, and was expected to bring advantages to British commerce. In August Russia concluded an agreement for the formation by the Russo-Chinese Bank of a company to construct and work a railway within China from the western borders of Wei-Lun-Tsian province to the eastern

province of Ghirin, and for the connection of this line with branches to be constructed by the Russian Government from Trans-Backaha and the Southern Ussuri lines. This company was to exploit coal mines and other industrial enterprises along this eastern Chinese railway, and only Russian and Chinese subjects were to be shareholders. By this agreement, therefore, Manchuria was to be linked to the Russian Trans-Siberian railway, and, by virtue of the preferential advantages given to the company, to become to some extent a Russian province.

Not content with the attempted Russification of Manchuria by means of these new branch lines Russia endeavoured to oust Mr. Kinder, an Englishman, from his position of Engineer-in-Chief on the Northern Railways of China—the Pekin-Tientsen-Shanhaikwan line. M. Pavloff represented to the Tsung-li-Yamên that the retention of Mr. Kinder would be displeasing to Russia, who wished to see a Russian in his place; and he had the impudence to tell Sir Claude Macdonald that he did not wish to get rid of Mr. Kinder because he was an Englishman but because he was not a Russian. Moreover, he declared that the intention of the St. Petersburg Government was that “the province of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under the influence of any nation except Russia.” Sir Claude Macdonald made energetic protests, warning the Tsung-li-Yamên that the dismissal of Mr. Kinder would be viewed with serious displeasure by Her Majesty’s Government. This view was communicated to Russia by Sir N. O’Conor. The Tsung-li-Yamên were between the upper and the nether millstones—Russia pressing them to dismiss Mr. Kinder and Great Britain warning them of the consequences if they did so. The controversy was kept going sharply at London, at St. Petersburg and at Pekin, and at length (on March 20th) Count Lamsdorff, finding he could not get his own way so easily as he had hoped, said that Russia would raise no further objection to the employment of Mr. Kinder and that he had instructed M. Pavloff to drop the subject. There the matter ended—for the time being, as we shall soon see. Sir Claude Macdonald had had his first encounter with the Russian diplomatists and had gained a victory which at least convinced the Tsung-li-Yamên that they had other forces to reckon with than those Russia could employ. But this was a mere skirmish among the diplomatists. More serious conflicts were to follow, in which Lord Salisbury rather than Sir Claude Macdonald was destined to be outwitted.

CHAPTER II.

A FEW RUSSIAN SUBTERFUGES.

The Russian Aim—German Seizure of Kiao Chau—Speech by the Emperor William—The German Michael and the Mailed Fist—Port Arthur—The Chinese “Invitation”—Visit of H.M.S. Daphne—Russian Explanations—The Vladivostok Ice-breaker—British Men-of-War at Port Arthur—Russian Complaints—Lord Salisbury’s Excuses—The Question of the Loan—Anti-British Intrigues—Winter Anchorage at Port Arthur becomes a Right of Exclusive Use—The Russian Claim to Talienwan—Count Mouravieff’s Pledges—A British Warship Ordered out of Port Arthur—Lord Salisbury’s Renewed Excuses—The Position of the Yamén—The Loan Question—Russian Threats to China—Decision of the Yamén—A British Warning—Success of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank—Port Arthur and Talienwan—Lord Salisbury and M. de Staal—The Russian Minister’s Pledges—The *Times* Reports of a Lease—Wei-hai-wei Offered to England—Signature of the Russian Lease—The Shuffling of Count Mouravieff—The Czar’s Assurance as to both Ports—Lord Salisbury Accepts the Situation—An Important Qualification—Lord Salisbury on Port Arthur—The Balance of Power—Russia asked to Abandon her Claim—Count Mouravieff Angry—Lord Salisbury gives way—A Retaliatory Policy—The Lease of Wei-hai-wei—The Russian Assurances—An Important Difference—Talienwan only to be an Open Port.

WHEN Lord Salisbury denied the story of the existence of a secret treaty by which Russia was to obtain Port Arthur from China, he may have thought more of lulling the suspicions the statement had aroused than of giving his opinions upon the probable course of events. The policy of Russia was transparent. Everyone knew that she was determined, by guile or by force, to obtain an ice-free outlet for the Siberian Railway; and anyone who took the trouble to look at a map and read it in relation to the fact that Japan had been driven out of the Liao Tung Peninsula, could see that no place served her purpose so well as Port Arthur. It was not, however, until the end of 1897 that Russia allowed it to be seen that her designs were being executed. A month earlier Germany had been allowed to reward herself, by the seizure of Kiao Chau Bay, for acting with Russia in compelling Japan to relinquish the Peninsula. Though Count Mouravieff said he had been “rather surprised when he heard of the occupation of the bay in question,” there can be little doubt that Russia was privy to the act. The pretext was the murder of two German missionaries in the province

of Shantung. Men of war appeared in Kiao Chau Bay and ordered the Chinese commandant to evacuate the place within forty-eight hours. The Yamên were so frightened at this peremptory demand that they instructed the officials to offer no resistance. Six hundred men were landed by the German Admiral and lodged in the Chinese barracks. Baron von Heyking, the German Minister at Pekin, told the Yamên that Kiao Chau would not be evacuated unless costs were paid, pecuniary satisfaction given for the murder of the missionaries, and preference allowed to German engineers in the construction of any railway in Shantung Province and in the working of any mine. Lord Salisbury protested against the latter part of this demand on the ground that it conflicted with British Treaty rights. The Yamên declined to comply until the evacuation of Kiao Chau. Germany thereupon put up her price and demanded a coaling station. The more obstructive the Chinese the heavier were the requirements of Germany. Meanwhile Lord Salisbury endeavoured to convince both the German Government and the Tsung-li-Yamên that the grant of exclusive privileges to Germany could not be allowed in Shantung. From the Chinese he received empty words; from German Ministers assurances of doubtful value.

The details of the diplomatic wrangle need not be stated. On December 16th Germany sent a naval expedition to China, under the command of Prince Henry of Prussia, to assist the Tsung-li-Yamên to come to a speedy decision. Speaking to the toast of his brother's health at a farewell dinner at Kiel the German Emperor surpassed even himself in magniloquence. Though, he said, the squadron was to defend and not to assail, its vocation was to make clear to every European in China, to the German merchant "and above all, to the foreigner whose soil we may be on, and with whom we shall have to deal, that the German Michael has planted his shield, adorned with the eagle of the Empire, firmly in the soil, in order, once for all, to afford protection to those who apply to him for it. . . . Should anyone attempt to affront us, or to infringe our good rights, then strike out with mailed fist, and, if God will, weave round your young brow the laurel which nobody in the whole German Empire will begrudge you." Prince Henry's reply was equally grandiloquent, and marked by a nauseous servility. His one desire, he said, was "to proclaim and preach abroad, to all who will hear as well as to those who will not, the gospel of your Majesty's annointed person." Europe smiled at the spectacle of the German

mailed fist; the size of the squadron was so ludicrously out of proportion to the swaggering language with which its departure was announced; but the Tsung-li-Yamên quaked in their shoes. Before the battleship which carried the "young brow"—the evangelist who yearned to preach the gospel of the annointed person—had reached Chinese waters, the opportunity of earning a "laurel" was closed by the signing of a lease confirming the Germans in their arbitrary possession of Kiao Chau Bay. The territorial integrity of China, which it had been the aim of British policy to preserve, had been violated. The bay and the adjacent territory, within limits that need not here be defined, became part of the German Empire. The Powers acquiesced. Lord Salisbury thought that probably no great injury had been done to England. He had been assured by the German Foreign Minister that Germany had no desire to do anything disagreeable to England. That was one of the reasons why the port of Kiao-Chau had been selected; it was in the north of China, "far removed from the regions in which England was directly interested"—a remark that showed that Germany shared with Russia the delusion that we had no interests in North China about which other Powers need concern themselves. Both the Emperor and himself were sincere partisans of a good understanding with England, and most sincerely hoped that "the irritation unfortunately existing in both countries would gradually subside." To these soothing platitudes Lord Salisbury replied that "should a demand be made for exclusive privileges, or should other countries seek to take possession of Chinese ports, it would become necessary for Her Majesty's Government to take steps for the protection of her vast interests in China."

Germany having thus established, with Russian sanction, a precedent for the spoliation of China—for the Chinese had paid heavy indemnities on account of the murders—Count Mouravieff prepared the way for the seizure of Port Arthur. It came to the knowledge of Sir Claude Macdonald that the Chinese were collecting provisions at Port Arthur for five Russian men-of-war which, by "permission" of the Chinese Government, were going to winter there. H.M.S. *Daphne* was sent north to look round. The Commander found four Chinese men-of-war inside the harbour and three Russian outside, and learned that more of the latter were expected. On December 22nd, 1897, the Yamên told our Minister that the Chinese Government had given permission for the Russian fleet to

winter at that port. Sir Nicholas O'Connor broached the subject to Count Mouravieff at St. Petersburg, and received a simple explanation. Russia had more ships of war in those seas than could conveniently lie in a Japanese port, and, Vladivostock being ice-locked, the Chinese Government had been so kind as to offer the vessels hospitality at Port Arthur.

Japan also inquired why Russian men-of-war were there, as she had every right to do, seeing that there was an express stipulation in the Treaty of Shimonoseki that Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung Peninsula should not pass out of China's possession. A like explanation was given to her, with the additional assurance that the Chinese had only lent the port "temporarily as a winter anchorage." About this time two British warships casually looked in at Port Arthur and stayed there. Count Mouravieff, quick to notice signs of English distrust, engaged our representative at St. Petersburg in conversation on the absolute unimportance of Port Arthur and of Chinese hospitality. The men-of-war, he said, had gone there merely as a matter of convenience; and the fact that China had invited them to do so was of trivial importance, because Vladivostock now possessed an exceptionally powerful ice-breaker, which would make the port available for ingress and egress throughout the winter. "In fact," he continued, "Vladivostock remained as heretofore the Russian centre in the Far East and the headquarters of their land and sea forces, so that the mere fact of the Russian squadron wintering at Port Arthur made no change whatever in the situation."

Nothing could have been more explicit—and more dishonest. If it be the duty of a diplomatist to lie in the interest of his country, Count Mouravieff richly deserved the lavish encomiums of the Czar in the Imperial Rescript on New Year's Day, 1900. It was on January 8th that Count Mouravieff made these declarations. Four days later there was a startling change in the position of affairs. The Russian Ambassador called upon Lord Salisbury and referred to the presence of two of Her Majesty's vessels at Port Arthur. The circumstance had, he said, "produced a bad impression at St. Petersburg." Lord Salisbury treated these representations with a delicacy that must have been vastly amusing to the wily Russians. Though he reminded M. de Staal that the ships had a Treaty right to enter the port, and that therefore there could be no ground for complaint by Russia, he added that, "as a matter of

fact, they had been sent thither by Admiral Buller without any orders from home, and that he (Lord Salisbury, from whose account of the interview this passage is taken) believed that in the ordinary course they would soon move to some other anchorage." From that moment Russia played her cards more rapidly.

A few days previously Sir Claude Macdonald had learned that Russia had offered China a four per cent. loan on the security of the Land Tax and *likin* revenue, the *quid pro quo* being that Russia should have the financing, construction and control of all the railways in Manchuria and North China, and that a Russian should be appointed Inspector-General of Customs when that position—occupied by Sir Robert Hart—became vacant. The China Association urged the British Government to guarantee a loan, then being negotiated by an agent of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. Lord Salisbury agreed, and a loan of £12,000,000 was offered to China, the *quid pro quo* in this case being: (1) requisite control of revenue; (2) a railway from the Burmese frontier to the Yangtze Valley; (3) a guarantee against the cession of territory in the Yangtze Valley to any other Power; (4) Talienwan to be made a free port (as had been provided for under the Chino-Japanese Treaty); (5) greater freedom of internal trade, and (6) the abolition of *likin* in the Treaty Ports. Russia, through M. Hanotaux, the French Foreign Minister, objected to an English loan. An isolated guarantee by England would mean the risk of "a good deal of jealousy in other quarters." Lord Salisbury ignored the hint of Russian opposition. Four days later the Yamên informed Sir Claude Macdonald that they could not agree to the condition that Talienwan should be made a Treaty Port. M. Pavloff, they said, had protested against this in the strongest manner, "and had warned them that they would incur the hostility of Russia" by opening the port. Why, asked Sir Claude Macdonald, should Russia be hostile if she had no ulterior designs upon Talienwan? He was astonished to find that they could not open a Treaty Port in any part of the Empire, particularly since the opening of Talienwan would protect China against its annexation. The trembling Yamên protested that it was not their fault. "They are evidently," wrote Sir Claude Macdonald, "greatly frightened by Russian threats."

While Russia was thus thwarting any English loan by playing upon the fears of the Yamên, Count Mouravieff volunteered the

statement that the Chinese Government had given Russia the prior right of anchorage in Port Arthur—"le droit du premier mouillage." A mere "wintering" at Port Arthur, granted by the hospitable Chinese, lest Russian vessels should be harbourless in the China Sea, had thus developed into a permanent right. There was an implied challenge to Lord Salisbury in this announcement. He did not take it up. It did not even stimulate him to stand firm on the question of Talienwan, for he instructed Sir Claude Macdonald not to insist upon it being made a Treaty Port. He had begun in weakness and in weakness he continued.

From this point the negotiations become less satisfactory the more closely they are examined. M. de Staal developed curiosity as to the position of the loan; and he argued vigorously that to insist upon making Talienwan a Treaty Port would be to "encroach on the Russian sphere of influence" and deny to Russia in the future "that right to the use of Port Arthur to which the progress of events had given her a claim." What possible objections, Lord Salisbury asked, could Russia have to making Talienwan a free port if she had no designs on the Peninsula? The answer was an implied admission that such designs were in fact entertained. It was generally admitted, said the Russian Minister, that Russia might claim a commercial outlet on the open sea. Lord Salisbury merely answered that in any event our Treaties with China forbade that Power giving preferential Customs terms to Russia.

Merely "wintering" at Port Arthur, as a matter of convenience until the "exceptionally powerful ice-breaker" at Vladivostock had got to work, had therefore developed in less than three weeks into a prior right of anchorage there for all time, and into an exclusive claim over Talienwan as a commercial outlet—Port Arthur being simply a naval base and fortress. These developments had occurred notwithstanding the voluntary assurance of Count Mouravieff that "Vladivostock remained as heretofore the Russian centre in the Far East and the headquarters of their land and sea forces, and that the mere fact of the Russian squadron wintering at Port Arthur made no change whatever in the situation." Lord Salisbury accepted these encroachments in so complaisant a spirit that Count Mouravieff became aggressive. He threatened China with terrible things should a loan be arranged with England, and he complained outright to Sir N. O'Connor that British gunboats should have dared to enter Port Arthur. That Talienwan should, as one of the con-

ditions of an English loan, be a Treaty Port, could not, he said, be regarded by Russia as a friendly act; and as for the presence of British warships in Port Arthur "these proceedings are looked upon here (St. Petersburg) as so unfriendly as to set afloat rumours of war with Great Britain."

This was a plain hint not only that Russia meant to have Port Arthur for herself but also that she was prepared to go to war with England if Lord Salisbury pressed his objections. The Government were thus brought within easy distance of an ugly contingency. That there should be no doubt as to what the ulterior meaning of Russia was, M. de Staal was instructed to drive home the complaint that British war vessels were at Port Arthur. Lord Salisbury was meekness personified. There was, he explained, only one British vessel at Port Arthur, the *Iphigenia*; she had every right to be there; the visits of men-of-war afforded no ground for objections by any other Power; but the *Iphigenia* "*would be leaving in a few days; her visit was by orders of the Admiral, issued at his own discretion and not under the directions of Her Majesty's Government.*"

And she did leave. Russia had, in effect, ordered away a British man-of-war from a port where she had an absolute right to call, and Lord Salisbury accepted the order and practically assured Russia that it would be executed forthwith. His words read like an apology that the *Iphigenia* should have been in Port Arthur at all, and in diplomacy are equivalent to a statement that it was not the fault of Her Majesty's Government that she was there but that of the British Admiral. It is a humiliating passage in the story of the negotiations. The severest comment that can be made on Lord Salisbury's weakness in this specific instance is that Port Arthur is to-day a Russian fortress—that British men-of-war are excluded from the harbour notwithstanding their Treaty right to use it and the unrestricted exercise of that right up to the time of Count Mouravieff's significant statement that the reports of such a use had set afloat rumours of war with Great Britain.

By craft, and by a subtle hint of force, Russia had thus secured for her fleet an exclusive anchorage in Port Arthur. Also by craft and threats she prevented China from accepting a loan from England. The Russian Minister at Peking, so the perturbed Yamên informed Sir Claude Macdonald, "had protested against the loan in the

strongest manner on the ground that it would disturb the balance of influence in China." The French Government also objected, complaining that England had asked for the opening of the port of Nanning and railway rights from the Burmese frontier to the Yangtze Valley. Sir Claude Macdonald took a strong line with the Yamên. He demanded that they should resist these protests, and said that if they did not "China must be prepared for the consequences." This threat having been communicated to the Russian Minister at Peking, Count Mouravieff acquainted the Tsung-li-Yamên with its value by causing an announcement to be published at St. Petersburg that British men-of-war, in consequence of Russian representations, had received orders to quit Port Arthur immediately. Lord Salisbury instructed Sir Claude Macdonald to inform the Yamên that the statement was a pure invention. It is impossible to withhold sympathy from the Yamên. China was in dire straits for money with which to pay the Japanese indemnity, and each of the two Powers prepared to lend threatened her with something worse than displeasure if she accepted the money of the other. More puzzled than ever the Yamên innocently suggested that Russia and England should divide the loan between them. This being impracticable, the Yamên told Sir Claude that though they would gladly have accepted the loan from England, Russia had used such threats that they saw no way out of the difficulty except some arrangement with Japan and borrowing neither from England nor Russia. Sir Claude Macdonald urged them to stand out against Russia's threats. They replied that nothing short of a promise of protection against Russia would help them, and added that the French Minister had spoken "very violently" against the opening of Nanning.

The Yamên took a few days to reconsider the matter. On February 3rd Sir Claude Macdonald learned from Prince Kung that the decision to borrow from neither Power would be adhered to; and on the 4th Li Hung Chang, then Grand Secretary, delivered the following message: "The Chinese Government has been warned by Russia that their acceptance of a loan guaranteed by Great Britain will entail an interruption in the friendly relations existing between the two Empires. In consequence of the minatory attitude assumed by Russia, the Chinese have been obliged to come to a decision not to take a loan from either the Russian Government or that of Her Majesty." How far were the Yamên to be

trusted? What if they were to accept a Russian or Franco-Russian loan after all? Lord Salisbury telegraphed to Sir Claude Macdonald instructing him to demand that in any fresh negotiations an adequate share of any loan should be assigned to British Banks, and authorising him to give "a very serious warning" to the Tsung-li-Yamên, "and to state that the friendly relations existing between the two countries will be seriously imperilled if there should be any appearance of excluding this country." As a matter of fact, Russia did not care a fig whether England lent China the money or not. All she was in reality concerned about was that Talienwan should not become a Treaty Port or an open port as a condition of the loan, or in any event—a point in which she sustained a diplomatic defeat at Lord Salisbury's hands, as will subsequently be shown. This view of the case seems to have presented itself to the authorities of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. They took up the thread of the loan negotiations. Meanwhile Sir Claude Macdonald obtained assurances of valuable concessions to Great Britain independently of the loan. The Yamên promised the opening of internal navigation to British steamers, the non-alienation of the Yangtze basin to any Power, the opening of a port in Hunan, and that, so long as British trade with China exceeded that of any other Power, the Inspector-General of Customs should be, in the future as in the past, an Englishman. But to return to the loan. On February 19th a preliminary agreement was signed by the agent of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Chinese Government for a loan of sixteen millions, on the security of the *likin* revenues. Ten days were given for final acceptance. The questions of Talienwan and Nanning having fallen out of the loan proposals, neither Russia nor France made any objection to the completion of the Bank's enterprise.

The subject of the loan is so inextricably mixed with that of Port Arthur and Talienwan that it has been necessary to interrupt the march of the story of Russia's acquisition of these places. We left the main track of Russian diplomacy at the point where objections were made to Talienwan becoming a Treaty Port as the condition of a guaranteed loan by England, and where British men-of-war were, broadly speaking, withdrawn from Port Arthur by Lord Salisbury at the dictation of Russia. This was on January 28th. On February 2nd M. de Staal again visited Lord Salisbury. On this occasion he showed his hand plainly. Russia having made up

her mind that Lord Salisbury would not resist her ambitions, no longer cloaked her desire to obtain the ports in assurances as to the temporary nature of the Russian anchorage at Port Arthur, or by talk about the exceptional power of the ice-breaker at Vladivostock. Lord Salisbury did not tell M. de Staal that the acquisition of Port Arthur and Talienwan would be a violation of Chinese territory and would on that account be objected to by us, but merely that the only cause for English apprehension was a report that Russia intended to cause some port to be opened to her own imports at preferential rates. This, he pointed out, would be an infraction of the most favoured nation treatment assured to England by Articles XXIV. and LIV. of the Treaty of 1858. In fact, by implication, Lord Salisbury invited Russia to obtain both these ports on the condition of respect for British rights. To satisfy Lord Salisbury that Treaty rights would not be infringed, M. de Staal appears to have shown him a telegram instructing him to declare that any port ceded to Russia as a commercial outlet would be a free port. Controversy subsequently arose as to whether the words used were a free port or a Treaty port; but that is a side issue that may be disregarded at the moment. Early in March the *Times*—which had throughout been brilliantly served by its special correspondent at Pekin—announced that Russia would be granted a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, and on a later date that Russia had demanded sovereign rights over Port Arthur and Talienwan, and the right to construct a railway from Petuna, on the Trans-Manchurian Railway, *via* Moukden to Port Arthur. Four days, it was said, had been given to the Yamên in which to accept this demand and in the event of non-compliance Russian troops would forthwith march into Manchuria.

That this dramatic development was imminent, was certainly known in Pekin if it was not foreseen in Downing Street, for, nearly a fortnight before the *Times* telegrams a Chinese Minister had told Sir Claude Macdonald that the Chinese Government would offer England a lease of Wei-hai-wei if they thought the gift would be acceptable. Nations do not give away important strategic points without reason; and there could be no other explanation of the offer than that China believed she would be safer against Russian aggression from Port Arthur if England were seated at the other horn of the Gulf of Pechili. The hint was not lost upon Lord Salisbury. If the *Times* reports were true it would be necessary to

make some counter move which would restore the balance of power. He instructed Sir Claude Macdonald to insist upon the lease of Wei-hai-wei on its evacuation by the Japanese. On March 9th Sir Claude Macdonald learned officially of the Russian demand for a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan with railway rights, and that the reason given was to "assist in protecting Manchuria against the aggression of other Powers"—which Powers, Russia declined to say, though England and Japan were clearly meant. There was, however, no indication of an ultimatum or of a time limit. Again the Yamên fell into a condition of pitiable fright. They implored Her Majesty's Government to give assurances to Russia that they had no designs on Manchuria. Sir Claude Macdonald informed them, as he had done in answer to the suggestion that Great Britain should take a lease of Wei-hai-wei, that we had no designs whatever upon Chinese territory, that our policy "at present" aimed at discouraging the alienation of Chinese territory, and that that policy would be pursued unless Her Majesty's Government were driven to different courses by the aggression of other Powers. The Yamên professed their gratitude for what they had heard, but begged Sir Claude Macdonald to ask Lord Salisbury to satisfy Russia that England had no such designs upon Manchuria as could furnish that Power with a pretext for her demand for Port Arthur and Talienwan.

Lord Salisbury, however, was more anxious to secure British Treaty rights in Manchuria than to try to prevent the Liao-Tung Peninsula from passing from Chinese control to Russian. He seems to have made up his mind that if Russia was determined to have Port Arthur as a naval stronghold and Talienwan as a commercial outlet it was not worth while to wage a war to prevent her. There are some who think he was wrong in taking this view, and that acquiescence in Russian aggression at China's expense was on a level with the apologetic compliance with the Russian demand earlier in the year that British men-of-war should keep away from Port Arthur; but that is a question for the future. The verdict depends upon events that cannot be foreseen, and on which it would be idle to speculate. The Salisbury Administration having declined to go to war with Russia about the Liao-Tung Peninsula the practical question is whether Lord Salisbury and his colleagues were successful in safeguarding British interests.

Lord Salisbury's task was one of unusual difficulty because of the craftiness of Count Mouravieff's diplomacy. In the New Year

Rescript of 1900 the Czar has accepted entire responsibility for his Minister's action. That curious document would have us believe that the Count was little more than a capable head clerk whose chief merit that of a scrupulous fidelity to his master's instructions. This view of the case would place a critic in the disagreeable predicament of acquitting Count Mouravieff of shiftiness and insincerity and convicting the Russian Sovereign. On the facts set forth in this chapter—and in each case the Russian explanations are taken from the official despatches—that would be a perfectly reasonable thing to do. There would be, however, no real justification for doing it. After the acquisition of Port Arthur, as will be shown in the succeeding chapter, the Czar took an active part in the negotiations and exerted his influence in favour of a straightforward Russian policy. He not only gave instructions but also saw that they were obeyed. There is no evidence that he did either prior to the acquisition of the lease. Certainly there is none that warrants the belief that he was a party to the methods by which Count Mouravieff sought to hoodwink Great Britain, to undermine our influence at Peking, and override our Treaty rights; and in its absence we need not credit the Imperial statement that in every particular Count Mouravieff was but carrying out the minute instructions of his employer. The theory that he was leads to a conclusion unfavourable to the Czar, who is more likely to have been misled by those about him than to have sought to deceive a State with which it is his personal desire to cultivate relations of friendship.

Before the lease was signed Count Mouravieff endeavoured to satisfy Lord Salisbury that it could do no harm to British interests; when the signatures had been affixed he sought to convert it into an instrument by which injury could be inflicted. A characteristic device was the denial, after the lease was granted, of the assurances given to England before it was obtained. The sovereign rights of China over Port Arthur and Talienwan would, said Count Mouravieff, be in no way infringed or abrogated by their cession on lease to Russia. On March 8th, in absolute forgetfulness of his statements of December 26th that Vladivostock would continue to be the Russian headquarters for the sea and land forces in the Far East and that that situation was unaffected by the fact of the squadron "wintering" at Port Arthur, he enlarged to Sir N. O'Connor on the vital necessity to Russia of an ice-free port. In December, as has

been seen, Vladivostock had been furnished with "an exceptionally powerful icebreaker," which was to give ingress and egress throughout the year; but in March Count Mouravieff was distressed to think that Russia was icebound in Vladivostock, while England, Germany and France had naval stations open all the year. In these circumstances "Russia had no alternative but to demand a cession both of Port Arthur and Talienwan, as one without the other would be of no use to them." Talienwan would, however, be "open to foreign trade like other ports in China." Sir Nicholas pointed out that the possession by Russia of a strong fortress like Port Arthur materially altered the position of affairs in China. Count Mouravieff could not see that it did. Were not British interests chiefly in the Yangtze Valley? He was reminded that British Treaty rights extended over the Chinese Empire; and there the matter rested. On March 16th Count Mouravieff announced—in advance of the execution of the document, which is dated March 27th—that a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan had been granted; and he added that "foreign trade shall have free access to both these ports, similarly to other ports in the Chinese Empire."

The object of British diplomacy was not to prevent the cession of any ice-free port to Russia, but to maintain our Treaty rights intact. This was the vital principle of Lord Salisbury's policy. Explicit instructions had been sent to Sir N. O'Connor to obtain assurances that there would be no interference with the stipulations of the Treaty of Tientsin, especially Articles 24, 52 and 54. He had been made acquainted with M. de Staal's assurances to Lord Salisbury on February 9th to the effect that *any* port would be a "free port" or "Treaty Port"—as to which was meant there was a singular misunderstanding. Prior to March 16th Sir Nicholas had had conversations with Count Mouravieff on the subject. The Count then (March 13th) wished to limit M. de Staal's assurances to Talienwan: the Czar had told him that Port Arthur was to be regarded as a military port. He could not therefore promise that both Port Arthur and Talienwan would be open; but he would give a definite answer later. When therefore, on March 16th, in formally announcing that the lease had been granted, he said that "foreign trade shall have free access to both these ports," there seemed to be an end to the matter. Sir Nicholas could not have mistaken Count Mouravieff. Alike in his

telegraphic report of the interview, and in his long-written account, the information is as definite and precise as it could be. The telegram having been quoted, it may be as well to cite the despatch: "His Imperial Majesty" (says the latter document) "had authorised him (Count Mouravieff) to give the assurance that both Port Arthur and Talienwan should be open to foreign trade, like other Chinese ports."

It was on the basis of this assurance, applicable equally to Port Arthur and Talienwan, that Lord Salisbury proceeded to deal with the new situation created by the cession of the ports. He instructed Sir Nicholas O'Connor to say that Her Majesty's Government would not regard with dissatisfaction the holding of a lease by Russia of an ice-free port connected by rail with the Trans-Siberian Railway; but he added these striking words:—

"Questions of an entirely different kind are opened if Russia obtains control of a military port in the neighbourhood of Peking. Port Arthur is useless for commercial purposes, its whole importance being derived solely from its military strength and strategic position, and its occupation would inevitably be considered in the East as a standing menace to Peking and the commencement of the partition of China. The military occupation or fortification of any other harbour on the same coast or in the Gulf of Pechili would be open to the same objections with almost equal force. From some observations made by Count Lamsdorff, and reported by you in your Despatch of the 8th instant, Her Majesty's Government gather that this is not a policy favoured by Russia, while it is one to which Her Majesty's Government entertain grave objections. Her Majesty's Government, on the other hand, are prepared to give assurances that beyond the maintenance of existing Treaty rights they have no interest in Manchuria, and to pledge themselves not to occupy any port in the Gulf of Pechili so long as other Powers pursue the same policy."

Sir Nicholas O'Connor reported that he had failed to induce Russia to abandon the claim to Port Arthur. Count Mouravieff would not hear of it. His remarks "showed some heat." He denied that the principle of the integrity of China would be violated by the cession of Port Arthur, and he pointed out significantly that England was the only Power that objected. This was on March 23rd. The next day the Yamên told Sir Claude Macdonald that Russia refused to consider Port Arthur and Talienwan apart and threatened China with hostile measures unless the lease could be executed by the 25th. Lord Salisbury telegraphed on the 25th to Sir Claude: "Balance of Power in Gulf of Pechili is materially altered by surrender of Port Arthur by Yamên to Russia. It is therefore

necessary to obtain, in the manner you think most efficacious and speedy, the refusal of Wei-hai-wei on the departure of the Japanese. The terms should be similar to those granted to Russia for Port Arthur." At the time the Yamên made no objection, and by April 3rd the Wei-hai-wei lease was agreed upon in principle. Meanwhile Lord Salisbury, on March 28th, had received the following communication from M. de Staal:—

"By order of my Government, I have the honour to notify to your Excellency that, in virtue of a Convention signed on the 15th (27th) March at Peking between the Russian representative and the members of the Tsung-li-Yamên, duly authorised for that purpose, Ports Arthur and Talienwan, as well as the adjacent territories, have been ceded to Russia in usufruct by the Chinese Government. These ports and territories will be immediately occupied by the troops of His Majesty the Emperor, my August Master, and the Russian flag will be hoisted beside the Chinese flag. I am likewise charged to inform your Excellency that the Port of Talienwan will be open to foreign commerce, and that the vessels of all friendly nations will receive the fullest hospitality there."

A comparison of the last sentence with the assurance forwarded by Sir Nicholas O'Connor on March 16th—"His Imperial Majesty had authorised him (Count Mouravieff) to give the assurance that both Port Arthur and Talienwan should be open to foreign trade, like other Chinese Ports"—reveals the exact difference that had now become acute between the British and the Russian Governments. Lord Salisbury replied to M. de Staal that assurances of a more comprehensive nature had been given than that Talienwan alone should be open to foreign trade; and he telegraphed to Sir Nicholas O'Connor to obtain from Count Mouravieff the assurance of March 16th in writing. This Count Mouravieff declined to do; the time was not opportune, he said, for making these assurances public. Sir Nicholas O'Connor pressed him on the subject, pointing out the difference between the assurance of March 16th and that on the circular letter to the Russian Embassies, saying that Talienwan alone would be open to foreign ships. Then Count Mouravieff complained that he had been misunderstood. He had given to Sir Nicholas O'Connor "ideas expressed very confidentially" on March 16th, but they ought never to have been interpreted as "assurances." In other words, when he had said that the Czar had authorised him to give the assurance that both Port Arthur and Talienwan should be open to foreign trade, Sir Nicholas ought not to have interpreted him to mean what he had said. How could he have meant what he said

when the lease had not been signed? Abandoning this pitiable wriggling he argued that the interests of other Powers had not been affected by the lease; on the contrary, Talienwan, a port hitherto closed, would be open to the trade of the world, and linked with the Siberian railway. Respect for the sovereign rights of China implied a scrupulous maintenance of the *status quo* existing before the lease. "*It follows that Port Arthur will be open to English ships on the same conditions as it has always been*"; but not that Russia should abuse the lease by the arbitrary transformation of a closed and principally military port into a commercial port, like any other. The quoted and italicised words open out a set of considerations dealt with in the succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER III.

SOME DIPLOMATIC MANŒUVRES.

Further Russian Intrigues—Japan Rejects the Russian Overtures—Her Support of England—Lord Salisbury wins Germany over—The Pledge to that Power in Shantung—Why it was Criticised—The Wei-hai-wei Lease—Is there a Russo-Chinese Treaty of Alliance?—The *Times* Reports—The Official Evidence—Sir Claude Macdonald's Views—His Interview with Prince Ching—The Wei-hai-wei Lease Granted—Renewed Russian Hostility in North China—The Passports Question—The Imperial Order as to Talienwan—Another attempt to Oust Mr. Kinder—British Warning to Russia—The Northern Railways Extension Loan—A Dead-Lock—The Peace Imperilled.

Nor content with having obtained Port Arthur and Talienwan for herself, Russia endeavoured to prevent the leasing of Wei-hai-wei to England. Japan, the Power she had forced out of the Liao-Tung Peninsula, was invited to act with her in maintaining the principle that, after evacuation by the Japanese troops, Wei-hai-wei should not pass from Chinese hands. Japan had no special cause for gratitude to England, which had stood idly by while Russia, France and Germany had compelled her to relinquish the fruits of conquest; but her statesmen had no mind to serve as tools to Russian hostility against Great Britain and refused to give Count Mouravieff the undertaking he sought. To Lord Salisbury they expressed pleasure at the prospect of Wei-hai-wei being held by a Power whose policy was the maintenance of the integrity of China. Immediate evacuation was promised on receipt of the final instalment of the indemnity, and, as a matter of fact, so prompt was the withdrawal that the British flag was hoisted on May 24th, 1898, amid the congratulations of the outgoing Japanese.

Lord Salisbury had detached Germany from the anti-English combination. That Power, having obtained what she wanted—a strategic position and commercial port in North China—had made overtures for a better understanding. These were answered by Lord Salisbury in the form of a voluntary explanation that the object of taking a lease of Wei-hai-wei was merely to maintain the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili and by simultaneous assurances that no desire existed to give umbrage to German interests in Shantung. It

was not intended, nor was it possible, to make Wei-hai-wei a commercial port and it would "never be worth while to connect it with the peninsula by railway." After slight negotiation a pledge was put on record:—

"England formally declares to Germany that in establishing herself at Wei-hai-wei she has no intention of injuring or contesting the rights and interests of Germany in the Province of Shantung, or of creating difficulties for her in that province. It is especially understood that England will not construct any railroad communication from Wei-hai-wei and the district leased therewith into the interior of the Province of Shantung."

This remarkable declaration was sharply criticised at the time, for it amounted to an abrogation of Treaty opportunities in favour of Germany within Shantung. It gave to that Power exactly those exclusive privileges of railway construction and mining rights which it had been the aim of British policy to prevent. An unmasked concession was made of the very point which Lord Salisbury had expressly reserved when the lease of Kiao Chau and the granting of German rights in Shantung Province was announced. He had said that nothing in the way of preferential treatment of Germans in that region could be sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government; yet he offered assurances equivalent to such a sanction. The inconsistency was unintelligible. Even those who agreed that Germany should be conciliated could not understand why it was necessary to do more than inform the Berlin Foreign Office that the object of taking Wei-hai-wei was to restore the balance of power which had been disturbed by the acquisition of Port Arthur by Russia. On the other hand no one was in a position to judge of that necessity so well as Lord Salisbury. It is, however, humiliating to notice that in order to checkmate Russia in her designs upon Peking and to avert the menace implied in her possession of Port Arthur by holding a fortress at the opposite horn of the gulf, a price had to be paid to Germany by conceding a principle we had declared would be upheld against all comers. That a prudent course was pursued by the Administration was not denied; but prudence that involved a surrender of rights was distinctly unpalatable to many of Lord Salisbury's supporters.

Wei-hai-wei, however, passed to the British Government for so long as Port Arthur shall remain in Russian hands. The lease will be found in the Appendix; and it is sufficient to say here that the place has been favourably reported upon by the Admiralty

experts; that it has been converted into a secondary naval base, and that it is believed to be an English equivalent for the Russian Port Arthur. Whether it is so or not depends, however, in some measure upon the exact relations between Russia and China. Did a Treaty of Alliance exist between those Powers? There is some obscurity upon that point. England does not know with absolute certainty the terms of the Agreement between Russia and China for the lease of the ports and territory in the Liao-Tung Peninsula. The *Times* published a version containing a clause declaring that Port Arthur was solely a naval port, to be used by Russian and Chinese vessels only, and from which the war and merchant vessels of other nations were excluded, and a translation of a Chinese *precis* was transmitted later showing that in this essential, and in all others, the *Times* account was correct. This translation is also given in the Appendix. Anyone who reads Article VI. will see that it is entirely inconsistent with British Treaty rights, not only as regards Port Arthur but also Talienwan, a portion of which harbour is reserved for the exclusive use of Russian and Chinese men-of-war. It is also equally at variance with the assurances given by Count Mouravieff, by the instructions of the Czar, on March 16th. Count Mouravieff was asked whether the *Times* account was true, but he brushed the query aside. The Agreement, he said, was between the Russian and Chinese Governments alone; it was not meant to be published. He would neither deny nor affirm the correctness of the *Times* version lest a demand should be made for the abrogation of the Agreement, and compliance was out of the question; all he would say was that the assurances would be adhered to. And by assurances at this date he meant those given after—not before—the lease was obtained. It follows, therefore, that the application of the assurances was strictly limited to that part of the harbour of Talienwan not reserved to Russian and Chinese men-of-war and that British men-of-war are excluded from Port Arthur. Our right to send them there still remains—on paper—so far as China is concerned, and Lord Salisbury has never admitted in any published document the Russian claim to exclude us by virtue of the Agreement with China; but the fact remains that since the *Iphigenia* disappeared from Port Arthur immediately after Russia had protested against her presence there no British man-of-war or any British vessel of any sort has looked into the harbour.

In the Russo-Chinese Agreement, so far as it is known, there

is nothing that indicates the existence of an alliance; but in the interchange of messages between the Czar and the Emperor of China, a phrase was used by the latter which was interpreted, and misinterpreted, to refer to a "Treaty of Alliance" in addition to, or as a part of, the Agreement. What the Emperor appears to have told the Czar was that the conclusion of the Agreement would "undoubtedly serve to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing for centuries past between our great neighbouring countries." The Report of the Russian *chargé d'affaires* who handed the Czar's message to His Majesty,—he was received with great *éclat*, being allowed to ascend the very steps of the throne and place the document in the Emperor's hands—made the latter say that "the sincere friendship existing between our two empires for more than 200 years, and lately newly assured by our mutual Treaty, will be henceforth still more strengthened." Sir Claude Macdonald's investigations led him to the conclusion that "the probabilities of the case are strongly against the existence of any treaty of alliance, of which signs would at once appear in the shape of a determination to resist all demands from other Powers."

The question had, in fact, been tested. The Wei-hai-wei Lease was not signed until July 1st. There had been tedious negotiations which again revealed the obstructiveness of the Yamên. Russian intrigue was the likely cause of the delay, which was not ended until Sir Claude Macdonald gave the Yamên two days in which to state their final decision, and threatened them with the British fleet at the expiration of that time. Then China yielded, appealing to England not to ask for anything more, and to "break the endless chain of demands now made." In the protracted story of Sir Claude Macdonald's negotiations with the Yamên there is no episode of greater interest than the interview with the whole body of Ministers on the expiry of the two days' grace. Sir Claude was received in great state by Prince Ching and his colleagues. The wily Prince opened the discussion by a bland assertion that though China took note of the British demand for the lease, the matter must stand over until Japan had evacuated the place. Sir Claude replied that the lease must be granted now. Prince Ching led the discussion into a maze of details, and "with eloquence and force" protested against the way in which first one Power and then another took advantage of China's weakness. Unmoved by the Prince's rhetoric, Sir Claude Macdonald quietly

reminded him that he had not yet received the promise of the lease. The Prince met this by asking for a pledge that England would demand nothing further. Sir Claude sympathised with such a request, but would give no pledge. England must do whatever was judged necessary for the protection of her interests in South China as well as in the North. The conversation promised to be interminable, the Prince pretending that a sufficiently definite pledge had been given, and trying to make the fulfilment of it conditional upon Lord Salisbury's answer to Sir Claude's representations of the views of the Yamên, that in no event should any further demands be made. Eventually Sir Claude drew from his pocket the Memorandum of Agreement, read it and told them that he must have a definite reply. They must give a plain yes or no, whatever Lord Salisbury might say as to the pledge they required. Then the Prince yielded and the formal promise of the lease was made.

Foiled in his attempt to prevent the cession of Wei-hai-wei to England, Count Mouravieff initiated a more active policy of hostility to British interests in North China. A Circular was issued at Tientsin by the Russian Consul forbidding foreigners to land at Port Arthur or Talienwan without passports *visé* by him. Count Mouravieff's attention was called to the provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin, under which passports were required only for journeys in the interior. Though he must necessarily have studied closely, for at least a year previously, the provisions of that document, he professed ignorance of its application in this case. On further examination of the question, however, he came to the conclusion that there was justification for Sir N. O'Connor's contention. He informed our Ambassador that the Russian Consul had been instructed to withdraw the Circular, "which had been issued without the cognisance of the Imperial Government." Now as the opening sentence of the Circular said it had been issued "in accordance with instructions just received from the Russian Foreign Office," it follows that either the Consul or Count Mouravieff did not tell the truth. The matter did not end here. Instead of a complete retreat from the ground taken up in the Circular, a new Circular was issued by M. Pavloff, informing foreigners that while passports for that part of the Liao Tung Peninsula ceded to Russia were compulsory, a traveller might get his passport *visé* at the Russian Consulate or not. Again Sir Nicholas O'Connor had the distasteful task of explaining to Count Mouravieff the provisions of a

Treaty on which he needed no enlightenment. The Count insisted upon the necessity of passports for Port Arthur and for Talienwan until a civil administration had been organised. But he gave definite pledges that Talienwan would be declared a free port immediately the civil machinery had been erected; and this was done by an Imperial Order in August, 1899. It is a brief document, with more unctiousness to the line than is usually found when a strong nation refers to territory filched from a weak one. It had pleased God, said the Czar, to effect a *rapprochement* between the people of Russia and China. Through "the friendly attitude of China"—a neat paraphrase of the effect of threats by which the Yamên were terrorised into yielding—Russia had "succeeded in obtaining her historic aim"—two Chinese harbours, with territory whereby an outlet to the sea was provided for the Great Siberian Railway. And, "in our unwearying care for the general weal," it was deemed necessary to declare Talienwan a free port.

For England this was an ending which made the best of a bad business. But it was not only by the passport requirements that Russia sought to injure British interests in the North. In June the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank arranged with China a loan of sixteen million taels for the construction of a railway in Manchuria from Chung-houso to Hsin-nung-tien, with a branch line to Ying-tsou, the security to be the entire property of the existing lines, of which the new enterprise was an extension, and coal and iron mining rights. A vital condition of the loan was to be European management of the line, it being expressly stipulated that the Bank syndicate should be consulted on the appointment of a new Chief Engineer in the event of Mr. Kinder's retirement. The objections of Russia to Mr. Kinder's employment on the Northern Railways of China and the intrigues by which they endeavoured to procure his discharge in 1897 have been narrated in a previous chapter. They were now renewed, and with redoubled energy, by M. Pavloff, who, on the principle that Manchuria must not come under the influence of any other Power, and that Mr. Kinder, being an Englishman, was not a Russian, set up the claim that Russian engineers and Russian capital should alone be employed on the line from Shan-hai-Kuan to the Russian frontier. He was referred to the Treaty of Tientsin and the subject was reopened at St. Petersburg with Count Mouravieff. Again Russia displayed a singular inability to understand the plain fact that our Treaty rights applied to the whole of


China and that the one issue upon which it would be worth the while of this country to go to war with Russia, or with Russia and China combined, was that of resistance to exclusive privilege. For this affected obscurity of mental vision Russia had some slight excuse in the alacrity with which Lord Salisbury had voluntarily given way on that point to Germany within the limits of Shantung Province. Since he had put it upon record that Great Britain would not construct any railroad from Wei-hai-wei, Count Mouravieff affected to think that he had but to press his point that England should have no part in railway construction and management beyond Shan-hai-Kuan. Russia was informed that England would regard it as a "most unfriendly act" if pressure continued to be applied to China for the removal of Mr. Kinder. In order, apparently, to test the reality of this declaration, the Russian agent set to work to upset the railway loan. He succeeded so well that the Yamên asserted that they could not allow European control of the extension or any mortgage of the existing lines. The security for the loan therefore vanished. The Bank declared that it would be impossible to float it. Lord Salisbury strongly advised China to disregard the Russian objections by retracting this cancellation of the vital conditions of the loan. Another deadlock had occurred which seriously imperilled the peace.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT.


North China and the Yangtsze Basin—China's Pledge of Non-alienation of the Yangtsze Region—Internal Navigation—The Inspector-Generalship of Customs—Russian and British Spheres of Influence—The Limitations of British Policy—Lord Salisbury Not Prepared to Fight—The Northern Railways Wrangle—Mr. Balfour at the Foreign Office—His Complaint to M. Lessar—Some Very Plain Speaking—The Russian Suggestion of "Hands Off" in the Respective Spheres—The Policy of "Spheres of Interest"—The Draft Railway Agreement—Efforts to Wreck the Arrangement—The Half-a-Loaf Principle—Lord Salisbury Grumbles, but Accepts—The Railways Loan—Foreign Office Pledge to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank—Supplementary Notes to the Anglo-Russian Agreement—The "Primordial Interests of China"—A Few Questions—Lord Salisbury's View of the Agreement—Russia seeks English Friendship—M. de Witte on the Financial Necessity of a Good Understanding—The Shanghai Settlement—French Extension Claim—Lord Salisbury's Pledge of Material Support to China—M. Delcassé's Tact—A Satisfactory Solution—The United States and the Open Door—A Belated Support—Formal Adoption of Lord Salisbury's Policy—Assurances by the Powers—The Chinese *coup d'état*—The State of China—Disturbances at Wei-hai-wei—The "Boxer" Rising.

THE partial failure of Lord Salisbury's policy in the Far East had been to some extent redressed by the taking of Wei-hai-wei. How far possession of that fortified base compensates England for the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur and domination over Manchuria, and German ownership of Kiao Chau Bay with preferential rights in Shantung, is not a question that can precisely be determined. An answer will be forthcoming when Russia takes another step towards the dismemberment of China and is resisted by Great Britain,—with or without China, or with or without any other Power. But if the negotiations unfolded up to the point of the Wei-hai-wei lease show a certain feebleness of purpose, valuable pledges were exacted from the Chinese Government and considerable commercial opportunities given to British traders by the opening of new ports. The chief pledge was the non-alienation of the Yangtsze Basin. As the question of our interests in that part of China is mixed up, as will presently be seen, with the dispute with Russia concerning the Northern Railways Extension Loan, explanatory reference should be made to it here. During the



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negotiations for the loan of sixteen millions, in the early part of 1898, Sir Claude Macdonald obtained from China three important assurances—that navigation of the internal waters of China should be allowed to British steamers after June, that the Inspector-General of Customs should always be an Englishman so long as British trade with China maintained its preponderance, and that China would not give away any part of the Yangtsze region. The last pledge was formally recorded in Notes. Sir Claude Macdonald's Note spoke of the "great importance that had always been attached by Great Britain to the retention in Chinese possession of the Yangtsze region," and asked to be placed in a position to communicate "a definite assurance that China will never alienate any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtsze to any other Power, whether under lease, mortgage, or any other designation." In accepting the terms of this Note the Yamên said: "The Yamên have to observe that the Yangtsze region is of the greatest importance as concerning the whole position (or interests) of China, and it is out of the question that territory (in it) should be mortgaged, leased or ceded to another Power."

There is a general misapprehension that by these notes China pledged herself not to alienate the Yangtsze region to any Power other than Great Britain—that the communications gave us the reversion of that region. An examination of the text, however, shows that all China said, and all that Great Britain asked, was that the provinces adjoining the Yangtsze should remain in her possession, and should not be ceded to any Power whatsoever. This is a vastly different thing from giving England a reversion of it, or even a formal declaration that it constituted an English sphere of interest. At the same time, in the subsequent negotiations with Russia arising out of the Northern Railways extension loan, the claim that the Yangtsze Basin was a British sphere of influence was set up and maintained, was agreed to by Russia, and formal recognition made by Lord Salisbury that Manchuria was a Russian sphere of influence. On what principle then did Lord Salisbury's policy proceed? Apparently, that of maintaining the territorial integrity of China and our Treaty rights throughout the length and breadth of China. But neither was secured when Kiao Chau Bay passed to Germany. That was the first inroad on the principle. Lord Salisbury showed himself powerless to prevent it. But if the past could not be undone it might have been

thought that the future could be safeguarded by a pledge from China that no part of her dominions would be alienated. Lord Salisbury clearly thought that such a pledge was of value, or he would not have asked for it with respect to the Yangtsze region. When he did ask for it the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan had not been granted to Russia. Lord Salisbury was actively engaged in opposing the cession. Why, then, wish for a pledge as to a part of China when the fundamental principle of British policy was the inviolability of the whole of China? The only answer that suggests itself is that Lord Salisbury foresaw that his objections would fail, that he realised that he was being outwitted and outmanœuvred by Russia, and that he hesitated to uphold the principle because he knew that Russia meant to fight for what she wanted if she could not get it by diplomacy. Lord Salisbury, in fact, was not prepared to fight. Russia knew it and so did China. The disappearance of British men-of-war from Port Arthur left no doubt in the mind of either Power on that point, even if any could have remained after Lord Salisbury's eager assurances to M. de Staal that it was not by the orders of Her Majesty's Government that the men-of-war were in Port Arthur at all, and that the last remaining vessel, the *Iphigenia*, "would be leaving in a few days." Being, then, unwilling to put the principle of territorial integrity to the test by asking for a pledge that no part of China should be ceded, Lord Salisbury accepted an agreement by which only the Yangtsze Basin was specified as not to be parted with. The assertion of the principle of integrity to the Yangtsze Basin is, so far as a pledge from the Yamên is worth anything, a victory for the principle; but in such a restriction of the principle to a given area there is an implied permission to cede territory outside it. The inference must be that the Power exacting the pledge did not care very much about what China did outside that area. Russia drew that conclusion and promptly brought her negotiations with China to a close by an ultimatum. The consequence was that Lord Salisbury found that not only had Russia acquired a commercial port—to which he had no great objections so long as our Treaty rights were not interfered with—but the finest strategic position and most powerful fortress in Asia.

The connection of the preceding passages with the wrangle about Northern Railways extension is not at first sight obvious. It will become so on resuming the facts of the dispute. Ill-health

interrupted Lord Salisbury's discharge of his duties at the Foreign Office immediately after China was "strongly advised" to disregard Russia's objections to the conditions of the railway extension loan. His work was taken over by Mr. Balfour, who invited the Russian *chargé d'affaires*—M. Lessar—to call at Downing Street. He complained to that official of the action of Russia and pointed out that it was an interference in a purely commercial transaction and in manifest contradiction to the Treaty of Tientsin. "The active participation of the Russian Government in this violation of our rights must," he said, "lead to consequences of great gravity." M. Lessar seems to have been taken aback by this vigorous handling of the question, and, for his part, complained that the action of the British Government in obtaining from China a pledge that Sir Robert Hart's successor should be an Englishman, was in excess of Treaty rights. Mr. Balfour rebutted the suggestion that any arrangement for the Customs Department was a violation of the Treaty, and pointed out that if the Russian argument were pressed to its logical conclusion the Treaty would require China to appoint among Sir Robert Hart's subordinates an equal proportion of Frenchmen, Germans, Russians and others. To this M. Lessar had, apparently, no answer to make; but he suggested that the difficulties of the situation might be met by an arrangement between Russia and Great Britain by which the latter should be bound not to interest herself in railway or mining concessions in Manchuria, Russia binding herself in a like manner with regard to the Yangtze region.

The card was obviously a good one to play. Having obtained Port Arthur it was not worth the while of Russia to go to war with England on any lesser question; and, as England had not thought it worth while to do more than make a verbal resistance to the possession of Port Arthur, it was equally to her advantage to find a pacific solution of the Northern Railways difficulty. The principle of territorial inviolability having been sacrificed all that remained was that of Treaty rights; and if the conflicting views of Russia and England in this respect could be brought into harmony by a formal agreement that would be far preferable to a serious quarrel. Hence, as had happened when the Yangtze region Notes had been exchanged with China the previous year, the policy of "spheres of interest" was put forward. Mr. Balfour said he had always felt that great advantages would ensue if all the nations

concerned could come to an arrangement on the basis of spheres of interest as regards railway and mining operations. The Czar seems to have been the author of M. Lessar's suggestion. Count Mouravieff expressed to Sir Charles Scott—who had succeeded Sir N. O'Connor as Ambassador at St. Petersburg—"the strong desire of the Emperor of Russia" for such an understanding. Mr. Balfour thereupon suggested the basis of an agreement, but the northern extension to be Chinese and under Chinese control. On Lord Salisbury's return to the Foreign Office in September he sought to strengthen the Agreement on two points: a stipulation that there should be no preferential railway rates or differential treatment in the respective spheres of interest and that the Yangtsze region should be defined as meaning "the provinces adjoining the Yangtsze River and Honan and Chekiang," Manchuria, as he pointed out, being already a clearly defined region—the provinces of Kirin, Moukden and Tsitschar. Protracted negotiations followed. Russia would not consent to a non-preferential and non-differential clause. She wanted Manchuria for herself. She did not want the Yangtsze Basin; but she did want to have her hands free to put Englishmen in Manchuria at a disadvantage as compared with her own subjects. It was clear that there were underground influences at work to wreck the Agreement. Lord Salisbury eventually withdrew any non-preferential clause. Still the negotiations dragged. Count Mouravieff was not well; the Czar was absent from St. Petersburg; and so forth. A limited Agreement was, however, practically arranged early in 1899. Then the enemies of it sent their last shaft. A report was concocted that in connection with the railway extension Sir Claude Macdonald had taken "strong action hostile to the interests of Russia." It took some time to demonstrate that this was a falsehood. Meanwhile the draft Agreement was whittled down still further. It contained no non-differential clause, no definition of the Yangtsze region; it was limited to two points—(1) that Russia would not oppose the railway projects of Great Britain in the Yangtsze Basin; and (2) that Great Britain would not oppose the railway projects of Russia north of the Great Wall of China.

Lord Salisbury accepted this on the principle that half a loaf is better than no bread. But he pointed out that the agreement was of a "considerably less exclusive character" than was originally suggested:—

The former proposal would have prevented England and Russia from supporting railways in Manchuria and the Yangtsze respectively. The proposal now before us only imposes upon England and Russia the obligation of abstaining from opposing Russian and English railways in Manchuria and the Yangtsze Basin respectively. Her Majesty's Government, however, are not disposed to take any objection to the proposal now made by Count Mouravieff on account of its more limited application. England and Russia will still each be bound to abstain from opposing the railway projects of the other in its own sphere of interest. This latter method of opposition is not one that is likely in either case to be adopted; but it cannot be said to impose any disadvantage on Great Britain.

Before the agreement could be signed there was, however, another difficulty to be overcome. Lord Salisbury stipulated that it should be made clear that the agreement in no way affected the rights of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank with regard to the Northern Railways Extension Loan. China had given a pledge that the lines should not be alienated to any foreign Power, and the British Government, by a Foreign Office letter to the Bank had taken note of it, and given a guarantee of its observance. On the strength of this guarantee the prospectus had been issued, and the whole of the capital—£2,300,000—subscribed in London. Russia protested against the prospectus, and shied at the stipulation Lord Salisbury demanded. Renewed intrigues by the Russian agents were met by another notification to the Yamên that they would be held responsible should they, because of the Russian protest, repudiate or fail to adhere to the contract with the bank. Then Russian opposition was withdrawn. After some further difficulties the matter was adjusted by the addition to the agreement of a note settling the question of the Northern Extension in a manner consistent with the contract between China and the bank. Then the agreement, with the additional note, was signed (April 28th, 1899). Russia and England engage not to seek for themselves or others railway concessions north of the Great Wall of China, and in the basin of the Yangtsze respectively; and each undertakes not to obstruct concessions sought by the other in the other's sphere of interest. And there is a declaration that the parties have nowise in view the infringement in any way of the sovereign rights of China, and that the agreement by averting all cause of complication between them, "is of a nature to consolidate peace in the Far East, and to serve the primordial interests of China herself."

That, however, remains to be seen. Though Russia has

shewn herself anxious to be on good terms with England—her immediate desires in China are satisfied and time is an essential requirement for the creation of an adequate fleet in China waters—it does not follow that the railway agreement put an end to rivalry in the Far East. That it is not an infringement in any way of the Sovereign rights of China is one of those solemn pretences which two great Powers never hesitate to put in diplomatic documents at the expense of a third and weaker State. Since China would incur the vengeance of Russia if she gave an Englishman a railway concession north of the Great Wall, and the retribution of England if a like concession were given to a Russian subject, what is the value of her “Sovereign Right” and how does the agreement “serve the primordial interests of China herself?” A partial reply is that since this agreement no Englishman and no Russian will seek or accept a concession in the sphere forbidden to each. What then, becomes of the Englishman’s rights under the Treaty of Tientsin for equality of opportunity in railway concessions or anything else with other foreigners in every part of China? And what becomes of Lord Salisbury’s contention—insisted upon in season and out of season upon every other concrete question in the Far East—that British rights covered the whole of China and that abrogation of them in any part of the Empire would be a “most unfriendly act” by China and by the Power which accepted preferential advantages from her? It is as impossible to reconcile this agreement with the principle upon which Lord Salisbury acted as to harmonise with it the Kiao Chau, Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei concessions. Consistency was sacrificed to expediency.

Lord Salisbury did not pretend that any great advantages had been gained. He spoke somewhat slightly of the agreement. He was anxious, he told the House of Lords on May 1st, not to appear to attach an exaggerated importance to the stipulations in the document; but he did attach very great importance to the agreement itself as a sign of good feeling between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia. At the Academy banquet on the previous Saturday evening he spoke with like circumspection. The agreement would, he thought, “to a certain extent prevent any likelihood of any collision between our interests and our objects in the future.” He thought it might have a good influence, though he did not wish to exaggerate its extent. But, on the other hand, limited as the

scope of the agreement was and vexatious as were the diplomatic difficulties that had to be overcome before it was signed, it marked a great change in the relations between Russia and England. For half a century intercourse had been founded on mutual distrust; and not without justification on England's side, as the story of the Chinese negotiations alone fully proves; but the personal intervention of the Czar in Far Eastern discussions—to which the completion of the railway agreement is due—was welcome evidence that Russia desired a better understanding. She had realised her great ambition in Eastern Asia; she had faced the risk of war with England and Japan in order to obtain her object; by diplomacy—crafty at one moment and blustering at another, but strengthened throughout by an inflexible will—she had obtained strategic and territorial spoils such as could have fallen to her only after a terrible and successful war; why, then, should she not make friends with the one Power who could deprive her of those spoils if it were continuously irritated? Prudence dictated a cessation of the attempts to thwart England in claiming her full Treaty rights. The Czar realised that his diplomatists had managed to revive in England a dangerous suspicion of his country. There were other reasons also why Russia should hasten to establish better relations. Russia was poor, England was rich; English capital was needed for the exploitation of the untouched mineral resources of Russia and the development of her manufacturing possibilities. M. Witte, the far-seeing Finance Minister, at one stage of the negotiations, undoubtedly rescued the agreement from the hands of those who would have torn it up. He candidly admitted that Russia had not the means wherewith to develop her existing possessions, that expansion was highly detrimental to her financial interests, that Russia had “an absolute need of a good and frank understanding with England,” that misunderstandings between the two Governments or peoples were “a positive injury to the real interests of Russia and a grievous impediment in his way as Minister of Finance.” These views—expressed with a candour in no way exaggerated by this paraphrase—were undoubtedly shared by the Czar; and it is to the steadiness with which they were held by him as well as the readiness of Mr. Balfour and Lord Salisbury to accept the overtures for a better understanding, that we owe whatever advantages may be derived from the railway agreement, with its inferential delimitation of spheres of interest.

A brief reference should be made to the French claims for an extension of their settlement at Shanghai in 1898. China was asked to give certain land which would have included British owned property. Lord Salisbury demurred, and suggested an international settlement, in which French applicants for land would be accommodated. France pressed her original claim. Lord Salisbury told the Yamèn that Great Britain would uphold her in resisting the French pressure. The Yamèn inquired to what extent and in what way. Lord Salisbury replied that "Her Majesty's Government would support China materially in refusing to give France rights over British owned property." So definite an assurance encouraged the Yamèn to resist the French demand, and conveyed a warning to France which could not be ignored except at the risk of war. The French Minister at Pekin became less pressing. Time was gained and the negotiations were allowed to assume a less dangerous form. They resulted eventually in an arrangement satisfactory to all concerned, the French obtaining an extension of their local settlement, without injury to British interests, and all the Powers likewise obtaining an increase in the international area. An importance was given to the dispute which was not warranted by the local facts, for it appeared that France was originally within her rights, and had volunteered the necessary assurances as to British interests in her required extension; and that, to some extent, Sir Claude Macdonald and Lord Salisbury had been induced by officious persons to take an extreme and not wholly justifiable view of the French demands. The French Government behaved with great tact, and thanks to Lord Salisbury's explanations and M. Delcassé's friendly acceptance of them, an incident which might, in less experienced and scrupulous hands, have reached an acute and dangerous stage, was closed without ill-feeling on either side.

This chapter would be incomplete if mention were not made of the diplomatic action of the United States in the interests of Freedom of Trade in China. So extensive is the commerce of the United States in the Far East, and so rapidly is it growing, that the maintenance of the policy of the open door is almost as important to that Power as to Great Britain. Yet, when Lord Salisbury was fighting the battle of the "open door" with Russia, American statesmen made no sign. They stood aloof, leaving England to incur the risk of war for a principle in which they also were

vitally interested. When Lord Salisbury had won in the conflict they exhibited a lively interest in the subject. It occurred to Mr. Hay, the State Secretary, that it would be desirable to obtain from the Powers interested in China declarations that they will in no wise interfere with any Treaty Port or any vested interest within any "sphere of interest" or leased area, by levying customs duties (other than those leviable and collected by the Chinese Government) or imposing higher dues and charges on vessels or goods at the ports or passing over the railroads in any such "spheres" or leased areas : in other words, that no Power to which rights over Chinese territory had been given, or might yet be given, will impose differential treatment of its commercial rivals. This was the English policy—the policy for which the Salisbury Administration had been willing to wage war with any Power or combination of Powers. Its formal, though belated, adoption by the United States made, of course, no change in the situation. The assurances were forthcoming. Lord Salisbury, who had so successfully and at such enormous risk, championed the principle, expressed on behalf of the British Cabinet his great pleasure in making a Declaration in the sense desired, provided that the other Powers made a like Declaration. Russia, France, Germany, Italy and Japan gave assurances which were regarded by the United States Government as satisfactory, and it remained only to embody the Declarations in a suitable Convention. Thus, all the Powers having a direct interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in China, or likely to have a vital interest in the partition of that country, if and when the Chinese Government can no longer exercise an effective authority, are pledged to maintain freedom of trade. There is to be equality of commercial opportunity; no Power is to make such use of its present or future acquisitions as to place the subjects of other Powers at a commercial disadvantage. How far the pledges would withstand the shock of international rivalries if and when the threatened collapse of the Chinese Empire takes place was a question for the future. The Manchu dynasty still held its own, and seemed likely to do so while the Dowager Empress lived. The *coup d'état* of 1898, when she re-asserted her authority by deposing the reforming Emperor, seemed then to have passed without producing any violent change in the situation. But there was a sharp recrudescence of anti-foreign feeling. The secret societies with which China is honeycombed displayed a significant and dangerous activity. It became necessary for

the Chinese regiment, raised by the British as a garrison for Wei-hai-wei, to rebut a Chinese attack upon the leased area. The "Boxers" or "Righteous Harmony Fists" committed such outrages upon Foreigners and upon Chinese Christians elsewhere that the Powers having warships in the Gulf of Pechili had to send detachments of troops to suppress disorder and guard the Legations at Pekin. This was near the end of May, 1900. Then came news of the murder of two British missionaries and unmistakable evidence of the criminal apathy of the Chinese Government in the suppression of the anti-foreign movement. An army of Boxers, apparently with the connivance of the Empress, moved upon Pekin, and foreigners in that capital seemed to be in such imminent peril, notwithstanding the increased strength of the Legation troops, that the Powers forgot their rivalries in a joint effort to protect their subjects and maintain their common interests in China. War ships were massed at Taku, and on June 9th Admiral Seymour landed with a mixed force of a thousand odd, of whom six hundred and fifty were British, with the object of marching on Pekin. The railway had been torn up by the Boxers and the Legations relief force had not proceeded far before communication with Pekin ceased and the column was cut off from its base. On June 17th the Chinese opened fire from the forts at Taku on the foreign war ships. The forts were destroyed, allied troops landed, and reinforcements were sent to Admiral Seymour. A startling change had come over the situation; but this must be left for elucidation and comment in a further chapter, according to the march of events at the time of publication.

CHAPTER IV.—Continued.

THE SIEGE OF THE LEGATIONS.

The Evidence of Disorder—Murder of Mr. Fleming—Piracy on the West River—The Banditti of Manchuria—Sir Claude MacDonald's Leave—Murder of Mr. Brooks—Alarm of the Chinese Government—The Boxers in Shantung—Action of the Yamên—Warning from the Legations—Naval Demonstration Asked For—Lord Salisbury Deprecates such an Extreme Measure—M. Delcassé's Views—The Imperial Decree—Change in the Succession to the Imperial Throne—Further Boxer Ravages—Massacres of Native Christians—Combined Action by the Legations—Lord Salisbury Agrees to a Naval Demonstration—The Immediate Future—M. Pichon's Fears—Optimism of Russia—Guards for the Legations—The Late Baron Ketteler's Views on the Situation—The Yamên Aroused—Chinese Evasion on the Question of Guards—Arrival of Troops at the Legations—The Situation in June—Attitude of the Empress—Preparations for Flight—Boxer Attack on Belgians near Tientsin—The Murders of Mr. Robinson and Mr. Norman—Alarm at the Legations—A Siege Feared—Appeal to Admiral Seymour—The Danger at Tientsin—The Attitude of Prince Ch'ing—Audience of the Emperor Demanded—Lord Salisbury gives our Minister a Free Hand—A Composite Force for Pekin—The Boxer Movement more Menacing—Abandonment of the Missions in Pekin—The British Legation a House of Refuge—Sir C. MacDonald Appeals for Immediate Help—Admiral Seymour takes Action—The Legations Besieged—The Railway Destroyed—Admiral Seymour's Force Cut Off from the Base—Chinese Attack on Tientsin—Bombardment of the Taku Forts—Relief of Tientsin—Admiral Seymour's Retreat—A Disastrous Failure—Our Interests in the Yangtze Valley—Consul Warren's Understanding with the Viceroy—The Chinese Government and the Legations—Troops Ordered from India—Japanese Intervention Invited—Attitude of Russia and Germany—Murder of the German Minister—The Dilemma of the Powers—Sir R. Hart's Message: "Hasten Your Coming"—International Troops Poured into China—News from the Legations—Dr. Morrison's Message—The Policy of the British Government Defined by Mr. Brodrick—Advance of the Second Relief Force—Relief of the Legations—The New Political Situation—Proposed Evacuation by Russia—The Russian Note—Reply of the United States Government—Attitude of the Powers—The Chinese Peace Commissioners—Revolted Murders of Missionaries—Work of the Next Administration.

THOUGH the convulsions in China during the summer of 1900 took the Western world by surprise the British Government are unable to plead that the sudden outburst of anti-foreign fury was unexpected. In the previous year evidence had accumulated of the disorganisation of Chinese society and of the unwillingness or the inability of the Pekin Government to afford protection to subjects of the Powers. Compensation for the murder of Mr. Fleming, a British missionary in South Kweichow, and the punish-

ment of the responsible local officials, were obtained only after a long wrangle with the Yamên, who treated the remonstrance of the British Minister with contempt and, when an Imperial Edict was at length issued, suffered it to be ignored. During the settlement of this incident the Consuls in various parts of the Empire were sending reports to the Legation—in due course transmitted to London—of disorders in the provinces and of the rise of marauding bands whose hatred for the “foreign devil” was openly displayed and unchecked, if not actually fostered, by the Mandarins. Piracy in the delta of the West River became so flagrant that its development into anarchy was clearly foreseen. There were significant anti-missionary riots at Kianning, and by November affairs in Shantung Province had reached the stage of civil war. Along the south-western frontier of Manchuria—a mountainous country notoriously infested with banditti—there was a like condition of things, though here the troops sent up from Chili succeeded for the time in repressing the excesses of the population. The year closed with abundant signs of the great commotion which was shortly to follow.

On January 4th, 1900, Sir C. MacDonald—who had been home on leave during the preliminary disturbances mentioned above—reported the murder, under barbarous circumstances, of Mr. Brooks, an English missionary travelling in the Province of Shantung. The Chinese Government appeared to take alarm at the state of things revealed by the crime. They ordered the capture and punishment of the guilty parties and the disgrace of the officials within whose jurisdiction the murder had been carried out. By this time the “Boxers” had extended their ravages from Shantung over a large portion of Southern Chihli, native Christians being the principal victims of their hostility. Repeated representations were made, especially by the German, United States and British Ministers, to the Chinese Government on the insufficient protection afforded to European life and property in the area covered by the Boxers, and the Yamên were warned that if the disorders were not vigorously quelled international complications would arise. The Chinese Government appointed a new Governor to Northern Shantung and sent troops into the disturbed areas; but, despite these steps, the Boxer movement spread. The good faith rather than the ability of the authorities was called in question and so unsatisfactory was the position that early in March the British, American, French, German and Italian Ministers

sent an Identic Note to the Yamên asking for the issue of an Imperial Decree suppressing the anti-foreign secret societies in Shantung and Chihli; and they requested their Governments in the event of a refusal to make a joint naval demonstration in North Chinese waters.

Lord Salisbury received this suggestion coldly. The Russian Minister, it will be observed, had not joined in the Identic Note. A naval demonstration might lead to incalculable complications. It would be desirable, Lord Salisbury pointed out to Sir C. MacDonald, to resort to naval action only when other means of pressure were exhausted. M. Delcassé exercised a more vigorous judgment. He told Sir E. Monson that if the representatives of the five Powers looked upon the situation as one requiring a naval demonstration their Governments could not properly refuse to authorise it. On the other hand the United States Government were disinclined to associate themselves with the proposal. M. Delcassé's ardour having been thus chilled the Powers let matters drift, the Chinese Government meanwhile giving no reply to the Identic Note. Later in March, fuller reports of the danger to Europeans having been received from Sir C. MacDonald, the Foreign Office acceded to an application by him that two British warships be sent to Taku. This seems to have had some effect, for in mid-April a satisfactory Imperial Decree was issued suppressing the Boxer Societies by name, and making membership of them a criminal offence. Meanwhile a change had been made in the succession to the throne. Rumours of the impending abdication or deposition of the Emperor had been rife in Pekin, and an Imperial Decree ("by the Emperor's own pen") had been issued making Prince P'u-Chün, a boy of fourteen years, and a cousin of the Emperor, the new heir apparent. The text of this Decree is worth putting on record, having regard to events afterwards to be narrated. It appeared in the *Pekin Gazette* of January 24th:—

(Translation.)

When at a tender age we entered into the succession to the throne, Her Majesty the Empress-Dowager graciously undertook the rule of the country as Regent, taught and guided us with diligence, and managed all things, great and small, with unremitting care, until we ourself assumed the government. Thereafter the times again became critical. We bent all our thoughts and energies to the task of ruling rightly, striving to requite Her Majesty's loving kindness, that so we might fulfil the weighty duties entrusted to us by the late Emperor Mu Tsung Yi (T'ung Chih).

But since last year we have suffered from ill-health, affairs of State have increased in magnitude and perplexity, and we have lived in constant dread of going wrong.

Reflecting on the supreme importance of the worship of our ancestors and of the spirits of the land, we therefore implored the Empress-Dowager to advise us in the government. This was more than a year ago, but we have never been restored to health, and we have not the strength to perform in person the great sacrifices at the altar of Heaven and in the temples of the spirits of the land.

And now the times are full of difficulties. We see Her Gracious Majesty's anxious toil by day and by night, never laid aside for rest or leisure, and with troubled mind we examine ourself, taking no comfort in sleep or food, but ever dwelling in thought on the labours of our ancestors in founding the dynasty, and ever fearful lest our strength be not equal to our task.

Moreover, we call to mind how, when we first succeeded to the throne, we reverently received the Empress-Dowager's Decree that as soon as a Prince should be born to us he should become the heir by adoption to the late Emperor Mu Tsung Yi (T'ung Chih). This is known to all the officials and people throughout the Empire.

But we suffer from an incurable disease, and it is impossible for us to beget a son, so that the Emperor Mu Tsung Yi has no posterity, and the consequences to the lines of succession are of the utmost gravity. Sorrowfully thinking on this, and feeling that there is no place to hide ourself for shame, how can we look forward to recovery from all our ailments?

We have therefore humbly implored Her Sacred Majesty carefully to select from among the near branches of our family a good and worthy member, who should found a line of posterity for the Emperor Mu Tsung Yi (T'ung Chih), and to whom the throne should revert hereafter. After repeated entreaties, Her Majesty has now deigned to grant her consent that P'u Chün, son of Tsai Yi, Prince Tuan, should be adopted as the son of the late Emperor Mu Tsung Yi (T'ung Chih). We have received Her Majesty's Decree with unspeakable joy, and in reverent obedience to her gracious instruction we appoint P'u Chün, son of Tsai Yi, as Prince Imperial, to carry on the dynastic succession.

The Decree for the suppression of the Boxer Societies proved to be ineffective. In the middle of May the Boxers wrecked three villages near Paotung-fu, sixty miles from Peking, killing sixty-one Roman Catholic converts, and destroyed the London Mission Chapel and killed the Chinese preacher at Kung-tsun, forty miles southwest of the capital. Reports were also received that the English and French missionaries at Yünnan-fu were in peril. The representatives of all the Powers met in a body and empowered the *doyen* to write in their name a demand upon the Yamen for the execution of the authors of these outrages and for the arrest of all persons aiding and abetting the Boxers and disseminating literature

menacing the safety of foreigners in China. And they again asked their Governments, should a satisfactory answer not be sent by the Yamên within five days, to make a naval demonstration at Shanhaikuan, or at Chingwangtao, and to hold guards in readiness on board to be sent to the Legations in Pekin if the necessity arose. The Russian Minister had agreed to this request, though deprecating it on the ground that naval demonstrations and landing guards were to be discouraged "as they gave rise to unknown eventualities." Lord Salisbury did not palter with this second opportunity to convince the Chinese Government that Europeans must be protected. He telegraphed to Sir Claude that Her Majesty's Government would support his action in conjunction with his foreign colleagues. The Yamên having sent a reply to the Note of the *doyen* which was regarded as evasive a further meeting of the *Corps Diplomatique* was held on May 27th. M. Pichon, the French Minister, produced evidence in support of a conclusion he had formed that a serious outbreak, which would endanger the lives of all Europeans in Pekin, was about to occur. Confirmatory information was also afforded by the Italian Minister. The Russian Minister—whose optimism was shared by the late Count Mouravieff—doubted whether the danger was imminent, but agreed that M. Pichon's evidence could not be disregarded. M. Pichon—who seems to have been well-informed of what was taking place and to have rightfully estimated the perils ahead—urged that guards should at once be brought up to Pekin. Baron von Ketteler, the German Minister, who was shortly to be murdered in the streets of Pekin, expressed his opinion that the Chinese Government was crumbling to pieces, and said that he did not believe in the efficacy of any action based on the assumption of their stability.

In the course of the day Sir C. MacDonald saw Prince Ch'ing and the Yamên Ministers, who showed so much alarm at the spread of the Boxer movement and promised measures of so energetic a character that the *Corps Diplomatique* decided to wait another twenty-four hours before sending for guards, which by the orders of the Admiralty were by this time waiting in readiness on board two warships at Taku. Further Boxer excesses near Pekin during those twenty-four hours led the French Minister to send for his guards ahead of his colleagues. On the 28th the Ministers unanimously resolved to send for guards. Permission to

bring guards to Peking was, however, refused by the Yamên. The Legations insisted upon facilities being granted. The Yamên resorted to evasion and delay. It was impossible, they pleaded, to give an immediate reply to the demand for a withdrawal of the prohibition because Prince Ch'ing was at the Summer Palace. As this was within an hour's ride from Peking the excuse was not accepted. Finally the Yamên consented to the coming of the guards provided there were not more than thirty to each Legation. This number was disregarded, and on June 1st, British, American, Italian, French, Russian and Japanese Guards arrived in the capital.

The situation in the early days of June was that Peking was comparatively quiet, that the Legations had a certain force for protection, that Boxer murders of Christian converts and destruction of missionary property were of daily occurrence in the neighbourhood of the capital and that the occupants of the Palace were at cross purposes. The Empress Dowager, said Sir C. MacDonald, did not dare to put down the Boxers because of the support given to them by Prince Tuan, father of the hereditary Prince, and other Conservative Manchus, and also because of their numbers. She seems indeed, to have been preparing to fly to Sian-fu, in Shansi, owing to the hostile demonstrations of Boxers against herself. Meanwhile there had been an attack on a party of fugitive Belgians near Tientsin. Europeans went out from Tientsin to rescue them and killed many of the Boxers, but nine of the fugitives were missing at the close of the struggle. On June 4th at Yung-Chung, forty miles south of Peking, the Boxers attacked the Church of England Mission, murdering one of the missionaries—Mr. Robinson—and carrying off another, Mr. Norman, who was subsequently done to death. On June 5th Sir C. MacDonald reported that affairs were so bad that the Legations might at any time be besieged and the railway and telegraph cut and urged that in these events instructions should be sent to Admiral Seymour to concert measures for relief with the officers commanding the other squadrons at Taku—Austria, Italy, Germany, France, Russia, Great Britain and the United States all having warships at that place. The apathy of the Chinese Government, particularly in securing the release of Mr. Norman, added to the gravity of the situation, the Yamên displaying the "greatest indifference" to Sir Claude's representations. "I informed them," he telegraphed on June 5th, "that the Chinese Government would be held responsible by Her

Majesty's Government for the criminal apathy which had brought about this disgraceful state of affairs."

On the same day Consul Carles at Tientsin reported that all the Consuls there had held a meeting to form a home guard and had passed a resolution asking their respective Governments for strong reinforcements. "This step," he telegraphed, "I consider to be absolutely necessary. Our passive position intensifies the danger of the situation hour by hour, and I strongly urge the advisability of the guard being permitted to take active measures of hostility." Also on June 5th Sir Claude MacDonald had an interview with Prince Ch'ing and the members of the Yamên concerning the fate of Messrs. Robinson and Norman. Sir Claude pointed out that there was not the slightest indication that the Chinese Government intended to deal severely with the Boxer disturbances, that, in consequence of this attitude, there was serious danger of an outbreak in Peking, and that failure to suppress the Boxers was leading straight to foreign intervention. Prince Ch'ing made no attempt to defend the Chinese Government. He admitted that the Government was reluctant to deal harshly with the Boxer movement, which, owing to its anti-foreign character was popular. Sir Claude telegraphed:—

He (Prince Ch'ing) stated that they were bringing 6,000 soldiers from near Tien-tsin for the protection of the railway, but it was evident that he doubted whether they would be allowed to fire on the Boxers except in the defence of Government property, or if authorised whether they would obey.

He gave me to understand, without saying so directly, that he has entirely failed to induce the Court to accept his own views as to the danger of inaction. It was clear, in fact, that the Yamên wished me to understand that the situation was most serious, and that, owing to the influence of ignorant advisers with the Empress-Dowager, they were powerless to remedy it.

In consequence of these admissions the *Corps Diplomatique* met on June 6th and agreed that the only chance of impressing the Court was to obtain a special audience with the Emperor and Dowager-Empress—an audience which they had no technical right to demand inasmuch as they were not invested with Ambassadorial privileges. Lord Salisbury replied that the situation was difficult and his (Sir Claude's) discretion must be quite unfettered. "You may take precisely what measures you think expedient."

Meanwhile the Powers were concerting measures for the despatch of a strong composite force to Peking under the command

of Vice-Admiral Seymour, and troops were ordered to be sent from Hong Kong, Wei-hai-wei and Singapore to Taku. While this was being done the Chinese Government issued another half-hearted Decree against the Boxers; but the state of things in Pekin rapidly became worse. The Boxers were openly drilling in the houses of the Manchu nobility and in the Temples. The Missions in Pekin were abandoned and the British Legation was crowded with British refugees, mostly women and children. Movements of Chinese troops against the Boxers near Tientsin had been conducted in such a way as to lead to the conclusion that the Chinese Government had abandoned any attempt to protect Pekin against the rebels. The question of the demand for a personal audience with the Throne was hanging fire and the Ministers were urging their respective Governments to hasten with the reinforcements, the Boxers having seized the railway and burnt down a station. On June 10th Sir E. Seymour reported that he had received a telegram from Sir C. MacDonald: "Situation extremely grave. Unless arrangements are made for immediate advance to Pekin it will be too late." With sailor-like decision he acted on that message, landing at once with all available men, and calling upon the foreign officers for their co-operation. A working party from Tientsin was then endeavouring to restore the railway, and Admiral Seymour left Tientsin by rail on the 10th with 300 British, 100 Americans, 60 Austrians and 40 Italians, the Russian, French and German detachments following him. By the next day Admiral Seymour had with him a force of 1,700. Three days before, according to a telegram from Sir C. MacDonald, the Boxers had attacked student interpreters of the Legations close to the city walls, the men escaping only by the use of firearms. Imperial soldiers had assaulted the Secretary of the Belgian Legation at the end of the Legation Street, and the Summer Legation at the hills had been totally destroyed by fire. On the 12th he sent a pressing message warning the relief force that mutinous Kansu soldiery had taken possession of the Pekin terminus. Meanwhile Admiral Seymour found the railway so much broken up that he covered only three miles in twenty-four hours. On June 14th communication with him was broken and also with Pekin. In Tientsin it was reported that the Empress-Dowager had resolved to destroy the Legations. A telegram of that date, however, had come through from Sir C. MacDonald, reporting the murder of the Japanese Secretary of Legation by Tartar cavalry close to the city

gate, and the embarkation of 2,000 Russians at Port Arthur for Taku. On the following day the native city of Tientsin was in the hands of the Boxers and the mob, and communication with Admiral Seymour's force was also cut off.

The curtain had fallen. The last intelligence from Pekin was that, on the night of June 13th, there were serious disturbances there, that many buildings belonging to foreigners were destroyed and that hundreds of native Christians had been slaughtered, with many servants of Europeans. On the night of the 15th, Sir E. Seymour was able to communicate the fact that he was cut off forty miles from Pekin by Chinese troops and Boxers. The Admirals at Taku then learnt that two thousand Chinese troops were endeavouring to cut off Tientsin, the European quarter of which was held by a Russian detachment from Taku, and they held a Council at which they decided that in that event the Taku forts must be shelled. On the 18th the Taku forts opened fire on the ships of the allied squadrons, men to storm the forts having been sent inshore from the ships the previous afternoon. After a six hours' bombardment the forts were silenced and occupied by the Allies and as fast as reinforcements arrived at Taku they were sent on to Tientsin, around which fighting was constantly going on. By the 21st the mixed garrison there numbered about 3,000. By the 23rd Sir E. Seymour, sorely hampered with many wounded, had fallen back to Peitsang, nine miles north of Tientsin. A strong detachment was sent out from Tientsin to succour him and on the 26th brought him and his force, which had lost 22 killed and 228 wounded, back to Tientsin. The Admiral had been beaten back by an overwhelming force of Boxers and Imperial troops, though not without inflicting heavy loss upon the enemy. Finding the railway destroyed he had decided on June 16th to return to Yangtsun, up to which place the line was safe, and there to organise an advance by the river. But the enemy swarmed behind him, attacked two trains, tore up the railway and cut off supplies. Instead of marching to Pekin the Admiral had to fight for his life and force his way back to the Tientsin base, aided by the timely arrival of the relieving force. The attempt to relieve the Legations had ended in lamentable failure.

During the progress of these events Lord Salisbury had the double task of arranging concerted action among the Powers and endeavouring to avert the threatened injury to British life and

interests in the Yangtsze Valley, where commotions similar to those in North China were daily expected. Up to a certain point, which will be touched upon later, there was no hitch in the arrangements of the Allies, each of whom was anxious to get as many troops as possible on the spot at the earliest moment in the hope of saving the Legations invested at Pekin. Count Mouravieff, who had taken a singularly optimistic view of the troubles, awoke to the urgency of the crisis when it seemed that the relief force under Admiral Seymour was likely to be annihilated and increased his forces on the spot to four thousand. France, under the stimulus of M. Pichon's messages, and his keen apprehension of the coming danger, acted with conspicuous energy. All the Powers were united on the principle that the Legations must be saved; the relations of statesmen were as harmonious as were those of the allied commanders and troops in China. With regard to the Yangtsze Valley, Mr. Pelham Warren, the Acting Consul-General at Shanghai, suggested, in view of the situation in the north, that Lord Salisbury should at once come to an understanding with the Viceroy of Hankow and Nanking. They would, he believed, do all in their power to keep the peace within their districts if they could depend on Her Majesty's Government for effective support. Communications were then opened with the Viceroy and Governors of the riverine provinces and on June 26th Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh, the Chinese Minister in London, was able to inform Lord Salisbury that Li Hung Chang, the Viceroy of the Two Kwangs and the Viceroy of the Upper and Lower Yangtsze had undertaken to afford adequate protection to foreign merchants, missionaries and native Christians in their respective Governments and to avail themselves of the support of the British Government to that end. The value of this pledge depended upon the ability of the Viceroy to fulfil it—and this was an unknown quality. It was, nevertheless, satisfactory so far as it went and at least indicated that the Viceroy had received no instructions from the Government in the north to withdraw protection from foreigners. The question of security in the Yangtsze Valley was, however, but a secondary question. The state of things in Pekin was unknown; the attitude of the Chinese Government towards the Legations and the Powers was an inexplicable mystery, because Imperial troops were fighting on the side of the Boxers; and it was more than ever necessary to retrieve Sir E. Seymour's failure by sending to Pekin a force so powerful that it would be

able to get through to the Legations. The British Government ordered the despatch of ten thousand men from India, but these could not reach China in time to be effective for the immediate purpose of securing the safety of the Ministers. Japan was the only Power near enough to China to render prompt aid to the Allies. Lord Salisbury therefore asked Russia to give her approval to the despatch of from twenty to thirty thousand men and urged the German Government to support this proposal. When the matter was broached to the Japanese Government it was not enthusiastically received. They were not anxious to give effective assistance if it were likely to lead to complications with other Powers interested. Russia replied to Lord Salisbury that she did not wish to hinder Japan's liberty of action so long as she was disposed to act in harmony with the other Powers; and Germany appeared to be doubtful of the political expediency of entrusting the work to a Japanese expedition, giving so chilling and evasive an answer to Lord Salisbury's appeal that the matter was dropped. The view of these Powers was that, in the face of so grave a crisis, there were objections to a mandate being given to one Power, though they would welcome all available forces which could be sent promptly by any Power to act in accord with the others. There was, therefore, no prospect of a Japanese army being landed in time to remedy the failure of the Seymour expedition.

On July 1st news was received from Peking that Baron Ketteller, the German Minister, had been murdered by native troops in the streets while on his way to the Tsung-li-Yamen, that the foreigners in Peking had taken refuge in the British Legation, that Prince Tuan had usurped the throne—the Empress-Dowager and the Emperor being still in Peking, but powerless—and that the Chinese forces were determined to resist any foreign army. Other news said that a large Chinese army was advancing on Tientsin. The Allies, with all reinforcements then expected, would have only twenty thousand men—sufficient, it was thought, to hold the base from Taku, Tientsin and probably Pei-ta-ho, but not to advance beyond Tientsin. In this dilemma a message was on July 2nd received from Sir Robert Hart, the Director of the Imperial Customs. "Foreign community"—it read—"besieged in the Legations. Situation desperate. Hasten your coming. Sunday 4 p.m." This message had been sent off eight days before. If the situation was desperate then, what had happened since? The worst forebodings were entertained. Other

news said that many of the Legations were burnt and that the ammunition of the besieged was running short. It was evident that the Chinese Government were unable to protect the Foreign Ministers and were possibly in league with the Boxers and troops against them. Rumours then and at a later stage became current in North China that the Legations had been overpowered and their occupants put to the sword. The Cheap Jacks of halfpenny journalism in London and Shanghai eagerly accepted these reports as true and published blood-curdling descriptions of massacre. The reckless and disgraceful lying indulged in by an unscrupulous section of the democratic press did not, however, destroy hope among the intelligent classes of the community; but intense anxiety naturally prevailed when it became known that the allied Commanders decided that it was impossible to attempt an advance on Peking with the forces then available—a total of about 9,000. The Consuls at Tientsin urged that a threat should be made that if the Ministers came to harm the tombs of the Manchu dynasty would be destroyed; but Lord Salisbury would not listen to a proposal so barbarous and so offensive to European sentiment. He requested the Chinese Minister in London to transmit to his Government by telegraph an intimation that the members of that Government would be held to be personally guilty if the members of the Legation and other foreigners in Peking suffered injury; and this threat was transmitted to our Consuls for communication to any Chinese authority to whom it was desirable it should be known. Meanwhile the Boxer movement, reinforced by Imperial troops, continued to spread. The Japanese Government, disregarding any question of a mandate to them from the Powers, took hurried steps to bring their force in North China to the number of 20,000; Russia, Germany and other Powers despatched considerable reinforcements; more troops were ordered from India and the number of British ships of war on the Yangtze was brought up to thirteen.

Towards the end of July hope that the Ministers were still alive was revived by the receipt of an undated message in cipher from Mr. Conger, the United States Minister, and by assurances from the Southern Viceroy, who had news from Peking that the Legations were safe and under the protection of the Chinese Government. Definite knowledge was forthcoming on July 30th, when a telegram reached London from Rear-Admiral Bruce, giving the contents of a letter from Sir Claude MacDonald, dated July 21st,

to the effect that the Legations had been subjected to artillery and rifle fire from June 20th to July 16th, but that on the latter date an armistice had been arranged. Sixty-two Europeans had been killed, including Mr. David Oliphant, Consular assistant, and Mr. Warren, student interpreter, at the British Legation. All the women and children were in the British Legation. A Despatch from Dr. Morrison, the *Times* correspondent—whose biography, in common with other leading Europeans in Peking, had been published in that journal—showed that treachery was still feared on July 21st, that Chinese soldiers were strengthening the barricades and batteries round the besieged area, but that supplies were coming into the Legations. The main body of the Imperial troops, he said, had left Peking to meet the relieving force. He gave particulars also of an Imperial Edict of July 2nd, calling upon the Boxers to exterminate the Christians and the Viceroy to expel all missionaries, and of another, dated July 18th, which made a complete *volte face*. This he attributed to the victories of the European troops at Tientsin. Other messages showed that if the bombardment were resumed there was little hope for the occupants of the Legations. The Powers, therefore, pressed forward their measures for sending a relief force from Tientsin.

The policy of the British Government was frankly stated in the House by Mr. Brodrick on August 2nd. The present object of the Powers was the relief of the Legations and the exaction of reparation for the outrage inflicted upon Ministers. But no countenance would be given to any schemes for the partition of China. Whatever punishment might be inflicted upon persons in high places who might be held to be responsible for what had happened there was to be no supercession of a Chinese native Government. The risks of partition were too great and the efforts of the British Government were to be confined to measures for the prevention of any recurrence of the troubles. This unambitious and intelligible policy was re-echoed by the Governments of the United States and the Powers and, on the basis thus provided, a start for Peking was made from Tientsin on August 4th by an army of about 13,000, including many Indians and Japanese. The first battle was fought at Peitsang the following day, the Chinese being driven from their trenches, though not without heavy loss to the Allies. Another successful engagement was fought at Yang-tun. By the 10th the relief force had reached Ho-si-wu, on the River Peiho, half-way between Tientsin and the capital. Early on the morning of the 14th Peking was reached and attacked by the Allies. After a feeble resistance an entrance was forced and the relief of the besieged was assured. No further deaths had occurred in the British Legation since the armistice reported

by Sir Claude MacDonald. The Imperial Court had flown and the Allies found themselves in possession of the ancient city, with no one with whom to arrange terms for the future.


The story of the siege will doubtless be told by one who endured the perils of that historic event, and it would be idle to piece together here the disconnected scraps of information which, up to the time of writing, have been received in Europe from Pekin. Nor would any useful purpose be served if an attempt were made, necessarily upon partial and somewhat conflicting information, to narrate the events of the forced march to Pekin. It must suffice to say that as a military exploit the defence of the Legations and the heroism displayed by the men and women cooped up within the barricades, were not less remarkable than the rapidity of the relief movement and the endurance shown by the troops. With the relief once accomplished, the interest of Europe was concentrated upon the political situation. It must needs be described without recourse to Official Documents such as form the basis of all other portions of this work relating to the diplomacy of the Administration. Exactness cannot therefore be claimed for the concluding sentences of this chapter. The chief factors of the situation were that the Dowager-Empress and the Emperor were in the interior of China, with other persons responsible for the non-suppression of the Boxer movement and for the connivance of the Chinese Imperial troops in the attack on the Legations; that no means existed at the moment for determining with any justice the measure of guilt that attached to them; that each of the Powers was pledged not to seize Chinese territory; that each of them had, or professed to have, the greatest reluctance to do anything which would carry with it the permanent occupation of any part of China; and that nevertheless reparation had to be exacted for the affront to Europe—and in a special sense to Germany by the murder of her Minister—and for the wholesale massacres of missionaries which it was then feared had taken place, and were soon to be placed beyond dispute. And, apart from these immediate difficulties, there was the question of influencing or compelling such a re-construction of the Government of China as would afford sure guarantees against the recurrence of disorder and reasonable scope for the commercial activities of the Powers—a matter of vital interest to England and of increasing importance to her Allies.

The lead was taken by Russia and promptly followed by the United States. A Russian Note was communicated to the Powers advocating a withdrawal from Pekin as soon as local military conditions rendered such a course feasible. The idea was that the International forces should concentrate at Tientsin and thus make way for the return of the Chinese Government—whatever it was and whoever might still be at its head—to return to the capital in order to treat with the Allies. It was believed that this action had been mooted by Russia on the strength of assurances received from the Dowager-Empress or from those about her

in her place of retreat at Sian-fu, in the province of Shansi, and that in the event of such withdrawal of the troops from the sacred city Prince Ch'ing, formerly the head of the Tsung-li-Yamên, would be empowered to negotiate a peace. The Russian proposal implied an abandonment of merely punitive measures; and the question of the advisability of this procedure therefore became the principal point of discussion. Russia reminded the Powers of the immediate objects she had in view at the outset—(I.) The protection of the Russian Legation and Russian subjects against "the criminal intentions of the Chinese rebels"—not, be it observed, of the Chinese Government; and (II.) to render help to the Chinese Government in "the speedy establishment of a legal order of things in the Empire." The *communiqué* in the *Government Messenger* pointed out that when deciding to send troops to Peking, "almost all the Powers"—the qualifying word "almost" is significant—agreed on four points: (I.) the maintenance of a common agreement among the Powers; (II.) maintenance of the former State organism of China; (III.) removal of everything that could lead to a partition of the Celestial Empire; and (IV.) the establishment, with united powers, of a legal central Government in Peking, able unassisted to preserve order and tranquillity in the country. The Russian Government would, said the Note, adhere to that programme and would evacuate New-chwang as soon as order was re-established in Manchuria. The principal task—that of the deliverance of the representatives of the Powers—had been accomplished and in order to facilitate negotiations Russia proposed to withdraw her Minister and troops to Tientsin.

In Berlin this communication was received with undisguised surprise. Large German forces had been sent to avenge the murder of the German Minister and, with the consent of the Powers, Count von Waldersee had been appointed *Generalissimo* of the International forces, for the purposes of such further military operations as might be found necessary. But in the United States it met with a markedly sympathetic reception, the commercial interests of America in China, coupled with the imminence of a Presidential election and the political inadvisability of avoiding any policy of adventure, commending it to the statesmen of Washington. They considered that, though the purposes in view could best be achieved by a joint occupation of Peking until a definite understanding could be arrived at with a Chinese Government, the continued occupation of the capital would be ineffective unless all the Powers remained there in full unity of purpose. Since Russia had proposed a withdrawal they were of opinion that a general retirement was expedient, the time and manner to be agreed upon by the various commanders of the International troops. There was, therefore, an agreement with Russia in principle, but there were so many qualifications in the American Note (which is dated August 29th) that immediate withdrawal was out of the question. France, as was to be expected, gave a prompt adherence to the Russian proposal; but Germany naturally saw in it a desire to check German ambitions and deprive

her of that accidental importance in the Concert which had been given her by the murder of her Minister and the unanimous acceptance of Count von Waldersee as *Generalissimo*. And with her were Austria and Italy, the other Powers of the Triple Alliance. On the eve of the initiation of these negotiations the allied troops had made a grand military demonstration through Peking, penetrating into the Imperial Palace, and though there were rumours that the Chinese intended again to attack the city it daily became more evident that peace was desired by those who were nominally in authority. Further troops continued, however, to be poured into China while the negotiations upon the Russian proposal proceeded; and England prepared to protect her special interests in the Yangtze Valley should the development of events compel her to take action for herself in that region. Early in September an Imperial Edict was issued appointing Li Hung Chang, Yung Lu, Prince Ching and Hsu-tung as Peace Commissioners. Soon afterwards Japan signified her willingness to withdraw her troops from Peking; but the Germans, so far as is yet known, showed a marked reluctance to withdraw before reparation had been exacted from the Chinese. A like disinclination appeared to influence Lord Salisbury and the Cabinet, whose reply to the Russian Circular had not been made known when these lines were written. Additional reasons for caution in this matter were furnished by telegrams from Dr. Morrison, the special correspondent of the *Times*, and by the special correspondent of the *Standard* in Tientsin. The first contained very serious evidence of the complicity of the Chinese Government in the attacks on the Legations, and gave a terrible account of the massacres of missionaries at Pao-ting-fu, eighty miles from Peking, where "children were butchered before their parents' eyes, while women were ravished and carried into captivity, and mothers and fathers tortured and murdered." The second gave particulars, on the evidence of a native Christian who had escaped to Tientsin and was officially examined in the Consulate there, of the shocking barbarities committed upon the missionaries and their families at Hsia-mi-hsien, Tai-yuen-fu, Tai-ku, and near Yen-chau-fu. Two ladies were stripped and clubbed slowly to death at the first place; at others there was a general butchery. The total number of the murdered missionaries is not yet known, but on the evidence at present available over one hundred persons—missionaries, their wives and children—were done to death with revolting barbarity. As for native Christians they were slaughtered in untold numbers. These revelations resulted in a demand for retribution, fatal for the time being to the Russian proposal for withdrawal. But at this point the narrative must of necessity be brought to a close. The work of punishing the high officials and others responsible for these enormities, of exacting reparation for them and of reconstructing the Government of China in such a way as to afford reasonable guarantees for the future has yet to be done—by England for herself or by all the Powers in concert. And the full discharge of these pressing obligations rests with the next rather than with the Third Salisbury Administration.



CHAPTER V.

CONCESSIONS TO GREAT BRITAIN.


The Hong Kong Extension—The Opening of Nanning—The Berthollet Murder—Railway Concession to France—Mr. Hosie's Report on Nanning—Other Ports Opened—The Advantages Gained—A Port in Hunan—The Battle for Railway and Mining Concessions—The Shansi Area—Baron Richtofen on its Mineral Wealth—The Honan Rights—Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Concessions—The Anglo-German Syndicate—Jardine-Matheson Syndicate—The Anglo-American Syndicate—Franco-Belgian Syndicate—The Commercial Community's Debt to Sir Claude Macdonald.

AGAINST the failure of Lord Salisbury to prevent the partial dismemberment of China, there should be set his successes in the matter of positive concessions wrung from the Yamên. It has been seen that, in the long run, he obtained from Russia the opening of Talienwan. Germany also declared Kiao Chau a free port, so that no real harm was done to British interests by the Teutonic violation of Chinese territory; on the contrary, a nominal advantage had been conferred, for Kiao Chau had not been a Treaty Port. The Chinese concessions were of greater practical importance. First there is the enlargement of the limits of Hong Kong, by which the promontory and the islands became by lease part of the British Colony. The means were thus obtained of putting Hong Kong into a state of perfect military and naval defence. An accompanying sketch map shows the limits of the extension, and the text of the Convention is given in the Appendix. The new boundaries are those recommended by the Colonial Defence Committee, and non-experts can therefore conclude that our principal naval stronghold and great trading emporium in South China should be as safe from attack as it is possible for it to be made.

Another concession was the opening of Nanning, in the Kwangsi Province. This the Chinese strongly resisted, partly because rebellion still lingered in the province, and partly because of French objections, a French missionary having been murdered there, and certain French demands remaining to be adjusted. China made terms with France, paying four thousand pounds compensation for the murder of Father Berthollet, and giving the concession of a railway between the Gulf of Tonquin and the


Si Kiung Valley, thus enabling France the better to penetrate into South China from her Tonquin possessions. This matter having been settled, Sir Claude Macdonald ascertained that the opening of Nanning was no longer opposed by France or any other Power, and, after convincing the Yamên that further delay would not be to their advantage, an Imperial Decree was issued on February 3rd, 1899, declaring the port open. A special report, by Mr. Alex. Hosie, Her Majesty's Consul at Wuchow, shows that Nanning is a most important commercial centre. It is expected that the French schemes for drawing the trade of Eastern Yünnan to Tonquin—already greatly injured by the opening of the West River to trade—would be completely frustrated. Wuchow, on the West River, was opened as a free port under the Convention of 1897, providing for the delimitation of the boundary between Burmah and China. The opening was also obtained of the ports of Samshui and Kongkên, at the apex of the delta formed by the Canton and West Rivers. By this concession access was given westwards to the Provinces of Yünnan, Kuei-chow, Kiangsi and large areas of Kuangtung, and, to the northward, the broad expanse of undeveloped country bordered by the chain of mountains forming the boundaries of Hunan and Kiangsi. An understanding was arrived at in February, 1898, and put formally on record that a Treaty Port should be opened in Hunan within two years. In addition to these new facilities, there was the opening of the inland waters of China to foreign trade in June, 1898, and the assurance as to the non-alienation of the Yangtsze Basin. Sufficient time has not yet passed to measure the effect of the admission of foreign steamers to the river systems of China. The regulations have not worked smoothly, the provincial authorities having hedged the new traffic about with unnecessary restrictions. But a study of recent Consular reports shows that—though advantage has not been taken of the opening to the extent that might have been expected in view of the eagerness with which the necessity of this concession was pressed upon the British Government by the commercial community—the change gives such facilities of intercourse that trade is likely, sooner or later, to expand largely. China is at last thrown open to the Western world. A new era in the relations of the Chinese people and the “foreign devils” has begun.

In the “battle for concessions” for railways and mines the Government were able to gain more than any other Power, in



MAP OF
NIGERIA & GOLD COAST
Showing Boundaries under the
Anglo French Convention
(Niger), June 14th 1898
Scale 600,000 or 1 inch = 94.69 Miles

V. & S. Lith



spite of the opposition of Russia and France at Pekin. Up to November 3rd, 1898—shortly before an Official Decree was issued declaring that China would not for the present entertain any more proposals—British subjects had obtained railway concessions representing two thousand eight hundred miles of line. Russian railway concessions figured at one thousand five hundred and thirty, German seven hundred and twenty, Belgian six hundred and fifty, French four hundred and twenty and an Anglo-American Syndicate three hundred. The chief British concession is to the Pekin Syndicate, which was formed to work coal and iron mines in the Province of Shansi, and to construct a railway of two hundred and fifty miles. Baron Richtofen, whose right to speak with authority on the geology of China is undisputed, declares that proportionately to its area Shansi has the largest and most easily workable coalfield in any region of the globe, and that the manufacture of iron is capable of almost unlimited extension—a verdict that suggests that China will eventually be able to supply herself with machinery for the manufacturing and industrial enterprises with which she is, as some believe, destined to engage. The same syndicate has also acquired similar rights in the Province of Honan. In the Province of Pechili, as has already been seen, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank are controlling the North China railways, with the extensions to Shan-hai-Kwan and Newchwang. It has also obtained a half interest in the coal mines at Nan P'ioa—which are said to contain the best and richest coal mines in China. The same Bank, in conjunction with Messrs. Jardine, Matheson and Company, have a concession to finance and construct a line from Shanghai to Nanking, and another from Nanking to Honan, for a distance of two hundred and seventy miles, and yet another from Soochow to Hangchow, with a possible extension to Ningpo; while the Firm and the Bank form the English portion of an Anglo-German Syndicate for the building of a trunk line of six hundred miles from Tientsin to Chinkiang. Then again, the Pekin Syndicate have mining concessions in the Chekiang Province similar to those in Shansi and Honan; the Jardine-Matheson Syndicate have the right to construct a railway from Kowloon—within the British extension of Hong Kong—to Canton; an Anglo-American Syndicate have rights of railway construction from Hankow to Kowloon—a trunk line of six hundred miles; and China has given Great Britain the right to

extend the Burmah railway system as far as the Yangtsze—a possible railway of seven hundred miles. This is not the place in which to attempt to estimate the value of these concessions, or to compare them with those granted to Russia in Manchuria; to France in the south, from Tonquin into Yünnan; to Germany in Shantung, and to the Franco-Belgian Syndicate, which has a concession for a trunk line of six or seven hundred miles north and south through Chihli, Honan and Hupeli Provinces; but they deserve to be mentioned, because they are the first-fruits—and the first-fruits only—of Lord Salisbury's diplomacy.

It would be tedious to the reader were the negotiations on each of these concessions compressed into an intelligible narrative and set forth in the manner followed when dealing with the leases of Port Arthur and Talienwan; but in every case the ingenuity and the perseverance of Sir Claude Macdonald were taxed to the full. He displayed an ability and persistence on behalf of the concessionaires that cannot be sufficiently appreciated from a mere study of the Despatches; and he was supported by Lord Salisbury with a steady vigour and consistency surpassing that which was shown in negotiations of an international rather than a commercial character. These concessions are not the least important successes of the Salisbury Administration, and they must be taken into account in any estimate of the opportunities seized or missed by British diplomacy. The commercial community cannot, at least, complain that their interests have been neglected. Lord Salisbury has, indeed, redressed the partial failure of his efforts in international diplomacy by the triumphs won, in spite of the influence of powerful rivals, in the field of commercial concessions and additional trade advantages.

BOOK IV.

THE NILE AND THE NIGER.

CHAPTER I.

RECONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN.

An Air of Mystery—The Italians at Adowa—General Baratieri's Defeat—Kassala and the Dervishes—An Egyptian Advance Ordered—Mr. Curzon's Explanation—Attitude of the Opposition—Our Relations with Italy—The *Caisse* Advance—French Objections—The Sirdar Acts—Mr. Morley's Vote of Censure—An "Infatuated" Policy—Mr. Chamberlain's Statement—The Mixed Tribunals and the *Caisse*—The Parsimony of the Government—Indian Troops for Suakim—A Shabby Act—The Battle of Ferkeh—Cholera and Sand Storms—A long Delay—Occupation of Dongola Town—The Gunboats in Action—A Province at a Stroke—A Halt Called—Lord Salisbury's Reasons—Khartoum the Objective—French Remonstrances to Egypt—Sir Michael Hicks Beach's Speech—England would not be worried out of Egypt—The Work for 1897—A Parliamentary Grant in Aid—Opposition Speeches—M. Hanotaux and the English Challenge—Abu Hamed taken by Assault—The Work for 1898—The Queen's Speech—British Troops for the Soudan—Lord Kimberley's Pronouncement—Lord Salisbury's Reply—The Battle of the Atbara—Province of Berber Recovered—Completion of Railway to El Obeid—The Movement towards Khartoum—Omdurman Bombarded—The Battle of September 2nd—Capture of the Khalifa's Capital—Enthusiasm of the Empire.

THE reconquest of the Soudan formed no part of the declared plans of Lord Salisbury's Government. It began in March, 1896, with a mere "diversion" up the Nile, in the supposed military interests of the distressed Italian forces; and it ended at the close of 1899 with the death of the Khalifa in a final engagement in Kordofan, and the establishment of Anglo-Egyptian rule throughout the lost provinces. This great achievement was begun in a haphazard way and had a somewhat mysterious origin; but, looking back upon events, there can be little doubt that the Cabinet decided at the outset that the Soudan should be recovered, if it were possible to achieve that result at a moderate cost, and consistent with the discharge of other responsibilities. Their policy was that of

proceeding step by step, of limiting themselves to the accomplishment of what events should prove to be practicable. The Nile Springs were the ultimate but not the immediate objective. For reasons that are not apparent they did not take the public into their confidence. On the contrary, they did their best to mystify observers of their doings and to cloak their real intent in partial and scarcely reconcilable explanations. But this, as will be seen, is an unimportant element in a narrative of much dramatic interest.

On March 1st, 1896, the Italian policy of adventure in North-east Africa was brought to a summary close by the disaster of Adowa. The attempt to extend the area of the Erythrea Protectorate, which had been pursued with varying success during 1895, met with a failure more decisive than any that had ever befallen the arms of an European race engaged in war against native peoples in Africa. General Baratieri then had nearly thirty thousand Italian troops in the field, many of them being lately arrived reinforcements, and a large number of well-armed native levies. The garrison at Mukaleh had been compelled to surrender. Notwithstanding this success Menelik made overtures for peace, the condition being that there should be a retirement from the region lately occupied by the Italian forces and the radical modification of the Treaty of Ucciali. General Baratieri rejected these overtures. An Abyssinian army of over a hundred thousand men seized the hills commanding the Italian position of Adowa. General Baratieri knew that he was about to be superseded. Being anxious to gain a decisive victory before General Baldissera could arrive and take the chief command he divided his troops into three columns and attacked the Shoan army. One column, under General Albertone, was driven back with resistless force; the second column, under General Arimondi, was unable to give it effective assistance because of the difficulties of the ground, and soon the entire army was compelled to retreat before the overwhelming rush of the victorious hillmen. Had the Shoans known how to pursue, the Italian army would have been annihilated. They captured fifty-two guns and inflicted a loss of seven thousand in killed, wounded and prisoners. General Baratieri concentrated his defeated forces at Massowah and the spell which had deluded the Italian Government into a disastrous enterprise was finally broken. Meanwhile the Soudanese Dervishes had swarmed around Kassala and the Italian garrison there was in imminent peril. Italy had been allowed to occupy

Kassala by a friendly arrangement with Egypt pending its recovery by that country with the rest of the Soudan, and Great Britain, as the guardian of Egyptian interests, was therefore directly concerned in its fortunes. Moreover, the Government had received information of a threatening movement of the Dervishes from Berber, with urgent representations from the military authorities of Egypt that an advance was immediately necessary in the interests of that country. In these circumstances a forward movement was sanctioned by the British Cabinet.

In a statement in the House of Commons, on March 16th, Mr. Curzon, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, explained the position of affairs in general terms, and said the advance had been ordered as far as Akasheh, on the Nile, about one-third of the distance between Wady Halfa, the then frontier post of Egypt, and the town of Dongola. The British advance might, he added, extend to Dongola, but it was not usual to publish plans of campaign. The future action of the Government must be regulated not merely by military and strategical but also by political and financial considerations, upon which he could not possibly enter. The Government expected the movement to have a twofold advantage: it would act as a diversion for the help and relief of the Italians in their sore distress at Kassala; and it would save Egypt from a menace which, if left to grow, might soon swell to formidable proportions.

The adjournment of the House was moved by Mr. Labouchere, who expressed his hearty pleasure at the defeat of the Italians, on the ground that they had been engaged in an unwarrantable invasion of Abyssinia. He protested against the advance, because it "would anchor us in Egypt for the next hundred years." The real object was, he declared, to place England in such a position that she could not fulfil the pledges of evacuation given to Europe, and, more particularly, to France. Sir Charles Dilke was of the same opinion, and enlarged upon the imprudence, the unwisdom and the folly of the advance. Sir Wm. Harcourt, as Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, declared that the step was of a most perilous character, and would meet with most steadfast resistance from his party. Mr. Courtney also expressed his "grave apprehensions." A full dress debate took place on the subject four days later, Mr. Morley moving the reduction of the salary of the Foreign Secretary—the equivalent of a vote of censure. Meanwhile statements had been made showing that communications had been

exchanged with the Italian Government, and that the latter regarded the proposed advance with pleasure. The Marquis of Rudini had spoken of the relations between Italy and Great Britain as those of "affectionate friendship," and had clearly indicated that the advance up the Nile was undertaken to serve Italian as well as Egyptian interests. On the other hand, a statement in the French Chamber showed that France objected to the request of the British Government that Egypt should be allowed to draw £E500,000 from the *Caisse de la Dette* for the expenses of the expedition. The request was, said M. Berthelot, open to most serious objections, both political and financial. While the diplomatists and Parliamentarians were talking, Sir H. Kitchener, the Sirdar, was acting. A force of ten thousand had been organised—a number equal to those the Dervishes then had stationed at Dongola—and on March 20th an advance column had pushed beyond the frontier and occupied Akasheh without opposition. The vote of censure was, therefore, moved when too late for retrogression, for to have returned to the frontier would have been to invite a Dervish attack. Mr. Morley complained that the Government had not treated the House with due frankness. Its hypothesis was that the Adowa disaster had given Mahdism a new stimulus, which had endangered Egypt. But if Egypt were really thus threatened, the military plans of the Government were ludicrously and dangerously inadequate. He censured the Government for reopening the Egyptian question and described their policy as infatuated.

Mr. Chamberlain was given the task of defending the Ministerial policy. Their opponents, he pointed out, were those in favour of an immediate or early evacuation of Egypt; but he suggested rather than stated the conclusion that evacuation could not, or at least would not, take place until the lost provinces had been recovered for Egypt. The cause of the advance was the new situation created by the defeat of the Italians and the consequent ferment among the Dervishes. It was the wisest policy to anticipate a Dervish attack upon Egypt. The interests of Italy and Egypt were inseparable. Two considerations would govern the advance: security of communications and the nature and extent of the resistance to be encountered. The railway would be extended to Akasheh and no recovered territory would be handed back to barbarism; but the Government did not contemplate gigantic military efforts; their policy was confined to what they believed to be the immediate needs

of Egypt. Several speakers followed, favouring or condemning the advance. Sir H. Stanley hoped our troops would go as far as Khartoum; Mr. T. G. Bowles thought the adventure most dangerous and hazardous. Sir William Harcourt twitted Mr. Chamberlain with having announced that if they met with resistance they would go no further and declared that the inevitable result would be a movement upon Khartoum. Mr. Balfour concluded the debate by defining the position of the Government in the matter of the evacuation of Egypt by saying that they could not regard the condition of that country as satisfactory until control over the Soudan had been established. Mr. Morley's amendment for the reduction of the salary was then negatived by a majority of a hundred and forty-three.

The organisation of the expedition was completed by the end of April. But it was hampered at the outset by want of funds. France and Russia had protested against the advance of money from the *Caisse* and this objection was sustained by the mixed Tribunals and afterwards on appeal. England, therefore, had to finance the enterprise, which was conducted with such parsimony that avoidable hardships were inflicted upon officers and men and an unnecessarily high sick and death-rate incurred. For reasons of economy also India was made to bear the cost of the pay and allowances of the Indian troops brought over to garrison Suakim and Tokar in the absence of the Egyptian forces in Dongola. This act of meanness, which was keenly resented in the Dependency, was defended by Lord George Hamilton on the ground that but for India British interests in Egypt would be inconsiderable, and that it was in accordance with practice for India to pay when her troops were engaged outside India in affairs in which India had a special interest. This defence did not convince the House that the Indian tax-payer was being fairly treated and much indignation was expressed at the shabbiness of the India Office in London. Mr. Morley raised a debate on the question and used several effective arguments at Lord George Hamilton's expense. He received support from the Ministerial as well as the Opposition side; but Ministers kept solidly together in support of Lord George Hamilton and the Whips succeeded in mustering a majority of eighty-five against Mr. Morley's proposition.

The incident had, of course, no bearing upon the work of the Sirdar. Until June he was steadily engaged in pushing forward

the railway from Wady Halfa and making ready for an attack. On the afternoon of June 7th the force moved out from Akasheh. Its objective was the Dervish position at Ferkeh, sixteen miles higher up the river. Three brigades of Anglo-Egyptian infantry with Maxims and artillery were led by the Sirdar along the river course. A detachment of cavalry, camelry and horse artillery under Colonel Burn-Murdoch struck across the desert to occupy some heights to the east of the Dervish camp. After a twelve miles' march the Sirdar called a halt. The troops bivouacked in the desert, and after a few hours' rest resumed the march. At five o'clock they came into contact with the enemy. A stubborn fight ensued; but the frontal attack of the infantry was successful within a couple of hours, and Ferkeh was entered. Those who fled from the town found their retreat cut off by Colonel Burn-Murdoch's cavalry; those who remained had no alternative but to surrender or fight to the last. The majority refused to surrender and fell with their arms in their hands. Colonel Burn-Murdoch pursued the fugitives as far as Suada, on the Nile. The Dervishes had vacated that position and it was soon occupied by the Sirdar's infantry. The loss on the Anglo-Egyptian side was trifling, only twenty being killed and eighty wounded, while nine hundred desert tribesmen were killed and five hundred taken prisoners. The Sirdar's black troops behaved magnificently, standing their ground with the bayonet against the charge of the Dervish horsemen, and preserving a coolness and discipline which convinced the emirs of the Khalifa that the day for despising them was past.

The first battle was a brilliant success—strategically well conceived by the Sirdar, excellently fought by his admirably handled forces. Circumstances combined to check a further advance. The season proved to be unusually hot, even for the Soudan. Cholera broke out in the camp and caused many deaths. A storm of unusual violence destroyed several miles of railway and the Village of Ferkeh. In September the forward movement was resumed, and on the 19th a still more signal success was won, and the Town of Dongola occupied. The immediate objective was Kiernan, near the Hannek Cataract, where Wad-el-Bishara held a fort with four thousand picked men of the Dongola garrison. This was found to have been evacuated. The Dervish leader had crossed the Nile to Hafir, where there was a stronger fort, under whose walls was the solitary Dervish gunboat and a fleet of sailing boats laden with grain.

Fire was opened upon the fort by the artillery, and three Egyptian gunboats were sent up the stream. The bombardment of the fort was vigorously replied to, but the Dervish gunboat was sunk, and the Egyptian gunboats steamed past Hafir up the river to Dongola. Wad-el-Bishara, who had been wounded by a shell, evacuated the fort in the night and hastened to Dongola, where he believed the Anglo-Egyptians would endeavour to cross the river. The Sirdar, however, crossed at Hafir, and led the expedition in the wake of the retreating Dervishes by the west bank. He overtook some Dervish horsemen a few miles outside Dongola—Baggara foemen, who refused to surrender, and were slain—but Wad-el-Bishara's main body was in full flight. Dongola was occupied without resistance, and cavalry sent in pursuit of the fugitives as far as El Debbah. The result was the restoration of the entire province to Egypt. What was more important than the territorial gain was the demonstration of the fighting powers of the Egyptian troops and the inherent weakness of the Khalifa's government. Many of his tribesmen had fought with their old ardour and fearlessness of death; but it had been made apparent to them that they could no longer count upon victory as the certain consequence of superior personal courage. A new power had arisen to threaten their dominion over the Soudan in the persons of English-trained Egyptian soldiery. Their defeats also brought to light the eagerness of the non-military inhabitants to throw off the Khalifa's yoke. With the flag of the Khedive flying at Dongola, the inhabitants of the province flocked to the Sirdar to give their allegiance to the Egyptian Government and express their gratitude for deliverance from oppression.

Up to this point Sir Herbert Kitchener had been given a free hand. He was now debarred from going beyond Dongola. The reason, Lord Salisbury explained in a speech in the House of Lords, was financial. Egypt was the only Power in Europe which was unable to borrow. In a sarcastic allusion to events in South Africa he said that if any millionaires who spent their money in supporting raids and invasions would come forward with an offer to carry the expedition further the Government might not be deaf to their entreaties. Though the advance was to stop for the present he declared that it would not be safe to leave Khartoum permanently in Dervish hands. He was of opinion that steps would have to be taken in the future to restore Egyptian authority

throughout the Soudan. When Parliament met in February, 1897, further evidence was forthcoming of the dislike with which France had witnessed the reconquest of Dongola Province. It appeared that the Russian and French Consuls-General at Cairo had not only objected—and successfully—to the withdrawal of money from the *Caisse*, but had represented to Egypt that she should not have accepted the advance of £T500,000 from Great Britain except by consent of all the Powers responsible for Egypt. To this view Sir Michael Hicks Beach indirectly objected in language of much significance. In asking for a vote of £798,802, as a grant in aid of the expenditure incurred in the recovery of Dongola, he referred to the decision of the Egyptian Courts under which the advance from the *Caisse* had to be returned, and said that the repayment of the British loan should rest between the Government of Egypt and that of Great Britain. If the English occupation of Egypt were regarded as an abstract question there was not a little to be said against it; but the matter had long past out of the region of abstract questions. Her Majesty's Government had to consider very carefully whether they should sanction further conquest; but there ought to be a further advance. "Egypt could never be held to be permanently secure so long as a hostile Power was in occupation of the Nile Valley up to Khartoum." There was one thing of which they might be quite certain—England would not be worried out of Egypt by hindrances and difficulties such as the refusal of money from the *Caisse*. There would, he added, be an advance to Abu Hamed, on the Nile—and probably beyond that point, but how far he did not think it right to say. The work to be done that year was the consolidation of the province already recovered, the acquisition of strategical positions likely to be useful in the future, and the continuation of the railway to Abu Hamed.

Mr. Morley was shocked to think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have declared that England would not be worried out of Egypt. He regarded the language as a challenge to Russia and France and prophesied that the policy of the Government would lead to perilous and thankless consequences. Sir William Harcourt condemned Sir Michael Beach for having made a "most mischievous and dangerous" reference to Franco-Russian action; but the vote was agreed to without a division. There was a hubbub in France and irritation was also expressed in

Russia. In a speech in the French Chamber, however, M. Hanotaux, then Foreign Minister, showed no inclination to take up the challenge thrown out by the English Chancellor. He had, as in due course will be seen, a card to play in the form of a secret expedition to the Nile under M. Marchand. As the year wore on Lord Kitchener worked steadily and quietly southwards from Dongola, establishing an administration in Dongola Province and carrying the railway onwards towards Abu Hamed. On August 6th a march was made by a column under Major-General Hunter towards that village, which was attacked at daybreak on the 7th. The high ground commanding the place was carried by assault and a stubborn house-to-house fight ensued on entering the village. Major-General Hunter's victory was complete. The gunboats reconnoitred as far as Metemmeh, where the Dervishes were in strong force. The forts were shelled but nothing further was done. The remaining months of the year were spent in completing the line to Abu Hamed and in constructing the extension to Berber, in collecting stores and war and railway material at railhead and in making other preparations for a further advance during the next season.

The Queen's Speech at the meeting of Parliament on February 8th, 1898, contained the announcement that apparently trustworthy intelligence had been received of the intention of the Khalifa to advance against the Egyptian army, and that instructions had therefore been given that a contingent of British troops should be dispatched to Berber. This was sufficient to indicate that the work to be done during the year was the recovery of Khartoum. Again the Opposition gave expression to childish alarms. Though admitting the necessity of the employment of British troops, Lord Kimberley regarded it with displeasure. The reconquest of the Soudan was against the interests of England. Lord Salisbury's reply was that Khartoum had formed a part of Egypt and that he hoped that before many months the barbarous and devastating despotism which had prevailed in the fertile provinces of the Nile Valley would be brought to an end. Sir William Harcourt in the Commons declared that the enterprise was unnecessary and harked back to the old complaint that the Government had shown a want of frankness and should make a plain statement of their intentions in the matter of the occupation of Egypt; but, as before, Opposition criticisms had no effect upon the action of the Government. The Egyptian army having been further stiffened with English troops, a cautious advance

was made from Abu Hamed. A few skirmishes took place in the early spring, with uniform success to the Anglo-Egyptians, whose southward movements were regulated by the continued progress of the railway. Late in March, Shendy was attacked and captured. A Dervish army under Mahmoud was then in an entrenched camp on the Atbara. The Sirdar attacked this position with brilliant success on the early morning of Good Friday, April 8th. He had with him a force of thirteen thousand men and twenty-four guns, and the Dervishes had about nineteen thousand behind a strong zariba encircling their camp. The Sirdar divided his forces into three brigades, the British under Brigadier-General Macdonald on his left. The artillery having shelled the enemy's trenches the three brigades advanced to the assault. The Dervishes stood their ground, reserving their fire until the troops approached the trenches, but our men tore away the zariba and entered the camp. Mahmoud was taken prisoner and the Dervishes suffered heavy losses in the attack and during the subsequent pursuit by the cavalry and artillery. Of the British brigade three officers and twenty-one non-commissioned officers and men were killed and ten officers and a hundred and six men wounded; and of the Egyptian force fifty-one men were killed and eighteen officers and three hundred and nineteen of the rank and file wounded. The Dervish loss was estimated at three thousand. The effect of this decisive engagement was to liberate the province of Berber from the Khalifa's rule, and still further to weaken the rapidly decaying *prestige* of Abdullah further south.

For the next few months the only news from the Soudan told of the progress made with the railway. The entire army was concentrated at Wad Hamed. Towards the end of August it was at Wad-el-Obeid, where cavalry pickets came into touch with the patrols of the Dervish army. It was thought that the coming battle would be fought at Kerreri. On September 1st the Dervish camp was found to be evacuated. Probably it had been used rather as a strong outpost from which warning could be given to the Khalifa's main army of the approach of the Anglo-Egyptians. From the Kerreri hill, across the level plain, Omdurman could be seen, the Tomb of the Mahdi being the most conspicuous edifice. Observers on the high ground could see the Egyptian gunboats steam up the river and open bombardment on Omdurman, and they could watch the Dervish host pour out of the city and over the plain. Their numbers were estimated by the Sirdar's advance cavalry at about thirty

thousand. The Dervish force halted at a khor and encamped there for the night. The two armies were now but three miles apart. At daybreak the entire Dervish force advanced upon the Anglo-Egyptian camp, with the intention of delivering a simultaneous onslaught on the front and flanks. They charged magnificently, notwithstanding the terrific fire from artillery, maxims and rifles; and they kept on their way, heedless of the great gaps made in their ranks, until the plain was cumbered with dead and wounded. Meanwhile the 21st Lancers had been sent to clear away a body of Dervishes, believed to number about a couple of hundred. They charged through them to the edge of a nullah, where some fifteen hundred Dervishes were concealed. These also they charged and there was a sharp hand to hand fight, in which twenty-four of the Lancers were killed and twice that number wounded. The charge was the most dramatic incident of the battle. For a couple of hours the Dervishes faced the storm of shells and bullets, and then masses of them fell back to the hills. At nine o'clock the Sirdar gave the order for the advance in *échelon* upon Omdurman, and the army moved across the plain, the native battalions despatching the wounded Dervishes as they went forward—a proceeding traditional in Soudanese warfare, and more or less necessary with a foe who neither gives nor expects quarter, and will continue to slay even when partially disabled. Though it appears that no order was given by the Sirdar for the killing of the wounded, the evidence is indisputable that butchery occurred in excess of the requirements of the case. That, however, is a side issue. As the advance developed a new danger presented itself. A mass of Dervishes emerged from behind the Kerreri hills and threw themselves upon Colonel Macdonald's brigade, threatening both his right and rear. The attack on the right was delivered with such rapidity and courage that the position of the brigade was for a time perilous, and the result of the whole battle in jeopardy; but, by a masterly handling of his troops, Hector Macdonald saved the situation. The Dervishes were repulsed and made no further attack. As the Anglo-Egyptian army advanced across the plain the remnants of the Dervish host receded. The Sirdar occupied Omdurman the same afternoon, the Khalifa and a following of uncertain numbers escaping from the southern end of the town while Sir H. Kitchener and the staff were within the streets.

The news of the destruction of the Dervish power was received with enthusiasm throughout the English speaking world. It was

recognised even by the political opponents of the Government that the execution of the plan of conquest had been as admirable as was its inception. The dismal prophecies of some of the Opposition leaders had been signally confuted by events. The opportune development of a tentative policy had resulted in the reopening of the Eastern Soudan and a vast area of Central Africa to European civilisation. The honour of England, which had been compromised by the death of Gordon and the withdrawal from the Nile Valley, had been vindicated at an inconsiderable cost in human life on the Anglo-Egyptian side, and for the sum of less than two and a-half millions sterling,—over a million of which was represented by a permanent railway through the desert to Khartoum. Hitherto the Administration had achieved no successes that appealed to the imagination of the nation; but with the Egyptian and British flags floating over Gordon's headquarters amid the ruins of Khartoum it was felt that Ministers had placed to their credit an achievement worthy to rank among the brilliant exploits of British statesmanship and military prowess. It was worthily supplemented by Sir Francis Wingate in November, 1899, when he engaged the remnants of the Khalifa's forces in the scrub west of the Nile, in the Province of Kordofan, Abdullah ben Taisha and his bodyguard of Emirs standing their ground and facing the belching Maxims of the Sirdar's army, with the sublime courage and indifference to death which have ever distinguished the Desert race.

CHAPTER II.

FRANCE AND THE NILE VALLEY.

The Marchand Expedition—Sir Edward Grey's Statement in 1895—An Unfriendly Act—“A Painful Impression” in France—M. Hanotaux's Declaration—The Anglo-German Agreement—The Rights of Egypt—France in the Nigerian Soudan—Lord Salisbury's Instructions to Sir E. Monson—The Niger Commission—An Offer about Lake Chad—M. Hanotaux's Reply—Statement of Policy to the Sirdar—His Orders Concerning the White Nile—M. Delcassé's Dilemma—Marchand as “An Emissary of Civilisation”—Vigorous Action by Sir E. Monson—His Denial of the French Claim to send the Expedition—Plain Language to France—“No wish to Pick a Quarrel”—No Hope of Compromise—The Sirdar Saves the Marchand Party from Massacre—His Relations with Captain Marchand—Marchand's Account of His Instructions from the French Government—Shilluk Country Occupied by the Anglo-Egyptians—Alleged Shilluk Treaty with Marchand—A Free Passage Down the Nile Offered to the French Expedition—M. Delcassé Withholds the Order to Retire—A Dangerous Deadlock—Lord Salisbury and Baron de Courcel—Lord Salisbury Immovable—The Prime Minister's Arguments—A Second Interview—Baron de Courcel as Diplomatic Explorer—Lord Salisbury Holds His Ground—The French Demand for Access to the Nile—Baron de Courcel Waxes Rhetorical—Lord Salisbury's Satirical Description of the Conversation—England United—Lord Rosebery Supports the Government—An Eloquent Passage—Public Feeling on the French Policy of “Pin-pricks”—M. Delcassé and French Opinion—Sir Michael Hicks Beach's Warning to France.

ONE result of the conquest of the Soudan was to bring into startling prominence the probability of immediate war with France. When, as the Sirdar led his victorious army through the town, the Egyptian gunboats ceased the shelling of Omdurman, they steamed up the Nile in search of news of an English expedition coming north to meet them from the head waters of the river. What they did learn was that the French flag was flying at Fashoda, seven hundred and fifty kilometres from Khartoum, on the White Nile, and that it had been planted there some months before by a French officer named Marchand, who, with a small but well equipped expedition, had emerged from the swamps to the west, had built a fort and was employing his leisure in the cultivation of fruits and vegetables. It had been known three years before that France had contemplated sending, or had already sent, an armed force into the Nile Valley, and during the progress of the Egyptian campaign in 1896 and 1897 rumours abounded that

the expedition was on its way. At one time it was supposed to have met with complete disaster, but stories of success gained currency, notwithstanding circumstantial reports of failure. The position of England in relation to any such expedition had been clearly defined by Sir Edward Grey, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Rosebery Administration, on March 28th, 1895, in the course of a speech relating to the Congo Agreement. He had then made a most important declaration of policy:—

“Towards Egypt,” he said, “this country stood in a special position of trust, as regards the maintenance of the interests of Egypt; and the claims of Egypt have not only been admitted by us, but they have been admitted and emphasised lately by the Government of France. I stated the other day that in consequence of these claims of ours, and in consequence of the claims of Egypt in the Nile Valley, the British sphere of influence covered the whole of the Nile waterway. That is a statement following logically upon what has happened in past years. . . . I am asked whether or not it is the case that a French expedition is coming from the west of Africa with the intention of entering the Nile Valley and occupying up to the Nile. I will ask the Committee to be careful in giving credence to the rumours of the movement of expeditions in Africa. . . . Rumours have come with greater or less freedom with regard to the movements of expeditions in various parts of Africa, but at the Foreign Office we have no reason to suppose that any French expedition has instructions to enter, or the intention of entering, the Nile Valley; and I will go further and say that, after all I have explained about the claims we consider we have under past Agreements, and the claims which we consider Egypt may have in the Nile Valley, and adding to that the fact that those claims and the view of the Government with regard to them are fully and clearly known to the French Government, I cannot think it is possible that these rumours deserve credence, because the advance of a French expedition under secret instructions right from the other side of Africa into a territory over which our claims have been known for so long would be not merely an inconsistent and unexpected act, but it must be perfectly well known to the French Government that it would be an unfriendly act, and would be so viewed by England.”

In an interview a few days afterwards with Lord Kimberley, the French Ambassador, Baron de Courcel, observed that Sir Edward Grey's speech would create a painful impression in France and that he feared it would have a prejudicial effect upon the future relations of the two countries. He could not but regard the declaration as amounting to a “*prise en possession*” by England of the whole basin of the Upper Nile. But he did not deny that there was a French expedition roaming about in Central Africa and could not give an assurance that it would not enter the Nile

Valley. Speaking in the Senate on April 5th M. Hanotaux made an important declaration in reply to that of Sir Edward Grey. In the forefront of his speech he stated the principle that the rights of the Sultan and the Khedive alone continued to exist over the country from the Lakes to Wady Halfa. To the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, in so far as it defined this region as a British sphere of influence, France had withheld her consent. The position taken up by France was, he said, as follows:—

The regions in question are under the high sovereignty of the Sultan. They have a lawful master, the Khedive.

This being laid down, we say to the British Government:—

“You state that by the Convention of 1890 England has placed a portion of these territories within her sphere of influence. Well, you can at least let us know what are the territories which you claim. Tell us how far this sphere of influence reaches, which, according to your view, starts on the left bank of the Nile, and extends, no one knows where, towards the north.

“In a word, you present to us a claim which is vague, uncertain, and couched in terms admitting of different interpretations. You unite in one phrase the sphere of influence of Egypt and the sphere of influence of England. Tell us then where Egypt ends, and where this sphere which you claim commences.

“You want us to settle the future of these regions now, as I think prematurely. You want to obtain our adhesion without even explaining to us to what you wish us to adhere. Under these circumstances do not be astonished at our refusing our assent and reserving our full liberty.”

So far the French Government has not been able to obtain any reply to these plain and reasonable questions. . . .

But, when the time comes for settling finally the fate of these distant countries, I am one of those who think that, by seeing that the rights of the Sultan and of the Khedive are respected, and by assigning to each party concerned what is due to it according to its works, two great nations will be able to arrive at an arrangement which will reconcile their interests and satisfy their common aspirations towards civilisation and progress.

This was the position of affairs when Lord Salisbury came into office. Attention was then diverted from the Nile Valley to the Niger region, where the activity of French expeditions had made a fresh diplomatic arrangement necessary, and had led to the appointment of a Joint Commission in the hope of arriving at an amicable settlement. This aspect of Anglo-French relations calls for separate treatment, which is given in a succeeding chapter of this book. All that it is necessary to say about it at present is that the Commission had come to no conclusion at the time Major Marchand's arrival at Fashoda was reported, and that it is necessarily related to

the Nile Valley question, inasmuch as the colonial policy of France contemplated an extension of her Congo possessions northward and eastward across the continent to the Nile, as well as an extension of her North African colonies, southward across the Western Soudan, until they joined the Ubanghi region.

Ten months before the battle of Omdurmun, Sir Edmund Monson, our Ambassador at Paris, M. Hanotaux and Lord Salisbury, were engrossed in the Niger negotiations. In a Despatch of December 10th, Sir E. Monson referred to reports of the massacre of the Marchand expedition, and urged that it was necessary to remind the French Government of the views held by England as to her sphere of influence in the Nile Valley. He was authorised to inform M. Hanotaux that if other questions were adjusted no difficulty would be made about recognising the French claim to the northern and eastern shores of Lake Chad. But, as possession of this territory might in the future open up a road to the Nile, it must be understood that no European Power other than Great Britain had any claim to occupy any part of the Valley. Her Majesty's Government entirely adhered to the language of Sir Edward Grey. M. Hanotaux replied, repeating the reservations of the French Government with regard to the Nile region, and saying that the position taken up by the British Government was likely to prejudice other questions than those which the Niger Commission had been appointed to settle.

Before the final advance upon Khartoum Lord Salisbury instructed Lord Cromer that the policy of Her Majesty's Government as regards the territories shortly to be conquered was exactly defined by the language used by Sir Edward Grey and subsequently by Sir Edward Monson. He authorised the Sirdar to send two flotillas, one up the White Nile under his personal command and another up the Blue Nile as far as Roseires, or as far as the first Abyssinian port, where he was to halt and wait for further instructions. The Sirdar was to go as far as Fashoda and take with him a small body of British troops, if that was thought desirable; and "in dealing with any French or Abyssinian authorities who may be encountered, nothing should be said or done which would in any way imply" (the quotation is from the Despatch) "a recognition on behalf of Her Majesty's Government of a title to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any portion of the Nile Valley." By this time M. Delcassé had succeeded M. Hanotaux in the Foreign Office. On learning of the battle of Omdurman he offered Sir E. Monson

congratulations on the success of our arms and said that it was probable that if the British flotilla continued its course up the Nile it would fall in with Captain Marchand. He then knew that the French expedition had entered the Nile Valley and was concerned lest he should come into conflict with the Sirdar. The Captain "had been distinctly told that he was nothing but an 'emissary of civilisation,'" that he had no authority to assume the decision of questions of right, and had been warned to take no steps whatever which might give rise to local conflict. Would Lord Salisbury, he asked, take steps to prevent any collision?

Within a few days, well in advance of Lord Kitchener's report on the subject, it became clear that M. Marchand was at Fashoda. M. Delcassé could not deny the news. Did he understand that Her Majesty's Government held that the "emissary of civilisation" had no right to be there? Sir Edmund Monson grasped the nettle firmly. Her Majesty's Government, he said, wished to live in perfect amity with France, but Fashoda, as a dependency of the Khalifate, had now passed into the hands of Great Britain and Egypt. M. Delcassé knew as well as he did that France had been informed that any incursion into the Upper Nile Valley would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Why, then, did they send this mission, when they knew what serious results its success in reaching Fashoda must inevitably produce? M. Delcassé took refuge in the old reservations on the subject of Egypt and communicated the interesting but irrelevant information that M. Marchand had received his orders from M. Liotard, who had been sent in 1893 to the Upper Ubanghi to secure French interests to the north-east. And he insinuated a claim to the whole region of the Bahr-el-Ghazal. Sir E. Monson's despatch (September 18th) concludes thus:—

"I said to his Excellency that I must tell him very frankly that the situation on the Upper Nile is a dangerous one. I must refer him again to your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant; and I must state distinctly that Fashoda falls within the territories therein designated as dependencies of the Khalifate, and that Her Majesty's Government are determined to hold to the decision already announced to him. It was right that I should state to him categorically that they would not consent to a compromise (*on ne consentira jamais à transiger*) on this point.

"For the rest we had no wish to pick a quarrel; but having long ago given a warning, I could not see how we could now cause surprise if we resented a step which we had cautioned France not to take.

"These were the essential points of our conversation, which was conducted on both sides with perfect calmness."

While Sir E. Monson was talking in this straightforward fashion to M. Delcassé, Sir H. Kitchener was destroying a body of Dervishes up the White Nile, where, with a steamer and eleven boats, they were awaiting reinforcements preparatory to falling upon M. Marchand's expedition at Fashoda. Having thus effectually saved the party from massacre—for eight Europeans and eighty Senegalese would certainly have been hopelessly overmatched—the Sirdar, after three days' further steaming, arrived off Fashoda, handed M. Marchand a formal written protest against any occupation of any part of the Nile Valley by France, hoisted the Egyptian flag, stationed a gunboat there, landed a Soudanese battalion and four guns, and invited M. Marchand to take a trip down the Nile. M. Marchand replied that he had received precise orders to occupy the country and hoist the French flag, and that it was impossible to retire without instructions to do so from his own Government; but in view of the Sirdar's superior force, he was not prepared to resist the hoisting of the Egyptian flag.

The Sirdar discreetly refrained from forcing the situation. He left the French flag flying on the ruined bastion of the old Egyptian fortifications, and steamed through the Shilluk country as far as the Sobat, where he established a post, and learned from the Shilluk Chief that they had made no treaty with M. Marchand, as the latter had declared, placing their country under French protection. Having saved the expedition from extinction by the Dervishes, the Sirdar found it necessary to preserve it from starvation. Supplies had run out, and the gallant "emissary of civilisation" and his courageous companions were in a sorry plight. The French Government were urged to recall him, and accept the offer of a journey down the Nile in an Anglo-Egyptian gunboat. But this was too humiliating an end to the expedition, and France sought a way out of the indignity by asking liberty to send a message to M. Marchand calling for his report. Lord Salisbury consented to be the bearer of this message and it was accordingly transmitted through the Sirdar. On the one hand the British Government refrained from removing the expedition by force and declaimed any responsibility for what might befall it, and on the other the French Government, while professing keen anxiety for an amicable adjustment with Great Britain, declined to give M. Marchand an order to withdraw.

While that order was withheld, the diplomatic tension con-

tinued. On October 6th Lord Salisbury had a two hours' conversation with Baron de Courcel at the Foreign Office. They separated without coming to any conclusion. "I had no communication to make," wrote Lord Salisbury, "except the reiteration of our claim of right; and he made no suggestion of any arrangement by which that right could be reconciled with the present pretensions or desires of France." These were that the country bordering the White Nile, though formerly under the Government of Egypt, had become a *res nullius*, that the French had a right to a position on the Nile, and had retained that right by the reservations made when England had asserted the contrary. He asked that it should be given out that negotiations were proceeding as to delimitations, and indicated that the delimitation must be one that would give a considerable stretch of the left bank of the Nile to France. Lord Salisbury, however, was immovable. He gave no countenance to the idea of any such delimitation. Though admitting that the rights of Egypt had been rendered dormant by the military successes of the Mahdi, they had been entirely reasserted by the recent conquest by the Anglo-Egyptian forces. In any case, whatever the dispute as to title between Egypt and the Mahdi and his successor, there was no ground in international law for a third Power to step in between them on the theory that the territory was derelict. The Dervish power had extended as far south as Bor; and their title passed, by the victory of Omdurman, into the hands of the conquering armies. But for that victory, he pointed out, M. Marchand and his escort would have been destroyed by the Dervishes. M. Marchand's was a secret expedition into a territory already owned and occupied, and concerning which France had received repeated warnings against seizing any land in the region. Having recapitulated these warnings, Lord Salisbury told Baron de Courcel that if France had intended to challenge the British claims she should have broken silence when they were asserted. At all events, if she thought fit to try, in face of these warnings, to establish a title over the vast territory to which they applied, by a secret expedition of a handful of men, she must not be surprised that the claim would not be recognised by us.

Six days later there was another and equally unsatisfactory interview between Lord Salisbury and the French Ambassador. Baron de Courcel said he had no instructions; he wished merely to explore the question. Lord Salisbury declined to help him in

his voyage of discovery, pointing out that since he had no instructions, anything he (Baron de Courcel) said would not bind the French Government, while anything he (Lord Salisbury) said would bind the British Cabinet. The Ambassador then said he had general instructions, and arguments with which the reader is already familiar were threshed out anew. Lord Salisbury would not budge. He reminded the Ambassador that M. Marchand was in an impossible position; he had told the Sirdar he could not retreat whence he came; and the French Government declined to allow him to escape down the Nile. Baron de Courcel said it was perfectly possible for M. Marchand to retreat by the west if the British Government allowed him to do so. Lord Salisbury assured him that no sort of impediment would be placed in his way. "But," said the Ambassador, "he cannot do so without food." If that was the only impediment, said Lord Salisbury, food should be supplied. But he would need arms, replied Baron de Courcel, for his munitions of war were exhausted. These also Lord Salisbury promised, conditionally upon an engagement that they would be used only for protection against the indigenous tribes and that M. Marchand withdrew to the region beyond the watershed that separates the Ubanghi from the affluents of the Nile. To this, however, Baron de Courcel did not assent. He passed from it suddenly. The object of the French Government was, he said, to have an outlet to the Nile from the Ubanghi Province; and he asked, on the basis of effective occupation, for such a territorial delimitation as would place France upon the navigable portion of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, so that there should be no barrier between her commerce and the Nile. Lord Salisbury would not discuss this question. It was of so grave a character that it could only be disposed of by the submission of definite proposals to the Cabinet. The Ambassador then intimated that if a pledge of the desired delimitation were given M. Marchand might be allowed to return down the Nile; but Lord Salisbury would give no undertaking. Baron de Courcel appears to have argued with much warmth. "The extreme indefiniteness of his language," wrote Lord Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, "and the rhetorical character he gave to it by the great earnestness with which he addressed himself to the subject, made it impossible for me to express or to form any definite opinion upon the various propositions which he seemed to desire to convey."

The Diplomatic Correspondence was published in two portions—the first in the early part of October and the second at the end of the month. It was seen from the earlier documents that the relations between the two countries had reached an extremely critical stage; when those telling of the abortive and heated interview between Baron de Courcel and Lord Salisbury were disclosed, the extreme imminence of war became apparent to the dullest observers. Fortunately the country was united in support of the Government. No dissentient voice was raised. It was universally felt that the French policy of pin pricks had been carried too far; that the time had arrived to confront a rival whose methods of opposition were marked by bad faith. In the Liberal as well as in the Ministerial press strong approval was expressed of the firmness of the Government. Lord Rosebery spoke out with his accustomed plainness in matters of foreign policy, giving yet another proof to the world that on Imperial questions Lord Salisbury could count upon his help when a decided and consistent course was pursued. He avowed personal and ministerial responsibility for the Grey Declaration of 1895, from which, he said, he felt no disposition to recede in any way. France had deliberately committed an act which she knew would be considered unfriendly—a word of exceptional weight and gravity among diplomatists. The policy of the British Government in this matter was the policy of the nation “and no Government which attempted to recede from or palter with it could last a week.” The present Government, he was sure, would stand their ground; “and if they kept to what they expressed the nation would make any sacrifice and go to any length to sustain their action.” And, in a passage of singular dignity and eloquence, the Liberal Leader extended the implied warning to France to any other Power that might be disposed “to encroach and impinge on the rights of England” :—

The present Government has shown no want of conciliation; some may think they have gone too far in the path of conciliation in various parts of the world. . . . All I wish to say is that Great Britain has been conciliatory, and that her conciliatory disposition has been widely misunderstood. If the nations of the world are under the impression that the ancient spirit of Great Britain is dead, or that her resources are weakened, or her population less determined than ever it was to maintain the rights and the honour of its flag, they make a mistake which can only end in a disastrous conflagration. The strength of ministries in this

country with regard to foreign affairs does not lie in the votes they can command in either House of Parliament. It lies in the intrepid spirit of a united people. If they are not the channels and the mouthpiece of that spirit they will cease to exist and be succeeded by Ministers who are.

Mr. Asquith followed Lord Rosebery's lead. Nor was any discordant note to be heard in speeches by Sir William Harcourt, Mr. Bryce, Lord Spencer, Sir Henry Fowler, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Lord Tweedmouth, Lord Crewe, Sir Charles Dilke, and other Liberals who might be named. Indeed some of them expressed a fear that, notwithstanding the validity of the British complaints and the unanimity of the nation, Lord Salisbury would, in the last resort, give way rather than declare war. Any feebleness such as this would apparently have been more unpopular with the Liberals than with the Ministerialists, for, unexpectedly enough, influential speakers at the Congregational Union utilised a resolution applauding the Czar's disarmament manifesto to refer to the difficulty with France in language of a distinctly bellicose character.

The only gleam of light in a gloomy situation was the manifest desire of M. Delcassé that war should be avoided—a wish that, however sincere it was, seemed to be inconsistent with the conditions which Baron de Courcel sought to obtain. The French press used language of more than ordinary hostility to England and, in the main, endeavoured to produce so excited a state of public opinion in France that it should not be possible for M. Delcassé to order the retirement of M. Marchand and abandon French pretensions to sovereignty in the region in which it was alleged treaties had been made by him. But as day succeeded day evidence accumulated that M. Delcassé had to make his choice between braving the wrath of the French newspapers or entering upon a war with England. Even the Council of the British and Foreign Arbitration Association resolved that M. Marchand's invasion of the Nile Valley "was a trespass upon and infringement of the territorial rights of a friendly and neighbouring State and cannot therefore be the subject of arbitration." Sir Michael Hicks Beach, than whom there has been no more vigilant guardian of the Exchequer and none less ready to stake the national credit upon a doubtful quarrel, told France plainly in a speech at Tynemouth that the country had put its foot down:—

"If, unhappily, another view should be taken elsewhere, we, the Ministers of the Queen, know what our duty demands. It would be

a great calamity—I do not underrate it—that, after a peace of more than eighty years, during which I had hoped that unfriendly feeling had practically disappeared between two neighbouring nations, those friendly relations should be disturbed and we should be launched into a great war. But there are greater evils than war. We believe that we have in this matter the country at our back; and we shall not shrink from anything that may come.”

Nor did Ministers restrict themselves to serious language. A reserve squadron was drawn up in the Channel; the last touches were put to the preparations for a conflict; the secret agents of the French Government were easily able to discover that on this occasion the English people were in no mood to be trifled with, and also that for the purposes of a war with France they were in a position of advantage. Another factor was the helplessness of M. Marchand and his companions. They could stay at Fashoda only so long as the Anglo-Egyptians tolerated their presence there, and they could neither fall back to the west, nor continue across the continent to the east, for lack of food and arms. Meanwhile, Captain Baratier had been sent down the Nile, by the courtesy of the English authorities, and had proceeded to Paris to hand in the desired reports; and soon after it was learned that M. Marchand had followed him as far as Cairo, to await the orders of the Government there. Obviously he could get back to Fashoda only by permission of the Anglo-Egyptians, though no political consequences were supposed to follow the leaving of his post, inasmuch as he had acted without instructions from his Government. Be that as it may, his departure marked the political failure of his mission. The Sirdar, in the meantime, had arrived in England—a peerage from the Sovereign and the acclaim of the nation being not the least part of the reward for his services to the Empire. At a banquet given to him at the Guildhall, on November 4th, Lord Salisbury was able to announce that the French Government had decided to withdraw M. Marchand's expedition. He had, he said, received from the French Ambassador, that afternoon, the information that the French Government had come to the conclusion that the occupation of Fashoda was of no sort of value to the French Republic, and they thought that, under those circumstances, to persist in an occupation which only cost them money and did them harm, merely because some people—some bad advisers—thought it might be disagreeable to an unwelcome neighbour, would not show the wisdom with which, he thought, the French

Republic had been uniformly guided; and they had done what he believed many other Governments would have done in the same position—they had resolved that the occupation must cease. But all causes of controversy were not removed. "I daresay," he added, "that we shall have many discussions in the future; but the cause of controversy of a singularly acute and somewhat dangerous character has been removed, and we cannot but congratulate ourselves."

The announcement caused profound satisfaction throughout the country. The nation was proud to think that the victory at Omdurman had been crowned by a signal diplomatic triumph in Europe. But there was no disposition to exult over France in her merited defeat. The English people had no quarrel with the French. There was no deep-seated prejudice against them, such as had been created against the English by the baser sort of Paris publicist. But they undoubtedly had a strong feeling of bitterness against the French Ministry and rejoiced to think that a check had been administered, such as would teach them that there were limits to the patience with which the British nation regarded their hostility. This feeling was, however, modified upon reflection, by a recognition of the moral courage and adroitness with which M. Delcassé and his colleagues had withdrawn from an untenable position. For M. Marchand, personally, nothing but admiration was expressed. He had performed a wonderful journey amid circumstances of great difficulty and had acted in trying circumstances with dignity and discretion. Nor was regard for him less high when it became known that he would lead his expedition eastwards to the coast, and that any imaginary indignity involved by a return to civilisation through Anglo-Egyptian territory would be spared to him. In his capacity of traveller, rather than as political emissary, he had won laurels worthy of a nation which has produced many daring and successful explorers of Africa; and there were few in England who begrudged him the wearing of them. Admiration of M. Marchand, and recognition of the good sense displayed by M. Delcassé, did not, however, lead to any abatement of the British determination that in the subsequent negotiations France should not be allowed to assail our position in Egypt. In some quarters a wish was expressed that a British protectorate should be declared over that country. A rumour gained currency that this course was contemplated by the Government. Lord Salisbury mentioned the supposed intention at the Guildhall Banquet, and

his speech was interrupted by loud and prolonged cheering. "It was quite clear," he said, "what would be done if some of the audience were at the head of affairs. But he was sorry to say that he could not for the present rise to the height of their aspirations." A protectorate would only be declared if England were forced to take that step. The country could reasonably rest content with the state of things then existing. At the same time the position of England in Egypt was not what it was before the victory at Omdurman. "A stricken field was one of the stages on the road to history"; and Lord Salisbury clearly indicated that freedom from Internationalism was the goal for Egypt, not the withdrawal of the English occupation.

In the arrangements for the government of the reconquered provinces, application was given to the argument of the stricken field. By a convention with the Egyptian Government, published in January, 1899, and given in the Appendix, it was provided that the British and Egyptian flags should fly together throughout the Soudan south of the 22nd parallel; that the supreme military command of the Soudan should be vested in a governor-general appointed by Khedivial decree, with the consent of Her Majesty's Government, and removable only with such consent; that the governor-general should have absolute power in legislation by proclamation; and that the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals should not extend nor be recognised for any purpose whatsoever in any part of the Soudan except Suakin. Foreign political influence was thus wholly excluded from the recovered provinces.

CHAPTER III.

THE PARTITION OF THE SOUDAN.

France and the Lake Chad Region—The Invasion of Nigeria—French Occupation of Boussa and Nikki—A Critical Situation—The Convention of June, 1898—A Re-adjustment of Frontiers—Relation of the Fashoda Incident to the Niger Convention—The Question of the Central Soudan—Secret Negotiations—Partition of the Central Soudan with France—The Addition to Article IV. of the Niger Convention—Its Terms Explained—Political Effect of the Settlement—The Treaty with Menelik—The Mission of Prince Henri d'Orleans—The Nile Valley from Uganda—Colonel Macdonald's Expedition—The Soudanese Revolt—Failure of the Expedition to Reach the Nile—Why England was Forestalled by M. Marchand—General Considerations.

WHEN Lord Salisbury's Administration took over the work of the Empire the expedition under the command of M. Marchand was not the only one directed by France against British interests in Central Africa. The Lower Niger, as well as the Upper Nile, was an objective of French colonial policy. In the little known but densely peopled region between the Sahara and the Bight of Benin French officers carried the flag of the Republic behind the British coast colonies. Their purpose was not merely to establish French authority in unacquired territory, but, wherever possible, to invalidate British treaties with native chiefs by the novel principle of "effective occupation." That is to say, priority by treaties was held to be of no account in comparison with priority in planting the flag. Such was the activity of French agents and the aggressiveness of French policy that daring encroachments were made upon the hinterland of the Gold Coast and Lagos. A conflict of territorial claims therefore arose and was referred to a Joint Commission sitting in Paris. Protracted negotiations led to no immediate result. Meanwhile French officers redoubled their zeal, and the region from Senegal to Lake Chad was studded with small but well armed bodies of Senegalese troops under French command. The principal object of France was to acquire by "effective occupation" the kingdom of Borgu. She had been beaten in the race for treaties a few years before, and the region behind Lagos had therefore fallen to the sphere of the Royal

Niger Company. Indeed it was understood, even in France, that by the Anglo-French Agreement of 1890 no claim could be set up to this territory. Under that instrument the northern boundary of the Royal Niger Company's territories was defined by a line from Say on the Niger to Barua on Lake Chad, "drawn in such a manner as to comprise in the sphere of action of the Niger Company all that fairly belongs to the Kingdom of Sokoto." From the south of the French Mediterranean possessions ran the French sphere of interest. By a previous agreement, that of 1889, France and Great Britain had settled the boundaries of their coast possessions of Dahomey and Lagos as far as the ninth parallel of north latitude—the line to run straight from Port Novo. The British contention was that the boundary should run from Say on the Niger practically in a straight line until it met the line from Port Novo. Such a delimitation would have secured to the Niger Company the Borgu territories already theirs by virtue of treaties. But the French set up the contention that though the Niger Company could not extend northwards beyond the Say-Barua line, France was at liberty to push up from Dahomey or across from Senegal into Borgu as far as the Niger—that in fact if she were first in establishing effective occupation she could absorb the hinterland of Lagos, with the right bank of the Niger, between the ninth parallel and Say—the starting point of the northern boundary of the Niger territories. In this way it was hoped that access would be obtained to that portion of the Niger which is navigable for large craft, the waterway above Boussa being blocked, for several hundred miles, by a series of rocks. In pursuance of this policy Boussa was occupied in February, 1897, by a French officer and a body of Senegalese troops, and Nikki later in the year.

Much irritation was caused in England when these proceedings became known, and vigorous representations were addressed to the French Government in the early part of 1898. In the meantime British West African troops had been sent into the Lagos hinterland and also beyond Ashanti. The situation became worse when it was known that a French officer had ordered a British Houssa force at Baria to haul down the Niger Company's flag, and when rumours were circulated that French expeditions had crossed the Niger and were advancing upon Sokoto. The last incident was officially contradicted by France. In the House of Lords, Lord

Salisbury read a telegram from Sir E. Monson to the effect that M. Hanotaux did not believe that there had been any movement towards Sokoto, and that if it had taken place it was against the wishes and instructions of the Government. But he did not deny that a French force was at Argungu, east of the Niger and south of the Say-Barua line. An invasion of British territory had thereby been committed. A significant hint was given to the French Government that this would not be tolerated, by the passing of a vote which included sums for raising a West African force for the occupation of our territories in Nigeria, and, if necessary, the ejection of the French intruders, and by the despatch of Colonel Lugard—who, by the way, had made treaties in Borgu in 1894 on behalf of the Niger Company—as chief in command. In explaining this vote Mr. Chamberlain gave a bald review of the facts of French aggression, and denied that there was any disunion in the Cabinet upon the question of our rights. Eventually the Joint Commission in Paris resumed its labours and arrived at the point of exchanging specific proposals.

A conclusion was reached in June. A Convention was signed on the 14th of that month by which the whole group of Anglo-French questions in the Western Soudan and in West Africa were definitely decided. The text is printed in the Appendix and the accompanying sketch map shows the effect of the new arrangement. The starting point of the northern frontier of Nigeria is brought down from Say to Ilo, thus giving France a further stretch of the River Niger. From Ilo a line is drawn, following an irregular course to the head of the Dahomey-Lagos frontier at the ninth parallel, and including in British Nigeria the country east of Nikki. That town was made to fall within the French hinterland of Dahomey. The extensive Gourma country south of Say, which was believed to have been within the Empire of Sokoto by virtue of a claim to suzerainty by the Sultan, was also allotted to the French. But with the exception of Nikki the territory on the right bank of the Niger below Ilo was reserved to England. The French, therefore, had to withdraw from Ilo, Boussa, Kiama, Boria, and other places east of Nikki, where they had planted the French flag and stationed troops. As compensation for the withdrawal of the starting point of the northern frontier from Say to Ilo, the British northward line was deflected by a curve with a radius of a hundred miles from the town of Sokoto.

In the Ashanti hinterland concessions were made to France, the extensive territory of Mossi being given up by the British. France also, to compensate her for the loss of Boussa or any other station on the navigable Niger, was given two bonded areas under lease—one at the mouth of the Niger and the other between Leaba and Fort Goldie. French goods could thus be landed on the Niger free of duty and transported to French territory. In return France gave equal terms to British and French trade in all the French West Coast colonies during the period of the lease, which was for thirty years.

The settlement was fairly satisfactory, for France had for years pursued a forward policy in West Africa, while Great Britain, except so far as she had been represented by the Niger Company, had been unenterprising and negligent. Its great merit was that it arranged, once for all, conflicting claims in that region, and, by the hundred mile radius from the town of Sokoto, set a definitive limit to British occupation in the Western Soudan. To the north, beyond the line from Ilo to Lake Chad, the French sphere extended to Algiers. All that remained to be done was to say where the French Soudan met the Anglo-Egyptian—to give exact definition to the French and British spheres in the Central Soudan west of the Nile Valley.

The Niger Convention was signed in June, at the very time M. Marchand had emerged from the Bahr-el-Ghazal, and the Anglo-Egyptian army was making the final preparations for an advance to Khartoum. Six months were allowed for ratification. In the meantime the battle of September had been fought, M. Marchand discovered, and the two nations brought once more into sharp conflict. Though Lord Salisbury was able to announce in November that M. Marchand had been instructed to withdraw, the claim of France to extend her Empire north-eastward from the Ubanghi to the Nile, and south-eastward through the Soudan from Algeria remained for discussion. The object of the French Government, Baron de Courcel had informed Lord Salisbury, was to have an outlet for their Ubanghi Province; and he asked for such a territorial delimitation as would place France upon the navigable portion of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, so that no frontier could intervene between her commerce and the Nile. For that purpose, he declared, France had established a chain of posts from Ubanghi into the Bahr-el-Ghazal region, and long and undisputed occupation had given France

the right to the desired access. The published negotiations show that Lord Salisbury treated this claim as an open question. He had not, he said, sufficient knowledge to discuss it; he must have definite proposals in writing for submission to the Cabinet; in any case M. Marchand must first be withdrawn. The local difficulty having been disposed of by the departure of M. Marchand, consideration of the graver matter was entered upon. It was conducted in secrecy. No despatches have been published subsequent to the Marchand incident. That the negotiations were difficult, as well as protracted, is shown by the fact that France would not ratify the Niger Convention. By mutual consent the ratification period was extended. In March, 1899, however, an agreement was signed marking out the spheres of respective influence. It excludes France absolutely from any sovereignty or hope of sovereignty in the Nile Valley. A line is drawn from north to south. On the east, from the eleventh parallel of north latitude is the British sphere; on the west the French. The Bahr-el-Ghazal and the old Egyptian provinces west of the Nile are British. Baghirmi, Wadai and Kanem, north and east of Lake Chad, and the Thibesti region south-east of Tripoli are French. The frontier line starts from the point where the boundary of the French territory and the Congo Free State territory divides the watershed of the Nile and the Congo. It follows that division up to the eleventh parallel, and from that point is so drawn as to allot the provinces in the manner already described. The Agreement took the form of an addition to Article IV. of the Niger Convention, and it was stipulated that the Ninth Article of that Instrument should apply equally so as to give the British access to and free traffic over the caravan routes through the French sphere, and France similar commercial access to the Nile. French and British protected persons are to enjoy "the same treatment in all matters of river navigation, commerce, and of tariff and fiscal treatment and taxes."

The Agreement was hailed in France as in England with feelings of satisfaction and relief. Whatever the international status of Egypt proper, France as well as Germany had now given an unqualified recognition of British supremacy over the entire region from the Great Lake to the northern frontier of the Soudan. Possession of the head waters of the Nile gave control over the destinies of Egypt—a mastery over the fortunes of the only part of

Northern Africa capable, because of the fertilising power of the river, of supporting a large population. No State could henceforth contest that position with us. The one country whose policy it had been to do so had confessed herself beaten in methods of hostility, and in a solemn instrument had acquiesced in the British claim. That the Soudan war should have been crowned by so sweeping a diplomatic triumph was a most notable event in the foreign policy of the Administration. Steadiness, determination, the adaptation of means to a definite end, marked the successive stages of the advance from Wady Halfa; and decision, the courage to face a war with the next greatest naval Power in Europe, and unflinching firmness in presenting that issue to France rather than be deprived of any part of the advantages of the Anglo-Egyptian conquest, distinguished our diplomacy. The entire question, from the initial stage of a diversion in the supposed interests of the beleaguered Italian garrison at Kassala to the final delimitation of the Western and the division of the Central Soudan, was superbly managed.

Nor has full justice been done in this crude outline of conquest and diplomacy to the foresight exercised by Lord Salisbury. His final triumph was carefully prepared by skilful diplomacy east of the Nile and by action to the south. Contemporaneously with the movement towards Dongola, Mr. (now Sir) Rennell Rodd was sent on a mission to Abyssinia, long the scene of French intrigues and suspicious Russian overtures. His purpose was to reassure the Emperor Menelik lest he should be disturbed by the Anglo-Egyptian advance and imagine that sinister designs were cherished against his territory and sovereignty. The result was a pledge of neutrality during the operations against the Dervishes and the Treaty of Adis Abbaba, defining the Anglo-Abyssinian boundary. The text of this interesting document is given in the Appendix. It forbade armed bands from either side to cross the frontier of the other on any pretext whatever without previous authorisation from the competent authorities and pledged His Majesty "to do all in his power to prevent the passage through his dominions of arms and ammunition to the Mahdists, whom he declares to be the enemies of his Empire." In return for this the Somali Coast Protectorate frontier was so rectified as to give to Abyssinia a large tract of grazing ground, subject to the just treatment of the rights of the local tribes. The Treaty did not, it is true, give a definitive shape to Anglo-Abyssinian interest in East Africa. It was as noteworthy for its omissions as

for what it contained, and, as Sir Edward Grey said in the House of Commons, partly in reply to criticisms from Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. A. E. Pease, it left the door open for future difficulties ; but on the other hand it led to the formation and registration of a good understanding with the Emperor and disposed of the possibility of an alliance between him and the Khalifa. In this respect at least it was a triumph for British diplomacy and one which redounded to the credit of the negotiator as well as the statesman from whom he received his instructions. The result was seen on the cordial reception given to Lieutenant Harrington, the new resident, the favourable impression produced upon the Abyssinians by the victory of Omdurman, and in the absence of hostile Abyssinian forces in the region of the White Nile. The boundary between Abyssinia and the British sphere in that region has yet to be drawn. In the instructions given to the Sirdar before advancing up the Blue Nile from Khartoum he was told to go as far as the foot of the cataract commencing in the neighbourhood of Roseires, not to land troops, to halt and wait for further orders should Abyssinian outposts be met with, and in the case of any European or Abyssinian forces being seen anywhere in the head waters of the Nile to do or say nothing which would in any way imply a recognition on behalf of Her Majesty's Government of a title to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any portion of the Nile Valley. These commands were carried out and no difficulties were encountered with Abyssinia on the Blue Nile as was the case with the French on the White Nile.*

How necessary this mission proved to be was shown by events shortly after Sir Rennell Rodd's departure for Adis Abbaba. The missions of Prince Henri d'Orleans and M. Bonvalot were avowedly undertaken in hostility to British interests ; and at the same time there were Russian missions in the country whose purpose was not limited to mere courtesy between the Czar and the Emperor or to a desire for geographical knowledge alone. British diplomacy was first in the field in any effective sense, and Menelik contented himself with the English Treaty, being on the one hand suspicious of further European bids for his friendship and having enough to do for the time being in suppressing a revolt by Ras Mangascia, the

* For a description of the journeys made up the Nile and its tributaries immediately after the reconquest, and for an account of the actual condition of the Soudan and its populations, see Lord Cromer's and Sir William Garstin's Reports, in the Author's "Politician's Handbook," issue for 1900.

Governor of Tigre, which threatened to engulf his Empire in civil war.

Further illustration of Lord Salisbury's prescience in the definitive acquisition of the Nile Valley is to be seen in the expedition sent northward from Uganda under Colonel Macdonald. Here the success was but partial, from causes that will be mentioned in a chapter dealing with the work of the Administration in the African Colonies and Protectorates other than those at the extreme south. The ostensible purpose of the Macdonald mission was to explore the districts adjacent to the Italian sphere along the course of the river Juba and make treaties with the chiefs in that portion of the British region; but its real object was to proceed northward and join hands with the Anglo-Egyptians coming southward from Khartoum, while Major Martyr was working his way down the Nile from the Lake in order to establish a chain of posts along the White Nile. This double enterprise was obviously intended to check the French movement towards the Nile Valley and to make good our rights by effective occupation. But for the native troubles in Uganda and the revolt of the Soudanese troops Colonel Macdonald would have started in September, 1897. He was delayed for nearly a year. Dividing his force into three columns he left one at the base at Save, under Lieutenant Hanbury Tracy, sent the second under Captain Austin to proceed to the north of Lake Rudolph, and with the headquarter column marched northward towards the Latuka Sultanate.*

Here he found remnants of the Soudanese troops who had been cut off from civilisation by the Mahdist rising. News was obtained that there were further bodies of these men ahead, and that the Soudanese mutineers from Unyoro were in communication with them. The probabilities were that the column would be attacked in the front and on the flank. Dervish movements also had to be reckoned with, the Sultan of Latuka, it appeared, having clad his fighting men in "jibbas," and sent them on to Bor. The column was already exhausted; the question of food and transport presented unusual difficulties; it was doubtful how far Colonel Macdonald could trust his Soudanese to fight against their kindred; and, on the whole, he had to choose between the probable

* A full digest of the Official Documents relating to affairs in Uganda and Unyoro and describing in detail the progress of the Macdonald Expedition, will be found in the Author's "Politician's Handbook," issues for 1899 and 1900.

destruction of his column and a return to the base. He hoped there to obtain a second year's supply of trade goods and make another advance. Consequently he abandoned the effort to reach Lado on the Nile, and retraced his steps to Save, there to reconsider the idea of attempting to reach the Sobat river. He could gain no intelligence of Egyptian gunboats having ascended the Nile as far as Lado, which was held by the Congo Free State on behalf of Great Britain. His information was that the sudd was so thick that boats could not get through. The Sobat affluent was, however, navigable, and his expectation was that if it could be reached he would fall in with an Egyptian gunboat or an Anglo-Egyptian post—a hope that would have been realised, for a post was established on the river within a month of the battle of Omdurman. But on arriving at the base, having been rejoined by the column which had been exploring to the north of Lake Rudolph, Colonel Macdonald found that the second year's supply of trade goods had not been provided. Someone had blundered; or, if no positive error had been made, the troubles in the Uganda Protectorate, the difficulties of getting and transporting supplies, had so completely handicapped the officials that the arrangements for the Macdonald expedition could not be carried out. Disappointed in the expectation of finding at Save trade goods and stores, which would have enabled him to make a second attempt to join the Anglo-Egyptians from Khartoum, Colonel Macdonald accepted the inevitable and broke up the expedition. In the meantime Major Martyr had been endeavouring to get into touch with the Anglo-Egyptians by the river. He got as far as Rejaf, but beyond this point it was impossible to proceed through the sudd; and he also had to return. It was not, however, for want of preparation that M. Marchand was allowed to forestall the British in the establishment of a post between Khartoum and the area of the Congo State lease on the Nile. There was to be a movement northward from Uganda—down the Nile, if that were practicable, and across country also—with the object of making good our claim to the entire upper valley by effective occupation. The Nile sudd blocked Major Martyr's way; the Soudanese revolt delayed the starting of Colonel Macdonald for nearly a year, and the breakdown of the Uganda administration, under the weight of native and Soudanese rebellions, deprived him of the means of making a second attempt to accomplish the primary purpose of his enterprise.

These matters have, however, only an incidental bearing upon the main question of the recovery of the Egyptian Soudan. Partial failure in the operations from the south had no effect upon the ultimate issue. That M. Marchand got through from the west and seated himself on the Nile did not result in any admission of the French claim to extend her sovereignty in Africa to the upper waters of the river. On the contrary, M. Marchand's success led to the definite rejection of the French pretensions and the formal abandonment of them by the French Government. It brought about a final settlement of the question of rival spheres of influence in the entire Soudan between the Niger and the Nile. France became responsible for an enormous area of "light soil," inhabited by intractable tribesmen, and Great Britain for the richest part of the Soudan, peopled by races that welcomed the destruction of the Mahdist Government and eagerly accepted British rule. The seal was set upon our Egyptian policy by the death of the Khalifa in an engagement fought by Colonel Sir Francis Wingate on November 29th. The Anglo-Egyptian flags now float over the towns of each of the recovered provinces; and, owing to the policy of the Salisbury Administration, a region subjected for years to fire and sword is provided with a just Government and opened to commerce and civilisation.

BOOK V.

INDIA, MINOR COLONIES AND PROTECTORATES.

CHAPTER I.

THE TROUBLES IN INDIA.

Chitral—Retention or Abandonment—Lord Rosebery's Views—Lord Salisbury's Decision and the Reasons thereof—The Ameer of Afghanistan—His Violation of the Durand Agreement—Retirement of the Afghan Army—Rising in the Tochi Valley—The Swat Valley Rising—Peace Patched Up—The Kyber Pass Blocked—A Formidable Rising—The Ameer and the Afridis—A British Army set to Work—The Earlier Operations—Sir William Lockhart in Command—Invasion of the Afridi and Orakzais Country—The Battle of Dargai—Charge of the Gordons—Terms of Submission Dictated—Withdrawal to Winter Quarters—The Tribesmen Defeated, but Unsubdued—Eventual Submission—Another Patched-up Peace—Policy of the Cabinet—Lord George Hamilton's Despatch—The Opposition and the War—The "Breach of Faith" Controversy—Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry Fowler—Plague and the Famines—Indian Sugar Duties—The Gold Currency.

NONE but those who know our Indian Dependency with the intimacy that comes of long residence and wide travel, or have given a lifetime of study to its history and present condition are qualified to write with confidence upon its affairs. The present chapter will, therefore, be a record rather than a critical examination of events during the period of the Third Salisbury Administration. The aim is merely to sketch in broad outline the principal questions that arose for settlement and to describe the decisions given by the Imperial Government. The issue of the retention or abandonment of Chitral had been left undetermined by the Liberal Administration, and formed the subject of a lively controversy in which expert military and political opinion seemed to be equally divided. The incidents that led up to the situation inherited by the new Government can be narrated in a few sentences. The Mehtar of Chitral had been murdered at the

bidding of his half-brother Amir-ul-Mulk, who usurped the Mehtarship. Mr. Robertson, the Commissioner for the Indian Government, took a force of Sikhs from Gilgit to Chitral for the purposes of holding an inquiry into the murder. While he was there a brother of Amir-ul-Mulk—Umra Khan—invaded Southern Chitral, and, though professing that his activity was not directed against the Indian Government, attacked a British force and besieged Mr. Robertson and his troops in the fort at Chitral. Two relief forces were sent to the beleaguered party—one under Colonel Kelly through the lofty Shandur Pass from Gizr, and the other under Sir Robert Low from Peshawur through the Malakand Pass. Both columns had to fight their way through to Chitral, Colonel Kelly being the first to arrive. The besieged, after a most gallant defence against overwhelming numbers for six weeks, had just previously been relieved by the levies raised by the Khan of Dir, who had rendered invaluable services to the Indian Government.

The position was that an Indian army was in occupation of part of the country bordered by the Hindu Kush, and that complete withdrawal would mean the abandonment of the fruits of victory with the certainty of a recrudescence of internal troubles in which tribes who had acted with us would be the chief victims. These tribes, and others living within the Chitral country, begged the Indian Government to retain the hold that had been won over the country, they being prepared to give land for military stations and to pay tribute in return for protection. When the new Parliament met Lord Rosebery urged that these petitions should not be granted. The establishment of a military post at Chitral might, he argued, be offensive to Russia, with whom a final arrangement had been made regarding the limits of her territory in the Pamirs. Moreover, pledges had been given to the tribesmen of Swat and Bagaaur, who had stoutly contested the passage of the Indian army through their country, that withdrawal would be made as soon as the relief of the beleaguered garrison had taken place and the Chitral country pacified. It was important that nothing in the nature of a breach of faith should be committed with regard to them. And, apart from these local considerations, what the Government of India needed was concentration of responsibilities, not their extension beyond the north-west frontiers. To maintain a military post at Chitral would entail a military and financial expenditure such as the Government of India could ill-

afford to incur. The policy of the Liberal Ministry was one of abandonment, which, however, they had been prevented from carrying out by the verdict of the constituencies; and this line of action was what they would have had their successors follow. The new Government, however, decided upon retention. Lord Salisbury argued that whatever might be the advantage of retirement from the standpoint of physical strategy, withdrawal would be most unwise as a question of moral strategy, since it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness by the tribes lying between India and the Russian frontier. He denied that the occupation of permanent posts would mean an added charge upon the revenues of India or necessitate an increase of the military strength of the Dependency, and he controverted the statement that faith would be broken with the tribes through whose country we had had to pass. A somewhat fuller defensive statement of policy was at the same time made in the Commons by the Leader of the House. The case of Chitral had, he argued, to be considered in relation to the adjoining part of Kashmir, in which we had Residents and troops. Retirement from Chitral would involve the abandonment of these posts, and would be a serious blow to our prestige. There were only two Governments to be considered—those of Great Britain and Russia—and it was essential that the population of the border territories should look to Great Britain alone as the Suzerain Power.

The issue was the familiar one of a forward *versus* a stationary policy on the Indian frontier. The balance of argument seemed to be against those who advocated retirement, notwithstanding that these included Indian authorities of high distinction. In any case it was the forward policy that was adopted and acted upon. The main army under Sir Robert Low was withdrawn, but a road made to Chitral, and a scheme for the distribution of the garrison and of the local levies put into operation. The tribes accepted the new arrangements with composure and for a time there was peace. Causes of anxiety had, however, revealed themselves in that part of Kafiristan which by a boundary agreement with the Ameer a few years before had become part of Afghanistan. The tribesmen here had maintained their independence for centuries. The Ameer determined to subdue them and it was not within the power of the Indian Government, or consonant with its desires, to prohibit the execution of that design. By the end of 1895 a large

Afghan army was in readiness to enter the Mountain State as soon as the passes should be open ; and in the spring of the succeeding year serious fighting occurred. The Ameer was eventually victorious and established his rule over the country, treating the subjugated Kafirs with greater leniency than his past exploits could have led them to expect. He attempted, however, to extend his authority into Bagaur, levying a demand for taxes upon the Khan of Nawagai and sending troops which occupied the Valley of Mittai. The Khan had been one of those who had remained friendly to the Indian Government during the Chitral troubles, and had, indeed, rendered useful services to the British Power. The Afghan incursion was a violation of the Durand agreement. The Khan appealed to the Indian Government against the Ameer, and after some delays, Abdur Rahman was induced to abandon his pretensions and withdraw his troops.

This matter was satisfactorily settled in May, 1897. Scarcely had the Afghan soldiery retired from the Mittai Valley when events occurred elsewhere in the frontier region which led to war on a grand scale. The tribesmen in the Tochi Valley made a treacherous attack upon the Sikh escort of Mr. Gee, the political agent, killing and wounding several British and Indian officers and men. A punitive expedition was sent into the valley. A few weeks later the tribesmen of the Swat Valley rose suddenly, at the instigation and under the leadership of a Mahommedan priest, who came to be known in England as the Mad Mullah. On the night of July 26th an attack was made upon the garrison at Malakan, where about three thousand troops were stationed. The outpost of Chakdara, in which there were rather less than three hundred troops, was cut off. The rising was quite unexpected, for it was thought that the Swat tribesmen had forgotten their grudge against the British because of the forcible passage through their country to Chitral two years before. Sir Bindon Blood, with a column of eight thousand, relieved Malakand and Chakdara, making a forced march of thirty-two miles in fifteen hours. Punishment was inflicted upon the tribes, fines were exacted and, to all appearances, peace was restored. But the whole country was in a state of ferment. The Mullah and his associates found thousands of adherents wherever they appeared. The effect of their preaching was to produce a wave of fanaticism that swept the warlike tribes into conflict with the British Power. The Mohmands, the Afridis and the

Orakzais took possession of the Kyber Pass and the Swatis rose again.

Suspicion became rife that these events had a deeper origin than local hostility and the incurable love of the Pathan for a fight. There were those who saw in them the hand of the Sultan of Turkey, at that time hardly pressed by England because of his treatment of the Christian peoples of his Empire. There were suggestions that he had worked upon the religious feelings of Abdur Rahman, and that the frontier risings were immediately due to the instigation and encouragement of the Ameer of Afghanistan. Countenance was given to this view in influential quarters of the English Press; but it was soon to appear that an injustice was done to our powerful Mahommedan ally. The Indian Government addressed a letter to him informing him that the measures of reprisal did not cover any intention to interfere with the independence of the tribes or remain permanently in their country. These assurances were accepted by the Ameer. He refused to see an Afridi deputation who offered allegiance to him as the King of Islam and besought his co-operation against the infidel. They were not allowed to come to Cabul, and they were answered by a public message to the effect that there was an alliance between him and the British Government in regard to matters of State, and that as no breach had been committed by the Indian Government none would be sanctioned by him. This was followed by a proclamation made known throughout his dominions—"a Clear Declaration by way of warning to all Afghans." It is a quaint document. "Why," the Ameer asked, "do you call these disturbances *jehad* or *ghaza*? The time will come for a *jehad*, and when it does come it will be announced. If you behave yourselves courageously on that occasion, I shall be glad to call you religious leaders. But the first condition of a *jehad* is the co-operation of the King of Islam. It is curious that the King is on friendly terms with the English, and yet you are making a fuss about a *jehad*. It appears that you yourselves are independent of kings and do not require a king over you. A similar instance occurred in France thirty years ago, when the people there revolted against their king, dethroned him and sent him to London, where he died. I will never interfere with you in religious matters nor prevent you from prosecuting your own objects, provided that these are in accordance with the principles of religion. But the present disturbances have nothing to do with religion."

As for the tribesman's version of the cause of the rising—that it was due to the British occupation of Swat and Chitral—the Ameer said: “I tell you that in taking possession of Chitral the object of the British Government is not to assess taxes on the land. Their only desire is to increase the population of the country and to strengthen their own position so that it may serve as a barrier against any future invasion by Russia.” By way of conclusion he thus apostrophised the turbulent hillmen who sought to drag him into their quarrel: “In short, I have nothing to do with your affairs, and no concern with you, because I have no trust in you. Do not be led to think that, like Shere Ali, I am such a fool as to annoy and offend others for your sake. Your real object is to make me fight with the British Government, and if I were to do such a foolish thing, I am sure you would assume the position of simple spectators.”

Nothing could have been more satisfactory than this declaration of policy. Beyond the question of honour involved in keeping faith with the British Government the Ameer had a clear grievance against the Afridis, who had turned out the Afridi garrisons from the Kyber Pass and thus stopped trade between India and Afghanistan, with the result that large stores of arms and goods which his Highness badly needed were lying useless meanwhile at Peshawur. Interest combined with policy to make the Ameer desire the speedy success of British arms. But success was not to be bought cheaply. General Sir William Lockhart was sent for from England and placed in command of an army of sixty thousand men. In August, Sir Bindon Blood, who had obtained the submission of the tribes in the lower Swat Valley, moved into the upper portion of the country, and on the 17th fought a sharp engagement near Landikai, capturing the heights held by the enemy, the West Kent regiment distinguishing themselves by a gallant rush with the bayonet and the Guides cavalry by a brilliant charge. This success, however, was of local rather than general importance. The Afridis swept down the Kyber Pass, driving in the Sikh outposts upon Fort Lockhart, and the Orakzais possessed themselves of the Samana range in the Miranzai country. A column under General Yeatman Biggs engaged the Orakzais on the Samana ridge and General Ellis pressed into the Mohmand country, but though the fighting was severe and the enemy suffered heavily no generally decisive advantage was gained.

The operations had been successful in the Mohmand country, in the Tochi Valley, and in the Swat Valley ; but each victory had been dearly won, a disproportionate number of British officers being killed and wounded. The Afridis and Orakzais had still to be crushed. Thus far the fighting against them had done little more than reveal their numbers, their determination and their courage. Sir William Lockhart arrived at Simla on September 20th. Early in October he was ready for the advance into the Tirah with an army of over thirty thousand, the flower of the British and native forces in India. Before starting he issued a proclamation to the Afridis and Orakzais. This reminded them of the treaty with the Afridis in 1881, by which they undertook, in consideration of certain allowances, to maintain order in the Kyber Pass. That engagement had been broken, and the Afridis had joined the Orakzais in attacks on the British posts on the Kohat border. Therefore he would march through and announce from the heart of the Afridi and Orakzais country the new conditions of peace. There was no intention to inflict unnecessary damage upon the tribes provided immediate submission were made ; all who wished to live at peace and possess their own country were urged to offer submission and avoid the punishment which the advance of the army against them would entail. This appeal to the spirit of disunion among tribes whose bond of union was religious hate of the infidel, had a certain effect upon the clans within striking distance, but the Afridis and Orakzais held together and fought with the utmost gallantry and tenacity. On October 20th the heights above Chagru Valley were taken by assault and the defences of Dargai village destroyed. The enemy, however, were in such numbers that they reoccupied Dargai and it was necessary to retake it. After a fight of great severity, in which several unsuccessful attempts were made to cross the zone of fire, the Gordon Highlanders were brought up by Colonel Mathias, with the 3rd Sikhs. While artillery fire was concentrated upon the height, the two regiments waited, with fixed bayonets, for the order to advance. "Men of the Gordon Highlanders!" said Colonel Mathias, pointing to the height, "the General says that position must be taken. The Gordon Highlanders will take it." With a ringing cheer they dashed after their officers across the open ground. Many fell under the deadly fire. Pausing for a moment to take breath, while the enemy moved higher up the ascent, they scaled the height, and after a

desperate struggle captured the position. The charge is famous in military history.

The Chagru Valley being cleared, Sir Wm. Lockhart's force, on October 28th, stormed the Sempaghar Pass, carrying the enemy's positions and driving them away to the Arhanga Pass, which was captured three days later. A camp was then formed in the Mastura Valley. A few days' further marching brought the invaders into the Maidan Valley. Bagh, the enemy's chief position there, was captured, and bodies of troops were sent from Maidan Camp against the neighbouring villages. The enemy still fought stubbornly, and gained a few successes in guerilla warfare, among the incidents of this stage of the operations being the cutting up of Lieutenant Macintyre's party of the North-amptonshire Regiment, who were unable to keep up with the retiring force without abandoning their wounded. Further on, in the Waran Valley, operations were conducted against the Akra Khel Afridis, strongholds taken and destroyed, and much loss inflicted upon the tribesmen, who, however, fought with great spirit. Sir William Lockhart was now in the heart of the country, from which it was hoped that he would be able to dictate terms of submission. From the Maidan Camp he demanded the surrender of all property looted in the Kyber Pass, and, from the Orakzais, the surrender of 500 breech-loading rifles and the payment of a fine of 35,000 rupees, and, from the Afridis, the surrender of 800 breech-loaders and payment of a fine of 50,000 rupees. That no announcement was made regarding a permanent occupation of the country was noted with satisfaction by the tribesmen; but they made no haste to comply with the invader's conditions. The camp had been moved from Maidan to Bagh, and on November 22nd a further move was made to Datoi, along the Bara Valley, to winter quarters. The hillmen, punished but unsubdued, swarmed the heights of a precipitous gorge through which the columns had to pass, and did their best to endanger the success of the movement. The march through the Bara Valley was not the least harassing experience of a campaign replete with exceptional dangers and difficulties. Before leaving camp, Sir William Lockhart issued a proclamation to the tribes that he was withdrawing from the mountain region only because winter was near, and that the country would again be invaded in the spring unless submission was made. The hillmen cared so little for this threat that they

continued their guerilla tactics throughout the period of the withdrawal.

The immediate result of the campaign was not, therefore, entirely satisfactory. Every valley in the Afridi and Orakzais country had been visited, the towers razed, the village defences destroyed, and severe losses inflicted; but this was done at a cost of over four hundred killed and over thirteen hundred wounded on the British side, among whom were thirty-six British officers killed and eighty-one wounded. The management of the campaign did not pass without criticism, which was more severe in India than in England, and the year closed with every prospect that war would be necessary in the spring. The Kyber Pass continued to be the scene of guerilla fighting; but early in the year signs began to multiply that the tribes had had enough for the present, and were disposed to avoid another invasion. With the approach of spring Sir William Lockhart issued an ultimatum that unless his terms were accepted by a given date an advance would again be made. Not until the end of March did the chiefs make submission; and even then the full fines were not paid and the quota of rifles surrendered. The Afridis, however, gave unreserved declarations of their intention to live at peace with the British, and early in April it became possible largely to reduce the force in the Kyber. In October new arrangements for the control of the Kyber were announced to the Afridis and accepted by them. The Afridis having broken their agreement and forfeited their allowances, the Indian Government would henceforth hold the Pass and control it as they wished. The Pass was to be open to trade. A fort would be built at Lundi Kotal and other places as far as Jamrud, and a railway if necessary. The Afridis would be left to manage their own affairs outside the Pass, but within it would be subject to the British Government. The allowances to them would be renewed, and would continue, subject to their good behaviour; and a militia would be recruited from the Afridis and placed under British officers for the maintenance of order. Since then there has been no serious difficulty. The arrangements for the control of the Pass have worked smoothly, and trade between India and Afghanistan has resumed its normal course.

The policy of the Cabinet was clearly defined in a despatch by Lord George Hamilton, who had succeeded Mr. Curzon as Secretary of State on the appointment of the latter to be Viceroy

of India. He pointed out that the risings had their origin in fanatical fervour excited by the Mullahs, who, in their journeys from Mecca to their homes in the north-west, gleaned distorted information of European events. For example, papers had been found in the house of a Mullah during the operations, containing the information that Aden had been taken from the British by the Sultan of Turkey, who had also seized the Suez Canal, any British force therefore requiring six months to reach India instead of twenty days. Knowledge of this kind, coupled with the facility for obtaining arms, had led to a belief among the transfrontier tribes that they could resist the British power. One consequence of the Durand Agreement, with its obligation upon the British Government to watch over the passes between India and Afghanistan, was the excitement of an unavoidable suspicion among the tribesmen that ulterior designs upon their independence were entertained. Freer communication with them possibly increased the risk of collision. The problem, therefore, was to avoid conflict, and at the same time to mitigate as far as possible the lawless and predatory instincts of the tribes without interference with their tribal system of self-government. The entire question was governed by our relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan—relations rooted in the policy of staving off the Russian advance Indiawards. The engagement of 1880 with the Ameer provided that if a Foreign Power attempted to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference led to aggression upon his dominions, the British Government would aid him to repel it to such extent and in such manner as seemed to them necessary, provided that his Highness followed unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. By the Durand Agreement this undertaking was confirmed and the subsidy paid to the Ameer increased to six lakhs. The question of British relations with the tribes between the Afghan, the Russian and the Indian frontiers was thus a part of the wider question of preventing the establishment of any political influence other than British beyond the Indian frontier. In practice, the carrying out of this policy ranged from the performance of a policeman's duties to the possible despatch of a large army. No precise instructions as to the settlement of frontier disputes could therefore be given. But there were certain leading principles, which Lord George Hamilton proceeded to state to the Indian Government on behalf of the Cabinet. The first

was the best possible concentration of military force so as to secure the defensive character of the posts necessary for keeping open the passes, while limiting interference with the tribes in the establishment of such posts, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory. The Imperial Government did not seek any such extension. For that reason tribute had not been imposed upon the Afridis and Orakzais. As to disarmament the payment of a fine in arms was justified; but permanent disarmament was not to be sought. The tribes could not live in a defenceless condition; to reduce them to that state would impose on the British Government the responsibility for their protection against their lawless neighbours. At the same time the traffic in arms should be controlled with rigour. Finally, the maintenance of the Kyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade was an essential measure, and in any new scheme of control to replace that which had broken down because of the Afridi revolt, the Secretary of State hoped that it would be possible to give the Afridis a share and enlist their goodwill and assistance in the future protection of the road.

It was in agreement with the principles here outlined that peace was made and the Afridis again utilised in the control of the Kyber. A sharp controversy arose in England upon the question of the cause of the frontier war. The Opposition took the line that the troubles were due to the reversal of their policy of withdrawal from Chitral. Mr. Morley led the way by charging the Government with a breach of faith towards the tribes. He was supported by Mr. Asquith. The public were reminded of the proclamation in which the Government of India declared that they had no intention of permanently occupying any portion of the country through which it was necessary to pass in order to relieve Mr. Robertson at Chitral. Therefore the Liberal Ministry had determined to withdraw from Chitral and the intervening country when the object of the expedition had been obtained. They did so also because they had been advised that the making of a road between Peshawur and Chitral and the occupation of forts along it by our own soldiers or organised tribal levies would arouse suspicions among the tribes; and because Chitral was of no strategic or any other value to the British Empire. "The present Government," said Mr. Asquith, "had not been in office a month before they reversed that decision—before they resolved to retain

possession of Chitral, with the necessary consequence of occupying by means of forts and garrisons the intervening space. Can you wonder that when it was gradually brought home to the minds of the tribes concerned that there had been what they considered, and what I for myself certainly consider, this gross breach of faith upon the part of the Indian Government, and that further, as had been predicted to us, and as the event has proved with the most perfect accuracy, they drew from the establishment of these positions the inference that their independence was threatened and that annexation to India was with them only a question of time. That rising was spread from one end of the frontier to the other, because the annexation of Chitral was only the extreme application of principles which now, unhappily for twenty years past, had been pursued in relation to our frontier policy in India, which had scattered, along the whole of that vast frontier, forts, strong places, occupied in some cases by British troops in other cases by subsidised levies from the local troops which, as the greatest authorities tell us, are of no advantage whatever for the purpose of spreading civilisation, and which as the present outbreak has shown, the moment war is declared become a source of danger." This was the accusation. Lord George Hamilton met it, in a speech at Acton on November 10th, by declaring that from first to last the former Cabinet had, in their correspondence with the Government of India, handled the question of Chitral as one of expediency alone. "Before they can even formulate the charge against us," he said, "they are compelled to admit that on this question of national honour they had befooled and trifled with the Indian Government by keeping back from them their real objection and only placing before them reasons of secondary importance." Dealing with the wider issue he reminded the public that it was Mr. Gladstone and Lord Ripon who had made a stationary policy on the frontier impossible by the Agreement of 1881, guaranteeing the territory of the Ameer against external aggression. The demarcation of the Afghan sphere under the Durand Agreement of 1893 had brought all the tribes in the debateable land either within the influence of the British or the Afghan Government. Developments of frontier policy were not the work of any particular party. They were "part of the common Imperial policy which all responsible Governments had been compelled to adopt whether they liked it or not, for there was no practical alternative course." Lord Salisbury alluded to the question

a few days later and scornfully referred to those who "in the hurry scurry of party warfare are not ashamed to cast this slight upon their country and upon the Queen's officer (Lord Elgin), or to set up this subject of difference between the races whom it is our highest privilege and desire to keep together."

Sir Henry Fowler, who was Secretary of State for India in the Liberal Ministry, and had added in that capacity to a reputation for sagacity and straightforwardness, had not yet intervened in the controversy outside the House. He did so in a speech on November 20th. The point to which he particularly addressed himself was a statement by Mr. Balfour that the late Government never told Lord Elgin that, in their judgment, the making of a road from Peshawur to Chitral would be inconsistent with the proclamation before the advance to Chitral, and a breach of faith towards the tribes. He added that on receiving the despatch of the Indian Government asking for permission to make the road, he personally raised this very point, and was informed by Lord Elgin that he (the Viceroy) did not consider the policy proposed would be a breach of the proclamation. He dissociated himself from any imputation upon Lord Elgin and the Indian Government. He was sure that they had no intention of violating the proclamation, that they believed peaceable arrangements could be made for the construction of the road. That belief he had not shared; it was a matter of argument; but he admitted that if peaceable arrangements could be made, there would be no breach of the proclamation. It will be seen from this summary that Sir Henry Fowler seemed to suggest that on the point of honour question there were personal or private communications between him and the Viceroy. Sir Henry was challenged by Mr. Balfour in a letter to the *Times* to produce them, on the ground that the India Office did not disclose any official messages on the point, and that as these private documents had been referred to in a public speech by the former Secretary for India, and had been made the ground for a party attack on the Government, their publication could justly be requested. Sir Henry objected to hand confidential Cabinet communications to the Press, but finally consented to do so. It then appeared that on May 30th, 1895, Sir Henry had sent a "private" telegram to the Viceroy to the effect that strong feeling existed in England on the inconsistency between the terms of the proclamation and the policy of road-making advocated in the despatch of the Indian Government, and

asking the Viceroy to telegraph privately any observations or explanations. The Viceroy telegraphed "privately" in reply saying that he had expected the charge of inconsistency, but thought it met by the circumstances, which he defined in such a manner as to show that the policy of retaining a garrison at Chitral and cutting a road from Peshawur, with forts, would not be any violation of the terms of the proclamation. After the production of these telegrams the attacks on the Indian Government, and on the Imperial Government, as *particeps criminis* in a "gross breach of faith," as Mr. Asquith had described it, were, more or less, explained away. The controversy continued on the general question of frontier policy, and, so far as the Opposition were concerned, was brought to a somewhat tame conclusion by Mr. Morley, who declared that the cost of the war would be ten million sterling. This was in the course of a speech at Bristol, the constituency of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach chanced to have an engagement to speak there the next night. He extinguished Mr. Morley by declaring that the cost of the war would probably not exceed two and a quarter millions. There the mere party dispute may be left. Whatever the defects of the policy of the Government, the retention of Chitral and the making of the road were not a breach of faith with the tribesmen. Nor was the subsequent war due to these acts, though it is probable that they had a certain effect in bringing them about. It is only too likely that, even if the question of Chitral had never arisen, there would have been a serious war along the frontier; for it is indisputable that the chief influence at work was religious fanaticism, having its source in misapprehension by the hillmen of the relations of the British power with the head of the Mohammedan faith at Constantinople.

While war raged across the frontier India was afflicted with famine and plague. Sedition also passed from a latent to an active stage. In the Bombay Presidency during the year 1897 there were over fourteen thousand cases of plague and nearly twelve thousand deaths. Everything was done by the Indian Government to stamp out the malady. Medical and sanitary measures were rigorously applied. But the utmost care could not prevent collision with the religious and caste susceptibilities of the people. Virulent attacks upon the Government appeared in the vernacular press, and on June 22nd two prominent plague officials, Mr. J. Rand and Lieutenant Ayerst, were murdered in the streets of Poona. On the

heels of this shocking crime there was serious rioting in Calcutta. The two events had nothing in common, the Calcutta trouble being merely a quarrel between Hindoos and Mohammedans over land containing the ruins of a mosque; but their practical simultaneity seemed to suggest a seditious movement in widely distant parts of India against the British power. This view was shaken when the cause of the Calcutta disturbances was understood; but the vernacular press teemed with sedition which it was impossible to disregard. Editors were prosecuted and heavy sentences passed upon them; the conspiracy which led to the murder of Mr. Rand and Lieutenant Ayerst was unmasked and the chief offenders punished, one man to whom the actual crime could be traced home being publicly executed. Repressive legislation was carried through which made sedition in the native press more dangerous for those who practised it, and the criminal law was otherwise strengthened. The wave of disloyalty did not, however, subside until 1898 had passed and signs appeared of a recovery from the terrible famine of the previous year. The area affected by the dearth, alike in British India and in the Native States, was larger than had been the case in any previous famine since the establishment of the British power in India, and the intensity of the consequent distress was greater. In the Central Provinces, the greater part of the Bombay Presidency, parts of Hyderabad and the Madras Presidency, practically the whole of the North Western Provinces, and in large areas of Bengal, the Punjaub and Native States in Central India, relief measures on a vast scale had to be undertaken. These were carried out in accordance with the settled principles of the Famine Code; and with a greater measure of success than had been attained in previous visitations. In January, 1897, a Relief Fund was opened at the Mansion House on the suggestion of the Secretary of State, with the object of supplementing the work of the Indian Government, and was kept open for the greater part of the year, over half a million of money being collected in England, with the aid of contributions from other parts of the Empire. By March there were over three millions of people employed on the Government relief works and in June over four millions. The dangers of the situation were relieved in July by a good rainfall over the major portion of India, but in August there were still over three millions of people living at the expense of the State. The cost of the famine to the Indian Treasury was

eight million rupees, while there had been loans and suspensions of revenue to the extent of four millions. At the close of the famine a Commission was set to work by the Indian Government, under Sir J. B. Lyall, with the object of formulating for future guidance the administrative and other lessons the latest experience had to teach. Though the result was to show that the disaster had, on the whole, been met with success, a multitude of minor defects were revealed and have since been remedied. The Report is, however, somewhat depressing to read. Its chief social lesson is that though the landowning and cultivating classes of India are better off and have greater power of resistance to famine than has previously been the case, the day labourers and lower classes of the people, who in the best of times live from hand to mouth, are expanding rather than contracting in numbers and exhibit a diminishing power of resistance. The conclusion was that even more strenuous efforts would be called for when the next famine arrived. Unfortunately this was proved to be true in 1900. Again there was a failure of the crops over an even larger area than before; and again the Indian Government had to face the task of keeping alive some millions of the population who without assistance would inevitably have died. Into the details of this administrative warfare with death there is no occasion to enter; it is sufficient for the purpose of this work to point out that it was waged with undeviating persistence and very considerable though not complete success. The principle that it was incumbent upon the British power to prosecute the almost superhuman task of preventing deaths from starvation in India, alike by measures of precaution and relief, was applied with greater vigour during the lifetime of the Salisbury Government than ever before in the history of the Dependency. The need unhappily was greater. But what might have been converted into an excuse for yielding to the fatalism which regards famine as the operation of natural law for the reduction of superabundant populations was made the occasion for a more generous output of humanitarian energy. Following in the footsteps of previous Viceroy, Lord Curzon, who succeeded Lord Elgin in December, 1898, demonstrated anew the beneficent character of British rule, receiving unstinted support from the Cabinet and public at home.

In any record of the positive benefits conferred upon India by the Salisbury Administration the legislation against the imports

of bounty-fed sugar claims a place. In this matter the Government reversed the policy of Lord Elgin. A two-fold object was pursued. On the one hand the Colonial Office wished to give some relief to the Mauritius planters whose sugar, largely the product of East Indian labour, was crowded out of the Indian market by the bounty-fed product of Europe, and, on the other, the Secretary of State for India desired to enable the Indian sugar producers in the Dependency itself to compete on better terms with bounty-fed imports. Lord Elgin collected information on the subject and came to the conclusion that the profits of Indian producers had not been lowered by the increased importation of beet sugars. After the failure of the Brussels Conference the Imperial Government were less disposed than before to accept that decision. Mr. Chamberlain urged Lord George Hamilton to advise the Indian Government to levy countervailing duties, his point of view being that this would arrest the decay of the sugar industry in Mauritius and be advantageous also to the West Indies, whose sugar industry was largely dependent upon imported labour from East India. Lord George Hamilton communicated this view of the subject to Lord Curzon; the Viceroy accepted it and reinforced it by arguments to the effect that the policy of imposing restrictive duties on bounty-fed sugar was urgently needed in the interests of the Indian cane sugar producers. A Bill was therefore prepared and passed which amended the Indian tariff accordingly, imposing duties on the bounty-fed article proportionate to the subventions paid to the producers or exporters in the country of origin. This was the answer of the Imperial Government to the action of France and Russia which led to the breakdown of the Brussels Conference; and it was a plain intimation to those countries that though the restriction of bounty-fed imports was at the moment limited to India there was in reserve the power of extending the policy to the United Kingdom and possibly also to all British possessions.

The establishment of a gold currency in India was another achievement to the credit of the Salisbury Administration. A committee of experts, under the Chairmanship of Sir Henry Fowler, was appointed in 1898 to inquire into the desirability of placing the Indian currency on a gold basis. It reported strongly in favour of a gold standard, with a fixed legal rate of one shilling and fourpence for the rupee. The Cabinet decided to act upon

the report and within a short time the British sovereign became legal tender in India, the mints of which were opened to the unrestricted coinage of gold and the permanent rate of exchange of the rupee fixed at the sum named. Stability was thus given to the Indian currency, and great benefits thereby conferred upon all classes in the Dependency. A minor advantage much appreciated in commercial circles in India and in the dominant State, and particularly by the soldiers and relatives of soldiers of the British Army in India, was the extension of penny postage to our Eastern Empire.

Reference has been made to the leading incidents only of British rule during the period under review. Indian experts will find this chapter remarkable because of its many omissions of evidence of Imperial activity; they will look in vain for an account of the work done in Baluchistan, in Burmah, in the settlement of the Burmah-Chinese boundary, in the arrangement of frontier incidents other than those that led to the campaign in the Tirah; they will justly be dissatisfied with the meagre and partial sketch of Indian domestic affairs since 1895; but it should be recollected that no attempt has been made to sketch the history of the Dependency during the years in question. The aim has been merely to indicate—and that from the standpoint of an observer without special knowledge—the questions that came up for decision and the manner in which they were handled by the Secretary of State. Inadequate as this chapter of necessity is, sufficient has been written to establish the conclusion that, though the record of the Imperial Government in India is noteworthy for war, famine, plague, and an undercurrent of sedition, with their consequent difficulties, it is nevertheless a good record. The British power stands more securely in India at the beginning of the new century than at the middle of the last decade of the old, as it inevitably must with continuity of rule and a maintenance of a high standard of administration. That this should be so is not noted in any Party sense. India stands—or should do so—outside the range of Party politics. No special merit is therefore claimed for the Administration in their relations with the Indian Government, except so far as they did not allow their policy in regard to the frontier and the sugar duties to be thwarted by the Liberals. Strong efforts were made to deflect that policy in each case; but in neither was any

success achieved by the critics and in each a distinct gain to the Empire is observable. The debateable land beyond the frontier is safer than it has ever been; such relations have been established with the tribesmen, notwithstanding the war, as may be expected to range them on the British side in any possible Russian advance through their territories; and security has been given to trans-frontier trade such as could not have been obtained had the *jehad* of the Mullahs been allowed an unchecked course.

CHAPTER II.

THE GOLD COAST AND SIERRA LEONE.

The Gold Coast Hinterland—The Overthrow of the Ashanti Power—The Arrangement with France—Samory and the Sofas—Lieut. Henderson at Wa—Samory's Attack on the British—The Prospects of the Colony—Railway and Mining Outlook—The Insurrection in Sierra Leone—The New Protectorate—The Hut Tax Scheme—Bai Bureh's Revolt—Sir D. P. Chalmers as Royal Commissioner—Summary of his Recommendations—Their Effect.

In the present section of this work an effort will be made to trace the achievements of the Salisbury Administration in maintaining and consolidating British interests in the Protectorates and Minor Colonies of the Empire. In the chapter on the partition of the Soudan, particulars have been given of the boundary settlements which defined the limits of Nigeria and restricted the hinterland of Lagos and the Gold Coast. Before the Government came into office an arrangement had been made with France cutting off that colony from access to the head waters of the Niger. The conclusion of the Niger Convention and the subsequent addition to Article IV. made each of our other West Coast possessions an *enclave* between French territory and the sea, Gambia being already a mere patch on both sides of the mouth of that river. Dealing first with the Gold Coast there has to be recorded the establishment of a Protectorate over the Ashanti hinterland. King Prempeh had become unduly troublesome before the Liberal Ministry fell. The British grievances against the Ashantis were that they indulged in slave raiding and human sacrifices, blocked the interior trade to and from the coast, refused to pay off the indemnity on account of the Expedition of 1874, when Kumasi was occupied and burnt by a British Expedition, and openly defied the remonstrances of the British Governor. In March the late Mr. (afterwards Sir) W. E. Maxwell was appointed Governor in succession to Sir Brandford Griffith and the effect of his representations was to induce the new Government to adopt a forward policy. Apart from the impossibility of allowing a savage people like the Ashantis to cripple the commerce of the Coast Colony, and the likelihood of the latter

being overrun by them, the activity of French expeditions between the northern part of the kingdom and the great bend of the Niger made it necessary to take steps to obtain for the Gold Coast a due share of the African hinterland. If we had not dealt with Prempeh the French would have done so either by overturning his kingdom or making a treaty with him which would have placed his kingdom within their West African sphere and thus hemmed in the British on the coast belt below the Prah. An ultimatum had been sent to Prempeh in 1894. This having been arrogantly defied, one of Mr. Chamberlain's earliest acts, after a preliminary mastery of his work at the Colonial Office, was to issue one which could not be ignored. A mission was despatched to Kumasi calling upon Prempeh to accept a British Protectorate and receive a British resident at Kumasi. Prempeh refused to have anything to do with this mission. Acting under the advice of missionary-taught coast negroes who had obtained influence over him he had sent two envoys to this country who were known as "Prince John" and "Prince Ansa." These gentlemen knocked at the door of the Colonial Office in vain. Prempeh was given until October 31st, 1895, to comply with the ultimatum. No answer having been given an expedition was organised, including six hundred and fifty British troops, under the command given of Sir Francis Scott. At the end of December the march up country began. The Ashanti kingdom was entered on January 5th. No resistance was encountered and the force entered Kumasi on January 17th. Not a shot had been fired. The king made his submission to the governor and was brought down to the coast. Annexation was declared, a British resident, with a strong force of native troops, was stationed at Kumasi and the expedition returned. It had been admirably planned and executed, and there had been little loss of life from disease, among those who succumbed, however, being Prince Henry of Battenburg, who had a relapse of fever on the voyage home. The effect of the expedition was threefold: it preserved for the Gold Coast an extensive hinterland; it overturned a Government as barbarous as any in West Africa outside the Niger Delta; and it put a stop to slave trade and human sacrifice. In an economic sense the result was of great importance to the Gold Coast Colony, for it opened out a prospect of mining and commercial development impossible so long as the Ashanti kingdom lasted—a prospect which is, however, overclouded at the time of writing by a locally formidable insurrection.

Immediate advantages were not to be gained. The Ashanti kingdom had served as a buffer between the Gold Coast Colony and Samory, a Mohammedan chieftain whose slave-raiding expeditions had made his name a terror to the hinterland tribes. It was against this chief that France was supposed to be operating when her expeditions were pushing across the backlands of Ashanti eastwards to the lower Niger and extending the French sphere at the expense of our coast colonies. The deposition of Prempeh and the annexation of his kingdom brought the British into contact with Samory, who entered the British sphere with a body of Sofas and committed the usual depredations and excesses. Lieutenant Henderson was sent north from Kumasi with a small force, with the object of visiting remote tribes with whom treaties had been made. He planted the British flag at Wa and with part of his men, and with Mr. Ferguson, a civilian official, made a march westward to Dawkita. Here they were attacked by an overwhelming force of Sofas, but succeeded in fighting their way back to Wa. The town was surrounded by Samory's people and there was no water. Lieutenant Henderson pluckily decided to go alone to the Sofa camp and treat for peace. He was made a prisoner and kept in custody a month. Samory, however, spared his life, sending him back under escort to the coast. Mr. Ferguson was less fortunate. The force at Wa was able to get away, but in the fighting Mr. Ferguson was wounded. His carriers relieved themselves of further trouble on his account by cutting off his head. So far the extension of British authority among the chiefs' tributary to the Ashanti kingdom had been distinctly unfortunate; but Lieutenant Henderson's enterprise in dealing direct with Samory had the effect of making that chieftain see the impolicy of conflict with the British. He showed a disposition to negotiate on the basis of keeping away from the British hinterland. A strong force was, however, sent into the interior, under the late Colonel Northcott, and there was some severe fighting, though not with Samory, in the spring of 1898. By the end of that year, however, it seemed that there would henceforth be no serious trouble with the tribes north of Kumasi. The Anglo-French Convention had settled the boundaries and put a limit to British expansion northward to the middle Niger, an incidental advantage of the arrangement being that France would have to deal with Samory.

Coincident with military activity in the hinterland, legislation was framed of a kind likely to attract European capital and enterprise. The colony is auriferous throughout and, if the collection of rubber be excluded from consideration, it is in mining that developments are expected. A Land's Bill was passed to give security to the title of ceded lands; measures were taken and enforced to make the lives of Europeans in the interior secure against armed risings by the natives--measures which have proved to be insufficient, as witness the investment of Kumasi in 1900. Surveys were undertaken for railways, one of which was to run from Accra to Kumasi, *viâ* Insuaim, and the other from Sekondi through the rich mining and forest district of the west to Tarquah. These lines were begun in 1898 and were assisted by the Home Government to the extent of a loan of over half a million. In the northern territories also a trunk road was constructed and surveys made for continuing the railways to Kumasi. There is little doubt that soon after the present risings are suppressed, the iron horse will be seen in the old Ashanti capital. Thanks to the measures taken by the Home Government in overthrowing the Ashanti kingdom, and in initiating a forward policy by providing the local administration with the means of opening up the mining districts, the colony will eventually enter upon a new era of prosperity. Its promising outlook is due less to its natural possibilities, which might have remained unrecognised in England for generations to come, than to Mr. Chamberlain's reversal of the policy of neglect. The Gold Coast offered a capital opportunity for the application of his principle that the expenditure of public money on the undeveloped estates of the Empire would be profitable. The past and present Ashanti expeditions, and the pledge of Imperial credit in railway construction seem likely to make this colony one of the most prosperous of our tropical possessions.

In Sierra Leone a position arose which severely taxed Mr. Chamberlain's judgment. Under the Anglo-French Agreement of 1895 England became responsible for a hinterland about the size of Ireland, and inhabited by tribes numbering between one and two millions. When the Government came into office, various treaties existed with the chiefs; but the only exercise of British authority which they knew was in the form of punitive expeditions by the frontier police of the Sierra Leone colony. They were practically independent. One consequence of the treaty with

France was to render necessary the introduction of a settled government. Sir Frederick Cardew, the governor, had paved the way for this by tours through the hinterland. On his recommendation the Colonial Office, in August, 1896, declared a protectorate over the hinterland. Mr. Chamberlain laid down the principle that the interior should contribute to the cost of its administration under the new conditions. A Protectorate Ordinance was passed, which included a scheme of taxation under which each hut should pay a tax of five shillings a year, and the huts of chiefs double that sum. The chiefs were made responsible for the tax, and the frontier police were employed in its collection. A native rising followed, attributed by the chiefs to their objections to the hut tax, but really directed against any form of European restraint upon their time-honoured practice of slave raiding. White missionaries were murdered, and friendly natives massacred. The leader of the revolt was Bai Bureh, and operations had to be undertaken against him. These were successful and he was taken prisoner, but the complete pacification of the country was delayed by the advent of the rainy season. An agitation arose in England against the hut tax, and in June, 1898, Mr. Chamberlain selected the late Sir David Patrick Chalmers to inquire into the cause of the insurrection, and make recommendations for the future government of the region.

The Royal Commissioner advised that a general amnesty should be proclaimed; that punitive operations should cease; that the hut tax should be abandoned because it was obnoxious; that the scheme of administration by district commissioners should be discarded; that the chiefs—many of whom had been in open rebellion, and some of whom were directly responsible for murder and outrage—should be restored to independence; that the frontier police should be withdrawn from the posts or stations in the interior; that the district commissioners should become mere resident justices of the peace at the native “courts”; and that subventions should be paid to missionaries conditional upon the teaching of agriculture and handicrafts. This is, of course, merely a statement in broad outline, and does not do justice to the earnestness, the sincerity, and the lawyer-like ingenuity with which the recommendations are stated.

What is the effect of them? It is that the murderers and rebels should go unpunished, that the edifice of government in the Protectorate should be destroyed, and that we should send residents to

use the arts of moral suasion upon the chiefs, and missionaries to teach the tribes the mysteries of religion and the growing of vegetables. It is strange that a man who knew the negro as well as did Sir David Chalmers should have come to a set of conclusions so inept. To act upon his recommendations would have been virtually to withdraw from the Protectorate and to leave the rebels in the belief that we were unable to punish them for the murders that had been committed. But all this is certainly not apparent from the Report. It is a powerful bit of work—powerful in its appeal that the abstract rights of the chiefs should be respected, in its censure—upon what proved to be insufficient evidence—of the conduct of the Governor and certain of his officers, and in its general humanitarian tendency. The impression it produces is that the chiefs and people of the Protectorate were oppressively managed, that their insurrection was justified, and that the black man of the Hinterland can be—and ought to be—treated on much the same principles as are applied to a highly civilised white population, and should enjoy the like methods of Government.

A weak Colonial Secretary would have acted upon this Report. He would have recalled Sir Frederick Cardew, disbanded the Frontier Police, and sent residents to the Chiefs—to be murdered. And one fine morning he would have been confronted with the news that the Kings had got into conflict again with the French; that the latter had crushed them and had well armed Senegalese and machine guns in the Protectorate; and that the Cabinet had met at the Elysée to draw up a bill of costs, to be delivered with a covert intimation that if we could not keep their Majesties in order France would do so for us in exchange for the Protectorate, with our other Possessions in West Africa thrown in. But Mr. Chamberlain is not a man who is either led or driven. He turned from the lawyer to the soldier administrator; from the man of abstract justice and estimable theories to the man of action. He asked Sir Frederick Cardew what he had to say for himself, and for his principles and method of Government, in view of Sir David Chalmers' indictment. The Governor had a good deal to say. He answered the Report as one whose career was at stake, sparing no energy in his blows at Sir David Chalmers.

Mr. Chamberlain had to throw over one or the other. Either the feelings and reputation of the Governor, or the opinions of the Royal Commissioner, had to be sacrificed. A Colonial Secretary

given to compromise would have sought a way out of the embarrassment by taking a middle course. But that is not Mr. Chamberlain's way. He discarded the Royal Commissioner—as gently as it was possible for him to do so, but with unmistakable firmness.

A short statement of the Despatch may be given. It recites in outline the obligations undertaken by the Signatory Powers to the General Act of the Berlin Conference, the object being to demonstrate that, in view of the slave trade of the Protectorate, we were bound to police and administer the interior. The formation of the Frontier Police and the work done by that body in putting down predatory wars are passed in review. Their employment in enforcing the collection of the tax is defended. Sir David Chalmers is sharply criticised for basing charges of illegality against the Government, in making certain arrests, upon partial quotations from an Ordinance which in other passages—on which their action had been taken—gave them full legal authority. Serious allegations of undue severity and worse, made by Sir David Chalmers against European officers in the Protectorate, are analysed and dismissed as unsustainable. Coming to the recommendations in the Report Mr. Chamberlain disputes the Commissioner's view—it is here stated in general terms—that the natives should be left alone as much as possible and argues that what they require is “firm and direct control” by the Power which undertakes to rule them by civilised methods. The insurrection he treats as confirmatory of this view rather than as indicating that the bonds of control should be cut. Hence he determines that the framework of the scheme of administration is sound, that the Frontier Police must be retained, that the District Commissioners must not be shorn of any authority,—that the machinery of Government which the rebels sought to destroy and without which the lives of Europeans would not be safe and the despotism of barbarous chiefs would continue unchecked over the natives, must be kept going. As for the question of funds direct taxation is shown to be necessary and the fairness of the hut tax, and the ability of the people to pay it, are plainly demonstrated. Sir David Chalmers' prophecies of evil if the tax were continued are met with the statements that the money was being collected without difficulty; that since the capture of Bai Bureh, trade in the interior had revived, that confidence had been restored, and that the natives were rebuilding the towns that had been destroyed by the punitive expedition and were at work again in their fields. On some points agreement with

Sir David Chalmer's views were expressed. An amnesty, with some exemptions, had, for example, been proclaimed; but the Despatch, in its entirety, is a justification of the policy applied to the Protectorate by the Governor, of the methods used by him and his staff, and is a rejection of the Royal Commissioners' scheme of argument and list of recommendations.

This is a minor chapter of colonial history which reveals Mr. Chamberlain's independence of judgment and power of arriving at and formulating definite decisions. It shows how firm is his grasp of fundamental principles in the government of tropical possessions peopled with savage races, the accuracy of his appreciation of native character, and his unswerving application of the lessons of experience. It would have been miraculous had the warlike chiefs of the Hinterland submitted to our authority without a struggle. If the Hut Tax had not given them a pretext for rebellion one could easily have been invented on other grounds. A social system in which for ages the chiefs had been at liberty to slay and enslave as they willed does not disappear under moral suasion. Conflict was inevitable. To conclude otherwise is to ignore the teaching of the past. Mr. Chamberlain saw this plainly. He showed his fitness for his post by deciding that the Administration of the Protectorate should stand. A retrograde policy—the substitution of the gentle arts of advice and persuasion upon chiefs and peoples incapable of appreciating any other argument than that of a word and a blow—would have meant a costly expedition in the near future and a loss of life far greater than that occasioned by the insurrection. There are beautiful sentiments in Sir David Chalmers' Report; but the practical wisdom, the governing power by which some degree of civilisation is imposed upon savages, at least to the extent of making their country accessible to Europeans, is to be found in Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch. The Colonial Secretary supported the man of action—the man on the spot who had the handling of the complex problems of West African government—rather than the critic and idealist.

CHAPTER III.

THE ROYAL NIGER COMPANY.

Revocation of the Charter—Why Imperial Rule was Substituted—An Outline of Earlier History—The Work of Sir George Goldie—An English Monopoly on the Lower Niger—The Anglo-French Agreement of 1890—The Say-Barua Line—The Emir of Bida—A Mahommedan Plot—The Nupé and Ilorin Campaign—Assurances to France—Foreign Office Sanction of War—The March to Kabba—Blockade of the Niger—The Battle of Bida—A Critical Moment—Political Effect of the Victory—The Capture of Ilorin—French Invasion of Borgu—Occupation of Ilo, Boussa and Nikki—Relation of the Nupé-Ilorin Campaign to the French Invasion—Lord Salisbury's Views—The Niger Delta—Benin Massacre—Admiral Rawson's Expedition—Capture of Benin—Extension of British Authority from the Coast to the Soudan.

ON January 1st, 1900, direct Imperial control was substituted for government by Chartered Company throughout the major portion of the Niger territories reserved to Great Britain by the Anglo-French Agreement. The Delta Strip, formerly known as the Niger Coast Protectorate, was, at the same time, incorporated with what had hitherto been administered by the Royal Niger Company. The status given to the entire territory, the limits of which will be seen in the sketch map illustrating the Niger Convention, was that of a Protectorate, the Company region being styled the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and the Delta territory that of Southern Nigeria. Colonel Lugard, C.B., who had won distinction in East Africa as traveller and administrator, and in 1894 had visited Borgu and made treaties with the Emirs there on behalf of the Niger Company, was appointed High Commissioner of the northern region. The Charter of the Company was revoked and it is now merely a trading concern, enjoying no special privileges. The revocation by no means implied any censure upon the Company, but was an act dictated by political necessity and made inevitable by constant friction between representatives of French interests and the officers of the Company. For this friction the Company was not to blame; but the French invasion of Borgu and the conditions under which that quarrel was composed and France allowed to lease two bonded landing places on the Lower Niger rendered it highly desirable, as a matter of national policy, that Her Majesty's Government should

exercise direct control over frontier and fiscal affairs. The Company was no longer a fitting instrument for the discharge of Imperial responsibilities over the enormous area it had won. It was therefore bought out under conditions set forth in a Treasury Minute printed in the Appendix and embodied in an Act which received the Royal Assent during the session of 1899.

In the story of British expansion there are few chapters of more entrancing interest than that which tells of the acquisition of Nigeria. In this book we are concerned only with the acts of Lord Salisbury's Administration in connection with the region. But a short review of antecedent events is desirable if the true significance of the assumption of direct Imperial control is to be appreciated. There is no need to go back to the futile attempts to open up trade with the Fulah Empire, following the voyage of the brothers Lander down the Niger to the sea, and the travels of Barth and Baikie in the Western Soudan; but it should be stated that in 1868 the British Government withdrew its Consul from Lokoja. The idea of exercising political influence in the Niger region was abandoned. Gunboats were no longer sent up the river. Such English traders as cared to remain had to do so at their own risk. The treaties that had been made by our Consuls with the Emirs of Nupé and other Mahommedan chiefs were allowed to become a dead letter and the further payment of subsidies to trading companies was refused by the Treasury. Notwithstanding this withdrawal the traders stuck to their posts and in 1897 amalgamated themselves into the United, afterwards the National, African Company. Mr. Goldie Taubman (now Sir George Goldie) who had visited the Niger and had an interest in its trade, was chiefly instrumental in carrying this amalgamation through. French traders had, however, established themselves at the mouth of the river. As these were believed to be subsidised by the French Government with the ultimate object of asserting political control over the Lower Niger, as on the upper waters of the river, there was a conflict of interests which menaced the future of the English Company. Sir George Goldie had the foresight to bring it to a close by raising the capital of his Company and thus acquiring the means to buy out the French traders. The lower Niger thus came exclusively under English commercial influence. By the General Act of the Berlin Conference in 1884 Great Britain was allotted the whole of the Coast line between Lagos and the

German Cameroons, with its undefined hinterland, and in June, 1885, the Government resumed its political relationship with the interior by declaring a Protectorate over the Niger territories.

Meanwhile the National African Company had greatly extended its trade. Three years before, it had applied for a Charter to enable it to administer the region on behalf of the Crown; but the Government of the day was not then convinced that Nigeria was worth troubling about and thought that, in any case, the Company was too small for so large a trust. This defect was remedied by increasing the capital to a million and securing the services of the late Lord Aberdare as chairman. The absorption of the French trading firms was doubtless another factor that strengthened the claim of the Company to a charter. A year was allowed to pass after the declaration of the British Protectorate and in July, 1886, the Government handed over its authority to the Company. In the then state of things on the Niger this was certainly the cheapest thing to do. Subsequent events have shown that it was the best, for it is tolerably certain that neither the Foreign Office nor the Colonial Office would have administered the region so well, unless either could have had the monopoly of Sir George Goldie's services. The conditions of the charter need not be closely examined here. In its trading capacity the Company was forbidden to set up any monopoly; but it was empowered to levy duties sufficient to meet the expenses of government. Authority was given to it to exercise full jurisdiction over all foreigners and British subjects in the territories, to acquire and hold new territories, to protect native chiefs with whom treaties had been made and generally to act as the representative of the Imperial Power. On the other hand the Charter was revocable at the will of the Imperial authorities. The Company was under the obligation to discourage slavery, to abolish it as far as was practicable, and to govern the tribes in accordance with their laws and customs. Accounts and reports had to be submitted to the Government periodically and power was reserved to disallow any act by the Company which did not meet with the approval of the Secretary of State.

Armed with this instrument the Company added to the number of treaties it had made and pushed its trade with vigour. Sir George Goldie was Deputy Governor; the Directors, with the exception of Lord Aberdare, were all men of experience in West African commerce; and the heads of the staff in Nigeria were men of proved

ability as well as of extensive local knowledge. A system of justice was organised, taxation plans perfected, and armed forces raised. The organisation was sound at every point and, on the whole, it worked well from the first. A limit was put to its enterprise northward by the Anglo French Agreement of 1890, by which the Say-Barua line became the frontier with the French Soudan. The Company, and through it the British Empire, was thus confirmed in the control of an area estimated at about 500,000 square miles and inhabited by between thirty and forty millions, mostly of the Hausa race. The rights thus acquired were originally secured by the Chartered Company and the fact that this enormous territory is now part of our Empire is due to the initiative of Sir George Goldie.

Shortly before the Government came into office French expeditions had begun to penetrate the Company's territories below Say and there had been much trouble with the Brass negroes on the Delta. It was, however, indisputable that the Lugard treaties made in Borgu ante-dated those asserted to have been made by the French. The Brass difficulty had been ended by a punitive expedition under Sir Claude MacDonald, and relief from further attack by these savages enabled the Company to pay closer attention to affairs in the interior. On the death of Lord Aberdare, Sir George Goldie became Governor of the Company. The situation inland was unpleasant, apart from French aggression. The Markhum Fulah, Emir of Bida, the capital of the Nupé country, one of the States of the Sokoto Empire, had been in the habit of crossing the Niger to the South West and raiding the country for slaves. Into this region the Company had extended its administrative system. In the early nineties Sir George Goldie, in the company of the Earl of Scarborough, one of the Directors, had visited Bida and had warned the Emir that these raids must cease. For a time they did so. But early in 1896 it appeared that the Emir was concerting a plan with the Emirs of Ilorin, an adjoining State on the right bank of the Niger and lying to the north of the Yoruba hinterland of Lagos, and with the King of the Borgu country, north-east of Ilorin, to drive the white men out of Nigeria. The King of Borgu, who, with the two Emirs were under Treaty with the Company disclosed the conspiracy. Whether the Emir of Nupé knew this or not, in May, 1896, he crossed the Niger from Bida with a force of several thousand Fulah horsemen and Hausa infantry and encamped at Kabba, fifty miles or thereabouts to the west of Lokoja, the Company's

station at the confluence of the Niger and the Benue. This was a clear violation of Treaty engagements and a menace which the Company could not ignore. The time had arrived to strike a blow at the Fulah dominion and accept the challenge of a Fulah combination against European Government. Lord Salisbury's permission for the overthrow of the Emir of Nupé was obtained and Sir George Goldie and his staff made elaborate preparations for a campaign. Assurances were given to France that what was intended would in no way affect French interests or the claims sought to be set up by her agents, who were working eastward from Senegal and northward from Dahomey. An understanding also appears to have been arrived at with the Emperor of Sokoto, by which he would hold aloof from the quarrel. Considerable uneasiness was felt in England, fears being entertained that the Company would eventually find itself opposed not only by the Emir of Nupé but by all the Fulah rulers, and doubts being expressed whether the Hausa forces at the disposal of the Company would be able to stand against the cavalry which is the mainstay of the Fulah power. Neither the Government nor the Company made statements to calm these apprehensions. The very objective of the expedition was kept secret. Few knew whether it was to operate in Nupé or Ilorin, or in both regions, and what the real chances of success were. It was apparent, however, that Sir George Goldie's enterprise was sanctioned by the Foreign Office and that the Government were determined to uphold the Company in maintaining the rights it had acquired for Great Britain in the Niger sphere. Sir George Goldie arrived on the Niger at the end of December and proceeded to Lokoja, where the armed forces of the Company were concentrated under the command of Major Arnold, D.S.O., an officer of experience in the Niger territories, who had won his way from the ranks. There, also, were assembled the Company's flotilla of river gunboats, which was intended to play an important part in the operations, the Niger being navigable for them for over two hundred miles up stream. Stores and ammunition had been collected at Lokoja and the place put into a state of defence. Two hundred Hausa infantry were left there under the command of Captain Sangster. On January 6th Major Arnold, who was accompanied throughout the campaign by Sir George Goldie, left Lokoja, his force consisting of thirty Europeans, five hundred and thirteen Hausa rank and file, with a maxim gun to each company, and five seven-pounder guns. In addition there were nearly a thousand

Hausa and Yoruba porters. The force marched north-west towards Kabba. On the same day the gunboats steamed up the river and established a blockade on the navigable portion running through the Nupé country. Passing through an undulating and at times hilly country, which had been swept bare of the means of subsistence by the Emir's forces, on the 11th the little army was within reach of Markhum's camp.* On the 12th a flying column, consisting of a fighting force of four hundred, was sent to Kabba, but it found the place deserted. Markhum had withdrawn his army north-west towards the Niger. The river being blockaded and it being impossible for Markhum's troops to cross, Major Arnold and Sir George Goldie doubled back to the Niger at Egbon and determined to march on Bida itself. The Niger was reached on January 22nd and the effect of this march was to send that portion of the Fulah army which had crossed the stream, far higher up in the hope of recrossing without interference from the gunboats. The Company's force crossed the river without delay and on the 25th advanced upon Bida. On the evening of that day, in the open country in the neighbourhood of Bida, they came into touch with the cavalry of the northern portion of the Nupé army. At daybreak on the 26th the battle began. The Fulah skirmishers having been driven back an engagement was fought within sight of the capital. In the early stages a retirement was ordered so as to allow of an opportunity for the seven-pounders to be brought into action. Interpreting this as an acknowledgment of defeat the Fulah horsemen launched themselves against the column. Square was formed and, though the troops had never faced cavalry before, such was their steadiness and so deadly was their fire that the Fulah horsemen broke and turned before they could complete the charge. The retirement upon the camp was carried out in perfect order notwithstanding the activity of the enemy's cavalry. Had the Emir's forces been under command of a general capable of taking advantage of the ground, they might have got between the retiring column and the camp and won a decisive victory. In the afternoon the artillery was brought into action and was used with such effect that the enemy were compelled to fall back to the town. When night fell neither side could claim a victory. Though the Fulah host had suffered heavy losses the attack

* A full and interesting account of the campaign will be found in Lieutenant Seymour Vandeleur's "Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger," from which this summary of events is partly drawn.

upon them could not be pressed home, and it is tolerably clear that the bad generalship of the Emir, combined with the steadiness of the Company's troops, saved the latter from disaster. On the next morning the force moved out of camp and formed square. Under a heavy rifle fire and exposed to repeated charges of cavalry the square fought its way to the ridge overlooking the town. There a halt was made and the artillery brought to bear upon the town and upon the masses of the enemy in front.

Some of the Fulahs retired into the town; others drew off to high ground to the left. Incendiary rockets as well as shells were fired until Bida became untenable to the Fulahs. The town was occupied with a loss of only eight men killed and nine wounded, while the loss of the enemy, says Lieutenant Seymour Vandeleur, who took part in the engagement, "must have been enormous." Nupé was entirely freed from the Fulah domination and trade opened to Kano from the south. Politically the victory was of importance because of the prestige gained by the Company in its first conflict with the Fulah conquerors of the Western Soudan and the resultant blow to slave raiding. Commercially it was of practical value because it opened the way *via* the Niger to the great Hausa emporium of Kano, to which European goods had come chiefly from North Africa, along the caravan routes of the French Soudan. A new Emir was appointed by Sir George Goldie and a treaty made with him by which he recognised that all Nupé was subject to the power of the Company and under the British flag. This appointment was apparently to the liking of the Sultan of Sokoto, who was willing to see the former feudatory Emir overturned and was favourably disposed to the family of the new office holder.

The Emir of Ilorin remained to be dealt with. A new base was formed at Jebba on the river at a point due north of the town of Ilorin, a total force of eight hundred, including carriers, being transported thither by the sternwheelers. On February 10th the march south was begun. On the 15th inst. the town of Ilorin was approached. Masses of horsemen endeavoured to check the advance and suffered heavy loss from the maxims and seven pounders. The battle was interrupted by night and resumed at dawn on the 16th. The close formation of the enemy enabled the maxim detachments and the gunners to use their weapons with terrible effect. The Fulahs were powerless against them and withdrew into the town. Some Hausa traders within the walls hung out a white flag, which

was taken to be a token of submission, but the Emirs were divided in counsel and did not take advantage of the chance to negotiate. They were given two hours in which to submit and, no answer being received, the town was bombarded, the Hausa colony taking refuge with the attacking force. Resistance soon ceased and the town was entered. The Emir and his chiefs had escaped but were induced to come in. They made their submission and the Emir subscribed to a Treaty pledging him to obedience to the Company and recognising such a frontier as should be determined by the Company as separating his territory from the Lagos hinterland, in which he had been in the habit of committing excesses.

It was while this expedition was in preparation that the French invasion of Borgu assumed the importance of an international question. When the force arrived at Jebba for the march south-east to the town of Ilorin, news was received of the occupation by French officers, with a considerable force of Senegalese, of Ilo, two or three hundred miles below Say, the starting point of the boundary on the north, and well within the straight line which, it was understood, was to run south from Say to the northernmost point of the Dahomey-Lagos frontier. From Ilo the French expedition descended the river by the right bank to Boussa, the capital of the Borgu kingdom, and within thirty miles of a military post established on the river by the Company by virtue of its treaties with the Borgu Emir. Meanwhile French occupations had taken place in the Borgu country between the Dahomey hinterland and the Niger. With the object of avoiding difficulties with France and thus imperilling pending negotiations, Sir George Goldie had been restricted by the Imperial Government from conducting any operations higher up the river than Jebba. Whether or not the local French forces shared the knowledge of this fact with the French Government it would seem that they took advantage of the occupation of the little army of the Company in the Nupé-Ilorin campaign to steal a march upon the English. Moreover, to reach the places they occupied they must have made free use of the territory towards the Niger beyond the point where the accurate delimitation of the Dahomey-Lagos frontier ended. There had been a clear infringement of British rights; and it was the time and manner in which it had been committed that helped to range both Parties in England on Lord Salisbury's side. That aspect of the matter is, however, sufficiently discussed in the chapter relating to the Niger Convention.

The point to which attention should be directed is that whatever neglect there had been in forestalling the French by actual occupation to the north of Leaba, the success of the operations against Nupé and Ilorin raised an absolute bar to further French aggression. Whatever might be the result of diplomatic action with regard to Borgu, and however much the negotiations were complicated by the presence of French troops at Ilo, Boussa and Nikki, the entire hinterland of Lagos as far as Jebba was effectively preserved for Great Britain. If any objection could be lodged by France against the pre-existing Treaties with the Emirs of Nupé and Ilorin it could now have no effect, for those Treaties had been abrogated by the new obligations incurred by the vanquished. The unassailable argument of the stricken field was brought into play; and it is reasonable to suppose that in view of the known movements of the French farther to the north, Lord Salisbury sanctioned the Company's operations with the object of creating that argument. The purely local necessity of the war therefore served the higher purposes of statesmanship. And, apart from merely diplomatic aims, the enforcement of the Company's Treaty rights upon the recalcitrant Emirs was in strict agreement with the principles upon which the British Government had reversed the policy of abandonment, initiated by short-sighted predecessors in 1868.

These principles were clearly expressed by a speech by Lord Salisbury in 1897, in which he declared that business objects were alone in view. "We wish to extend the commerce, the trade, the industry and the civilisation of Markhum. We wish to throw open as many markets as possible, to bring as many consumers and producers into contact as possible; to throw open the great natural highways of this great continent. We wish that trade should pursue its unchecked and unhindered course upon the Niger, the Nile and the Zambesi." The conquest of the Fulah overlords of Nupé and Ilorin relieved the semi-pagan peoples of a large area from periodical raiding for slaves, and thus raised them at once to a higher level of civilisation; and it broke down the barriers erected by the Emirs to trade with the city of Kano—the great market of the Western Soudan. That this was a stroke likely to benefit British commerce can easily be seen by anyone who will look at a map and compare the Niger route with that across the desert from North Africa. On these grounds, therefore, the wisdom of the Government in sanctioning the campaign can be justified.

In the Delta also—in what used to be known as the Niger Coast Protectorate—the Government showed that it was prepared to maintain and extend its control over the degraded savages who inhabit this part of the coast, and to do what was in its power to help them to a higher plane of social life. Benin City had long been the centre of a system of government so terribly degraded as to give the place an evil repute even surpassing that enjoyed by more distant townships in the recesses of the swamps. After the fall of Nana in 1894 the King of Benin, possibly fearing attack, closed the markets against the river chiefs who were the intermediaries between the coast and interior trade. The Protectorate officials were engaged during 1895-1896 in endeavouring to get the prohibition taken off; but they were not allowed to visit Benin. Late in 1896 Mr. Acting-Consul Phillips sent word to the King that he would like to pay him a visit, the object being to open more amicable relations with him and obtain permission for white traders to enter the city. Early in January Mr. Phillips, Major Copland Crawford, Mr. Locke, Captain Maling, Mr. Kenneth Campbell, Dr. Elliott, Captain Boisragon, and two civilians, Messrs. Powis and Gordon, started unarmed for Benin.* On January 4th they left for Benin City, with their carriers and an escort of Benin messengers. On the afternoon they were fired upon. A one-sided conflict ensued in which seven of the Europeans and many carriers were slain, only Captain Boisragon and Mr. Locke, both of whom were wounded, managing to escape into the bush. After four days wandering and several narrow escapes from falling into the hands of the Benin people, they reached Gwath.

News of this terrible massacre reached England on January 11th. Telegrams were immediately despatched to Admiral Rawson, in command of the Cape Squadron, instructing him to undertake a punitive expedition, in conjunction with the Niger Coast Protectorate force. So expeditiously was this organised that Benin City was taken, after some difficult bush fighting, on February, 18th.† The state of the city was revolting because of the appalling evidences of the extent to which human sacrifice was practised. An accidental fire almost destroyed the place. The entire

* An interesting volume has been published by Captain Boisragon, one of the two survivors, under the title of "The Benin Massacre."

† See "Benin, a City of Blood," by Commander R. H. Bacon, R. N. Intelligence Officer to the Expedition.

Benin country, including over four hundred villages, was brought under the direct administration of the Protectorate, to the infinite advantage of the inhabitants and to the benefit of the trade of the coast. Hostile camps further afield than Benin City were broken up by a later Protectorate expedition and the chief responsible for the massacre of Consul Phillips and his party was captured and executed. Though the results were disproportionate to the loss of life incurred through Mr. Phillips' journey, their blood had not been shed in vain. Benin City was rebuilt, the market reopened, the country parcelled out for administration by selected local chiefs working under the supervision of European officers, and a new era instituted. Nor does this represent the only progress made during the lifetime of the Salisbury Administration in the pacification of the Niger delta. There were other minor punitive expeditions by the Protectorate and by the Niger Company which do not call for description. The present purpose is served by an outline of the principal operations undertaken either by the Home Government or with its sanction, and culminating in the establishment of direct Imperial authority throughout the region from the coast to the Soudan.

CHAPTER IV.

UGANDA AND THE RAILWAY.

The Condition of Uganda—The Railway from the Coast—Its Bearing upon Slave Trade and Administrative Problems—The Crisis in the Protectorates—Expedition against Kabarega—Mwanga threatened with Deposition—A “Catholic” Conspiracy—Revolt in Buddu—Flight of Mwanga—Re-appearance of Kabarega—The Macdonald Expedition to the Soudan—Revolt of his Soudanese Troops—Grievances of the Men—Extension of the Rebellion—Murder of Major Thurston, Mr. N. A. Wilson and Mr. Scott—British Attack on Fort Lubwas—A long Blockade—Escape of the Soudanese—The Rebels driven to the Kioga Swamps—The Waganda Rising—Timely Help from Germany—Success of British Arms—Criticism of the Officials—Responsibility of the Imperial Government—A Cheeseparing Policy—Appointment of Sir H. H. Johnston—Work for the Incoming Administration.

When the Government entered into office the English public were under the impression that the peoples of Uganda and Unyoro had composed their religious differences, had ceased to slaughter each other because some were called Catholics and others Protestants, and had settled down to ways of peace. Ministers who had access to more accurate information could scarcely have shared that agreeable delusion. The fires of sectarian animosity flickered feebly, it is true, and, among the Waganda, seemed as though they had burned out; but the rifles and maxim guns of the Administration were kept pretty constantly employed in various parts of the Protectorates—in Northern Unyoro against Kabarega, against the Arab slave-raiding fraternity, and against the warlike tribes who held the mountain fastnesses north-east of the Great Lake. The local authorities were, however, able to hold their own. It was not apprehended that any unusual strain would be put upon them. Within two years the country was aflame with revolt among the subject tribesmen and with mutiny among the Soudanese infantry, who were the chief instrument by which British rule was maintained. Our hold upon the region was so far weakened that it seemed only too probable that the Administration would be expelled and a war of conquest have to be entered upon. This result was the natural consequence of administration on the cheap—a fault inherent in everything that had been done since the Imperial Government took over the responsibilities

incurred by the East African Company. Peace, however, once more rules. The railway from Mombassa is well on the way to completion to the Lake terminus. British arms have been carried to victory over every portion of the Protectorates, and through the hitherto unknown region between the Nile and Lake Rudolph almost to the confines of the Soudan; and British officers and travellers have got through from Uganda down the Nile to Khartoum and thence to the Mediterranean. The progress implied by these sentences is great. The credit has to be divided between those who faced and eventually overcame a serious crisis in Central Africa and the Imperial Government, which, despite every discouragement, persisted in a policy of retention. It was of vital importance that the Government should not fail, for the question of British domination in Uganda is not merely local. It comprises possession of the head waters of the Nile and, consequently, the mastery of the destinies of Egypt. There is, also, another consideration which made it imperative that Uganda should be kept in British hands. With the *Pax Britannica* once securely established in the region of the Great Lakes, through telegraph and railway communication between Cairo and the Cape would be brought nearer into view. What this will mean for the African Continent now that the Soudan is under civilised government, and when South Africa again enters upon a period of peaceful development, can be but dimly realised by the present generation; but the slave trade is already crippled. The sources of slave supply are no longer close preserves for Arab raiders, and European commerce in Mid-Africa is thus opened to an extent likely to be as advantageous to the native population as to ourselves.

The project of a railway from the Coast to the Lake was originally conceived, during the second Salisbury Administration, with the object of destroying the slave trade of Central Africa and the East African Company. The late Sir William Mackinnon, to whom the project commended itself on commercial grounds, obtained from the Government a guarantee of interest on the capital for construction. When the Company found itself compelled for financial reasons to withdraw from its territories the scheme of railway construction devolved upon the Foreign Office. The Rosebery Administration dallied with the question and came to no decision. In the Session of 1896 the new Government persuaded the House of Commons to provide three millions sterling for the

building of the line,—an estimate increased in the session of 1900 by £1,930,000. The laying of the rails was begun, the distance to be covered then being six hundred miles. No pretence was made that the railway would immediately become remunerative. It passes through a country of no great value, and in which, so far as is known, it would be useless to make lateral extensions; but the expenditure was defended on the ground that security would be given to the British hold upon the Lake region and a blow dealt at the slave traffic such as would eventually render unnecessary the yearly expenditure of over a hundred thousand pounds on the squadron employed for slave suppression in East African waters. As this sum, capitalised at three per cent., represented the total expected cost of the line, the enterprise—apart from considerations affecting Uganda and Unyoro and the beneficial effects upon the East African Protectorate—was worth undertaking inasmuch as it would set free a portion of the Navy for work strictly within its functions. It does not fall within the scope of this volume to describe the incidents of construction. Though, in the main, the line passed over an easy country—engineering and labour difficulties were encountered that caused the usual delays. Indian coolies were imported in large numbers and, under the direction of English engineers, pressed forward inland mile by mile, fever and lions proving to be foes more deadly than the dreaded Masai, who, by the way, have now become so far reconciled to the white man's presence on their old raiding grounds, that many of them were employed with success to the British as well as profit to themselves, in Colonel Macdonald's expedition to the north-east of Uganda. By December, 1897, a hundred miles of railway had been opened for traffic; by October, 1898, two hundred and twenty-five miles had been completed; and at the time of writing the rails are being laid within a short distance of the Lake. Notwithstanding the delays that have occurred—and there is Sir Guildford Molesworth's authority for the view that the rate of progress has been as rapid as could reasonably be expected—the enterprise constitutes one of the chief assets of the Government in its administration of the African Protectorates. There is every likelihood that the railway will serve its purpose of dealing a death blow to the slave traffic over the great eastern caravan routes and that in time the traffic upon it will yield a return on the capital employed. It has already been of enormous service to the Uganda Protectorate, not only by lessening the cost of

transport across the Yaru desert, but by enabling Indian troops to be thrown into the Lake region in time to prevent the expulsion of the British authorities.

A short narrative of the events that led up to the crisis should here be given. In the summer of 1895 Major Cuninghame had led an expedition against the notorious Kabarega, King or Chief of Unyoro, and had broken up his following. But Kabarega succeeded in escaping with a considerable force across the Victoria Nile above Mruli, where the river makes a sharp turn after leaving Lake Kioga. In the morasses of the Wakedi country he found a safe refuge, and, as the Wakedi people gave the pursuing column much trouble, cutting up a large company of Waganda soldiers and badly harassing the expedition, his capture was impossible. He remained quiet until internal troubles, which he probably found the means of instigating, arose in Uganda. In November 1896, Mwanga, the King of Uganda, got himself into trouble with the Administration by smuggling ivory into German territory. The new Commissioner, Mr. Berkeley, who had succeeded Sir Henry Colville, fined him a thousand pounds and threatened him with deposition should he again misbehave. A few months afterwards a movement arose for overthrowing the European Administration. Its ostensible leader was a "Catholic" chief named Gabriel, but the king, who was Protestant, Catholic, or Mahomedan, according to the varying phases of Uganda politics, instigated the agitation. A rising ensued, which was promptly suppressed by the Soudanese troops and loyal Waganda. Gabriel, however, escaped southward to Buddu, on the north-western shores of the Lake, and there joined two hostile chiefs. A formidable revolt occurred in Buddu. Mwanga, either fearing for his own safety having regard to his complicity in the troubles, or thinking the time was ripe to throw off the British tutelage, secretly left his capital for the south. All the available troops were concentrated upon Buddu, including those who had been detailed to accompany Colonel Macdonald northward to join hands with the Anglo-Egyptians coming south from Khartoum. Meanwhile King Mwanga was formally deposed and his son, a boy of thirteen, installed in his place under a regency of nine loyal chiefs. The Buddu rising was suppressed, Mwanga having fled to German territory and being detained by the authorities there. But while these operations were going on—and they taxed the energies of every European in the

country to the utmost—various chiefs in Uganda proper revolted and Kabarega resumed his old activity in the north. By September, however, the Administration thought they could spare troops for the secret Imperial purpose Colonel Macdonald had been instructed to carry out, and Soudanese, who had been marched up and down the country in a series of fatiguing and dangerous operations were sent by rapid marches round the northern shore of the lake to Eldoma Station, on the eastern slope of the main escarpment. Shortly before reaching this fort some of them mutinied, their leader being Mahbruk Effendi, a Soudanese captain, who had hitherto done admirable work and was highly esteemed by his European superiors. The mutiny spread and shots were exchanged between the revolted troops and those who remained loyal to their European officers at the Ravine garrisons. Mr. Jackson, an Administration officer, visited the mutineers' camp and ascertained their grievances. These were, briefly, that they were tired of being marched about, that they were badly fed, that they were not to be allowed to take their women with them, that they were commanded by young and inexperienced officers who paid no attention to their complaints and "treated them like donkeys" and that they were nevertheless expected to go on a long and dangerous expedition into an unknown region. A settlement might have been come to with them had Colonel Macdonald remained at the Ravine Station for a month while the Soudanese women were brought from Kamputa and Lubwas; but this was considered to be impossible, apart from reasons of military discipline. Parleying with the mutineers led to no result and they marched off in high dudgeon into the Nandi country. Measures were concerted to confine them to that outlying part of the Protectorate where, it was hoped, want of food would bring them to reason; but they would not have been Soudanese if they had not been expert raiders. Starvation was as remote as capture. The immediate effect of the mutiny was to reduce Colonel Macdonald's force to seventy loyal Soudanese, and he had, of course, to abandon his expedition, with political consequences in the Nile Valley which have already been touched upon. From Nandi the mutineers made their way through Kavirondo, north and along the shores of the Lake, to Lubwas, close to the bay which has an outlet to the Victoria Nile. The Soudanese there also mutinied and were joined by a body of Mahommedan Waganda. Colonel Macdonald had followed the track of the mutineers, but did not catch them up before they reached the

Lubwas Fort. Major Thurston was in charge of the garrison there and was foully murdered, with two Protectorate officers, Mr. N. A. Wilson and Mr. Scott. Major Macdonald engaged the mutineers and defeated them at Lubwas; but the victory was incomplete. The infuriated Soudanese still held the fort; other Soudanese garrisons were restless and getting out of hand; and the Mahommedan Waganda were again giving serious trouble. Colonel Macdonald made an urgent request for five hundred East Indian troops. One hundred and fifty men with a maxim were sent up from the railhead in the East African Protectorate as soon as the disastrous news was known, and Lord Salisbury immediately ordered the despatch of a regiment from Bombay.

Until the arrival of these insignificant reinforcements the Protectorate officials, military and civil, were engulfed in a sea of rebellion, native and Soudanese. For a month communications with Uganda were interrupted. The mutineers at Lubwas were blockaded, but for lack of ammunition the place could not be stormed. It was held by at least three hundred Soudanese who, knowing that the murder of Major Thurston and his companions had placed them beyond the pale of mercy, were determined to sell their lives dearly. Leaving a force under Captain Woodward to keep the Soudanese within Lubwas, Colonel Macdonald left for Buddu, where the movement under Chief Gabriel and ex-King Mwanga had again assumed formidable proportions. The Soudanese garrison there seemed to have been on the point of joining Gabriel, but Lieutenant Hobart managed them so well that they inflicted a defeat upon the rebels. Meanwhile, however, Captain Woodward's task proved to be too great. Want of food compelled the mutineers to leave the fort. They escaped across the bay in a large dhow and several canoes on the night of January 9th, 1898, the boatmen of the blockading canoes being afraid to get within rifle range. Captain Harrison with two hundred loyal Soudanese and a thousand Waganda endeavoured to cut them off from crossing the Victoria Nile and thus reaching the hitherto loyal Soudanese garrisons in Usoga and Unyoro. He came up with them just south of Mruli, in North Unyoro, and after a gallant fight, in which Captain Maloney was killed, captured their stockade. The remnant of the mutineers took refuge in the swamps near Lake Kioga. The defeat appeared to be decisive and, thanks to the governing capacity and tact of Lieutenant Scott, Lieutenant Dugmore and Lieutenant Sitwell, the

Soudanese garrisons in Unyoro and Yoru had thus far been kept loyal.

But while the mutineers were being mastered to the north the situation in Buddu was critical in the extreme. Mwanga had drawn to his standard the Chief of Kijiba, a rebel from German territory, and with an army of Mahommedan Waganda, numbering three thousand guns, held the south-western part of the Protectorate. The German authorities supplied Colonel Macdonald with ammunition and thus enabled him to engage Mwanga, whom he defeated with great loss. By this time the regiment from India had arrived. The crisis was past. But not until 1897 was order re-established. The Soudanese mutineers had to be followed up from Lake Kioja northward towards the Shuli country. They were overtaken by Major Martyn late in 1898 and crushed. Kabarega also was at length captured and shot. The native rebellion in Buddu smouldered for a longer time but at last died out. How severe was the fighting during 1897-98 may be gauged by the fact that the Protectorate losses were 280 killed and 555 wounded. Among the Europeans who lost their lives was Mr. Pilkington, of the Church Missionary Society, a man whose goodness was equalled only by his courage.

Every European in Uganda behaved magnificently; as, indeed, did many of the Uganda chiefs and Soudanese. The Protectorate was saved by the energy and resource of a handful of young Englishmen. Colonel Macdonald and the Commissioner Mr. Berkeley were, however, sharply criticised in England. Blame cannot justly be attributed to them. They and their subordinates were confronted with circumstances of very great and exceptional difficulty. It is possible that Mr. Berkeley might have managed Mwanga differently—there is always someone who imagines that he can control a vicious brute better than the keeper for the time being. It may be that Colonel Macdonald should have appreciated the fact that the Soudanese were in a dangerous mental state after so much marching and so long an absence from their women-folk—there is always someone who understands the obscure mental processes of the lower races better than those for whom a failure in comprehension may mean death. But in difficulties such as arose in Uganda the men on the spot have to be trusted. If the officials erred at all it was in trying to do too much, in endeavouring to administer an enormous and, for the most part, a savage area with the instruments placed in their hands by the Imperial authori-

ties. Reinforcements, it was argued, should have been demanded at the outset of the trouble with Mwanga. No undue strain would then have been put upon the Soudanese companies which started the revolt. As the officials could not foresee the extent of the trouble caused by the Gabriel rising it is scarcely fair to censure them for not having immediately called for help. The fault lies less with them than with the authorities at home, who not only thought that the Lake region could be held securely with the existing inadequate forces but also that these could largely be subtracted from, immediately after their subjection to a great strain, for the purposes of a long and dangerous expedition into an unknown region. The entire succession of difficulties arose from a cheeseparating policy—from the delay of the Rosebery Administration in starting the railway from the coast, from the neglect of their successors in providing the Protectorate with sufficient means of defence against internal trouble until the railway should be completed, and facilities thus afforded for the rapid transit of troops and stores. The misfortunes that ensued were the direct consequence of running the outlying parts of the Empire on the cheap. There is, however, no reason at the moment to apprehend a recrudescence of rebellion. The Soudanese garrisons are no longer the potential masters of the country. They have been largely replaced by Indian troops. The staff has been strengthened. In the new Commissioner, Sir H. H. Johnston, the Government have found a man who was brilliantly successful in administering the turbulent region south of the German sphere, known as the British Central African Protectorate. He has been able to repress the disorderly elements in Uganda; and with a completed railway to the Lake and possible extension north in due course, it will become practicable to carry the *pax Britannica* to the yet wilder parts of the Protectorate through which Colonel Macdonald passed in the hope of coming into touch with the Anglo-Egyptians. The assertion of British dominion in this part of Africa, simultaneously with the extension of the Anglo-Egyptian authority throughout the Mudirieh of Fashoda, remains to be accomplished by the incoming Administration. The preliminary work has been done; and if the doing of it was delayed by untoward circumstances it must at least be admitted that those to whom it was entrusted acted with courage and fortitude worthy of the best traditions of their race.

CHAPTER V.

UNDEVELOPED ESTATES.

Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonies—Neglected Estates of Empire—The Plight of the West Indies—Sugar Planters' Views—Countervailing Duties—Class *versus* Common Interests—Appointment of a Royal Commission—Verdict against Countervailing Duties—Sir H. W. Norman Dissents—Conditions of the Problem—Special Responsibility of the Imperial Government—Action taken on the Report—Brussels Conference on Sugar Bounties—Why it Failed—Remedial Measures for the Islands—The Hurricanes—Grants from the Imperial Exchequer—Mr. Chamberlain as Administrator—Influence of the Sugar Planters—The Colony of Jamaica—The Railway Contract—Tariff Legislation—The Colonial Secretary and the Elective Members—Sir David Barbour's Report—Newfoundland—The Reid Contract—Mr. Chamberlain's acrid Criticisms—The Question of Disallowance—The Principle of Imperial Sanction—A Royal Commission Asked for and Refused—The French Shore Question—Royal Commission Granted—The Report Withheld.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN had not been long at the Colonial Office before it was seen that a vigorous mind was at work upon the problems of the hour. Events were to show that he had a comprehensive grasp of the responsibilities of his Department. His earlier speeches on Colonial topics were marked by breadth of view and originality of idea. While exhibiting a just perception of the need of strengthening the bonds that unite the great self-governing Colonies to the Mother Country he did not ignore the smaller and neglected possessions, ruled more or less directly from Downing Street. His watchword was the development of our Imperial estates, several of which, from economic causes, combined with official mismanagement, had either gone out of cultivation or had their resources neglected. The West Indies—the oldest group of our over-sea possessions—were in this plight. The islands were steadily on the decline. Even Trinidad and British Guiana—and this last colony may for convenience be grouped with the West Indies, though it forms part of the South American Continent—were becoming impoverished, and in a few cases were already bankrupt. The sugar planters attributed this wholly to their inability to compete with the bounty-fed beet sugar of Europe; and they had but one remedy—the imposition of a countervailing duty. Urgent representations were made to the Imperial Government and the Colonial

Office was deluged with memorials, petitions and the like from the Colonies themselves and from the West Indians—or, rather, the West Indian sugar interest—in London. Mr. Chamberlain received these appeals with sympathy, but did not use undue haste in accepting the proposed remedy. Very little study of the West Indian problem was sufficient to show that the matter was not so simple as the planters would have had the Government believe. Although countervailing duties might possibly, for the time being, enable this class to pursue their industry at a profit and thus benefit the populations whose livelihood, directly or indirectly, depended on sugar, the economic and social conditions of the Colonies loudly called for Imperial activity on a wider basis than that of arresting the diminishing rate of interest on capital invested in sugar estates. The planters were not the West Indies, though they had been accustomed to regard themselves as synonymous with everything worthy of Imperial attention in those regions, and had exercised a preponderating influence on the Colonial legislative bodies. Their interests had become those of a class rather than of a community. Since the days of slavery there had been brought into existence elements in the population which did not live by or for sugar, and for whose future it was as much an economic necessity to make provision as for the negroes who, it was alleged, would starve if the sugar mills ceased to work. There were, therefore, broader issues at stake than those which affected the planters and their dependents. The problem was not merely that of propping up the sugar industry, but of preparing for a collapse should any buttresses that might be used fail in their purpose.

In these circumstances Mr. Chamberlain obtained the appointment of a Royal Commission. It was composed of General Sir H. W. Norman, a former Governor of Jamaica, Sir Edward Grey, Sir David Barbour, an ex-Indian official of great financial and administrative experience; and Dr. Morris, of Kew, was attached to the Commission as expert adviser on the question of developing the latent economic resources of the Colonies. After an exhaustive study of existing conditions in the islands and in British Guiana the Commission declined to recommend countervailing duties as a remedy, Sir H. W. Norman, however, dissenting.* At the same time they declared that the abolition of the bounty system was an object at

* The work and conclusions of the Commission are described in detail in the author's "Politician's Handbook." Issue for 1899.

which Her Majesty's Government should aim, and that it was worth some sacrifice provided that it would not involve evils out of all proportion to those it was desired to remove—a point on which they were vexed with doubts. They did not altogether endorse the alarmist views of the planters as to the effects of a general failure of the sugar industry in those colonies where it continued to be the chief means of support. Such was the nature of the soil and climate that there was no likelihood of a permanent deficiency in the food of the labouring classes; but only by means of an export trade could prosperity be maintained at a level which would yield a revenue sufficient for the purposes of civilised government. The consequences of a large reduction in the sugar area, or of the extinction of the industry, would probably be of a very serious character. Until other industries could be established and fresh sources of private and public revenue thereby provided the work of the local government would be paralysed and it would be necessary for the Imperial authorities to come to their aid. The Commissioners believed that this crisis would be reached in a very few years. No industry or series of industries could be established in the room of the decadent sugar industry at once. How then could the mass of the population—chiefly negroes, of pure and of mixed blood, with a proportion of East Indians for whose return to India the Governments were responsible—support themselves otherwise than as labourers on the sugar estates? The answer to the question was in extending the system of peasant proprietorship which had been begun in some of the islands—in throwing open the Crown lands to the people and in teaching them what to grow upon them. For the latter purposes the Commissioners recommended the establishment of a Department of economic botany, with botanical stations and agricultural schools at convenient points. The fruit industry, which had already attained considerable proportions in Jamaica and Trinidad,—both of these islands having emerged from the state of total dependence upon the sugar cane,—offered the readiest means of livelihood for labour displaced by the decline in the sugar cultivation; and the Commissioners recommended that, with the object of establishing a fruit trade in the smaller islands, a subsidy should be granted for steamers which would give the necessary facilities of communication. On the question of administration they advised a more rigorous control of expenditure. In the Appendix will be found a summary of these conclusions; and from this it will be gathered that, during the transition from reliance

upon sugar to dependence upon industries yet to be developed and in many cases created, the entire group of Colonies,—with the possible exception of Trinidad and Jamaica and of British Guiana, should the gold industry undergo great extension,—are likely to be a burden upon the Imperial Exchequer for several years to come.

Sir Henry Norman's opinion was that this burden could be avoided by the levying of countervailing duties on beet sugar imported into the United Kingdom. The Commission therefore led to a discordant result. On the one hand the Imperial Government were advised to grapple with West Indian problems by giving the population facilities for becoming independent of the sugar industry and on the other to make a radical change in the fiscal system of the Mother Country. The first course would involve heavy and continuous expenditure for an indefinite period; and the second might not, after all, enable the sugar industry to continue, in which case the last state of the West Indies would be worse than the first. The central fact, however, was that whatever the Imperial Government did or failed to do it was in an especial sense responsible for the welfare of the West Indies. The population was for the most part brought there against its will. The slave system had grown up under the sanction of British Governments. The slaves had been freed by the Government, which had thus incurred obligations towards their descendants, from which escape was not possible. The East Indian element had been introduced under the authority of the Imperial Government; and if the planters could not fulfil their labour contracts and the local Government discharge the obligation of repatriation the Imperial Government would be bound to do so. The population could not in honour be allowed to starve, of which there was in reality no danger; and it could not be suffered to relapse into barbarism. A short-sighted and negligent statesmanship in the past had produced in the West Indies a crop of economic and social evils which were tolerable only so long as the sugar industry was fairly prosperous; and if that solitary pillar fell others would have to be erected at any cost, unless, of course, the Imperial Government repudiated its moral obligations to the inhabitants and abandoned the Colonies—a line of action not to be imagined, much less pursued.*

* One of the best works on the present social condition of the West Indies is "Black Jamaica: A Study in Evolution," by W. P. Livingstone. Though dealing with Jamaica alone, its description of the negro population has a general applicability to the entire West Indian group.

The Ministry took immediate steps to assist such of the Colonies as were in urgent financial need and Mr. Chamberlain used the Report of the Commission as an unanswerable argument for the calling of an International Conference for the abolition of the Bounty system. Lord Salisbury opened negotiations with the bounty-giving Powers and a Conference met at Brussels in June 1898, the English delegates being Sir F. Plunkett, Sir H. Bergne, Lord Ampthill, and Mr. E. C. Ozanne, with Sir Neville Lubbock and Mr. G. Martineau as expert advisers. The gathering did not, unfortunately, come to any agreement. The English delegates were not armed with the powers which might have led to a common understanding. They were unable to say that, unless the bounties were abolished, the English market would be barred to sugar producers who were recipients of bounties, by the levy of a countervailing duty equivalent to the advantages conferred by the country to which the producer belonged. Their instructions were to maintain an "attitude of reserve" because the Government hoped that the result of the Conference would "relieve them from the necessity of prosecuting any ulterior measures" if the system of bounties should be retained. The Conference had not gone far before the Continental delegates discovered that their British colleagues had no other weapon than arguments derived from political economy. Russia declared that her subventions to sugar producers were not bounties and that even if they were she had no intention of altering her existing legislation; and France followed suit by declining altogether to discuss certain specific abolition proposals. The breakdown was therefore complete. It was as clear as anything could be that if any change was to be made England would have to make it at the expense of the fiscal system peculiar to herself. Ministers shirked the issue before them—not from any pedantic regard for doctrinaire principles, but because it was highly doubtful, to say the least, whether the placing of countervailing duties would, in the long run, benefit the West Indies. For a few of the arguments that influenced them the reader should study the Report of the Commission, which sets forth certain considerations which bear upon the Colonial aspect of the question; and, as everyone knows, there is a home aspect also, involving the question of the cheapness of an article of prime necessity and the prosperity of important domestic industries such as confectionery and jam-making.

The bounty question being thus left open it remained for the Government to assist the West Indies on the lines of the Commissioner's Report. This was done by the creation of a Botanical Department with Dr. Morris at the head; by grants in aid of revenue to certain Colonies on the verge of bankruptcy; by the establishment of an inter-colonial steamer service as part of a project of assisting fruit culture; by a close check upon administrative expenditure, and by local legislation and public works facilitating settlement on unoccupied lands. All this was little enough in view of the ruin that seemed to be imminent when the Commission was appointed; but the Government acted with wisdom in avoiding panic measures. The sugar industry did not collapse when the hopes of the planters that the Brussels Conference would lead to the abolition of bounties, were dashed to the ground; on the contrary it showed signs of revival. A profit could still be made on those estates where cultivation and manufacture were conducted on scientific principles. So long as this state of things continued there was no necessity for reckless plans. Prudence lay in careful expenditure upon schemes to broaden the basis of prosperity in the sugar Colonies. Unhappily the efforts of the Government had to be redoubled. Hurricanes did enormous damage in some of the islands. Private charity was stimulated by the quickness with which Mr. Chamberlain recognised the need for help; but this did not prevent him from keeping a tight hand upon the allocation of the money contributed to the Lord Mayor's Fund. Barbados and St. Vincent were each granted a Hurricane Loan of £50,000 from the Imperial Exchequer; and in many ways the theory of Imperial responsibility for the people, whether their misfortunes arose from economic causes or from storm, was put into practice. But with that theory there went a more stringent control. Mr. Chamberlain's Despatches on various questions of finance and administration, first to one colony and then to another, disclosed an intention to secure for the West Indies a more business-like system of government and administration. The West Indies had enjoyed a degree of political liberty for which they were not entirely fitted. Institutions of a more or less representative character, on an extremely limited franchise, are not the best possible way of governing a mixed population, the bulk of it negroid and incapable of self government. Such modifications of the Crown Colony system as some of the islands possessed had been perverted by the planting interests to their own advantage. The unofficial

personnel consisted, for the most part, of the salaried servants of absentee estate owners; they were elected to vote sugar, and vote sugar they did with singleness of purpose. From this class statesmanship could not be looked for. Any legislation which threatened to touch their interest they fought tooth and nail. The lot of a Governor or other official person who incurred their displeasure was made unpleasant; and the West India Committee—their masters in London—had the means of bringing pressure to bear upon the Colonial Office in favour of sugar whenever the broader interests of the West Indian populations seemed to be in conflict with that privileged industry. Mr. Chamberlain saw that it was advisable to control the governing bodies. As an illustration of the personal authority and influence he threw into West Indian affairs the case of Jamaica may be mentioned.

Jamaica is a Colony that figures prominently in the early history of the Empire. The island politicians are disposed to think somewhat meanly of the Colonial Office and whoever may be at the head of it for the time being. They cannot forget that for two hundred years they enjoyed representative government. When their rights were abolished in 1866 they agitated until restoration was granted in 1884. Though intensely proud of their history and fervent in their expressions of loyalty to the Crown they cherish a sense of grievance against the Parent State. They have never quite forgiven the Imperial Government for compelling the acceptance of emancipation—and no wonder, for the Jamaican negro's independence is in inverse ratio to his industry and the abolition of slavery almost ruined the island. Lord John Russell's equalisation of the sugar duties still rankles in their memories. They cannot speak of the refusal of successive British Governments to put a countervailing duty on bounty-fed sugar from the Continent, without unreasoning anger. Some of them suspect that they would be much better off if the United States took over the island, and a few cranks have not hesitated to declare their preference for the Stars and Stripes. Seeing that, in their view, the Imperial Government has done so little for them they are hypersensitive on the subject of control from headquarters. They distrust and dislike the Colonial Office. An easily manageable set of gentlemen they are not. Nor have they such conspicuous ability that their little failings of temperament can be disregarded.

Since 1884 they have more or less bungled the business of

Government. In financial matters they have been reckless and imprudent. The ugly necessity of cutting their coat according to their cloth has been ignored. In 1889 they made a contract for railway extension which for some years cost the island at least £26,000 annually, in the form of the loss of railway revenue, and would impose on the finances a further burden estimated at £45,000 for the first year after the railway is taken over by the Government and of £35,000 in subsequent years. There was no corruption traceable in this matter. The elective members made up their minds that the contract as it stood was a good thing for the island and they insisted upon entering into it. Consequently, with excessive expenditure in the various departments of the Government the finances of the Colony fell into confusion and bankruptcy became imminent.

The fault was solely that of the elective members. They had absolute control over the finances and they had used their powers foolishly. Mr. Chamberlain summed up their misdeeds in a Despatch (November 30th, 1898) which in point of plain speaking is one of the best examples of his manner. And he sent Sir David Barbour to report as to the methods by which the financial tangle could be unravelled. Sir David Barbour's Report shows the folly of continuing representative government in a community which cannot produce a competent governing class. The reader of this chapter may be spared the details. Before the Report was delivered a new Tariff Bill was introduced by the Governor, Sir A. W. L. Hemming. The Elective members wished to postpone it, and, being in a majority, had the power to do so. Mr. Chamberlain insisted upon the first reading being obtained before the then Tariff expired, whereupon the Governor nominated four additional members.

There was a great outcry. Angry telegrams were sent to Mr. Chamberlain. He was unmoved, seeing "no reason to disapprove" of the Governor's action. Sir Augustus Hemming became a little uneasy about the agitation, or the Elective members realised that it was no use beating their heads against an adamant Secretary of State—either view is tenable. Negotiations for the removal of the deadlock were entered upon; the Electives gave pledges of good behaviour and the Governor withdrew the nominated members. Mr. Chamberlain was displeased. "Let it be clearly understood," he telegraphed, "that it is my instruction that Government measures when fully considered and judged of paramount importance must be

passed." Having thus dictated to the Electives the course they should pursue he rapped Sir Augustus Hemming sharply on the knuckles: "I defer making any remarks on the withdrawal of these four members . . . but the members should not have been withdrawn without my sanction." The Bill was passed and the Governor sent by mail a statement of the circumstances which induced him to retreat from the appointment of nominated members. "I will not withhold my approval of your having requested the four additional members to resign their seats" was all the comfort vouchsafed to him by Mr. Chamberlain. And in the same Despatch there was an implied threat to the Electives that dreadful things would happen if the necessity again arose to overcome their obstruction to measures thought by the Colonial Secretary to be imperative.

While the Elective members were smarting under Mr. Chamberlain's arrogance—as they chose to regard it—he was considering Sir David Barbour's Report. With one hand he made provision in the Colonial Loans Bill of the '99 Session for supplying Jamaica with over four hundred and fifty thousand pounds and, with the other, he made a drastic change in the constitution of the islands. "I must instruct you therefore," he wrote to Sir Augustus Hemming, . . . "to fill up the full number of nominated members and to retain them, using at your discretion, the power given by the Constitution to declare measures to be of paramount importance. You will give the Council and the public to understand that this step is taken by my express instructions." And again he threatened that even wider changes would be made. The effect of the above is, of course, that Mr. Chamberlain will have his own way. The Colony is as much under the control of the Colonial Office as if it had no elective system. All that the Secretary of State has to do is to instruct the Governor that this or that measure is necessary and the Governor will therefore pass it, in spite of the Electives, by a majority consisting of the official element and his own nominees. The vaunted political liberties of Jamaica can be suspended at any moment at the will of Mr. Chamberlain. And it is right that it should be so. The corollary of Imperial grants in aid is Imperial control.

If the historical importance of certain minor colonial questions warranted such a tax upon the reader's attention as would have to be made in however short a narrative of them, evidence could be accumulated of the vigour Mr. Chamberlain infused into the affairs

of his Department. Those whose special interest it is to watch colonial questions will recall a number of cases which attest the thoroughness with which the Colonial Secretary did his work. He was never at a loss for a policy and had no fear of the Treasury. It may safely be concluded that he did not obtain money from Parliament for grants to the West Indies, for railways and harbour works on the Gold Coast, at Lagos, on the Niger Delta, at Sierra Leone, in the Malay States, at Seychelles and at Cyprus without a sharp tussle with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was in these and the like practical expedients that the Chamberlain policy of developing the neglected estates of Empire took shape. It was a new policy in the minor possessions, which previous Governments had in too many cases treated on the principle that they were more trouble than they were worth; and though in some instances it is largely experimental the expenditure involved bids fair to be productive.


There was, however, one occasion when Mr. Chamberlain seemed to act in opposition to a policy of development; though in reality his objections were to the methods by which development was sought. The reference is to the case of Newfoundland and the Contract by which Mr. Reid, of Montreal, took over the railway, with vast land concessions, and practically undertook to "run" the island and develop its latent resources.* Newfoundland—as usual—was in financial difficulties. The Contract would enable it to meet its obligations. Pass the Bill and avert Bankruptcy, was the argument used in the House of Assembly by the Reid party. The Contract was approved, and the Governor urged to sign. He telegraphed for instructions. Mr. Chamberlain objected to the improvidence of pawning the island to Mr. Reid or to anyone else. The Ministry sent a long Minute which told him, in effect, that he could not understand a plain document. They dilated upon the attractiveness and the advantages of the million dollar bait which Mr. Reid dangled before the Colony. Mr. Chamberlain renewed his objections to a measure transferring "the future prospects and a great part of the present assets of the colony to a private individual," and disclaimed any responsibility for the Contract. When the full text of the Bill reached him, with Memorials for and

* The conditions of the Contract and the Correspondence between the Colony and the Colonial Office are summarised at length in the author's "Politician's Handbook." Issue for 1899.

against it and reports of the controversies it had excited, he wrote Despatches tearing the policy of the Contract to pieces. But he was not prepared to disallow the Bill. It was one of local concern. A self-governing Colony had got itself into a financial mess and if Ministers thought best to get out of it by mortgaging the future to a private person that was their concern and that of the people who elected them. Disallowance would only be promulgated in a case where Imperial interests were concerned or where a measure was so "radically vicious as to reflect discredit on the Empire." According to the Finance Minister, if the measure were rejected the Colony would be unable to pay its way. If the Queen annulled it the Imperial Government would find itself saddled with the claims of creditors whose security was solely that of the assets of the Colony. What the Despatch amounted to was that if the Newfoundlanders chose to manage their affairs badly and dispose of their assets in the hope of averting ruin they had the right to do so, that the Imperial authorities did not think the case so bad as to warrant a withdrawal of the self-governing privileges, but that they would take no responsibility in the matter. There is in these communications a strong undercurrent of annoyance, if not of contempt for what Mr. Chamberlain regarded as an unbusinesslike bargain; but Newfoundland politicians are tough of skin and do not seem to have cared much for the Colonial Secretary's reflections upon their capacity. They gave him yet another opening by passing Resolutions in the Assembly asking him to send a Royal Commission to the island; and they let it be known that their real object was, notwithstanding the Contract made with Mr. Reid, to dip their hands into the Imperial Exchequer. Then Mr. Chamberlain sent a Despatch which should have made their ears tingle. He refused the Commission. They had, he said, alienated the assets of the Colony; their request for a Royal Commission was only an appeal for financial assistance:—

"Such an application cannot for a moment be entertained and I request that you will at once inform your Ministers that it is impossible for the Imperial Government to take any responsibility, or accord any financial assistance, in the case of a self-governing Colony which has had full control of its finance and is solely responsible for its mismanagement."

Having delivered that blow from the shoulder Mr. Chamberlain allowed Sir H. H. Murray, the then Governor, to sign the Contract and the Bill became an Act. The case cannot be stated in a



manner likely to satisfy either those who favoured or those who opposed the contract. The subject is highly controversial. A writer who took a brief either for or against would have little difficulty in convicting either Mr. Chamberlain or the Newfoundland Ministers of a gross error of judgment. No verdict can be given until it is seen how far the Contract benefits Mr. Reid at the expense of the Colony or the Colony at the cost of Mr. Reid. Opinion must be held in suspense. It is sufficient for the purpose to show how masterly and decisive was Mr. Chamberlain's attitude and how arrogant and unpleasant he can be when he thinks himself warranted in playing the part of mentor. Another point may be made: disgusted as Mr. Chamberlain evidently was with the Contract, and with the cunning showed by the Newfoundland Ministers in attempting to get money from the Imperial Exchequer as well as from Mr. Reid, he nevertheless adhered to Constitutional principle. Newfoundland being a self-governing Colony, he did not, on the one hand, curtail its privileges, or, on the other, permit it to fumble in the pockets of the British taxpayer while retaining its rights. In this he showed the capacity of the statesman.

A Royal Commission was granted eventually. Further negotiations took place. A Newfoundland Mission came to England and bearded the Colonial Secretary in Downing Street. They made such representations as to the injurious effect of the Treaties with France upon the economic condition and future of the Island that a Royal Commission was constituted. For reasons of high State policy the Report was withheld. Apparently it will not see the light until some future Government is prepared to incur the risk of serious difficulties with France by making a proposal by which the limited but undoubted rights of that Power in Newfoundland can be bought out, or, failing an arrangement on a business basis, by taking action to limit the exercise of those rights by the French Admiralty and fishing fleet to whatever may be strictly allowable under a hard and fast reading of the Treaties. That, however, is a large subject which it will be discreet to leave alone until the Government permit the publication of the Royal Commission's Report. Though Mr. Chamberlain was annoyed with the Newfoundland politicians he was far too sensible to refuse to give ear to the grievances of the people, and, on Newfoundland representations, took the best preliminary measures open to him to relieve them of the incubus of the French Treaties. A feeble Colonial Secretary would have allowed

the Colonists to suffer under their wrongs—which is exactly what the Government had been doing, probably because there were more serious matters to settle with France in West Africa and the Valley of the Nile, and because of the all-absorbing nature of events in South Africa.

On the whole the record of the Administration in regard to the smaller Colonies is undeniably good. In the chapter upon India it will be seen that the passing of the Indian Sugar Duties Bill was due to Colonial Office representations on behalf of the sugar producers of Mauritius. The abolition of extraterritorial rights in Zanzibar, the division of the neutral zone in the Gold Coast Hinterland, the extension of the boundaries of Hong Kong, yield yet further evidence of the success with which Mr. Chamberlain has discharged the duties of his office.

BOOK VI.

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

CHAPTER I.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE BOERS.

The Overthrow of the Boer Republics—Issue on which the War was Fought—Sand River Convention—Did it confer Independence?—The Orange River Convention—Sir George Grey's Warnings—Stupidity in High Places—The Diamond Discoveries—Territory Filched from the Orange Free State—Lord Carnarvon's Federation Scheme—Miscarriage of the Proposals—The Sekukuni Peril—Annexation of the Transvaal—Mr. Kruger as Delegate—The Kaffir and Zulu Wars—Mr. Gladstone and Retrocession—Sir Bartle Frere and the Boer Demand for Independence—The Revolt in the Transvaal—Bronkhorst Spruit, Majuba Hill—The Pretoria Convention—Rights Retained by the Imperial Power—Revision Promised—Legislation Depriving British Subjects of Equal Rights in the Transvaal—The Negotiations with Lord Derby—Failure of the Chief Aim of the Boer Delegates—The New Convention—Omission of the word "Suzerainty"—The Delegates' False Report—The Final Position of the Disputants.

AFTER an arduous, bloody and costly war the Boer Republics in South Africa have been extinguished. The tragic story of this momentous achievement makes the Third Salisbury Administration memorable in the annals of the British Empire. The circumstances are too recent for their development to be described with dispassionate calm. Scrupulous fairness to both sides is an ideal that is difficult—nay, impossible—of attainment. An attempt should, however, be made to lay bare the causes of the conflict between the Franco-Dutch and British races without prejudice against the former, and to narrate the acts of the English Government in a manner free from party spirit. The fundamental cause of war was the claim of the South African Republic to absolute independence. That was the issue on which the war was fought. The acts of the outgoing Ministry resolve themselves into diplomatic resistance of the Boer claim and its final repudiation by force of arms. To this question of independence will the present chapter be confined.

By what right was the Boer claim asserted? The answer is to be found in three documents defining the relations between the inhabitants of the Transvaal and the British Power—documents which have meant one thing to the Boer mind and another to the British. The first is the Sand River Convention of 1852. British sovereignty had been formally asserted over the territory between the Orange and the Vaal Rivers, which was occupied by Boer emigrants, who had no form of government of their own and did not recognise that of their fellows across the Vaal. They revolted and were joined by a body of Transvaal Boers under Pretorius. Sir Harry Smith defeated the united forces at Boomplatz and Pretorius was declared an outlaw, sovereignty being re-established in the Orange territory. Three years afterwards the British forces were engaged in holding the Kaffirs in check on the eastern border of Cape Colony. Seizing his opportunity Pretorius renewed the demand of the Transvaal Boers for a recognition of independence and threatened to incite another insurrection in the Orange Sovereignty. Commissioners were sent to negotiate with him, the Home Government being consumed with anxiety to limit the responsibilities and expense of remaining in South Africa. The result was the Convention of 1852, on the basis of which the Boer communities across the Vaal eventually coalesced. Did this Convention give them absolute independence? The Boers say that it did; and this view is supported by the fact that though the British Government had hitherto claimed their allegiance it did not want to annex their territory. Or was it merely a gift of Home Rule within the Empire?

The Convention is inconclusive because of its limitations. On the one hand it "guarantees in the fullest manner to the immigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River the right to maintain their own affairs and to govern themselves according to their own laws without any interference on the part of the British Government." On the other hand it provided that "no slavery is or shall be permitted or practised in the country to the north of the Vaal River by the emigrant farmers," and that the Queen's writ should run in the Boer territories as against fugitives from justice. Obviously this Convention did not give the Boers beyond the Vaal the status of a Sovereign State, for they had fled beyond the jurisdiction of the British Crown chiefly because slavery was prohibited. It is, however, arguable that this prohibition in the Convention represented the condition on which such Sovereignty was granted. Be that as it may

the Boer interpretation of the Convention was that it definitively cut them off from the British Crown and left them free to do as they pleased; and the British Government at that time did not care what they did so long as they, as a Government, were put to no further trouble on their account. Two years later absolute independence was allowed to the Boers in the Orange River Sovereignty by a Convention so explicit that it does not admit of argument. Oddly enough the inhabitants of the Orange River territory did not want independence. They pleaded with the Home Government to keep the British Administration at work, sending delegates to London to urge their views. A motion was made in Parliament asking the Crown to cancel the renunciation of Sovereignty. It met with no support. Indeed, the House of Commons willingly voted nearly fifty thousand pounds as compensation to those who suffered from the retirement. Lord Aberdeen's Government was in the thick of the war with Russia. They were determined to lessen their obligations in South Africa at any cost. The result was that the inhabitants between the Orange River and the Vaal were "declared, to all intents and purposes, a free and independent people" and that "the future independence of the country and its Government" were guaranteed by Great Britain. Here also there was a prohibition of slavery, which, similarly with the case of the Transvaal, may be held to vitiate the absoluteness of the independence granted. The definite guarantee of independence, also, implied a certain superiority of relationship, inasmuch as the guaranteeing Power would have to undertake a protecting part against any who sought to overthrow that independence. That this possibility was present to the minds of the British Government is extremely unlikely. All that they cared about was to be rid of the trouble of administering the region, and to divest themselves of responsibility for the future of the intractable Boer immigrants from the Cape. On the whole it is not surprising that the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions were regarded as Charters of absolute independence. So far as the Transvaal Boers were concerned the Sand River document was the formal acceptance by the British Government of their repudiation of allegiance to the Queen. As such it was always regarded by Mr. Kruger, then a man of twenty-seven or thereabouts, who, as a child, had shared in the Great Trek and had been nurtured in hatred of British rule.

International dissensions and native wars brought the Transvaal community to the verge of ruin. The Home Government were heed-

less of the disorganisation beyond the borders of Cape Colony and Natal. Sir George Grey pleaded in vain for authority to knit the South African Colonies and States into a defensive whole against the warlike native tribes and to give them political and commercial homogeneity; and he warned the Government that if that course were delayed the time might come when the Boers would again find themselves in conflict with the Imperial Power and would carry with them their Dutch kinsmen in British territory. His warnings were ignored, his federation proposals were rejected and he was censured for lack of adherence to the non-intervention policy of Downing Street. Meanwhile the Boer farmers were organising themselves into Republics and there was an all-round industrial and political development in South Africa. Then came the discovery of diamonds where Kimberley now stands. The region was seized by Cape Colony on the ground of prior cession by the Griqua Chief, Waterboer; but it was unquestionably within the territory of the Orange Free State, to whom the sum of £90,000 was paid as compensation for the error. This was the first departure from the policy of a non-extension of the then Colonial boundaries and it carried with it a technical wrong to the Orange Free State. From this time forward the Home Government acted on the principle that the Boer communities should be governed with a view to the common safety of the various European communities. The Transvaal Government were quick to note the change. They claimed—and in this they were technically right—that the assumption of administration over Griqualand West was a breach of the Sand River Convention, by which the British Government undertook to make no encroachment upon the native territories north of the Vaal River. Their reading of the Convention, in fact, was that Great Britain was to stand still eternally and that they were at liberty to expand at will over the whole territory beyond the Orange and Vaal Rivers. An interpretation such as this would not have been objected to by the Aberdeen Government, but events had moved since then and the policy of the Imperial Government had undergone a radical change. Lord Carnarvon was enamoured of the Federation plan of Sir George Grey and sent Sir Bartle Frere to carry it out. The Transvaal had for years been in a chronic state of war with the natives and was at this time at the mercy of Sekukini. So weak had the Republic become that it constituted a danger to the other European communities, who were likely to be engulfed in destruction with them at the hands of the

Kaffirs. Sir Theophilus Shepstone was sent by Lord Carnarvon to the Transvaal to confer with Mr. Burgers, the then President of the Republic, on the Confederation plan; and he was given authority to make arrangements to bring the country under the British flag. The tangled story of the Confederation proposals need not here be told. They were designed to serve the double purpose of giving political homogeneity to the whites, whether of British or Dutch origin, and to put an end to the troubles with the natives, chiefly caused by the Transvaal Boers. A fortnight after Sir Bartle Frere landed at Capetown he learned that Sir Theophilus Shepstone, taking a liberal view of his instructions and acting independently of the new Governor, had issued a proclamation annexing the Transvaal.

This he had done with the consent of President Burgers and the leading Boers. No sooner was the Proclamation issued than Mr. Burgers and his friends drew back. A storm of dissent subsequently arose in the Transvaal. The mass of the Boers strenuously objected to the loss of their independence and they dispatched Mr. Kruger and Dr. Jorissen to England to obtain the cancellation of the annexation. With the army of Cetewayo on the south-east of the Transvaal and Cetewayo's "watchdog" Sekukuni on the north, retirement by the British Government was not possible unless they had been willing to allow the country to be overrun by the Zulu hordes, with the probable result that every homestead in South Africa would have been destroyed. But so long as this danger was imminent the Boers kept quiet. With the events of the Kaffir and Zulu wars we are not immediately concerned. From the date of the annexation in April 1877 there was no open hostility in the Transvaal to British rule until the subjugation of the natives was completed. Meanwhile Federation had been rejected by the Cape Parliament and that policy had become impracticable. The first mission of Mr. Kruger and Dr. Jorissen for the re-establishment of independence had failed. A second was now sent, with Mr. Kruger at its head. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach had succeeded Lord Carnarvon as Colonial Secretary and he also declined to yield to their representations, advising them to persuade the Transvaalers of the hopelessness of disaffection. The mission was not, however, without results. Members of the Liberal Party took up the cause of the Deputation and in the autumn of 1879 Mr. Gladstone accepted it as a plank in the Liberal programme, denouncing the annexation in vigorous language and urging the justice of retrocession. In the

spring of that year the disaffected Boers had gathered in force north of Natal and had succeeded in imposing their views upon such of their fellow countrymen as were well-disposed towards the British Administration. The camp of the malcontents was visited by Sir Bartle Frere in April and a conference with the leaders was held, Piet Joubert and Mr. Kruger taking a leading part. The Boers demanded independence; Sir Bartle Frere declared that the annexation was irrevocable. He was prepared only to ascertain what their wishes were as to their future government under the Crown. The Conference broke up on an understanding that Sir Bartle Frere would communicate their views to the Home Government. This was done and Sir Bartle Frere wrote to the Secretary of State accordingly. The accuracy of this communication was vouched for by the marginal signatures of certain of the Boer leaders—among them Mr. Kruger. For present purposes it is sufficient to quote three paragraphs. "They (the Boers) desire that their independence may be freely and unreservedly restored to them. They desire nothing more in the shape of concession and they cannot be satisfied with anything less. By 'independence' they understand the same entire freedom from all control in choosing their own form of Government, and their own administrative machinery, as was guaranteed to them by the Sand River Convention of 1852."

When Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Pretoria at the end of the year he publicly declared that as long as the sun shone the Transvaal would remain British territory. The Boers, however, clung to the idea of independence and prepared for revolt. They waited until the General Election in England had passed. Expecting that Mr. Gladstone's policy when in power would be the same as that which he had advocated in Opposition, they appealed to him to undo the act of annexation. He declined to advise the Queen to grant their request. The Boers proclaimed their independence on December 16th, 1880. On the 20th they surrounded a small British column at Bronkhorst Spruit, opened a deadly fire upon it and compelled its surrender. Reinforcements were sent to the Transvaal from Natal and on February 26th suffered a disastrous defeat at Majuba Hill. Though Sir Evelyn Wood had sufficient troops with which to crush the revolt Mr. Gladstone stayed his hand and opened negotiations with the rebels. The result was the conclusion of the Convention of Pretoria, 1881.

Thus far we have seen that absolute independence was the fixed

idea in the Boer mind before and after the Sand River Convention. To obtain it again after the annexation they had negotiated and fought. Did the Convention of Pretoria restore it to them? The answer is in the negative. It merely granted to them "complete self-government, subject to the Suzerainty of Her Majesty," upon specified terms and conditions and subject to express limitations and reservations. Apart from the Suzerainty laid down in the Preamble the following were the principal rights retained by the Crown: The appointment of a British Resident with the right of veto over legislation affecting the natives; the right to move troops through the Transvaal in time of war or apprehension of war between the Suzerain Power and any Foreign State or native tribe; the control of the external relations of the Transvaal, including the conclusion of Treaties and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with Foreign Powers, such intercourse to be carried on through Her Majesty's diplomatic and consular officers.

This was nothing more than a measure of local autonomy. It was signed by the Boer triumvirate rather than renew the war and incur certain defeat. Mr. Kruger, one of the signatories, apologised for it to the Volksraad on the ground that it represented the best terms they could then obtain. The discussions in the Volksraad revealed strong exceptions to the conditions which limited the independence conferred. The speakers did not repudiate the Suzerainty so much as object to the stipulations by which that Suzerainty could be made operative. Telegraphic communications were opened with Mr. Gladstone in the hope of inducing him to abandon the control of foreign relations and abolish the right of the Resident to interfere in native legislation. Mr. Gladstone's Government declined to alter the Convention but suggested that if it did not work well future revision would be considered. Thereupon the Volksraad ratified the arrangement, and set to work to obtain revision by the invention of grievances. While conforming also to the letter of the Convention legislation was passed depriving British residents in the Transvaal of the equality of rights secured to them by that document.

The Boer leaders kept steadily in view the ultimate independence of the country and, on Mr. Kruger's first election to the Presidency in 1883, Dr. Jorissen was sent to England to ascertain whether the fetters provided by the Convention were likely to be removed. Lord Derby was then Colonial Secretary and amiably consented to discuss any required modifications in the Convention. Mr. Kruger and

others thereupon came to London. They told Lord Derby that they objected to the Pretoria Convention *in toto*, but would be willing to accept a treaty of amity and commerce—as between two independent Powers. They, in fact, regarded themselves as the emissaries of an independent Power, as is plain from the points of their case. These were that the Pretoria Convention was not the result of free negotiations but a unilateral document framed by a Royal Commission on which the Burghers were not represented; that it was merely of a temporary character and had been ratified by the Volksraad with the object of averting bloodshed; and that to work it had become impracticable. They asked that it should be swept away altogether and the suzerainty with it, and Great Britain and the Transvaal should enter into a Treaty arrangement on the basis of international law. Lord Derby may have been a very weak man but he was not so weak as to establish an entirely new relation with the Transvaal Boers, placing them in a position of international equality with Great Britain in South Africa. He was prepared to revise the Convention with the object of getting rid of any practical difficulties, and even—unfortunately—to go a long way to gratify the sentiments of the Boers; but farther than this neither he nor Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet would travel. The main purpose of the Boer mission, which was to secure freedom to revert to the independence guaranteed by the Sand River Convention, therefore failed at the outset. The Convention was not abrogated. It was merely supplemented by certain new provisions.

On the terms of the amendment there was much “slim” manoeuvring by the Boer delegates. They appear to have thought that if they could not obtain complete independence by the cancellation of the Pretoria Convention that object would be achieved, or nearly so, by the disappearance of the words Suzerainty or Suzerain Power from any revision of that Instrument. They at first sought to have embodied in the revision a formal revocation of the suzerainty. But Lord Derby would not consent—not, as the interpreter to the Boer delegates thought, because the Suzerainty was a matter of no importance, but, as Sir R. G. W. Herbert, of the Colonial Office, who was present at the interviews, said, because he had previously declined to consider any new arrangement as between equal contracting Powers. In any case the word Suzerainty did not appear in the revision agreed upon—known as the London Convention, February 27th, 1884. The Boer delegates thought, or pretended to

think, that because it was not mentioned the relationship had thereby been ended. But the London Convention is not an abrogation of the Pretoria Convention; it is a supplement to it, for it provides merely for the substitution of the *Articles* of the Pretoria Convention by new Articles. The preamble of the Pretoria Convention, containing the grant of "complete self-government subject to the Suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors" is left intact. No part of it appears in the London Convention. If because of the absence of the Suzerainty declaration from the new document the declaration ceased to have any force in the old and still continuing document, then by parity of reasoning "complete self-government" went the way of the Suzerainty. If one fell the other fell also. The London Convention demonstrates, however, that neither disappeared. Independently of the fact that the preamble stated that the "following articles . . . shall be substituted for the articles" in the Pretoria Convention, the "following articles" contained express evidence of the retention of the Suzerainty as well as the continuance of the grant of "complete self-government" subject to the conditions in those articles. Article IV. for example stipulated that the South African Republic "will conclude no treaty or engagement with any State or Nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen." Yet in the face of this article the Boer delegates reported on their return to the Transvaal that the New Convention abolished the Suzerainty! On that report the Volksraad ratified the new Convention; and articles were written in the Dutch newspapers which disseminated the totally erroneous impression that the Queen had abandoned the Suzerainty. The Boer delegates had obtained many things—the reduction of the British resident to the status of an agent with functions analagous to those of a Consular officer, freedom to conduct negotiations with Foreign Powers, the withdrawal of the right to move British troops through the Republic; and they seem to have thought that having obtained so much they might just as well act on the assumption that they had obtained everything—that their independence was absolute and unfettered. Events were to prove that they could not act upon that assumption with impunity. That, however, opens out another aspect of the question. The purpose this chapter is designed to serve is to demonstrate that throughout the relations between the Transvaal

Boers and Great Britain the steady aim of the former was independence without any limitations whatever. Their object in each of the three Conventions was to exact from Great Britain recognition of their pretensions to be a Sovereign State. In none of the Conventions did Great Britain make that recognition. The first contained the nearest approach to recognition. It was superseded by the Convention of 1881, which asserted a definite Suzerainty over the Republic; and though the operative effect of that Suzerainty was lessened in certain specified respects by the substituted articles of the London Convention, the Suzerainty itself remained. The position subsequent to the London Convention was that though the Republic was an autonomous State for internal purposes, it was not independent. Boer politicians, however, assumed that it was so—ambition being the basis of their error. Athwart the ground to be traversed before the goal of an absolute independence could be reached was the barrier of the Suzerainty.

CHAPTER II.

A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.

Mr. Chamberlain's Early Relations with Mr. Kruger—Closing of the Drifts—The Colonial Secretary's Threat—Mr. Kruger Gives Way—The Johannesburg Uitlanders—Racial and Political Animosity—The Great Conspiracy—Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Beit—The "Jumping Off" Place—Dr. R. Harris and the Colonial Office—What Passed or did not Pass in Downing Street—A Question of Veracity and Personal Honour—Transfer of the Bechuanaland Strip—Progress of the Conspiracy—Mr. Rhodes and Sir Graham Bower—An Astonishing Pledge—Mr. Newton's Silence—How the High Commissioner was Kept in Ignorance—The British Public Tricked—A Fraudulent Letter—The Signatories Thereto—The Compact on the Flag—When Conspirators Fall Out . . .—Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Leonard—according to Mr. Leonard—Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Harris and the Colonial Office—Dr. Jameson Instructed to Wait—He Refuses, and Cuts the Wires—Sir Graham Bower's Belated Confession—The High Commissioner's Action—Mr. Rhodes' Advice Rejected—The Fraudulent Letter Published in England—A Lady's Part in the Plot—The Intrigue Against the High Commissioner—Mr. Chamberlain's Action—Dr. Jameson Refuses to Return—Dr. Jameson Defeated at Krugersdorp—A Humiliating Surrender—The Invaders in Pretoria Gaol—A Befeared Public's Excitement—The Re-action—The Floundering of the Reform Leaders in Johannesburg—The High Commissioner, Mr. Kruger and the Johannesburg Capitalists—An Unconditional Surrender—Sir Jacobus de Wet—The Reform Leaders and the Safety of their own Skins—The Alleged Pledges of the British Agent—Transfer of Dr. Jameson—Arrest of the Reform Ringleaders—The German Emperor's Message—Mr. Kruger's Reply—Exasperation in England at German Interference—A Flying Squadron Ordered—The Danger Passes—Mr. Kruger's Assurances to the Uitlanders—Their Limitations—The High Commissioner's Attitude—Mr. Chamberlain's Disappointment—"The Root Causes Remain"—The High Commissioner Declines to Go On—His Reasons for Inactivity.

ONE of Mr. Chamberlain's earliest duties as Secretary of State for the Colonies was to authorise the High Commissioner for South Africa publicly to convey to President Kruger the expression of most friendly feelings towards the Government and people of the Transvaal. The occasion was the official opening at Pretoria of the railway to Delagoa Bay. His next important act was to protest against the closing of the Vaal Drifts, which had been ordered by the Transvaal Executive so as to divert traffic to the Bay and give the monopoly of the land trade to the Netherlands Railway. This was a flagrant breach of the London Convention, which gave all persons other than natives full liberty to enter, travel and reside in

the Republic, and hold property and carry on commerce and industry therein. Mr. Chamberlain carried his point by a threat of war openly communicated to the Transvaal. For the first time Mr. Kruger learned that henceforth he had a strong personality to reckon with in Downing Street and that conformity with the spirit as well as the letter of the Conventions would be required of him. He found an excuse for suspending the proclamation closing the drifts; trade across the Vaal then resumed its normal course. Meanwhile the Uitlander population of Johannesburg, which in a single decade had reached the number of sixty thousand, and paid nine-tenths of the taxation of the entire State, was seething with discontent because of the persistent refusal of the Boer oligarchy to reform an administration notoriously oppressive and corrupt. Their dissatisfaction culminated in a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic and led to a war which annihilated the Boer ideal of sovereignty throughout South Africa. The subject is many-sided. Its adequate treatment would demand an examination of the political, industrial and social condition of the Transvaal, and more especially of the Rand, during the growth of the gold industry; but with this we are now concerned only so far as it bears upon the conduct of the British Government. The object in view is to describe what was done by the Salisbury Administration rather than the causes which made action of some kind imperative. It will suffice to say at present that the course pursued by Mr. Kruger and the Executive had throughout been one of undisguised hostility to the Uitlander population; that the Boer dislike of the immigrants from whose industry the Republic derived enormous financial and other benefits was heartily reciprocated; and that on both sides there was an ill-will so intense that the prospect of preserving the peace was almost hopeless even at the time of the General Election of '95.

The originators of the conspiracy to overturn the Boer Government were Mr. Cecil Rhodes, then Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and a Member of the Privy Council, and Mr. Alfred Beit, a German subject carrying on business in London and having large interests in the mining industry of the Rand. Mr. Rhodes was also Director of the South African Chartered Company, with full power from his Directors to do as he pleased, the head of the De Beers Mining Company, and Managing Director of the Goldfields Company at Johannesburg. Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Beit met at the Cape in May, 1895, and discussed the part they should play in

the affairs of the Transvaal, deciding to "assist" Johannesburg in view of a rebellion there at the end of the year. Mr. Beit went to Johannesburg and laid the joint scheme before his partner, Mr. Lionel Phillips, and Mr. Leonard, a solicitor who was Chairman of the National Union, a local body formed with the object of obtaining redress for the grievances of the Uitlanders. Mr. Phillips at first thought that the better course was to spend ten or fifteen thousand pounds "to improve the Raad," but subsequently agreed to violent methods. The course determined upon was to arm Johannesburg, promote a rising there and, simultaneously with the rising, to invade the Transvaal from the west with the military police of the Chartered Company under Dr. Jameson, the Administrator. According to Mr. Rhodes a provisional government was to be established in the event of success and a vote taken as to whether the Transvaal should form one of the States into which South Africa would be federated, or be a separate entity under the British Crown.

In furtherance of the conspiracy Mr. Rutherford Harris, the South African Secretary of the Chartered Company, was sent to London by Mr. Rhodes to obtain the transference of a portion of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the Chartered Company, ostensibly for the sole purpose of a railway through the strip which would connect the Cape Colony with Rhodesia, but also for acquiring the land to be used for a "jumping off place" for the Company's troops intended to be used for the invasion of the Transvaal; and Colonel Frank Rhodes, brother of Mr. Rhodes, was sent to Johannesburg nominally as Manager of the Consolidated Goldfields Company but really to make the military preparations for the rising. It was left to Mr. Harris's discretion to communicate to the Colonial Secretary the use to which the Bechuanaland strip was to be put in the event of trouble in Johannesburg: his purpose, in fact, was to "sound" Mr. Chamberlain and enlist him in the conspiracy if that could be done. He had various interviews with Mr. Chamberlain in the presence of Lord Selborne, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies, and obtained the required transfer of part of Bechuanaland. There is a conflict of evidence as to what passed. He declared that he made statements to the effect that if a rising took place in Johannesburg the Chartered Company's forces would be on the Transvaal border and would not stand by and see the Uitlanders tightly pressed. Neither Mr. Chamberlain nor Lord Selborne heard these words, or anything

like them. They declared that Mr. Harris remarked that he could tell something in confidence, whereupon Mr. Chamberlain stopped him and said he would not hear any confidential communication; that he was there in his official capacity and that he could only hear information of which he could make official use. As Mr. Harris afterwards insisted in the Select Committee that he had given Mr. Chamberlain to understand that one of the reasons why the transfer was required was to provide a suitable "jumping off place" for an invasion of the Transvaal, and that he had spoken in the same sense to the late Mr. Fairfield, the head of the South African Department of the Colonial Office, and as Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Selborne were confident that no such statement had been made, the inference to be drawn is unfavourable to Mr. Harris. Let it be assumed that he had unconsciously deceived himself into thinking that he had communicated part of the conspiracy to the Colonial Office, when he had not in reality done so. It is not necessary to conclude that he lied to his employers when he telegraphed to Mr. Rhodes that the Colonial Office knew of the ulterior purpose for which the territory was wanted; he may merely have been honestly mistaken, accepting for a fact what he wished to believe. But no one can conclude from the evidence that Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Selborne, and Mr. Fairfield had the slightest idea that it was intended to use the strip as a "jumping off place" and that that was one of the reasons why the transfer was asked for. The conspirators, however, acted as though the Colonial Office knew and approved—or, at least, did not withhold approval.

The transfer having been granted the conspiracy was perfected. Arms and ammunition were purchased in large quantities by Mr. Harris with the moneys of the Chartered Company and diverted from Rhodesia, their supposed destination, to Johannesburg, being smuggled thither through the instrumentality of the De Beers Company; stores were collected at stations on the route which the Chartered Company's force would have to take from the west; and the troopers were brought down to the border. By the beginning of December arrangements were far advanced alike for the rising and the invasion. They were conducted with absolute secrecy as against the British Government; but Mr. Rhodes furnished Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary to the High Commissioner, with an outline of what was intended, having, however, first obtained a pledge of secrecy from him—a pledge that in no circumstances such as these

should have been observed. Mr. Newton, the Chief Magistrate in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, had also been informed of the reason for concentrating the Company's forces on the Transvaal frontier and had weakly promised to keep silence. The High Commissioner was thus cut off absolutely from the only sources from which he was likely to derive information, for to none of his colleagues in the Ministry did Mr. Rhodes disclose his intentions. And in furtherance of the plot it was thought desirable to trick the British public.

Dr. Jameson went to the Transvaal to make final arrangements with the Johannesburg leaders towards the end of November and a letter was concocted there signed by Charles Leonard, Lionel Phillips, Francis Rhodes, John Hays Hammond and George Farrar, inviting him to invade the Transvaal. He was to date the letter and publish it at the moment he made his movement and as justification for the invasion. "What," said the letter, "will be the condition of things here in the event of a conflict? Thousands of unarmed men, women and children of our race will be at the mercy of well-armed Boers, while property of enormous value will be in the greatest peril It is under these circumstances that we feel constrained to call upon you to come to our aid, should a disturbance arise here. The circumstances are so extreme that we cannot but believe that you and the men under you will not fail to come to the rescue of people who will be so situated. We guarantee any expense that may reasonably be incurred by you in helping us, and ask you to believe that nothing but the sternest necessity has prompted this appeal." With this letter in his pocket Dr. Jameson returned to the frontier. While he was waiting there for the date provisionally arranged by the plotters dissensions arose in Johannesburg. The nearer they came to the execution of their enterprise the less attractive did it seem. Fear took possession of their souls—or, as they would prefer to put the matter, they could not agree among themselves whether or no the British flag should float over Johannesburg. They differed among themselves over the results of a rebellion they had not the nerve to lead. According to Mr. Leonard there was a compact with Mr. Rhodes that the Union Jack was not to be hoisted. Mr. Farrar, however, knew that Dr. Jameson intended to float the flag. Mr. Rhodes either did not care about the point one way or the other or chose to ignore the compact, for he had represented to his agent in London by telegraph: "Of course would not risk everything as I am doing, except for English flag." If this was meant in good faith

towards those in high places in England to whom Mr. Harris had discretionary powers to reveal part of the plot the conclusion follows that Mr. Rhodes was negligent in informing the Johannesburg leaders of his change of front. This difficulty as to the flag was brought to light on the 25th December—only three days before the time for the seizure of the Pretoria arsenal, the rising in Johannesburg, and the inrush of the Chartered Company's troopers from the Bechuanaland border. Mr. Leonard was sent post haste to Capetown to Mr. Rhodes with instructions to insist on the compact that the British flag should not be hoisted; and Dr. Jameson was instructed to remain where he was until further advised. Mr. Rhodes seems to have assured Mr. Leonard that there was no reason to distrust his intentions as to the flag and to have arranged with him to postpone the rising until January 6th, to allow of further arms being smuggled into Johannesburg. Dr. Jameson was informed of the delay and urged to wait; a messenger from the Johannesburg branch of the conspiracy reached him with instructions to postpone the invasion; but he took the matter into his own hands. "I shall leave to-night, Transvaal," he telegraphed to Capetown. "My reasons are, final arrangement with writers of letter was that without further reference to them. . . . I was to take my troops immediately to prevent loss of lives, as letters state." And leave he did, taking the precaution first to cut the telegraph wires.

Mr. Rhodes telegraphed: "on no account whatever must you move. I most strongly object to such a course;" but that message could not be sent. The position therefore was that while the Johannesburg leaders were disunited on the question of the flag—which furnished a convenient excuse for backing out of the conspiracy at the last moment—Dr. Jameson and his troopers were riding hard across the veldt in defiance of their wishes. The 29th was a Sunday. Late that night Mr. Rhodes sent for Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary, and told him that Dr. Jameson had announced his intention of invading the Transvaal that evening and that he (Mr. Rhodes) had been unable to telegraph the message to stop him because the wires were down—and it was part of the conspiracy that they should be cut at the moment of departure. Early the next morning Sir Graham Bower told the High Commissioner what he knew. Lord Rosmead—Sir Hercules Robinson as he then was—immediately telegraphed to Mr. Newton, the Chief Magistrate at Bechuanaland to send a special messenger on a fast horse to overtake Dr. Jameson and order him to

return. And he urged Mr. Rhodes to co-operate in obtaining Dr. Jameson's return and to make a public disavowal of complicity with him—a course also pressed upon Mr. Rhodes by his colleagues in the Ministry. Mr. Rhodes would, however, do nothing of the kind. He wished the High Commissioner to delay the issue of a proclamation ordering British subjects to abstain from aiding and abetting Dr. Jameson in his act. Lord Rosmead sent out this proclamation on the 31st. Meanwhile Mr. Harris had telegraphed from Capetown to Miss Shaw, the concocted letter of the Johannesburg leaders to Dr. Jameson, and on the 31st he sent instructions for its publication.

The part played in the conspiracy by Miss Shaw was peculiar. As a writer for the *Times* newspaper she had the usual facilities of access to Colonial Office information and was also in touch with Mr. Harris. When he returned to the Cape he made use of her as a confidential press agent. She knew what was intended to be done and was in telegraphic communication with Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Harris during December; and Mr. Rhodes seems to have been under the delusion that she was able to influence Mr. Chamberlain. No inkling of the conspiracy, however, reached Mr. Chamberlain or the authorities of the Colonial Office from her. "Inform Chamberlain," telegraphed Mr. Rhodes on the 30th, "that I shall get through all right if he supports me, but he must not send cable like he sent to High Commissioner in South Africa. To-day the crux is. I will win and South Africa will belong to England." And on the next day: "Unless you can make Chamberlain instruct the High Commissioner to proceed at once to Johannesburg the whole position is lost." The lady did not communicate these cables to Mr. Chamberlain: Mr. Rhodes had evidently sent them under a complete misapprehension of her position in that quarter. She showed them, however, to the *Times*, and in the issue of January 1st the concocted Johannesburg letter was published by that journal. It follows that at the very time Mr. Rhodes was refusing to co-operate with the High Commissioner to secure Dr. Jameson's recall the plotters were endeavouring to mislead the public in England, by the publication of this letter as to the cause of the invasion, and sought to make use of Miss Shaw to induce Mr. Chamberlain to support them rather than the High Commissioner.

Immediately the news of the Raid reached Mr. Chamberlain he sent peremptory cables to the High Commissioner, to Mr. Rhodes

and to Dr. Jameson ordering the force to return. Dr. Jameson had taken with him four hundred and eighty men, eight maxims and four field pieces. The mounted messenger sent at the instance of the High Commissioner on Monday, the 30th, overtook the column at mid-day on Tuesday. The only answer given was that the Despatches would be attended to. The Boer Commandant of the district, who had protested against the invasion was informed by Dr. Jameson in writing that he intended to proceed. The column moved forward. On Wednesday it was met by despatch riders from the British Agent at Pretoria commanding their return. Dr. Jameson replied that having finished supplies in the rear he "must perforce proceed to Krugersdorp or Johannesburg." At three p.m. on Wednesday, January 1st, Krugersdorp was within sight. Here a body of armed Boers in sheltered positions contested the advance. A fight ensued until after dark, and the troopers were compelled to fall back to higher ground. Had they pushed on to Johannesburg by the main road during the night they would probably have reached the town. They camped and in the morning found themselves in a disadvantageous position with a large force of Boers with artillery and maxims opposed to them. The famished and weary troopers attacked the Boer position in vain and to avoid a useless loss of life ran up the white flag, offering to surrender on a guarantee of safe conduct out of the country for every member of the force. The Boer Commandant—P. A. Cronje—offered to spare the lives of the force on their surrender with their arms and on an undertaking to pay the expense caused to the Republic. This offer was accepted and the surrender took place, other Boer Commandants coming on the scene and disputing Cronje's right to guarantee the lives of the force. The captured troopers were escorted to Pretoria and there confined.

The news of the invasion of the Transvaal for the reason given in the fraudulent letter in the *Times* was received with frantic delight at home. Ignorant as the public necessarily were of the duplicity practised upon them by Mr. Rhodes and his associates, the act had all the appearance of a chivalrous intervention to save the women and children of Johannesburg from a Boer massacre. The heart of England beat fast with hope for the success of the enterprise. The wish was almost universal that the order for recall would be disobeyed, that Dr. Jameson would enter Johannesburg in triumph, and that the outcome would be the overthrow of the Boer Republic.

Dismay and humiliation succeeded to this feeling when it became known on January 3rd that the force had suffered defeat, that a score of the troopers lay dead on the veldt, and that the whole column was in durance. Why, it was asked, had not Johannesburg come to their aid? It had not done so because the leaders thought they had done enough by telling Dr. Jameson to postpone his coming; the fact that he had come notwithstanding, and by coming held them to their arrangement with him, was not regarded by them as creating an overmastering necessity to stand or fall by him. They were unequal to the crisis for which they had prepared for months past and which Dr. Jameson had merely precipitated by a few days. There may be, of course, some excuses for them, such as can always be found for men who are unwilling to stake their own lives while imperilling the lives of others; but the fact remains that though they knew that Dr. Jameson was coming they did nothing to help him. Those of the leading citizens of Johannesburg who were responsible for the conspiracy were destitute of any capacity to lead. Was there not a proclamation by the High Commissioner calling upon them to abstain from aiding Dr. Jameson? Disobedience to that command would probably have meant death for some of them in the open with Jameson's troopers; obedience to it meant at least a hope that they would escape the worst consequences of their conspiracy. So, instead of fighting, they sent a whining telegram to the High Commissioner appealing to him to protect them lest they should be shot at sight by the Boers who, they learned, had been commandeered to attack the town; and they had the astounding impertinence to put this appeal on the ground that they had for years agitated constitutionally for their rights.

Under leadership such as this the town fell into terrible confusion. The Transvaal Executive acted with firmness and decision and demanded that all arms should be given up. On the night of January 4th the High Commissioner arrived at Pretoria. The position then was that the Boer military preparations for the subjugation of Johannesburg, should that course be necessary, were completed. On the 6th the High Commissioner met the President and Executive Council. He expressed to them on behalf of Her Majesty's Government "sincere regret at the unwarrantable raid by Jameson" and thanked the Government of the Republic "for the moderation shown under trying circumstances." The President announced to him the decision as regards Johannesburg, which was that it must

lay down its arms unconditionally as a precedent to any discussion of grievances. To this ultimatum a reply was demanded—a plain Yes or No—within twenty-four hours. Lord Rosmead transmitted this ultimatum to the Reform Committee through Sir Jacobus de Wet and privately advised compliance. The Uitlander leaders, fortified by the strong feeling of anger and shame which events had caused in the town, so far recovered their courage and self-respect as to hesitate to make an unconditional surrender. The High Commissioner informed them through Sir Jacobus de Wet that if they did not comply they would forfeit all claim to sympathy from Her Majesty's Government and that the lives of Jameson and the prisoners "practically" depended upon their decision. There was a good deal of discussion between the Reform Committee and Sir Jacobus, the object of the leaders being to obtain guarantees from him of the personal safety of those who had taken an active part in the plot. Care for their own skins was a feature of their conduct throughout.

There was a conflict of evidence between them and Sir Jacobus de Wet upon the assurances alleged to have been given by the latter; but, in any case, those assurances could not bind the Boer Government. The end of the parley was that Johannesburg surrendered unconditionally so far as the Boer Government was concerned. But that the members of the Reform Committee alleged that they were under the impression, in consequence of what the British Agent had said, that the Imperial Government accepted responsibility for their liberty in consideration of their compliance with the High Commissioner's advice to make the unconditional surrender demanded in the Boer ultimatum. After the surrender the Boer Government notified that Dr. Jameson would be handed over to Her Majesty's Government; and it issued a proclamation exempting from prosecution all who had laid down their arms "except all persons and Corporations who will appear to be the chief offenders, ring-leaders, leaders, instigators, and those who have caused the rebellion at Johannesburg and suburbs. Such persons and Corporations shall have to answer for their deeds before the legal and competent Courts of this Republic." The result was that sixty members of the Reform Committee were arrested and lodged in Pretoria Gaol.

Mr. Chamberlain had intimated to Mr. Kruger through the High Commissioner that Dr. Jameson and those who had taken a leading part in the Raid itself would be brought to trial in England.

It was at first rumoured that they would be shot in Pretoria; but Mr. Kruger denied this and, in a telegram to the Colonial Secretary, made a justifiable attack upon Mr. Rhodes, whom he suspected—wrongly, as was proved to him—of preparing another invasion of the Transvaal. Mr. Kruger required that all the raiders, not the officers alone, should be tried, the alternative being a trial at Pretoria. Mr. Chamberlain sent an imperative telegram saying that serious consequences would ensue unless the original pledge to hand over the whole force was fulfilled. Mr. Kruger then gave way and Mr. Chamberlain, by command of the Queen, expressed satisfaction that he had decided to hand over the Raid prisoners to the British Government. "This act," he said, "will redound to the credit of your Honour and will conduce to the peace of South Africa and to the harmonious co-operation of the British and Dutch races, which is necessary for its future development and prosperity." The Jameson force was then dispatched to Durban.

Before the negotiations had reached this fairly satisfactory stage the German Emperor almost blundered into war with England. Sharing the extravagant delight with which the German people learned of the defeat and surrender of Dr. Jameson's force he telegraphed in hot haste to President Kruger. "I express to you," he said, "my sincere congratulations that without appealing to the help of friendly Powers you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed band which had broken into your country and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression." This was a clear recognition of the Boer claim to sovereign independence and a plain offer of help in any future emergency against England. It seemed to point to the establishment of a German Protectorate over the Transvaal if that would be thought desirable at Pretoria, as Germany had reason to believe it would be. But Mr. Kruger had no intention of leaping out of the English frying pan into the German fire. Independence was his aim—independence that should bring with it a realisation of the Afrikander dream of a Dutch supremacy not only in the Transvaal but throughout South Africa. That was an issue between him and England alone. He did not want Germany or any other Power to take a hand in working it out on the soil of South Africa, however gladly he would welcome moral support from England's rivals and such help as could be derived from the active thwarting of English policies in the world. The unjustifiable in-

vasion had of itself enormously weakened the Suzerainty of England and he saw no need for German help in disregard of whatever latent strength there remained. So, in sending "very deep and heartfelt thanks" to Berlin he remarked that, with the help of God, he and his people "hoped to do everything further that is possible for the holding of our dearly-bought independence and the stability of our beloved Republic,"—using, be it observed, the language of a Sovereign State, and conveying a plain hint that ambitions for its absorption into the Colonial system of Germany would be met with resistance, however specious the expressions of friendship in which they were disguised.

The Emperor's message excited intense irritation in England, where it was believed that only the defeat of Dr. Jameson's force had prevented the sending of instructions from Berlin for the landing of marines from German warships in East African waters and their conveyance to Pretoria under the pretence of protecting the German Consulate. Negotiations had, indeed, been opened with Portugal for the use of her territory; and there can be little doubt that intervention was contemplated by the Emperor. The British Government promptly avowed a determination to prevent German interference by forming a flying squadron to proceed either to South Africa or to strengthen the fleet elsewhere; and as the lately organised Channel Squadron was then in British ports the Admiralty was in a position to move an overwhelming naval force against Germany at any point against which operations might become desirable. At the same time troops on their way home from India were ordered to call at the Cape and preparations made which convinced the world that the German Emperor's message was interpreted as having created an emergency of the first magnitude. Germany professed to regard these precautions with profound surprise, and so did the other Powers of Europe, whose ill-will took the form of violent denunciations of the raid and denial of the British Suzerainty. But there were no further developments. Germany saw that any attempt to assert a *locus standi* in the Transvaal would inevitably lead to war—that we were ready to enter the lists with any Power which desired to challenge our supremacy in South Africa. The timeliness of the lesson was not lost upon the world, and though Germany accepted it with ill grace the Emperor subsequently made such amends as were possible. Throughout the war in South Africa he imposed neutrality

upon the German Government in the teeth of the wishes of his people.

Sir Hercules Robinson, it will have been seen, had prevented the Raid from leading to further bloodshed after the battle at Dorn-koop. He had obtained the release of Dr. Jameson and his force on the understanding that the principals should be tried in England; he had induced Johannesburg to disarm, and he had received assurances from Mr. Kruger that the grievances of the Uitlanders should receive the consideration due to them. These assurances had been made public in a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Rand, in which Mr. Kruger made an eloquent appeal to them to live fraternally with the Government of the Republic. Though his promises were vague their scope was wide and his intentions seemed to be sincere. "For months and months," wrote the President, "I have thought which alterations and emendations would be desirable in the government of this State, but the unwarrantable instigations, especially of the press, have kept me back:"—

It is my intention to submit a draft law at the first ordinary Session of the Volksraad whereby a municipality with a Mayor at its head, will be appointed for Johannesburg, to whom the whole Municipal Government of the town will be entrusted. According to all constitutional principles such a Municipal Council should be appointed by the election of the inhabitants. I ask you earnestly, with your hand upon your heart, to answer me this question: Dare I, and should I, after all that has happened, propose such to the Volksraad? What I myself answer to this question is, I know that there are thousands in Johannesburg to whom I can with confidence entrust this right to vote in municipal matters. Inhabitants of Johannesburg, make it possible for the Government to appear before the Volksraad with the motto, "Forget and Forgive."

The definite promise was as to municipal matters alone: no hint was given that any larger reform, giving the Uitlanders political rights, would ever be conceded. The omission was in accord with the Krugerian policy of keeping the Uitlanders within but apart from the State—as a mere revenue-producing community; and it was in diametric opposition to the changes sought on their behalf by the British Government. It passed unnoticed by the High Commissioner. He was probably disgusted with the Raid, with the criminality of its promoters, with the folly and ineptitude of Johannesburg, with the deceit that had been practised upon him. In all likelihood he thought he had done all that could be expected of him in rescuing the lives of the invaders and in saving

Johannesburg from the Boer guns; perhaps, also, he believed that President Kruger meant what he said in his proclamation about forgetting and forgiving, and that things would come right after the passions aroused by the revolt and the invasion had subsided. Whatever he thought he did not press upon Mr. Kruger the need of a comprehensive settlement with the Uitlanders. He made no effort to obtain the extinction of grievances by an admission to political rights. The time was unpropitious. The circumstances of his visit to Pretoria were such as to deprive him of whatever sympathy with the Uitlanders he may previously have entertained. Moreover, he was in very indifferent health. None knew better the difficulty—nay, the impossibility—of persuading President Kruger to agree to a root and branch reform of the Administration; and he did not attempt the impossible. Leaving his task unfinished he turned his face southward. Mr. Chamberlain, however, was dissatisfied with his partial success. He did not see much that was of practical value in the “Forget and Forgive” Proclamation. He telegraphed to Sir Hercules Robinson asking what had become of telegrams in which he had pressed for a settlement of grievances and for explanations of the arrests of the Johannesburg Reform leaders. To these he had received no reply; but he assumed that negotiations were proceeding upon them with the President. “There can,” he said, “be no settlement until the questions raised by these telegrams are disposed of” :—

“The people of Johannesburg laid down their arms in the belief that reasonable concessions would be arranged by your intervention; and until these are granted, or are definitely promised to you, by the President, the root-causes of the recent troubles will remain. The President has again and again promised reform and especially on 30th December last, when he promised reforms in education and the franchise; and grave dissatisfaction will be excited if you left Pretoria without a clear understanding on these points. Her Majesty’s Government invite President Kruger, in the interests of the South African Republic and of peace, to make a clear declaration on these matters. . . . It will be your duty to use firm language, and to tell the President that neglect to meet the admitted grievances of the Uitlanders by giving a definite promise to propose reasonable concessions would have a disastrous effect upon the prospects of a lasting and satisfactory settlement.”

That duty the High Commissioner did not discharge. He answered the telegram while he was *en route* to Cape Town. He thought it would be inopportune to communicate Mr. Chamberlain’s message to the President. Nearly all the leading men of Johannes-

burg were in gaol on a charge of treason; it was rumoured that the Government had written evidence of a long-standing and widespread conspiracy to overturn the Government and incorporate the country with that of the British South African Company; the truth of these reports would be tested in the Boer courts of law; "and meanwhile to urge claims for extended political privileges for the very men so charged would be ineffectual and impolitic."

The chagrin with which Mr. Chamberlain received these excuses may be imagined. The High Commissioner had, in effect, declined to carry out his instructions. It was in vain that Mr. Chamberlain pointed out to him that though the moment was not opportune the arrest of a few score individuals out of a population of seventy thousand or more on the supposed existence of a plot amongst the minority was no reason for denying the reforms. "Whatever may be said about the conduct of a few individuals, nothing can be plainer than that the sober and industrious majority refused to countenance any resort to violence and proved their readiness to obey the law and your authority." He hoped, therefore, that the High Commissioner would resume discussion with the President and did not see that the matter need wait until the trial of the supposed plotters. And he asked for an answer to a Despatch of an earlier date in which he had indicated the reforms that were to be obtained. But Sir Hercules Robinson was not to be moved. He had communicated that telegram to the President, he said; "but the question of concessions to Uitlanders has never been discussed between us." Nor was he disposed to obey. "Pending result of coming trials, and until the extent to which Johannesburg is implicated in the alleged conspiracy to overturn the State is made clear, the question of political privileges would not be entertained by the Government of the South African Republic." After sending that message he appears to have thought that he stood in need of further excuse, for on the same day he sent another, in which, though he offered to advocate the claims of the Uitlanders as soon as he thought that could be done with advantage, he urged that "the present moment is most inopportune, as the strongest feeling of irritation and indignation against the Uitlanders exists. . . . Any attempt to dictate in regard to the internal affairs of the South African Republic at this moment would be resisted by all parties in South Africa and would do great harm."

Clearly, nothing further could be done with the then High

Commissioner. A younger and stronger man was needed. Without such a man in South Africa Mr. Chamberlain's efforts to secure a redress of grievances were certain to fail. That they did fail and that, therefore, the Transvaal was enabled to become a still more powerful military State, was a misfortune to which the weakness of the late Lord Rosmead materially contributed.

CHAPTER III.

SOME EFFECTS OF FAILURE.

The Queen's Speech—The *London Gazette* Despatch—"A Clear and Unequivocal" Declaration—Self-Government for the Rand—Mr. Chamberlain's Arguments—Invitation to Mr. Kruger—Krugerian Sensitiveness—Mr. Rhodes' Flying Visit to England—The Matabele Rising—Cause and Effect—The Trial of Dr. Jameson and his Officers—Verdict and Sentences—No Raid no War—No Raid no Matabele and Mashona Rising—Massacres of White Settlers—The Matoppos Hills—Mr. Rhodes in Rhodesia—His Negotiations with the Natives—The Inquiry into the Raid—Report of the Select Committee—Censure of Mr. Rhodes—Was Mr. Chamberlain Privy to the Raid?—Missing Telegrams—Mr. Hawkesley's Refusal to Produce—The Conclusions of the Committee—Mr. Labouchere's Dissenting Report—Is Mr. Rhodes a Statesman?—Some Considerations bearing upon that Question—Mr. Chamberlain's Certificate of Character—A List of Questions—The *Independence Belge* Letters—A Conclusion—subject to the Production of New Evidence—The Trial of the Reformers—The Sentences and Fines—Mr. Kruger's Attitude towards Johannesburg—Retirement of Sir Jacobus de Wet—Death of Lord Rosmead—Appointment of Sir Alfred Milner as High Commissioner.

THE Queen's Speech at the meeting of Parliament in February, 1896, promised a searching inquiry into the origin and circumstances of the invasion of the Transvaal. Mr. Kruger was complimented upon having acted with "moderation and wisdom"; but he was pointedly reminded of his voluntary assurances that grievances would be redressed. Alike in words and in acts the Government had shown that their policy was that of an effective exercise of the rights of a Suzerain Power, notwithstanding the wrong done to the Transvaal by the Rhodes-Beit conspiracy. In the succeeding chapter the steps taken by them to exact from Mr. Kruger specific performance of his obligations and fulfilment of his promises will be passed in review: for the moment attention will be devoted to such of the consequences of the failure of the plot as fell within the scope of Government action. Just before Parliament met Mr. Chamberlain published in the *London Gazette* a Despatch to Mr. Kruger. In an exhaustive statement he showed conclusively that the British Government had no part or lot in the incursion or in the revolution in Johannesburg, and that the transfer of the Bechuanaland strip to the Chartered Company was made in good faith by the Colonial Office and, so far as Mr. Chamberlain knew or

suspected, had no connection with the state of affairs in the Republic. He had, in fact, been tricked; and this he made clear to the President.

From this point he went on to draw a distinction between the mass of Uitlanders and the minority who had sought to overthrow the Government of the Transvaal by force; and he argued that the fact that the few had been engaged in a treasonable conspiracy was no reason for denying reform to the many. The Despatch contained a "clear and unequivocal" declaration of the position Her Majesty's Government claimed to hold towards the Republic. Since the Convention of 1884 the Republic had been a free and independent Government as regards all its internal affairs; but, as regards its external affairs, it was subject to the control of Great Britain in accordance with the provisions of Article IV. There was, said Mr. Chamberlain, no reason to expect that any foreign State would dispute our rights; but it was necessary to state clearly that Her Majesty's Government intended to maintain them in their integrity. As regarded the internal affairs of the Republic, independently of any rights of intervention arising out of the Articles of the Convention, Great Britain was justified, in the interests of South Africa as a whole, as well as the peace and stability of the Republic, in tendering its friendly counsels as regards the new comers, who were mainly British subjects. Then followed a recapitulation of the grievances of the Uitlanders—naturalisation, franchise, education, finance, the right of free speech, State monopolies of necessities, labour supply, railway administration, police oppression and the like. These grievances, he admitted, could not be redressed without extensive changes in the law, which would be unpalatable to the more Conservative section of the burghers: he had therefore considered whether they could be met without weakening the institutions of the Transvaal or interfering with the burgher administration of affairs. As the Uitlanders were massed on a limited area and as President Kruger had promised Municipal Government to the Rand, he suggested, as one way of meeting the difficulty, that the whole of the Rand district should be given something more than a municipality, as that word is ordinarily understood; that in fact it should have a modified local autonomy, with powers of legislation on purely local questions, subject to the veto of the President and the Executive Council of the Republic, and should levy its own taxation subject to the payment of an annual tribute to the Republic, revised

periodically so as to accord with the increase or decrease in the mining district. Under this scheme the Rand would have a superior court of its own, would control its own civil police, its education and all other matters affecting its internal well-being. It would be an autonomous district, having no voice in the General Legislature, the Central Executive or the election of the President. Acceptance of the plan would, Mr. Chamberlain pointed out, relieve the burghers of the haunting fear that the Uitlanders would upset the Republican form of Government if they were admitted to a share in the Administration of the State; and he concluded by saying that he would be glad to have the opportunity of discussing the subject with the President "if it suited his convenience and if he were agreeable to come to this country for the purpose."

Mr. Kruger took umbrage at the publication of this Despatch in London before its terms had reached him. He solemnly reproved Mr. Chamberlain by publishing a reply in the *Staats Courant* condemning the "new diplomacy." As for the invitation to meet Mr. Chamberlain he inquired whether any modification of Article IV. controlling the foreign relations of the Republic would be included in the subjects for discussion. A firm but polite negative was sent. Mr. Kruger, nevertheless, was for a time disposed to visit England. He thought better of that intention. Apart from the profound distrust he entertained of Mr. Chamberlain personally—and evidence has since been forthcoming to show that he believed Mr. Chamberlain had foreknowledge of the conspiracy and the invasion and was merely a tool of the Rhodes-Beit combination—his place was in Pretoria. The burghers needed him. Affairs were still dangerously unsettled. There was no one he could safely leave in control of the Republic. Mr. Chamberlain's scheme for a settlement of the Rand difficulty by the creation of an autonomous but tribute-paying district fell stillborn. Mr. Kruger would not reply to it because of its premature publication; and he eventually declined to come to England to talk about it or about anything else. Not even a tender inquiry by Mr. Chamberlain concerning the health of Mrs. Kruger mollified the offended President. A deadlock had been produced, the true cause of which was not in the premature disclosure of Mr. Chamberlain's proposals of reform but in the intense suspicion that had been engendered in the Boer mind by the events of the Raid and the supposed complicity of the Colonial Secretary.



In the meantime Mr. Rhodes had come to England "to face the music" and Dr. Jameson and his officers were brought to London under arrest. Mr. Rhodes had resigned the Premiership of Cape Colony and it was expected that he would make to the Chartered Company a speech which would contain a defence of his proceedings. He stayed in London only four days, having interviews with Mr. Chamberlain and his co-directors, and then, without breaking silence, hurried back to South Africa, where the Matabele had risen in consequence of the withdrawal of the Chartered Company's forces for the purposes of the Raid. He was deprived of the means of committing further aggression upon the Transvaal by the Crown taking over the military bodies in the service of the Company and resuming possession of the Bechuanaland border. The arrival of Dr. Jameson and his officers was followed by a preliminary hearing of the charges against them under the Foreign Enlistment Act. Committal followed in the case of Leander Starr Jameson, Sir John Christopher Willoughby, Bart. (who had had the military command of the expedition), Henry Frederick White, Raleigh Grey, Robert White and Charles John Coventry, the last five having been at the time officers in Her Majesty's Army. The ten counts of the indictment resolved themselves into a charge that within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions and without the license of Her Majesty, they prepared and fitted out a military expedition to proceed against the dominions of a friendly State. The trial was transferred from the Central Criminal Court to the High Court and the Bench was composed of the Lord Chief Justice (the late Lord Russell of Killowen), Baron Pollock and Mr. Justice Hawkins. The evidence added nothing new to the main outlines of the story of the conspiracy and the Raid. A verdict of guilty was the only possible result. The Court sentenced Jameson to fifteen months' imprisonment, Sir John Willoughby to ten months, Robert White to seven months, and Raleigh Grey, Henry White and Charles John Coventry to five months, without hard labour in each case. In passing sentence, the Lord Chief Justice, in a brief address, of great dignity and restrained feeling, commented upon the gravity of the offence. The consequences of most crimes, he said, ended with the actual facts which constituted the crime itself. In this case the immediate consequences were known. The crime of the prisoners had led to the loss of human life, the disturbance of public peace, the creation of a sense of distrust of public professions and of public faith, for they were men of position

and confidence and authority in the service of the Queen. Whether the consequences ended there he would not stop to inquire.

Had there been no Raid there would have been no war—certainly no war on a great scale such as England and the Transvaal have lately waged. Even if this is too sweeping a generalisation it is beyond dispute that there would have been no Matabele and Mashona rising which could not easily have been suppressed. The measures taken to stamp out rinderpest in Rhodesia of necessity meant the slaughter of cattle belonging to the natives and added another to the tolerably long list of grievances against the rule of the Chartered Company; but the fact remains that the subjugation of these warlike tribes had been incomplete and that they seized upon the withdrawal of the Company's military force as presenting an opportunity for ridding their country of the whites. The revolt began in the massacre of white settlers in various parts of the country and by March the whole region was in insurrection, and Buluwayo and Gwelo, whither the whites from outlying districts had fled, were surrounded. Earl Grey had been appointed by the Company as Administrator in succession to Dr. Jameson, Colonel Sir Richard Martin was sent out as Deputy High Commissioner and Sir Frederick Carrington was given command of the military forces. The natives gathered in strength in the Matoppo hills and these were invested by a chain of posts and were the scene of many engagements. A heavy battle was fought in July among the kopjes near Inyati and another in August, Colonel Plumer succeeding in breaking up two powerful impi. The natives then retired to the caves in the deepest recesses of the hills and from them kept up a desultory warfare.

Mr. Rhodes had gone from England to Rhodesia "almost," as Mr. Chamberlain said, "as a private individual." He had no official position of any sort, having resigned the managing directorship of the Chartered Company. To judge by the panegyrics of his admirers he himself suppressed the rebellion and the Imperial officers played by comparison an insignificant part. That version of events is an exaggeration. Mr. Rhodes gave material help, his presence in the country which bore his name giving the settlers new hope against their native foes. He accompanied the troops throughout the campaign and took his share of the hardships and risks of death. After Colonel Plumer's second engagement the chance fell to him to render an important service. To rout out

the Matabele from the caves would have meant prolonging the operations to the following year, at an enormous expense to the Chartered Company. The question was whether they could be persuaded to submit. Mr. Rhodes volunteered to try and Sir F. Carrington accepted the offer. With Mr. Johann Colenbrander, as interpreter, Dr. Hans Sauer, Captain Stent and two natives, he camped at the foot of the hills for a night. The next day the party rode into the Matabele stronghold to parley with the chiefs. They went in unarmed and came out uninjured. The Matabele had had their fill of fighting. They were only too pleased, it appears, at the chance of laying their grievances before the man whom they regarded as the king of the whites. Moreover, their supplies were exhausted; the time for sowing had come round and they were desirous of peace. The preliminaries for a cessation of hostilities were arranged and for some weeks Mr. Rhodes encamped in the hills while they were finally settled. It was a plucky thing for any man to do; and Mr. Rhodes was probably the only white man in the country with sufficient confidence in his personal power over the natives to attempt it with any hope of success. On the other hand it can never be forgotten that he was personally responsible for the withdrawal of the Company's armed forces to the Transvaal border; and that their absence from their posts led to the massacre of scores of white settlers, and the heavy loss of life among the whites and the Matabele and Mashona in the subsequent fighting. The rising was not the least deplorable consequence of the Rhodes-Beit conspiracy.

Inquiry into the origin and circumstances of the Raid was made by a Select Committee, composed of Sir Richard Webster, the Attorney-General, Mr. Bigham, Mr. Blake, Mr. Sydney Buxton, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Mr. Cripps, Sir William Hart Dyke, Mr. John Ellis, Sir William Harcourt, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Labouchere—who in the Debate on the Address had vigorously denounced the invasion on the ground that its object was to put up prices on the Stock Exchange—Mr. Wharton and Mr. George Wyndham. It had to report not only on the Raid but also into the Administration of the British South Africa Company and to say what alterations were desirable in the Government of the territories under the control of the Company. It met at the close of the 1896 Session, was re-appointed, after slight opposition, at the beginning of 1897 and reported on July 13th of that

year. Mr. Rhodes attended and gave evidence, frankly accepting the position of principal and responsibility for the acts of those who served directly or indirectly under his orders. The Report censures him in uncompromising language :—

“ Mr. Rhodes occupied a great position in South Africa ; he was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and, beyond all other persons, should have been careful to abstain from such a course of action as that which he adopted. As Managing Director of the British South Africa Company, as Director of the De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Gold Fields of South Africa, Mr. Rhodes controlled a great combination of interests ; he used his position and those interests to promote and assist his policy.

“ Whatever justification there might have been for action on the part of the people of Johannesburg, there was none for the conduct of a person in Mr. Rhodes' position, in subsidising, organising, and stimulating an armed insurrection against the Government of the South African Republic, and employing the forces and resources of the Chartered Company to support such a revolution. He seriously embarrassed both the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and his proceedings resulted in the invasion of the territory of a State which was in friendly relations with Her Majesty, in breach of the obligation to respect the right to self-government of the South African Republic under the Conventions between Her Majesty and that State. Although Dr. Jameson 'went in' without Mr. Rhodes' authority, it was always part of the plan that these forces should be used in the Transvaal in support of an insurrection. Nothing could justify such a use of such a force, and Mr. Rhodes' heavy responsibility remains, although Dr. Jameson at the last moment invaded the Transvaal without his direct sanction.

“ Such a policy once embarked upon inevitably involved Mr. Rhodes in grave breaches of duty to those to whom he owed allegiance. He deceived the High Commissioner representing the Imperial Government, he concealed his views from his colleagues in the Colonial Ministry, and from the Board of the British South Africa Company, and led his subordinates to believe that his plans were approved by his superiors.

“ Your Committee have heard the evidence of all the Directors of the British South Africa Company, with the exception of Lord Grey. Of those who were examined, Mr. Beit and Mr. Maguire alone had cognisance of Mr. Rhodes' plans. Mr. Beit played a prominent part in the negotiations with the Reform Union ; he contributed large sums of money to the revolutionary movement, and must share full responsibility for the consequences.

“ There is not the slightest evidence that the late High Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Rosmead, was made acquainted with Mr. Rhodes' plans. The evidence, on the contrary, shows that there was a conspiracy to keep all information on the subject from him. The Committee must, however, express a strong opinion upon the conduct of Sir Graham Bower, who was guilty of a grave dereliction of duty in not communicating to the High Commissioner the infor-

mation which had come to his knowledge. Mr. Newton failed in his duty in a like manner.

"Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor any of the officials of the Colonial Office received any information which made them, or should have made them, or any of them, aware of the plot during its development.

"Finally, your Committee desire to put on record an absolute and unqualified condemnation of the Raid and of the plans which made it possible. The result caused for the time being grave injury to British influence in South Africa. Public confidence was shaken, race feeling embittered, and serious difficulties were created with neighbouring States."

Was Mr. Chamberlain privy to the Raid? The Committee did not have before it every scrap of evidence bearing upon that question, for some of the duplicates of the telegrams which had passed between Mr. Rutherford Harris in London and Mr. Rhodes at the Cape, which were alleged to bear out Mr. Harris's belief that he had acquainted Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Fairfield and Sir Robert Meade, of the Colonial Office, with the real reason why the transfer of the Bechuanaland strip was desired, had been destroyed in the ordinary way of business by the telegraph company; and others, which were in the possession of Mr. Hawkesley, as Mr. Rhodes's solicitor, Mr. Hawkesley declined to produce. Such telegrams as were forthcoming did not incriminate the Colonial Office; they merely went to show that those persons, outside the Colonial Office, to whom they were sent, or who saw them, had been given to understand by Mr. Harris that the Colonial Office was "in it." Had the Colonial Office been "in it," as Mr. Harris seems to have believed, would Mr. Rhodes, who by the time this question was reached in Committee was again in South Africa, have made no use of the telegrams?—not for his own benefit but for those of his subordinates who had to bear the punishment for his offence as well as their own in English prisons. Undoubtedly the telegrams should have been produced. Parliament should have compelled their production. So long as they remain undisclosed there will be a suspicion that the full story of the Raid and of the relations of the Rhodesians with the Colonial Office has not been disclosed. A mistake was made in not probing the matter to the bottom. The result was to intensify Mr. Kruger's distrust of the Colonial Office and to make Mr. Chamberlain the target of insinuations for which there was no sure evidence. That, however, is a question which has filled a disproportionate space in public discussion. Party feeling has been imported into it so freely

that the central fact has been obscured. And this fact is that the Committee came to the conclusion that the only persons in the service of the Queen who had any foreknowledge of the invasion were Mr. Newton, the Chief Magistrate of Bechuanaland, and Sir Graham Bower, Imperial Secretary to the High Commissioner. These officers were censured for a grave dereliction of duty in not acquainting the High Commissioner with the information that had been imparted to them; but the Committee declared that there was not the slightest evidence that Lord Rosmead knew of Mr. Rhodes' plans. "The evidence, on the contrary, shows that there was a conspiracy to keep all information on the subject from him." Nor, they declared in their conclusions, did the Secretary of State for the Colonies or any of the officials of the Colonial Office, "receive any information which made them, or should have made them, or any of them, aware of the plot during its development."

Mr. Labouchere was not of that opinion. In an elaborate and ingenious report, framed with the cleverness and plausibility which make the writings of Mr. Labouchere so attractive to his political opponents, he made a scathing exposure of the unverity and deceit which some of the conspirators had practised; and he defined the object of the Raid and the rising to be that certain wealthy men might become more wealthy. This report, which was rejected by the Committee, the only vote for its acceptance being that of Mr. Chamberlain himself, also analysed the evidence as to the relation of the Rhodesians with the Colonial Office in such a way as to suggest that the latter did possess the knowledge Mr. Harris believed he had imparted to Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Fairfield; and it regretted that "the alleged complicity of the Colonial Office has not been probed to the bottom." Mr. Labouchere, however, in his eagerness to impugn the motives of the Raid and to prove that it was solely due to the desire of "certain wealthy men to become more wealthy," had overreached himself by accusing Mr. Harris of having formed part of a syndicate in the autumn of 1895 to "bear" the shares of the Chartered Company and of having himself sold shares in turn to the syndicate. Having made this charge on wrongful information he apologised to Mr. Harris, and the evidence of the latter, which of course was on oath, that he had had no part in any such transaction, was accepted by the Committee. Mr. Labouchere, in fact, failed to establish his principal points—that the Raid had its origin in a base desire on the part

of the capitalists for immediate pecuniary gain and that the Colonial Office knew, in a general way, what was about to happen in the Transvaal.

It is impossible to believe that the Colonial Office did know. Nor is it necessary to assume that Mr. Rhodes was influenced only by sordid motives. He is supposed to be a man of pre-eminent abilities; the fact that he has acquired great wealth in Africa is evidence of mental powers above the average; his schemes of expansion north of Cape Colony (the germ of them, by the way, is to be found in the policy, the speeches and writings of a greater Imperialist, the late Sir George Grey); the magnitude of his railway and telegraph enterprises; the attractiveness of his idea of through communication from Cape to Cairo—all these things have impressed the imagination of the public and led to the belief, sedulously fostered by those who hoped to make money through his enterprises by gambling operations in Throgmorton Street, that he is an intellectual colossus and a statesman. But the fact seems to be that he blundered into criminal conspiracy, as the result of conversations with Mr. Beit, and with a deplorable lack of judgment and even of common sense. If he hoped eventually to make money he went to work in a stupid way. It is indisputable that throughout his proceedings there was a conspicuous lack of statesmanship. A schoolboy would have shown more circumspection in like conditions. He would have asked himself whether it was consistent with honour to finance an illegal enterprise while in the service and in the confidence of those who were bound to prevent and to foil any such undertaking; and he would have answered such a question in the negative. Even if he were so deficient in principle as to regard considerations of this kind as “unctuous rectitude”—to employ a phrase with which Mr. Rhodes has enriched our political literature—he would surely have used his brains in such a way as to prevent the undertaking ending in so miserable a manner. He would not have acted unless there was a strong probability of success—unless he could be certain that Johannesburg was wholly with him; unless, in the event of conflict between the invaders and the burgher forces, the former would be handled with military skill and in all likelihood would win, and unless he was reasonably sure that the withdrawal of the armed forces from Rhodesia would not be followed by the ghastly murder of every white settler north of Buluwayo on whom the

Matabele and the Mashona could lay their hands. With Johannesburg swarming with Boer spies and open to destruction by the artillery of the Republic, with the Transvaal able to place a mobile force in a few hours at any point between the frontier and the Rand, and with hordes of sullen tribesmen in Rhodesia waiting for an opportunity to slaughter their white masters, no very penetrating mind was needed to foresee a failure of the Johannesburg revolt, the defeat of the Jameson troopers and the massacre of defenceless settlers in Rhodesia. The likelihood of disaster all round could have been gauged by anyone with only a superficial acquaintance with the factors in the case; the necessity of a well-matured plan and the employment of sufficient material strength to carry it out, if these awful consequences were to be avoided, would have been apparent to the meanest intellect. Where, then, is the evidence of Mr. Rhodes' "statesmanship"? His was supposed to be the master mind of Africa. He was credited with an unerring judgment of men. Yet his ignorance of the elements with which he had to deal and his misjudgment of superficial facts were so gross that he could not even prevent dissension in Johannesburg. His co-conspirators distrusted him on the question of the flag. His Administrator in Rhodesia left the settlers at the mercy of savages waiting to seize their chance to murder indiscriminately and entered the Transvaal with an insignificant force, allowing it to be shepherded by the Boers into a position in which defeat was certain. Incapacity, want of judgment and foresight in the inception and execution of the plan damned the enterprise from start to finish. Mr. Rhodes may yet prove himself to be a great man and a statesman, though the manner in which he has played fast and loose with the Dutch in South Africa and his dishonourable failure of duty towards the Sovereign under whom he held office, suggest the contrary. He is apparently under the belief that these things are not inconsistent with possession of the qualities of a statesman, for he told the world shortly after his downfall that his career was only beginning. But it is certain that from the time of his conversations with Mr. Beit to the moment when he made a vain endeavour to prevent Dr. Jameson from starting, his actions are inconsistent with the theory of his greatness and belief in his capacity. There is, however, Mr. Chamberlain's authority for the statement that, though the fault of Mr. Rhodes was about as great a fault as a politician

could commit, there existed nothing which affected his personal character as a man of honour.

This astounding declaration was made in the House of Commons on July 26th, 1897, when a motion by Mr. Phillip Stanhope was debated, and defeated by 304 votes to 77, affirming that the House "regrets the inconclusive action and report of the Select Committee to recommend specific steps with regard to Mr. Rhodes" and orders the production of the telegrams withheld, on the instructions of Mr. Rhodes, by Mr. Hawkesley. Mr. Chamberlain, after giving the certificate of character to Mr. Rhodes, announced that the Government did not intend to prosecute him, nor advise Her Majesty to remove his name from the roll of the Privy Council, nor take away the charter of the British South Africa Company. Mr. Rhodes was not only to go unpunished, though he was the prime mover of the Raid, but he was also to be allowed to retain his confidential position in relation to the Sovereign whose trust he had betrayed and whose representatives he had deceived. A gloss has since been put upon Mr. Chamberlain's words. It has been suggested that when he said Mr. Rhodes had done nothing which affected his personal character as a man he meant that he had not been actuated by sordid motives—that he (Mr. Chamberlain) had in his mind the dishonouring accusation to which Mr. Labouchere had given expression. Excuses are made for him on the ground that he is not in the habit of choosing his words with the care and precision required by a man in an official position. Unfortunately, the context of the speech does not bear out the view that he was repelling the charge that Mr. Rhodes had been influenced by unworthy motives of finance. Was there, then, some great secret in the missing telegrams? Was Mr. Chamberlain in Mr. Rhodes' power? Was the non-production of the missives the result of a compact between Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain by which the Colonial Secretary was to be screened against the charge of complicity in the Raid and Mr. Rhodes to escape prosecution and obtain a testimonial that his personal honour was untainted? Insinuations to this effect were rife at the time, in Parliament, in Society and in the Opposition Press; and they have not yet received their *quietus*. But not a tittle of proof was then available; nor can the documents which were stolen from Mr. Hawkesley and published in the *Independance Belge* early in 1900 be said to have done more than strengthen unfavourable but probably unjustifiable inferences. What gave suspicion so great a vitality was the fact that the Committee

had not exhausted the subject and that in the Debate on the Report the two Front Benches hung together in resisting the attack upon the Report as inconclusive and in rejecting the demand of a minority of the House for compelling the production of the telegrams. Was the controversy nothing but a gigantic bubble? With the reservation that the telegrams may even yet be published and that they may conceivably throw a new light upon an admittedly obscure passage in history, the conclusion must stand that there was no complicity in the Raid or foreknowledge of it on the part of Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonial Office, that there was no secret compact between Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain subsequent to the Raid, or between members of the Committee, or between the two Front Benches. But Mr. Chamberlain blundered in giving Mr. Rhodes a testimonial as a man of honour. His words gave great offence to all who thought that rectitude, "unctuous" or not, was a more desirable quality in politics than the duplicity of "the Rhodesian gang."

The British Government had carried out their pledge to the Transvaal by the trial of Dr. Jameson and his officers, and by an inquiry into the Raid. If it be objected that the performance of this undertaking was inadequate, inasmuch as Mr. Rhodes, the chief offender, went scot-free, it must be remembered that events had happened at Pretoria which showed that Mr. Kruger and his Executive had ignored the promise to Johannesburg to act on the motto of "Forget and Forgive." Sixty-four members of the Reform Committee were put upon their trial. There was no defence to the indictment against them, though they had plausible explanations and excuses to offer. Mr. Attorney Gregorowski was lent by the Government of the Orange Free State to the Transvaal to act as Judge, and Mr. Rose-Innes, Q.C., of Cape Colony, watched the trial in the interests of the Imperial authorities. The Judge applied the Roman-Dutch law to the case, holding the signatories to the concocted Jameson letter to be directly responsible for the loss of burgher life at Dornkop; and these—Mr. Lionel Phillips, Colonel Rhodes, Mr. George Farrer, the absent Mr. Leonard and Mr. Hammond—he therefore sentenced to death. The remaining prisoners were sentenced to two years' imprisonment and the payment of a fine of £2,000 apiece. A profound sensation was created by the death sentences, and had they been carried out, or had not the news of their commutation flashed over the wires within twenty-four hours, it would have been impossible for the British Government to resist

public opinion in favour of immediate war. To shorten a story told at length, and with pardonable bias against the Boer Government, by Mr. J. P. Fitzpatrick, in "The Transvaal from Within," Mr. Kruger first released the majority of the prisoners on May 30th on the payment of their fines (one had committed suicide in gaol), and on July 11th released the four who had been sentenced to death in consideration of the payment of £25,000 apiece. Two prisoners, Mr. A. Woolls-Sampson and Mr. W. D. Davies, had refused to bargain with the President or make any appeal to his clemency; and they remained in prison until the Queen's Jubilee day the following year, when Mr. Kruger ordered their release. Altogether the Pretoria Government netted £212,000 in fines; but as most of the prisoners were rich men, or had rich men behind them, it cannot be said that they paid an undue penalty for their crime. On the whole Mr. Kruger treated them with as much consideration as, in the bulk, they deserved. People who make revolutions must bear the consequences of failure. This was the view taken in England; and it was acted upon by Mr. Chamberlain, who respected the internal independence of the Republic to the extent of declining to quarrel with Mr. Kruger on the prisoners' account, though urging a lenient course in the interests of South African peace.

Mr. Kruger had refused to come to England to discuss the future of the Uitlander population with Mr. Chamberlain unless the question of English control of the foreign relations of the Republic could also be debated. He appointed a Commission to inquire into the conditions of the mining industry, but at the same time he initiated legislation of a repressive character. Mr. Chamberlain kept steadily harping upon the necessity of a more liberal treatment of the Uitlanders, but without effect. It was seen that sooner or later another crisis would come and that it was imperative to be prepared for it by strengthening the Imperial staff in South Africa. Sir Jacobus de Wet, whose work as British Agent had not been conspicuously successful, retired from the service and his post was filled by Mr. William Conyngham Greene, an experienced member of the diplomatic corps. At the end of the year Sir Hercules Robinson, whose services to the Crown had been recognised by his elevation to the Peerage, came home to die and, to the surprise of everyone and the delight of many who knew his worth, Sir Alfred Milner became Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner.

A new and strong personality was thus introduced into the

affairs of South Africa. Though only forty-three at the time of his appointment Sir Alfred Milner had already had a distinguished career. He is the son of a medical man and had few adventitious aids to success. Talent of a high order, personal charm, tact, and inexhaustible powers of work—these were the gifts and qualities by which he won his way to the front rank in the service of the Crown. After a brilliant course at Oxford he was admitted to the Bar, but found in journalism rather than in law a shorter road to advancement. As a writer he displayed a grasp of great issues and a breadth of view that attracted attention to his work, which was as conspicuous for facility and ease of style as for knowledge and judgment. In 1885 he contested the Harrow division of Middlesex, but without success, and was fortunate enough to become Private Secretary to Mr. Goschen, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. In 1889 he was appointed Under Secretary for Finance in Egypt, and made a reputation in that capacity, obtaining also a wider fame by the authorship of "England in Egypt," a brief but masterly work which is admitted to be the best of the many that have been produced on the affairs of that country. In 1892 he returned to England to take up the appointment of Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, the duties of which responsible post he discharged with more than adequate success until his selection as High Commissioner. Great as his abilities were known to be by those who had been brought into contact with him at the University, in London journalism, in Egypt and in official life in the Capital, the appointment to the Cape,—the grave of so many reputations—in a time of crisis fraught with dangerous issues for the future, was a courageous experiment by the Government. But to unusual gifts of mind and character there were allied the inestimable qualities of youthful vigour, perfect health, physical as well as mental fitness for the discharge of onerous responsibilities. In what manner he justified the choice will be seen in succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER IV.

AGGRESSIVE DIPLOMACY.

Quarrelsome Boer Secretaries—A Policy of Patience—The State of Public Opinion in England—A Striking Change of Tone—Mr. Kruger's Misuse of his Years of Grace—Secret Alliance with the Orange Free State—A Duel by Despatches—The Superficial Issues—The Real and Fundamental Contention—Sovereignty the Boer Aim—Mr. Kruger's "Little Bill"—A Fraudulent Claim—Lord Rosmead's Views—Mr. Chamberlain's Repudiation—Sir A. Milner's Instructions—A Franchise Policy—A Boer Confederacy—Mr. Kruger's "Secrets"—The Cape General Election of 1898—Rand Industrial Commission—The Report Burked—Mr. Kruger's Re-Election—An Uphill Task for Mr. Chamberlain—The South African League—Mr. Chamberlain Assumes the Offensive—His Attack on the Dynamite Monopoly—The Attack Developed—The Edgar Incident—Excitement in Johannesburg—Petition to the Queen—Sir A. Milner's Review of the Situation—"Ineffectual Nagging"—A Call for Imperial Intervention—Mr. Chamberlain's Reply to the Petition—A Suggestion for a Conference with Mr. Kruger—Preliminaries Arranged—A Pot-house Conspiracy—The Conference at Bloemfontein—Franchise or Municipal Rights—The Motives of the Imperial Government—The Motives of Mr. Kruger—His Attitude at the Conference—Mr. Kruger tries to Bargain a Franchise for Foreign Arbitration—Incorporation of Swaziland—Breakdown of the Conference.

WHILE Mr. Kruger laid a still heavier hand upon the Uitlanders after the Raid, he and his successive State Secretaries, Dr. Leyds and Mr. F. W. Reitz, adopted a more aggressive tone towards the British Government. For three years Mr. Chamberlain preserved admirable coolness and politeness. Then his diplomacy became almost as aggressive as that of his opponents. The criminal conspiracy of which the Jameson incursion was the outcome had imposed upon the Cabinet a policy of patience. Public opinion had been so violently disturbed, and the better elements of the nation so profoundly disgusted with the trickery and ineptitude brought to light, that any other course than one of prolonged tolerance of Mr. Kruger's hostility would not have been practicable. The condition of public opinion for at least three years was such that it would have been highly inadvisable for the Administration to do more than persist in a policy of friendly pressure upon the

Republic. Ample time had to be given to Mr. Kruger to redeem his promise to "forget and forgive," and to show by his acts towards the Uitlanders that he was desirous of removing the causes of their discontent. He enjoyed three years' grace before Mr. Chamberlain changed the tone of his Despatches from that of amicable representation and polite remonstrance to one of urgency, reproof and —on matters specifically within the scope of the Conventions—of direction and command. Those years were grossly misused by Mr. Kruger and his advisers. A farcical municipal law was passed for Johannesburg which left the Uitlanders in as evil plight as before; additional taxation was piled upon them; laws were framed depriving the Press of freedom and providing for the exclusion from the Republic of any persons whom the Executive chose to regard as undesirable; powerful forts were erected at Pretoria and outside Johannesburg and money was spent lavishly in artillery, modern rifles and ammunition. A secret offensive and defensive alliance was made with the Orange Free State and plans were laid for the coming time when an attempt should be made to destroy British supremacy in South Africa and replace it by a great Afrikander Republic stretching from Cape Town to the Zambesi. Only by the slow filtration of knowledge of these things did the English public realise that the wrong done to the Transvaal by the Raid was an insufficient reason for Imperial inactivity. It was, however, with an earnest hope of peace that they watched the prolonged duel by Despatches between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Kruger; indeed, they were convinced that war would in the long run be averted. Government and people alike, at least in the earlier stages of the wordy warfare, did not appreciate the ambitious character of the Boer policy and the persistency with which the Boer ideal of Independence would be cherished. Throughout 1897, 1898 and the greater part of 1899 the whole question was regarded in England as a group of rather peddling issues—the true amount of damages to be paid for the Raid; the precise meaning and application of certain Articles of the Convention of 1884; whether, and if so what franchise President Kruger could be persuaded in course of time to give to the Uitlanders. These were the superficial points of the wrangle, and such of the public as followed the controversy upon them lost sight of the underlying and cardinal issue for which war was alone really worth while alike to the Boers as to the British Empire.

It was not Mr. Kruger's fault that this country did not

appreciate from the first that Sovereignty was his real aim,—that his object was not to live at peace with the Uitlanders and “forget and forgive,” but to use their condition, the controversy relative to it, and the events to which it had given rise, as a means of extorting a recognition of absolute independence from the British Government. When it was pointed out to him early in 1897 that the Aliens Law was a breach of the Conventions, inasmuch as it placed restrictions upon the right of free entrance into and residence in the Republic by British subjects, the line taken in reply was that the Republic had the same right of exclusion as any other State. When brought to book for having broken the Conventions by failing to submit for Imperial approval extradition and other Treaties with Foreign Powers, arbitration as between independent States was suggested on the meaning and observance of the Conventions, the decision to rest with a foreign arbitrator. The suggestion was firmly rejected by Mr. Chamberlain. In a Despatch of October 16th, 1897, he asserted the continued existence of the Suzerainty, reminding the President of the unimpaired validity of the preamble to the Convention of 1881. The Suzerainty being the essential condition on which self-government had been granted to the Transvaal there could be no interference, not even in the form of arbitration on disputed points, by any Foreign Power between Her Majesty and the Government of the Republic. It was in this Despatch that the doctrine of the Suzerainty, which had practically been allowed to fall into abeyance since 1884, was re-asserted; and from this time forward the diplomatic wrangle is resolvable into an attempt by the British Government to give it effective expression and by the Boer Government to deny it and obtain in its stead a recognition of Sovereignty.

In the “little bill” for damages on account of the Jameson Raid the Boer Government also showed that they claimed to be treated on an equal footing with any independent State which had suffered violation of territory. With cool precision they asked for £677,938 3s. 3d. for material damages and £1,000,000 for what they called “moral and intellectual damages.” The presentation of this claim astonished even Lord Rosmead. He transmitted it with the observation that it was preposterous. Even if the claim for moral and intellectual damage was at all justifiable the amount was ludicrously disproportionate. As for the item for specific damages it was on the face of it fraudulent. Expenditure for military and commando services in connection with the incursion accounted for

£136,733 of the total. Even if ten thousand burghers had been commandeered each man would have obtained £46.*

Mr. Chamberlain repudiated the claim for a million and asked for a detailed account of the material damages. After some demur the latter was furnished. Some amusement might be extracted from the items if an analysis of them were worth while. It is enough to say that the burghers looked to make an enormous profit upon the expense to which they were put in repelling the Raid. The account was sent to the Chartered Company, who dissected it and suggested that the amount which they should be called upon to pay should be submitted to arbitration, and Mr. Chamberlain commended this proposal to Mr. Kruger. Nothing further was heard of it, except reminders from the Boer Government that the bill was unpaid. It is difficult to believe that there was any belief that one part of it at least—the million for moral and mental injury—would ever be paid. That part of the claim, we may be sure, was made for political purposes. It gave financial expression to the grievance of the State that the Raid should have been made at all, and furnished the Executive with a *prima facie* complaint against the British Government as an offset to any complaints of theirs. It may also be regarded as a challenge to the British Government. If it did not quite amount to that it was a plain intimation of the determination of the Republic to pick a quarrel with us. Had that not been the policy, a demand for reasonable compensation would have been advanced; and it would have been met by the British Cabinet in a conciliatory spirit and in fulfilment of the understanding that the damage caused by the Raid would be satisfied.

Mr. Chamberlain contented himself for the time being with repudiation of the claim for a million and set himself to exact obedience to the Conventions. Meanwhile the state of things on the Rand went from bad to worse. Sir Alfred Milner took up his duties as High Commissioner in May, 1897. His confidential instructions may be inferred from his subsequent action. What they amounted to were to obtain by steady pressure the admission of the Uitlanders on reasonable terms to such a share in the Government of the Republic as would enable them to work out their own salvation. We shall presently note the reasons which led him to the conclusion

* Full particulars of the claim and of the subsequent negotiations down to the outbreak of war will be found in the Author's "Politician's Handbook" (issues for 1899 and 1900)—a Review and Digest of Diplomatic Correspondence and other State Papers.

that the active intervention of the Imperial authorities in the affairs of the Transvaal was essential if civil war throughout South Africa was to be avoided. His study of the problem was necessarily far more thorough than appears in the Blue Books, which do not, of course, contain reports of a confidential nature or documents which, having regard to the racial tension in South Africa, it would have been impolitic to publish, while there was any hope of a satisfactory settlement, or even after that hope had failed, for, no doubt, many communications passed between him and Mr. Chamberlain on the subject of the latent disloyalty among the Dutch in the British Colonies. His task was one of extraordinary difficulty, for it is clear that not only had the alliance between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State been cemented by the Raid, but that emissaries from these States were at work among the Dutch elsewhere, secretly preparing them for revolt against British rule. It is certain, at any rate, that the Afrikaner Bond, liberally fed with money from the huge Secret Service Fund of the Transvaal, renewed its vitality after the Raid and from this time onward acted as an insidious foe to the Imperial Government in its efforts to bring Mr. Kruger into line with its policy of justice to the Uitlanders. "In the capacity I hold," said Mr. Kruger in one of his addresses in 1898, "I have secrets which I cannot impart to my burghers, because if I do they are no longer secrets; but this I may tell you that if we succeed in our endeavour we may become a great and mighty African nation." Among those secrets was not only the arrangement with Mr. Steyn, the President of the Orange Free State, that the latter was to be his successor as the head of an Afrikaner nation, but that the Presidency was to be not merely over the two United Republics but over a great confederacy to be established with the aid of the Cape and Natal Dutch on the ruins of British authority. Not until the archives of the Colonial Office are ransacked will this view of the matter be capable of complete historical proof. The conduct of the Bond and the partial fulfilment of Boer hopes, as shown by the Dutch risings in certain parts of Cape Colony and Natal during the war, are, however, sufficient indications of a treasonable spirit. It was not the least of the factors with which Sir Alfred Milner had to reckon and, in a self-governing colony, presented points of unusual difficulty. These were added to by the victory of the politicians supported by the Bond in the General Election in Cape Colony in the summer of 1898. Though the Bond Ministers, with Mr. Schreiner as Premier, were free

from the taint of active disloyalty, the fact of their success over the Rhodes party was a sign of Dutch reaction to the Boer ideal of the elimination of the Imperial factor from South Africa. The Bond party, however, enjoyed only a majority of three in the Cape Assembly and in the long run was powerless to do more than offer a feeble and timorous obstruction to Imperial policy.

On the Rand much was hoped for as a consequence of the Industrial Commission, appointed by the Volksraad ostensibly with the object of remedying the economic grievances of the mining industry. The facts were so glaring that it could not avoid making recommendations on the desired lines. The Uitlanders and the Imperial Government waited patiently for action to follow the Report. Mr. Kruger, however, interposed his will and the Volksraad delayed reform until after the election for President should have taken place. During the election Mr. Kruger was opposed by General Joubert and Mr. Shalk Burger, but was re-elected by an overwhelming majority. No other result was to be expected. He personified the ideal of a Dutch Confederacy, of undeviating resistance to the political claims of the Uitlanders; and in his speeches he astutely played upon the racial prejudices of the burghers, even going so far as to represent that the establishment of an Industrial Advisory Board at Johannesburg, as recommended by the Volksraad Committee, would endanger the independence of the Republic. With Mr. Kruger re-seated in the Presidency, on a programme such as this, the prospects of any removal of Uitlander grievances became still more gloomy.

Mr. Chamberlain, however, kept doggedly at his task of urging reform upon the President. Meanwhile corruption, oppression and misgovernment were rampant on the Rand. It seemed to be the policy of the Republic to goad the Uitlanders into revolt again rather than keep the peace with them. To appeals, complaints and remonstrances from them Mr. Kruger turned a deaf ear. He despised as well as disliked the Uitlanders and he was at no pains to conceal his contempt. Scandals accumulated; and with the scandals came the inevitable recrudescence of agitation, and renewed pressure upon the High Commissioner and the Imperial Government to take a stronger line with the obstinate President. No doubt the incompetence and the deliberate hostility of the Transvaal Government were exaggerated by the South African League. There was never yet a political movement free from excesses, and probably never will be; but of the definite and intolerable wrongs of the Uitlanders there can be

no question. So great was the unrest in Johannesburg that the Imperial Government could not allow matters to drift. Mr. Chamberlain seems to have made up his mind towards the end of 1898 that at whatever cost they should drift no longer. He attacked the dynamite monopoly as a breach of the London Convention, inasmuch as explosives of British origin were refused admittance into the Republic. Mr. Reitz, who had succeeded Dr. Leyds as State Secretary,—that diplomatist having been sent to Europe with the object of enlisting the sympathies of the Powers against Great Britain in the coming struggle,—in effect told the Imperial Government that the dynamite question was no affair of theirs—that Article XIV. of the Convention merely gave British subjects the same trading rights and obligations as burghers.

Mr. Chamberlain then took up the entire case of the British in the Transvaal. He complained that the Report of the Industrial Commission had been shelved; that nothing had been done to remedy the economic grievances of the Rand; that recent legislation against aliens and the Press was “another step in the policy of exasperating the Imperial Government,” and that the Boer Government in the persons of its agents had committed or permitted outrages on British subjects. The most conspicuous instance of the last complaint is that of an Englishman named Edgar. Edgar was molested in Johannesburg just before entering his house. He had knocked his assailant down. The Boer police forced their way into the house, breaking open the door. He was unarmed. There is a conflict of evidence as to the kind of resistance he offered; but the fact is incontestable that a Boer policeman drew his revolver and shot him dead in the presence of his wife. This incident excited Johannesburg to fever heat. But the Uitlanders were powerless. Revolt was impossible. They could but appeal to the Imperial Government to enforce if needs be better conditions of existence. This they did in a Petition to the Queen, signed by nearly twenty-two thousand British subjects. It is a document of historic interest—a clear and unexaggerated statement of the wrongs of the population. No more convincing indictment of the Government of the Republic could be framed than is contained in the unimpassioned sentences of this appeal to the Crown. It is printed in its entirety in the Appendices to this volume and there is no need here to marshal its facts and arguments.

Sir Alfred Milner reviewed the situation in a Despatch of great

power and eloquence. What had to be dealt with, he said, was a popular movement of a like kind with that of 1894 and 1895 before it was ruined by a conspiracy of which the mass of the Uitlanders were ignorant. None of the grievances then complained of had been remedied. Others had been added. He defended the Uitlanders from the attacks made upon them. It was a wilful perversion of the truth to represent their movement as artificial—as the work of scheming capitalists or professional agitators. A large and constantly increasing proportion of the Uitlanders were not birds of passage. They contemplated a long residence in the country or a permanent home within it. They would make excellent citizens if they had a chance. They felt deeply the personal indignity of a position of permanent subjection to a ruling caste which owed its wealth and power to their exertions. The political turmoil would never end until they were admitted to a share in the Government; and while that turmoil lasted there would be no tranquillity or adequate progress in Her Majesty's South African dominions. It was absurd for either the Dutch or the English to dream of subjugating the other. The only condition on which they could live in harmony and South Africa progress was equality all round. South Africa could prosper under two, three, or six Governments, but not under two absolutely conflicting social and political systems—perfect equality for Dutch and British side by side in the British Colonies and permanent subjection of British to Dutch in one of the Republics. In a passage upon the uselessness of past appeals to the Boer Government, Sir Alfred Milner said that from his great dislike of “ineffectual nagging” he had sometimes abstained when he ought to have protested. But the attempt to remedy wrongs springing from a hopeless system by taking up isolated cases was perfectly vain. “It may easily lead to war and will never lead to permanent improvement.” The true remedy was to strike at the root of all these injuries—the political impotence of the injured. The final passages of the Despatch are so crowded with argument that further summary would be an injustice to their author:—

“The case for intervention is overwhelming. The only attempted answer is that things will right themselves if left alone. But, in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for years, and it has led to their going from bad to worse. It is not true that this is owing to the raid. They were going from bad to worse before the raid. We were on the verge of war before the raid, and the Trans-

vaal was on the verge of revolution. The effect of the raid has been to give the policy of leaving things alone a new lease of life, and with the old consequences.

"The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain and the respect for the British Government within the Queen's dominions. A certain section of the Press, not in the Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a Republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which in case of war it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects. I regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of the British Government, is producing a great effect upon a large number of our Dutch fellow-colonists. Language is frequently used which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right even in this colony to their fellow-citizens of British birth. Thousands of men peaceably disposed, and, if left alone, perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are being drawn into disaffection, and there is a corresponding exasperation on the side of the British.

"I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of Her Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South Africa. And the best proof alike of its power and its justice would be to obtain for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal a fair share in the government of the country which owes everything to their exertions. It could be made perfectly clear that our action was not directed against the existence of the Republic. We should only be demanding the re-establishment of rights which now exist in the Orange Free State, and which existed in the Transvaal itself at the time of and long after the withdrawal of British sovereignty. It would be no selfish demand, as other Uitlanders besides those of British birth would benefit by it. It is asking for nothing from others which we do not give ourselves. And it would certainly go to the root of the political unrest in South Africa, and, though temporarily it might aggravate, it would ultimately extinguish the race feud which is the great bane of the country."

Until the receipt of this Despatch on May 4th Mr. Chamberlain had not taken action upon the Uitlanders' petition. On May 10th he sent to the High Commissioner a long communication stating the views of Her Majesty's Government upon it. These were entirely favourable to the petitioners, and in harmony with the principles in the High Commissioner's recommendation of intervention. Mr. Chamberlain declared that the root of the matter lay in the policy that had been pursued from the first by the Government of the Republic towards the immigrant population,

and defined the remedy as equality of treatment and the possession of full political rights. Her Majesty's Government had, he said, been anxious to avoid any intervention in the affairs of the Republic. If they really entertained the design of destroying the internal independence of the Transvaal, as had been alleged against them, no policy could better defeat that object than the removal of any pretext for interference by relieving British subjects of the causes of complaint. With that object in view he instructed Sir Alfred Milner to suggest to Mr. Kruger a personal conference at which they could arrive at "such an arrangement as Her Majesty's Government could accept and recommend to the Uitlander population as a reasonable concession to their just demands, and the settlement of the difficulties which have threatened the good relations which Her Majesty's Government desire should constantly exist between themselves and the Government of the South African Republic."

Meanwhile Mr. Hofmeyer, the leader of the Afrikander Bond, had made a similar suggestion to Mr. Kruger. The President expressed willingness to meet the High Commissioner provided that the independence of the Republic was left outside discussion. The Bond party, through Mr. Schreiner, represented this as a great advance on Mr. Kruger's part. Preliminaries were arranged and a more hopeful feeling set in. This was considerably lessened by the Boer invention of a pothouse conspiracy, the persons charged being falsely represented as British officers, and this lie being circulated by the Boer Government throughout the world. Though it was promptly disproved the impression was created that there was a plot against the Republic, which had been cleverly frustrated by the Boer police. It was not dispelled until later in the year, when the affair was shown to have been a "put-up job." But this is a side issue which need not be noted except as an illustration of the craft and yet the stupidity of the agents of the Boer Government. The Conference met at Bloemfontein at the invitation of President Steyn on May 31st and lasted until June 5th. Mr. Chamberlain gave the High Commissioner almost a free hand, merely suggesting that the franchise question was the more important, and that "if President fears that independence will be endangered by concession of general franchise," full municipal rights for the Rand might be a feasible solution of the difficulty. There can, therefore, be no doubt about the aim of Her Majesty's Government in going into

this Conference. Primarily, the object was to obtain a reasonable franchise for the Uitlanders; but if President Kruger could not be convinced that this would not be detrimental to the institutions of the Republic, autonomy for the Rand might be accepted as a reasonable substitute. Mr. Chamberlain, in this suggestion to Sir Alfred Milner, went back to the policy of his Despatch of February 4th, 1896, the terms of which have been narrated in a previous chapter. And he was ready to do this for no other reason than that of consideration for the strong feelings of the Boers on the subject of independence. Could anything have been more conciliatory? So far from going into the Conference with any ulterior design of destroying the independence of the Republic, the High Commissioner went with a specific instruction to co-operate with the President in preserving that internal independence.

With what motives, on the other hand, did Mr. Kruger go into Conference? It is a hard task to describe with any approach to accuracy what men say and do, when there is no documentary evidence of their conduct; to attempt to divine what they think but do not express, and to lay bare the hidden springs and motives of their acts is to enter upon a region of speculation in which wrong may easily be done. There can, however, be little doubt that Mr. Kruger sought to make the Conference serve his unfaltering purpose of obtaining the unreserved independence of the Republic. He met Sir Alfred Milner's suggestions for enfranchisement with the remark that they were "tantamount to handing over his country to foreigners"—the British subject, to his mind, was a foreigner, the Republic a region in which the British had no special rights. He acted on the assumption that the Boers had attained independence when the Sand River Convention was signed and recovered it entirely when the London Convention was, as he contended, substituted for that of Pretoria. There was, in fact, no Suzerainty. That was his attitude—unexpressed during the Conference but underlying all that he said and did. But, though rejecting Sir Alfred Milner's suggestions, which would have given the franchise to every Uitlander with a five years' residential qualification, the President was prepared to talk about a franchise scheme of his own, provided he could get in exchange arbitration, with the foreign element, on all other questions. While being willing to consider any method that could be devised for the settlement of future disputes and possibly some of the existing questions, Sir Alfred

Milner declined to pledge the Government to arbitration or make arbitration in any sense part of a bargain over the franchise. Franchise first and independently of everything else was the principle on which he acted. Mr. Kruger then produced his own franchise scheme, which he declared he was willing to submit to the Volksraad if arbitration were agreed to and if Swaziland were incorporated with the Republic. This plan stipulated for a two years' naturalisation period and full franchise after five years' continuous residence, subject to a property or income qualification. Obviously this would not give that "substantial and immediate" representation which, in the view of the Imperial Government, would alone put an end to the dangerous situation. Sir Alfred Milner regarded it as entirely inadequate, for he fell back at once upon the method of local self-government for the Rand, according to the Chamberlain Despatch of February, 1896. Mr. Kruger, however, would not hear of this. He would not have what would, in effect, be a State within the State. Nor was it surprising that he should have scouted a suggestion so violently opposed to his deeply-rooted dislike of the Uitlanders. He was, indeed, on the horns of a dilemma. To grant a franchise was to swamp his burghers and lead by constitutional means to the overthrow of the Republic, or, at least, of the Boer administration of the Republic; and to grant local autonomy to the Rand would permit the growth of a powerful alien organisation which would probably repudiate the payment of tribute in due course and would, in the best of circumstances, be a political menace to the State. On the other hand the conditions of the entire problem were such that there was no third alternative for the Imperial Government, short of the inconceivable course of abandoning the Suzerainty and,—to the peril of the whole of South Africa and the ultimate expulsion of British authority,—leaving Boers and Uitlanders to settle their differences by themselves.

Mr. Kruger's franchise proposal was debated between him and the High Commissioner without result. In itself it was unacceptable; and the conditions as to arbitration and the question of Swaziland, which were attached to it by Mr. Kruger, destroyed any value it would have had could Sir Alfred Milner have persuaded Mr. Kruger to make its terms less illiberal. The Conference therefore broke down. Mr. Kruger said he would recommend the Volksraad to pass his franchise proposal and that he would then expect Her Majesty's

Government to agree to arbitration. The High Commissioner declared that the effect of what had been said was that both parties were in the *status quo ante* the meeting, and that there was no obligation on either side. The stubborn President had made no concession worth having and the Imperial Government had still to find the means of satisfying the Uitlanders.

CHAPTER V.

THE EVE OF WAR.

Mr. Kruger's Franchise Law—Cape Ministry's Views—The Draft Law and the "Irreducible Minimum" of the British Government—The Boers and Foreign Arbitration—A Tricky Proposal—Energetic Remonstrance by Mr. Chamberlain—Joint Examination of the Franchise Law Proposed—Arbitration Proposals Rejected—Refusal to appoint Delegates—Modified Franchise Proposals—Unacceptable Conditions Attached—Qualified Acceptance of the Boer Offer, but Rejection of the Conditions—The Boers Withdraw their Offer—The New Deadlock—Mr. Kruger Responsible—The Cabinet Meeting of September 8th—The Despatch of that Date—Proposals *De Novo*—The Boer Reply—A Charge of Bad Faith—Mr. Chamberlain's Answer—The Old Issue of Sovereignty—British Proposals Promised—The Door Left Open—How it was Closed—Intervention of Mr. Steyn—His Supercilious Patronage and Insolent Dictation—The Cape Ministry and the Importation of Arms—Mr. Steyn and the Free State Volksraad—A Fatal Resolution—A Pretence of Ignorance—The First Act of War—Natal Communications Cut—Troops Ordered from India—Expulsion of British Subjects from the Republics—Mr. Steyn's *Rôle* as Fomenter of Rebellion amongst Dutch-British Subjects—The Ultimatum of October 9th—The Reply of England—Mr. Steyn Questioned—An Answer for Dutch Consumption in Cape Colony and Natal—Public Opinion in England—Some Views upon Mr. Chamberlain as a Diplomatist—Sir Edward Clarke's Attitude—The Public Swing Into Line with the Government—Attitude of the Opposition Leaders—The October Session—Lord Kimberley's Attack on Mr. Chamberlain—Lord Salisbury's Defence—A Motion in the Commons—The Colonial Secretary's Speech—Sir Edward Clarke Justifies His Attitude—Expectations of an Easy Victory—A Gross Miscalculation—A Ludicrous Financial Forecast.

NOTWITHSTANDING the failure of the Conference, Mr. Kruger and his Executive were the only persons who foresaw that war would follow. The Cabinet seem to have regarded war as a possible but still remote contingency. The public were under the misapprehension that Mr. Kruger would give way if hard pressed. They pinned their faith to Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy, barren as it had been of results, though through no fault of his. Mr. Kruger had yielded to the threat of an ultimatum about the Drifts and—it was cheerfully assumed—he would yield to a like threat about the franchise should it become necessary to make one. They missed the point that whereas the Drifts question had no bearing upon the stability of the Republic that of the Uitlanders had a very important bearing indeed, inasmuch as stability was

necessarily endangered. They saw rays of hope in the fact that Mr. Kruger intended to propose a franchise law to the Volksraad; that the Bond party at the Cape were endeavouring to bring those proposals into harmony with moderate views; that Mr. Fischer, of the Orange Free State, had gone to Pretoria on a mission of peace. When the Draft Franchise Law was submitted to the Volksraad the Cape Ministers represented it as "adequate, satisfactory, and such as should secure a peaceful settlement." Unfortunately it was nothing of the kind. It followed the lines of the unacceptable proposal* sketched by Mr. Kruger at Bloemfontein; and it was hedged about with so many safeguards that it would have been within the power of the Executive to restrict the exercise of political rights to such persons as it thought fit. A new comer to the Transvaal would only obtain the franchise after nine years' continuous registration, and those already there, after five years, provided that they had already been resident for two years. This was a vastly different thing from Sir Alfred Milner's "irreducible minimum" of the franchise for all who had been five years in the Republic. The last would have given immediate representation to a very considerable number of the Uitlanders; the first would have deferred representation, even of those who had been in the Republic several years, for at least five years. A concession was made on one point, owing to the views of the Afrikaner element outside the Transvaal, the term of nine years—two years prior to naturalisation and seven years' further registration—being reduced to seven, thus making a seven years' retrospective franchise. This difference was inappreciable. The law had the fatal defect of yielding nothing to the Imperial Government, which sought an immediate enfranchisement for the Uitlanders long resident in the Republic, not an enfranchisement, under onerous conditions, some years hence.

While the Draft Law was being considered by the Volksraad the Boer Government again demanded arbitration "on differences arising out of the London Convention"—that is to say on the point whether or not the Suzerainty existed. They proposed the appointment of an Arbitrator to be nominated by Her Majesty's Government and one by the Republic—say the Chief Justices respectively of the Republic and of the Cape Colony or Natal—these to choose a President who was not a subject of either party. This was the old proposal for a

* The text of the Draft Franchise Law will be found in the "Politician's Handbook" (1900 issue), pp. 55, 56, 57

Foreign Arbitrator in a new form, for, obviously, the President would decide everything. With this proposal before him Mr. Chamberlain, on July 27th, wrote a Despatch on the subject of the Conference and the later development of events. In this document the Colonial Secretary took high ground. He accused the Republic of having deliberately placed one of the two white races in a position of political inferiority to the other. Claiming the right under the Conventions to regulate the relations between the Government of the Republic and Her Majesty's subjects he reminded Mr. Kruger of the assurances as to equality of treatment, on which the annexation of the Transvaal had been undone. And he quoted from the Blue Books the following passages as to what occurred at the Newcastle Conferences in 1881. The first meeting was on May 10th. Sir Hercules Robinson was President. Her Majesty's Commissioners were Sir Evelyn Wood and Sir J. H. De Villiers; and the Boer representatives Mr. Kruger, Mr. P. J. Joubert, Dr. Jorissen, Mr. J. S. Joubert, Mr. De Villiers and Mr. Buskes. This extract cuts to the heart of the question:—

"239. (*President*).—Before annexation, had British subjects complete freedom of trade throughout the Transvaal; were they on the same footing as citizens of the Transvaal?

"240. (*Mr. Kruger*).—They were on the same footing as the burghers; there was not the slightest difference in accordance with the Sand River Convention.

"241. (*President*).—I presume you will not object to that continuing?

"242. (*Mr. Kruger*).—No; there will be equal protection for everybody.

"243. (*Sir E. Wood*).—And equal privileges?

"244. (*Mr. Kruger*).—We make no difference so far as burgher rights are concerned. There may perhaps be some slight difference in the case of a young person who has just come into the country."

At the Conference of the 26th May, 1881, at Newcastle, there were present: Sir Hercules Robinson (President), Sir E. Wood, Sir J. H. De Villiers, Her Majesty's Commissioners; and, as representatives of the Boers, Mr. Kruger, Mr. J. S. Joubert, Dr. Jorissen, Mr. Pretorius, Mr. Buskes, and Mr. De Villiers.

At this meeting the subject of the assurances was again alluded to, as thus reported:—

"1037. (*Dr. Jorissen*).—At No. 244 the question was, 'Is there any distinction in regard to the privileges or rights of Englishmen in the Transvaal?' and Mr. Kruger answered, 'No, there is no difference;' and then he added, 'there may be some slight difference in the case of a young person just coming into the country.' I wish to say that that might give rise to a wrong impression. What Mr. Kruger intended to convey was this: according to our law a new

comer has not his burgher rights immediately. The words 'young person' do not refer to age, but to the time of residence in the Republic. According to our old 'Grondwet' (Constitution) you had to reside a year in the country."

Mr. Chamberlain argued that, notwithstanding these positive assurances, there had been a complete reversal of the conditions of equality. They had existed before the Conventions and the latter were granted on the understanding that they would continue to exist. Yet not only had the letter but the whole spirit of the Conventions been infringed. Her Majesty's Government had hoped that the Bloemfontein Conference would restore equality. They had been disappointed, not only because Mr. Kruger had refused to make or accept adequate proposals but because he had declined the suggestion, failing the franchise, of local autonomy for the Rand. As for the franchise law passed by the Volksraad there was a difference of two years in the qualifying period between the Imperial Government's minimum and Mr. Kruger's; and the conditions were of so complicated and technical a nature that a further interchange of views was desirable. Mr. Chamberlain suggested that the law should be examined by delegates appointed by the High Commissioner on the one part and by the Boer Government on the other; and he intimated that if this could be arranged and if it should appear that the law would not be nullified or reduced in value by subsequent alterations or acts of administration, its acceptance would be recommended to the Uitlanders. In other words if the law gave what it pretended to give by a seven years' retrospective period the Imperial Government might waive its objection to the fact that the seven years' limit was not five. As for the Arbitration proposal Mr. Chamberlain rejected it on the ground that it admitted foreign interference in the person of a Foreign President of the Arbitral Tribunal; but he expressed a willingness to renew the Conference with Mr. Kruger with the object of devising arbitration from which the foreign element would be excluded, and for discussing other questions.

The principal point at issue therefore was whether the new Franchise Law was honestly intended to give—or would in fact give—what it purported to offer, namely, a seven years' retrospective right to vote to whoever had taken out letters of naturalisation. The point to determine was whether the law was unworkable because of its restrictive conditions, or could be nullified by acts of the Administration. The *bona fides* of the Boer Government would have

been shown by the appointment of delegates. The matter could easily have been settled had the law been honest or had there been any desire to come to a settlement. But the Boer Government did not want it settled. What they wanted was to get rid of the Convention or, failing that, to consume time in negotiation so that the season for rains would come, the grass grow on the veldt, and subsistence thus be provided for the horses that were to carry the commandos into Natal and Cape Colony. So, instead of accepting the suggestion for a joint inquiry into the Franchise Law they offered a five years' retrospective franchise, representation in the Volksraad to the number of ten seats instead of the then existing two for the Gold Fields, and equal rights in the election of President. A great concession that would have ended the wrangles! But here again impossible conditions were attached. A pledge was asked for that there should be no future interference in the internal affairs of the Republic, no further insistence on the Suzerainty, and arbitration from which the foreign element, *other than the Orange Free State*, should be excluded. As these conditions amounted to the elimination of the Suzerainty and the introduction of an arbitral element certain to be even more favourable to the Boers than if a foreigner from outside South Africa were chosen, they vitiated the concession. Mr. Chamberlain met the offer by giving a qualified acceptance of the five years' retrospective franchise, but rejected the conditions. The Boer Government assumed surprise and regret at his attitude and thereupon withdrew the proposal altogether. From that moment war became certain.

The date of refusal was September 2nd and the season of rains was near. Negotiation had led nowhere. The only change in the position was that there had been placed on the Statute Book of the Republic a law that was supposed to give a seven years' franchise, but, in the opinion of those who would have to live under it, was nothing but a legislative *hocus pocus*. Another deadlock was reached, the Imperial Government being as far off as they ever were from obtaining "immediate and substantial" representation for their subjects, and the Government of the Republic being confronted as firmly as ever with an uncompromising assertion of the suzerainty and rejection of every proposal of theirs for weakening or destroying it. And the new deadlock, be it observed, was not brought about by Mr. Chamberlain, who was prepared to accept a five years' franchise and arbitration other than foreign, but by Mr. Kruger, who

withdrew the five years' proposal because he could not obtain the withdrawal of the suzerainty and consent to foreign arbitration in the person of a Free Stater.

The next move lay with Mr. Chamberlain. After a Cabinet meeting on September 8th he sent a Despatch upon the withdrawal of the five years' offer because the conditions attached to it were rejected by Her Majesty's Government and reminded the Republic that the Cabinet had absolutely repudiated the view of the *status* of the Republic which underlay those conditions. They were unable to consider any proposal conditional on the acceptance by them of the view that the Republic was a Sovereign International State. They could not now go back to the proposals for a joint examination of the new Franchise Law, and for non-foreign arbitration on other questions; but they were still prepared to accept the five years' offer, with a representative for the Goldfields, and ten seats in the Raad, and equal rights in the election of President, subject to an inquiry showing that the new scheme of representation would not be nullified. Acceptance of these terms would, Mr. Chamberlain pointed out, remove the tension between the two Governments; but if the reply of the Government of the Republic was "negative or inconclusive Her Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider the situation *de novo*, and to formulate their own proposals for a settlement."

The Imperial Government had thus brought matters to a head—on the old issue of the Republic's self-assumed "inherent right as a Sovereign International State." Mr. Kruger replied on September 16th declining to put forward again the withdrawn proposals without the conditions on which alone they were based. But it expressed a willingness to accept a joint inquiry by delegates into the new Franchise Law, thus going back to the position before the five years' proposal was made. At the same time it made a charge of breach of faith against Mr. Conyngham Greene, the point being that Mr. Greene had accepted the five years' proposal with the accompanying conditions, and that the proposal and conditions were, in fact, induced by suggestions made by him to the State Attorney. That this was not a correct version of the conversations between the British Agent and Mr. Reitz is abundantly clear from the evidence of the former; but that is a side issue that need not be pursued. The object of the accusation was to discredit British diplomacy in Europe and among the Afrikander

sympathisers with the Transvaal. Mr. Chamberlain replied on September 22nd—after a further meeting of the Cabinet—in two Despatches. In the first profound regret was expressed at the repeated refusal to adhere to the five years' basis. There was no desire to interfere in any way with the independence of the Republic, no assertion of any right, other than that derived from Conventions, to intervene in the internal affairs of the Republic. By the action of the Republic in setting up a claim to be a Sovereign International State Her Majesty's Government had been compelled absolutely to deny and repudiate that *status*. Their object had been stated in a manner which did not admit of misapprehension—namely, to obtain such a substantial and immediate representation for the Uitlanders as would relieve Her Majesty's Government from any necessity for further intervention on their behalf; and no conditions less comprehensive than those of the five years' offer could effect this object. The refusal of the Republic, after four months' protracted negotiations and an agitation extending over a period of more than five years' made it useless further to pursue discussion on the lines hitherto followed. Hence, he repeated, Her Majesty's Government were compelled to consider the situation afresh and formulate their own proposals for a final settlement of all questions with the Republic. These proposals would be communicated in a later Despatch.

The door was left open for further negotiation. There was still time for the Republic to agree with the adversary it had created and had for years provoked. It set Mr. Steyn to work to fill up the time until it should be convenient for military purposes to slam the door. In these extraordinary negotiations there is nothing more remarkable than the intervention of the President of the Orange Free State, with whom and with whose people the British Government had no cause of quarrel and for whom there was every feeling of friendship. Though his pose was that of a maker of peace the tone of his communications was that of supercilious patronage and insolent dictation. In mid-August he affected to be disturbed at rumours—whose falsity he could easily have ascertained—that Imperial troops were being massed on the borders of his State preparatory to an invasion. Sir A. Milner formally assured him that his news was unfounded and significantly reminded him of the large importation of arms and ammunition into the State—chiefly over the Cape railways and by the authority of the Cape

Ministry, which thus played into the hands of the Republics, justifying its constructive disloyalty by the technical plea that to prohibit such importations would be a breach of courtesy with the Free State. Late in September Mr. Steyn fired the Volksraad and the Free State with a mischievous speech which, while full of expressions deploring a war, secured the passage of a resolution which helped materially to bring war about by declaring that no cause for war existed, that if a war was "begun or occasioned by Her Majesty's Government" it would morally be a war against the whole white population of South Africa, would be "calamitous and criminal," and adding that "the Orange Free State will honestly and faithfully observe its obligations towards the South African Republic arising out of the political alliance between the two Republics, whatever may happen." Notwithstanding this resolution, which showed the Imperial Government clearly enough that in the coming struggle the two Republics would have to be reckoned with, Mr. Steyn still wore the mask of peace. He worried the High Commissioner with verbose despatches giving his version of the negotiations and complaining that he did not know specifically what it was the Imperial Government wanted the South African Republic to do. The impudence of this pretended ignorance found support among the fifty-eight members of the Cape Parliament—among them five members of the Ministry. Fifty-three loyalists, however, were found in the Assembly to support the Imperial policy and deprecate attempts to encourage resistance by the Transvaal. After this stage Mr. Steyn loudly complained of British military preparations, which had thus far been of a ludicrously insignificant character, quite inadequate even for the defence of Colonial territory in the event of unauthorised raids by any bodies of burghers who might get out of hand. Mr. Steyn was rather sharply informed that these preparations had been caused by the policy of the South African Republic—and the Orange Free State might have been included—in converting the country beyond the Vaal into a permanent armed camp.

On September 29th what was, to all intents and purposes, an act of war was committed by Mr. Kruger, the Government of the Republic taking over the railway from Charlestown on the Natal border, refusing Natal traffic and cutting the telegraph wire. Early in September a force of over seven thousand troops were ordered to South Africa from India and two battalions were sent

from England. Mr. Steyn returned to the attack on the subject of the disposition of the local forces of the Crown and the evident preparations for war in England. He was informed that the British movements were purely of a defensive nature and were not comparable in magnitude with the massing of armed forces on the borders of Natal. Mr. Steyn then began the wholesale expulsion of British subjects from the Orange Free State, a process begun also in the Transvaal, the authorities of which also seized half-a-million of bar gold sent by rail to the Cape. On October 4th Mr. Steyn, though ostentatiously affirming his desire for peace and willingness to act as mediator between the Transvaal and the Imperial Government, demanded an assurance that British troops on the borders should be withdrawn and the despatch of reinforcements countermanded. The assurance was, of course, refused, though an offer was made that if a pledge that no act of hostility would be committed was given by the Republics Her Majesty's Government would give a corresponding undertaking. Mr. Steyn evaded this issue occupying himself in the interval by sending his commandoes to the borders, and in inditing verbose and hysterical telegrams to the High Commissioner reviewing the negotiations, evidently with the object of exciting Afrikaner sentiment in the British Colonies against the Imperial authorities. If he really desired peace he went to work in a blundering way to maintain it, the certain effect of his action being to foment rebellion among the Dutch outside his State. Thus the days passed until October 9th when Mr. Reitz handed the following insolent ultimatum to the British Agent at Pretoria:—

The Government of the South African Republic feels itself compelled to refer the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland once more to the Convention of London, 1884, concluded between this Republic and the United Kingdom, and which [? in] its XIVth Article secures certain specified rights to the white population of this Republic, namely, that (here follows Article XIV. of Convention of London, 1884).

This Government wishes further to observe that the above are only rights which Her Majesty's Government have reserved in the above Convention with regard to the Uitlander population of this Republic, and that the violation only of those rights could give that Government a right to diplomatic representations or intervention; while, moreover, the regulation of all other questions affecting the position or the rights of the Uitlander population under the above-mentioned Convention is handed over to the Government and the representatives of the people of the South African Republic.

Amongst the questions the regulation of which falls exclusively within the competence of the Government and of the Volksraad are included those of the franchise and representation of the people in this Republic, and although thus the exclusive right of this Government and of the Volksraad for the regulation of that franchise and representation is indisputable, yet this Government has found occasion to discuss in a friendly fashion the franchise and the representation of the people with Her Majesty's Government, without, however, recognising any right thereto on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

This Government has also, by the formulation of the now existing Franchise Law and the Resolution with regard to representation, constantly held these friendly discussions before its eyes. On the part of Her Majesty's Government, however, the friendly nature of these discussions has assumed a more and more threatening tone, and the minds of the people in this Republic, and in the whole of South Africa, have been excited, and a condition of extreme tension has been created, while Her Majesty's Government could no longer agree to the legislation respecting franchise and the Resolution respecting representation in this Republic, and finally, by your Note of 25th September, 1899, broke off all friendly correspondence on the subject, and intimated that they must now proceed to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement, and this Government can only see in the above intimation from Her Majesty's Government a new violation of the Convention of London, 1884, which does not reserve to Her Majesty's Government the right to a unilateral settlement of a question which is exclusively a domestic one for this Government and has already been regulated by it.

On account of the strained situation, and the consequent serious loss in and interruption of trade in general which the correspondence respecting the franchise and representation in this Republic carried in its train, Her Majesty's Government have recently pressed for an early settlement, and finally pressed, by your intervention, for an answer within forty-eight hours (subsequently somewhat modified) to your Note of the 12th September, replied to by the Note of this Government of the 15th September, and your Note of the 25th September, 1899; and thereafter further friendly negotiations broke off, and this Government received the intimation that the proposal for a final settlement would shortly be made; but, although this promise was once more repeated, no proposal has up to now reached this Government.

Even while friendly correspondence was still going on an increase of troops on a large scale was introduced by Her Majesty's Government and stationed in the neighbourhood of the borders of this Republic. Having regard to occurrences in the history of this Republic which it is unnecessary here to call to mind, this Government felt obliged to regard this military force in the neighbourhood of its borders as a threat against the independence of the South African Republic, since it was aware of no circumstances which could justify the presence of such military force in South Africa and in the neighbourhood of its borders.

In answer to an inquiry with respect thereto addressed to His

Excellency the High Commissioner, this Government received, to its great astonishment, in answer, a veiled insinuation that from the side of the Republic (van Republikeinsche zeyde) an attack was being made on Her Majesty's Colonies and, at the same time, a mysterious reference to possibilities whereby it was strengthened in its suspicion that the independence of this Republic was being threatened. As a defensive measure it was, therefore, obliged to send a portion of the burghers of this Republic in order to offer the requisite resistance to similar possibilities.

"Her Majesty's unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of this Republic in conflict with the Convention of London, 1884, caused by the extraordinary strengthening of troops in the neighbourhood of the borders of this Republic, has thus caused an intolerable condition of things to arise whereto this Government feels itself obliged, in the interests not only of this Republic, but also [?] of all South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and feels itself called upon and obliged to press earnestly and with emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things and to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the assurance—

"(A) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by the friendly course of arbitration, or by whatever amicable way may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's Government.

"(B) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be instantly withdrawn.

"(C) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since the 1st June, 1899, shall be removed from South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee on the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities against any portion of the Possessions of the British Government shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith, be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Republic from the borders.

"(D) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas shall not be landed in any port of South Africa.

"This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her Majesty's Government to return such an answer before or upon Wednesday, the 11th October, 1899, not later than 5 p.m., and it desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval [it] will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that in the event of any further movements of troops taking place within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of our borders this Government will be compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war.

"I have, &c.,

(Signed)

"F. W. REITZ,

"State Secretary."

The reply of Her Majesty's Government was that they had received these peremptory demands with great regret and that "the conditions demanded by the Government of the South African Republic were such as Her Majesty's Government deem it impossible to discuss." This reply was sent on the 11th, and Mr. Steyn was at the same time asked whether the action of the Republic received his concurrence and support. The answer he sent was evidently meant for Afrikander ears:—

The high-handed and unjustifiable policy and conduct of Her Majesty's Government in interfering in and dictating in the purely internal affairs of South African Republic, constituting a flagrant breach of the Convention of London, 1884, accompanied at first by preparations, and latterly followed by active commencement of hostilities against that Republic, which no friendly and well-intentioned efforts on our part could induce Her Majesty's Government to abandon, constitute such an undoubted and unjust attack on the independence of the South African Republic that no other course is left to this State than honourably to abide by its Conventional Agreements entered into with that Republic. On behalf of this Government, therefore, I beg to notify that, compelled thereto by the action of Her Majesty's Government, they intend to carry out the instructions of the Volksraad as set forth in the last part of the Resolution referred to by your Excellency.

The die was cast. Both Republics had entered irremediably upon a course that could end only in their extinction.

What was the state of English opinion at the time? An accurate diagnosis is scarcely possible. The breakdown of the negotiations came as a surprise to the public. Until the end of September even the Stock Exchange had refused to believe in the likelihood of war. It was generally assumed that in the long run Mr. Kruger would give way, that the intervention of Mr. Steyn was really meant in the interests of peace, that the question begging revolution of the Orange Free State Volksraad had no serious military meaning. Hope of a peaceful solution of the difficulty lingered even in pessimistic quarters until the moment the Boer ultimatum was published. When thus destroyed, the conclusion that war had all along been inevitable—that it had, in fact, been made inevitable by the folly of British Governments in allowing the Republics to become powerful military States—was adopted by the vast majority of Englishmen throughout the Empire. On the other hand there were not a few among the supporters of Lord Salisbury's Ministry who had uneasy doubts upon the wisdom, or the want of it, with which the negotiations

had been conducted by Mr. Chamberlain. The Colonial Secretary had offended many by an aggressive temper and by the occasional use of indiscreet language. It was felt that he had failed to make sufficient allowances for Mr. Kruger's difficulties and prejudices, and had taken a line of controversy which could only be interpreted as an attack upon the independence of the Republic.

Like most men of very decided character Mr. Chamberlain is some times more truculent than a Statesman should be; and this defect of his many good qualities was remembered against him by other than his political opponents. Recognition of his abilities, his fearlessness in accepting great responsibilities was accompanied by a feeling that his temperament unfitted him for the finer work of diplomacy. People whose judgment was paralysed by the dread of a race war throughout South Africa, and whose mental picture of the Boers was that of a pastoral race who wished only to be left alone with their Bibles and their simple faith in the upland veldt their forefathers had wrested from savage dominion, had qualms of conscience upon the question of intervention on behalf of a motley collection of money grubbers on the Rand. They were troubled in their consciences about the justice of the war, the inadequacy of the cause; and, as they pondered over the international problems to which it might give rise, they read in Mr. Chamberlain's despatches a provocative intention which did not always exist. As they remembered the monstrous wrong that had been done to the Transvaal as well as to the Imperial Government by the deceit and force employed by Mr. Rhodes and his allies, as they recalled the immunity from punishment of the arch-conspirator, the suspicious circumstances of the missing telegrams, the inexplicable declaration by Mr. Chamberlain that Mr. Rhodes's character as a man of honour was untainted, their sympathies with the Uitlanders became subordinate to a feeling that greater patience should have been exercised by the Imperial Government. Justice must be done to their point of view. There was solid ground for their doubts, for undoubtedly the foes of the Transvaal had exhausted the arts of agitation to bring the South African Republic and the Imperial Government into open conflict. Such a policy was not in itself unjustifiable; it was the logical consequence of the misgovernment under which the Uitlanders lived. The responsibility lies with Mr. Kruger as well as with those who financed and carried on the agitation.

But the class whose mental attitude is here described grew daily and hourly less in numbers. Sir Edward Clarke was its chief exponent; and the course he took wrecked his prospects as a politician and compelled him to withdraw from Parliament. But any recruits he may have gained were disproportionate, in numbers and in influence, to defections among those who were at first in agreement with him. The English people have a surprising aptitude for adapting themselves to the facts of the time, of ignoring preceding circumstances and concentrating their attention upon those of the moment; and the fact of the moment was that war had been declared by the Republic, not by Great Britain, and that swarms of Boers were pouring through the Passes to Natal. Under the influence of this dominant circumstance it was almost universally recognised by the supporters of the Government that it was bootless to inquire whether war might not have been averted had Mr. Chamberlain's diplomatic methods been less direct and his tone more suave. The insolent ultimatum of the Republic and the hysterical fury with which Mr. Steyn had announced his intention to make war upon us, were accepted as giving the true measure of the spirit in which the negotiations had been carried on on the Boer side; and Mr. Chamberlain in his severest mood as Despatch writer to the Republic was mildness itself in comparison with Mr. Reitz in his calmest moments.

Among the Opposition there was a pronounced division of opinion as to the avoidableness or the necessity of the war. But the official leaders ranged themselves on the side of the Government, preferring patriotism to Party spirit, and thus affording the world the spectacle of a nation united upon the need of fighting the war to a finish. Parliament was called together on October 17th. The state of affairs in South Africa—ran the Speech from the Throne—had made it expedient that the Government should be enabled to strengthen the military forces of the country by calling out the Reserves; and measures would be laid before the House of Commons to provide for the expenditure to be incurred. In the Debate on the Address in the Lords the Earl of Kimberley declared that the Opposition were ready to support whatever measures were necessary to vindicate the honour and maintain the interests of the country; but he sharply criticised the conduct of the negotiations, complaining of the publication of Despatches which in his view should have been regarded as confidential and condemning Mr. Chamberlain for having

provoked irritation and suspicion in the Republic by brandishing the word suzerainty in the face of the Boers. Lord Salisbury's reply was to the effect that even if there had been provocation on our part—which, of course, he did not admit or impute to Mr. Chamberlain—the Boers by their ultimatum and the invasion of our colonies had done that for which there could be no justification. He denied that Mr. Chamberlain could have proceeded by the carefully secret methods of the older diplomacy. His belief was that the desire to get rid of the word suzerainty, and the reality which it expressed, had been the dream of Mr. Kruger's life and that during recent years Mr. Kruger had seen that in the Uitlander population he had those beneath him whom he could oppress and that he "had used the oppression of the Uitlander population as a screw by which to obtain some concessions from us on the subject of the suzerainty." In the Commons Mr. Chamberlain's conduct was impugned by Mr. Philip Stanhope who moved an amendment to the Address expressing "strong disapproval of the conduct of the negotiations with the Government of the Transvaal which have involved us in hostilities with the two South African Republics." Sir William Harcourt agreed with Lord Kimberley in asserting the duty of the House to support the Government in maintaining the integrity of the Queen's dominions and then reviewed the negotiations in a somewhat inconclusive speech. His chief points were that the question of the suzerainty was dropped in 1884, that it should not have been revived by Mr. Chamberlain, and that the Government should have gone on with the negotiations about the franchise instead of declaring that they would formulate their own proposals. Mr. Chamberlain made a long and powerful speech in defence of himself and of the Government—a speech in which he reached a higher level than he had before attained as Statesman and as orator. It had an incalculable influence, reassuring the victims of honest doubt and steadying the opinion of the nation. He repudiated with indignation a statement by Mr. Philip Stanhope that he and Sir Alfred Milner had months before determined in their own minds that war was the only solution; but in the light of most recent events he had come to the conclusion that war was always inevitable. His policy had been at all costs to obtain justice for British subjects in the Transvaal and maintain the paramountcy of the Crown in South Africa. The suzerainty had never been renounced—but what did

the word matter? It was not the word but the substance that we were fighting for. It was British paramountcy the Boers had sought to undermine and which they had now attacked. He passed the negotiations in review, vigorously defending his share in them, the publicity he had given them, and denying that in any on the British side there was any sign of provocation for bloodshed, or desire for war, or any conspiracy to bring war about. It was a great speech, delivered with the restrained force of a master of the art of Parliamentary oratory. Sir Edward Clarke followed Mr. Chamberlain. He criticised the negotiations far more effectively than Sir William Harcourt or the mover of the Amendment had done, and denounced the war as absolutely unnecessary. The basis of his speech was that there was no suzerainty over the Transvaal; to assert the contrary was to make a statement not only in defiance of fact but also of national good faith. The Convention of 1884 was a new Convention and did in fact recognise the Transvaal as a Sovereign International State. This view of the matter he asserted and defended in a speech of remarkable interest. But it had little effect either upon the House or the country. Admiration for Sir Edward Clarke's great abilities and for his still more conspicuous courage and sincerity of purpose did not disturb the conviction the public had derived from the published Despatches that on the question of law and fact he was hopelessly in the wrong. The Amendment was defeated by 362 votes to 135, the majority including fifteen Liberals and the minority, among whom were the Nationalists, comprising Mr. John Morley and two Unionists—Mr. Courtney and Mr. Maclean.

At this time the prevailing impression was that the war would be a short one—that a single army corps in addition to the forces on the spot would easily be able to sweep back the Boers and, by Christmas, dictate terms of peace from Pretoria. The Government grossly underestimated the military ability of the Republics. Under the erroneous belief that the task before them was a light one, they placed on the supplementary army estimates a sum of £10,000,000 for additional expenditure in consequence of the war. Sir Michael Hicks Beach shared the error of his colleagues, for in explaining that he would have a Budget surplus of £3,000,000 and that it would be necessary only to raise eight out of the ten millions by Treasury Bills, he committed himself to the remark that he would thus have a margin of a million, which he did not

think, however, he would need. The observation supplies a key to the views of the Cabinet as to the character and duration of the war. That, however, is a matter dealt with in the succeeding chapter. The estimate was passed, power was taken to embody the militia and call up the militia reserve, and the short Session was brought to a close, while the British forces in the northern part of Natal were vainly endeavouring to stem the torrent of the Boer invasion of that Colony.

CHAPTER VI.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR.

Isolation of Kimberley and Mafeking—The Ladysmith Entanglement—An Egregious Estimate—What the Late Sir W. Penn Symons Thought—A Conference with the Natal Government—Northern Natal Overrun by the Boers—The Battle of Talana Hill—A Retirement to Dundee—The First British Disaster—A Retreat to Ladysmith—The Disaster of Nicholson's Nek—Investment of Ladysmith—The Attitude of the Foreign Press—Home Criticism of the Government—A Lame Defence by Lord Salisbury—A Warning to the Powers—"We Seek Neither Gold Nor Territory"—Sir Redvers Buller at the Cape—Methuen's Victory at Belmont—His Disaster at Magersfontein—General Gatacre at Stormberg—The Moonlight March—Retreat to Molteno—Another Battalion for Pretoria—Lord Roberts's Views on the Disaster—Sir Redvers Buller's Turn—The Colenso Defeat—Loss of Eleven Guns and a Thousand Men—A Stream of Troops for Africa—Lord Roberts accepts the Supreme Command—State of Public Feeling—A Proposed Day of Humiliation.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the inrush of Transvaal and Free State Boers through the mountain passes of Northern Natal, railway and telegraphic communications were cut on the western border and Kimberley and Mafeking were surrounded and isolated. No attempt need here be made to tell the story of the war in any detail. Several accounts have already been published by more or less qualified observers in widely distant areas. Military histories are sure to be forthcoming. The present volume is concerned only with the action of the Government in relation to events; and the events themselves need only to be sketched in so far as narration in general terms is necessary to give point to the measures taken by the Government.

The responsibility for what came to be known as the Ladysmith entanglement rests with Sir George White. That the military authorities in South Africa failed egregiously to appreciate what the Boer invasion would be like and therefore misled the Imperial Government has been demonstrated with the utmost clearness in the State Paper on the Defence of Natal, published in February, 1900. And they were too late in asking for even such ludicrously inadequate reinforcements as they thought would be sufficient to enable them to hold the salient angle of the

Colony. The story is one of lamentable muddling. The Natal Ministry had obtained from the High Commissioner an assurance that in the event of war Natal would be defended with the whole force of the Empire. They were anxious lest the collieries should fall into the enemy's hands and a successful Boer inroad should lead to a native rising. The late General Sir W. Penn Symons, confidentially informed them in July that with two thousand additional troops Natal would be in an efficient state of defence. A little later he thought five thousand would be better than two. On July 21st he wrote to the Governor of Natal: "I consider one cavalry regiment, one infantry battalion, 250 mounted infantry (total 1,600 men), in addition to our present force, necessary to render Natal safe from raids and to hold Newcastle. To hold Laing's Nek, and to make the whole Colony safe from invasion, I consider that we should require, in addition to our present strength of troops, two cavalry regiments, one battery horse artillery, three field batteries, four infantry battalions, 500 mounted infantry—a total of about 5,600 men." On September 7th Natal Ministers became very uneasy about the defenceless state of the Colony and made urgent representations on the subject. On September 9th Mr. Chamberlain was able to reassure them by the statement that in five weeks' time 5,700 troops would arrive from India; and two battalions and three batteries of artillery with horses, from England in about six weeks. Arrangements were thus made for giving Natal more troops than General Symons asked for. The military necessity of an advance northward to command the passes came before the arrival of these reinforcements. General Symons was of opinion that with his then forces it would be injudicious to move to Laing's Nek and that he could occupy with safety only so far as Glencoe Junction, or Newcastle after the arrival of the Manchester regiment; and on September 25th Glencoe was occupied accordingly, but not Newcastle. This was the position on the day the Boer ultimatum was sent. Late that night Sir George White, who had just arrived from England to take command, Sir A. Hunter and Colonel Duff (the Military Secretary) had an interview with the Governor of Natal. Sir George White saw that the troops at Glencoe were, in a military sense, in a dangerous position, that they could not be reinforced and should be withdrawn to Ladysmith. Sir A. Hunter agreed. But, said Sir George White, General Symons was quite confident

about the troops at Glencoe, and did not think they ought to be withdrawn to Ladysmith. What did he—the Governor—think? Sir Hely-Hutchinson wisely declined to give an opinion on the matter as a military question but explained that his primary object in wishing Glencoe occupied was to secure the coal supply, avoid discouragement to loyalists and avert rebellion among the Dutch colonists and a native rising. Withdrawal would be looked upon by these as a defeat and he (the Governor) could not answer for what would then happen. Unfortunately Sir George White allowed his better judgment to be overruled by these considerations. It was a question of balancing one disadvantage against another. Sir A. Hunter was appealed to. As a military issue he was in favour of withdrawal, but, in the circumstances, thought the troops should be retained at Glencoe. Sir George White fell in with that view and acted accordingly. The troops from India having by this time arrived, Dundee, on the line a little to the south of Glencoe, was also held. The headquarters were at Ladysmith. Altogether, Sir George White had about twelve thousand men, inclusive of those under General Symons.

The Transvaalers swept through Laing's Nek while the Free Staters poured down Van Reenans, Botha's and the Tintwa Passes. They occupied Charlestown and Newcastle without opposition on October 15th, and made a combined movement against General Symons with the object of cutting him off from Ladysmith. He took the offensive and fought a brilliant little engagement at Talana Hill, where, unhappily, he was mortally wounded and where a body of Hussars and mounted infantry, pursuing the enemy too far, were cut off and sent as prisoners to Pretoria. General French was sent from Ladysmith to assist in keeping the Boers from Glencoe, and on the 21st fought a stout battle among the hills at Elandslaagte. He achieved success for the time being, but could not prevent the combination of the three columns in which the enemy were operating against Glencoe, and General Yule, who had succeeded General Symons, fell back upon Dundee and there found himself so hard pressed and in a position of such military danger that he retired upon Ladysmith, leaving his wounded in Dundee. The retreat was covered by an action fought at Reitfontein by Sir George White. That object being effected the force retired into Ladysmith, while the Boers, twice if not thrice the strength of British set to work to invest that town

and cut off communications with the south. Thus far the British had done badly. So far from having prevented the invasion of Natal they had been compelled to withdraw from the positions it had been thought necessary to hold. On October 30th came the disaster of Nicholson's Nek. Sir George White had planned an attack in force under cover of night on the Boer position to the north of Ladysmith in the hope of turning the enemy's flank. He sent one column under Colonel Carleton consisting of the 10th Mountain Battery, four-and-a-half companies of the Gloucesters and six companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers with instructions to seize Nicholson's Nek, and after its departure no communication seems to have been kept with it. The night march of this force went well until it was within a couple of miles of that eminence. Boulders rolled from the hills startled the battery and ammunition mules and they stampeded. With fixed bayonets the infantry seized an adjacent hill and prepared cover. At dawn the Boers attacked. The fight raged for five hours. Twenty officers and men were killed and a hundred wounded. The ammunition being exhausted, nothing could be done but surrender, and nearly nine hundred men were sent to join the Hussars and mounted police at Pretoria. Our losses in killed, wounded and missing at Talana Hill, Elandslaagte and Reitfontein had numbered about six hundred, and now there had to be added the entire column under Colonel Carleton. From this point the Boers were able to compel the retirement of the British troops at Colenso across the Tugela River and thus complete the investment of Ladysmith, but fortunately not before the arrival of a strong naval battery from Durban.

The disaster of Nicholson's Nek shattered the delusion—shared alike by the military authorities, by the Government and by the public—that the Boers could easily be outgeneraled and were no match for disciplined troops. And it weakened confidence in Sir George White's ability as a commander. No fears were, however, then entertained as to the safety of Ladysmith, or as to his ability to break out of the town should he consider it advisable to do so. The long siege was in no wise foreseen, and the echoes of the artillery duel that succeeded Sir George White's withdrawal within the defences were heard in England without alarm. The army corps from England was on its way, and Sir Redvers Buller was thought to be more than competent to extricate the Ladysmith garrison and be in Pretoria by Christmas.

These initial reverses were received with frantic joy by the press of Europe. The military power of England was derided, that of the Boers, who were partly officered by Germans, was extravagantly praised. Unauthorised but significant threats were made that if the tide of fortune set against the Boers this or that Power would intervene on their behalf. At home the Government were sharply criticised for having entered upon the war with inadequate forces on the spot. In a speech early in November Lord Salisbury dealt with both questions. His answer to home critics was that if they had begun their preparations for war two months earlier than had been the case they would have received the Boer ultimatum two months earlier than they did. Superficially regarded that was conclusive; but it did not meet the point that the military arrangements of the Republics would not have been in so advanced a stage, that the negotiations had been protracted by the Boers in order to get further time for their completion, and that the veldt would then have been bare of subsistence for the Boer horses and oxen. It may, however, stand until we come to the debate in which the Government were challenged in Parliament upon the conduct of the war. As for intervention by Foreign Powers, he characterised it as a wild suggestion, but contrived to convey a pointed warning to any who might be disposed to pursue that course. It was not, he said, by intervention that the conflict would be concluded. "We shall have to carry it through ourselves. The interference of nobody else will have any effect upon it—in the first place because we should not accept of an interference by anybody; and, in the second place, because I am convinced that no such idea is present to the mind of any Government in the world." The cry of "Hands off!" could not have been paraphrased with more delicate irony. It was in the course of this speech also that Lord Salisbury defined the object of the war. "We seek," he said, "neither gold nor territory, but only equal rights for all men of all races and security for our fellow subjects and for the Empire."

Sir Redvers Buller had reached Cape Town on October 31st. Transports with troops were daily arriving. As fast as the men landed they were sent to the front—some to Durban for the relief of Ladysmith, others to the Orange River for the relief of Kimberley and the others to the north of Cape Colony for an advance into the Free State. As November wore on he found himself in command of over ninety thousand men, including South African colonial troops to

the number of about fifteen thousand, and Australian and Canadian contingents numbering two thousand five hundred. General Gatacre was in command at Colesburg, in the north of Cape Colony, and General Lord Methuen at the Orange River with about thirteen thousand men. On November 23rd Lord Methuen engaged about eight thousand Boers at Belmont, sweeping them away from the ridges at the point of the bayonet. The victory was undeniable. Two days later he attacked the Boer position six miles farther north, again inflicting defeat upon them after what he somewhat extravagantly described as "one of the hardest and most trying fights in the annals of the British army." The Modder River having been crossed the relief of Kimberley appeared to be merely a question of days. But the Boer army, strongly entrenched at Magersfontein, lay athwart the path. Reinforcements having reached him, bringing his force up to double the number of the Boers, Lord Methuen bombarded Magersfontein on the afternoon of December 10th, and during the night, through a heavy thunderstorm, moved his army towards the enemy's entrenchments. The Highland Brigade, to whom had been allotted the task of assaulting the Magersfontein Kopje, marched in mass of quarter columns, the four battalions keeping touch. The Highland Light Infantry was to be in reserve until the action was developed. The three other battalions were to extend just before daybreak, two companies in firing line, two in support and four in reserve—all at five paces distance between them. Before the march began notice was unfortunately given to the enemy by the accidental discharge of two rifles; and even if this did not put them on the alert they were advised of the movement by the flashing of a lantern by a Boer spy. Instead of being caught unawares they were waiting for the attack. In the darkness, and owing to the difficulties of the ground,—the thick bush throwing the leading battalion into confusion,—the brigade got closer to the kopje than it should have done in mass formation. The order to deploy was given too late. While the companies were moving out to extend, a terrible fire from the kopje was poured into them. From that moment the attack was hopeless. Major-General Wauchope was killed at the head of the brigade. The initial error brought others in its train. Someone shouted the word "Retire" and obedience to this mistaken command added to the confusion of the brigade. Attempts to reach the trenches with the bayonet failed. The engagement became general and raged from daybreak till after

one o'clock, the Highland Brigade, or what remained of it, taking what cover was possible and keeping up the rifle duel. At one p.m. the Seaforths were exposed to a heavy cross-fire and retired for five hundred yards, suffering terrible loss. "This was an unfortunate retirement," says Lord Methuen in his account of the battle, "for Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes Hallett had received orders from me to remain in position until dusk and the enemy were at this time quitting the trenches (which had been under a heavy artillery fire since daybreak) in tens and twenties . . . The attack failed; the inclement weather was against success; the men in the Highland Brigade were ready enough to rally, but the paucity of officers and non-commissioned officers rendered this no easy matter. I attach no blame to this splendid brigade."

But, rightly or wrongly, the public did attach blame to Lord Methuen. They measured his capacity as a general by the fact that, at a cost of eight hundred and thirty-three in killed, wounded and missing, he had failed in his purpose.

Nor did this reverse stand alone. On December 10th General Gatacre tried conclusions with the Boers at Stormberg. On the evening of the 9th he detrained a force of about two thousand of all arms at Molteno, his headquarters then being at Puller's Kraal. Marching by moonlight the column halted for three-quarters of an hour at a spot reported by the chief guide to be within a mile and a half of the Boer position. Whether by treachery or accident the guide led the column in a wrong direction. At three forty-five General Gatacre found that he had made a long detour and was not at the point he had intended to reach. He was, in fact, leading the column full tilt against a strong position crowded with an expectant instead of an unsuspecting foe. The enemy opened a heavy fire; the ground was so difficult that the artillery could not be brought into action against them. There was no help for it but to order a retirement upon Molteno. The conditions of the retreat were in every way disastrous to the British column. The men were dead beat. As many dropped from fatigue as from the Boer bullets. While men and horses staggered over the broken ground the Boers moved along the heights and poured shell upon them. When General Gatacre collected his shattered column at Molteno he was minus six hundred and seventy officers and men of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers and the Irish Rifles. They had been left behind, had been outnumbered and had surren-

dered. The action may be dismissed in the language of Lord Roberts. General Gatacre had relied on inaccurate information as to the ground to be traversed. He had employed too small a force and had tired out his men by the long night march immediately after the railway journey. He should have halted when, after midnight, it became evident that the column was going in a wrong direction; and if he had then failed to find the right road he should have fallen back upon Molteno rather than risk the safety of the entire force by following a route which brought the troops into difficult ground commanded on both sides by the enemy.

Two disasters of such magnitude in a couple of days—each of them due to errors of judgment—was more than the public at home could bear. There was a very natural outcry against the Generals and also against the Government, which, however, was powerless to do anything but send more troops. Five divisions were already in South Africa. A sixth was now mobilised and sent out with all speed. And it was announced that a seventh and even an eighth would be mobilised. These measures had the effect of calming the public, which, with the news of each reverse, grew only the more determined to attain the object of the war at any cost—a resolution strengthened by the taunts of Continental critics, who gloried in the mistakes of our Generals, foretold the loss of South Africa and the collapse of the British Empire. But to return to the facts. Lord Methuen was powerless on the Modder, General Gatacre was paralysed in the north of Cape Colony, Ladysmith was still unrelieved. Sir Redvers Buller had taken personal charge of the operations in Natal. It was now his turn to suffer a humiliating defeat. Early in December he had collected a powerful force—about twenty thousand of all arms and many guns—at Chieveley, south of the Tugela. In the early morning of the 15th he attempted the passage of the Tugela. There were two fordable places about two miles apart. He intended to force one or the other with one of two brigades, having a third brigade in reserve. General Hart was to attack the left drift, General Hildyard the road to the right, and General Lyttleton to hold the centre to support either. General Hart's task proved to be so difficult that Sir Redvers Buller directed him to withdraw. He then ordered General Hildyard to advance, but at that moment learned that two field batteries and

six naval 12-pounder quick-firing guns had been taken by Colonel Long close to the river at Colenso, that the men and horses had been shot by the Boers and the guns captured. Judging that it was hopeless to continue the action Sir Redvers Buller ordered a retirement and the force returned to Chieveley, having lost eleven guns and suffered casualties to the number of a thousand.

The Government and the nation, though bitterly disappointed with the course of the war, promptly learned the lesson of the defeats. The Seventh Division, then being mobilised, was sent out, and with it more artillery and a howitzer brigade. An Eighth Division was mobilised. The remaining reserves were called up. Twelve battalions of militia were invited to volunteer for service abroad; twelve more were embodied for home defence. Volunteers were invited for South Africa from the Yeomanry; the volunteer regiments were asked to furnish enough men to add a company of civilian soldiers to every battalion of regulars at the front. *Carte blanche* was given to raise as many mounted men in South Africa as might be found useful. The Colonies were invited to send further contingents of mounted men, whom the War Office, with characteristic fatuity, had thought, before the war broke out, were less desirable than infantry. Above all, Lord Roberts, whose only son had lost his life in a vain endeavour to bring away Colonel Long's abandoned artillery, was offered supreme command, with Lord Kitchener as chief of the staff.

Public confidence was in a measure restored by the frank recognition of past miscalculations which these steps implied. The man in the street had pinned his faith to Sir Redvers Buller; and Sir Redvers Buller had sustained what he himself described as a serious reverse. It was evident that he had all his work cut out to relieve Ladysmith, and that he would have no thought to spare for the guidance of the main plan of campaign—the invasion of the Republics from Cape Colony. In no other quarter had events produced a man of pre-eminent military capacity: General Gatacre had blundered badly; Lord Methuen had failed disastrously. A fresh mind was needed—a man who could restore confidence to the army and the nation, not alone by the magic of his personality but also the ability of his strategy. In Lord Roberts the nation had such a man; and it was with profound gratitude it learned that the veteran would put aside his private grief and once more face the dangers and responsibilities of the field. With

another fifty thousand men on their way, with Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener steaming south, with offers of men pouring into the War Office from every yeomanry and volunteer regiment and from every Colony, the year closed in a more hopeful mood. Government and people were absolutely united. Even the few who were conscientiously opposed to the war recognised that the acceptance of defeat was impossible—that the contest must be fought to a finish if the Empire was to be preserved. Pietists suggested a day of humiliation. Never was proposal more out of harmony with public sentiment. God helps those who help themselves, is a maxim dear to the English heart; and, in agreement with it, the nation faced the situation with calmness and self-reliance.

CHAPTER VII.

THE TURN OF THE TIDE.

The Peril of Ladysmith—Fierce Boer Attack—"Very Hard Pressed"—A Dramatic Situation—Buller's Army almost Inactive—Sir George White Repulses the Attack Unaided—Disaster to the Suffolks—Buller and Ladysmith—"There will be no Turning Back"—Spion Kop—Buller's Army does Turn Back—"A Masterly Retreat"—Opening of the New Session—The Queen's Speech and the War—Debate on the Address—Lord Kimberley's Criticism of the Government—A feeble Speech by Lord Salisbury—He complains of the Treasury and the Constitution—Lord Lansdowne takes cover behind the "Best Military Advice"—The Debate in the Commons—Mr. Balfour's Excuses for the Government—Lord E. Fitzmaurice's Amendment to the Address—"The Man in the Street"—Paltriness of the Debate—Mr. Wyndham comes out into the Open—A Series of Admissions—One Hundred and Eighty Thousand Men and Four Hundred and Ten Guns against Fifty-One Thousand Boers and a Hundred and Ten Guns—Sir R. Buller's Third Failure to Relieve Ladysmith—The Vaal Krantz Retirement—Military Proposals of the Government—Plans for Home Defence—Sir A. Acland-Hood's Caustic Comment—The Government Attitude towards Conscription—Lord Roberts at Work—Relief of Kimberley—Cronje Caught at Paardeberg—An Armistice Asked for and Refused—A Week's Bombardment—An Unconditional Capitulation—Effect of Paardeberg on the Ladysmith Investment—Sir R. Buller's Advance—Withdrawal of the Besieging Force—Relief of Ladysmith—Lord Roberts's Dash upon Bloemfontein—Boer Concentration at Kroonstadt—Pretended Submission of the Free Staters—Boer Overtures for Peace—"In the Name of the Triune God"—The Boer Despatch—Lord Salisbury's Reply—Boer Appeal for Mediation by the United States—A Polite but Firm Refusal by Lord Salisbury—Promises of Further Support from the Colonies—A Lull in the War—Events Pending a Further Advance—The Queen and the Shamrock—Royal Visit to London—Issue of Correspondence with Germany relating to Contraband—German Brusqueness and Ill-will towards England—Publication of the Spion Kop Despatches—Lord Roberts's Report—The Censure of Sir Charles Warren and Sir Redvers Buller—The War Office and the Despatches—Lord Lansdowne's Proposal—Sir R. Buller Declines to Re-write his Report—Criticism of Lord Lansdowne—Lord Portsmouth's Attack—The War Secretary's Reply—Lord Rosebery's Comments—Debate in the Commons—The Red Herring of "Personal Honour"—Mr. Balfour's Speech.

LORD ROBERTS and Lord Kitchener arrived at Cape Town on January 10th. The three besieged towns still held out. The harassing dread that Ladysmith would fall before Lord Roberts was able to concert measures for its rescue had been lessened by Sir George White's gallant and successful resistance to a Boer assault on his positions between the town and Colenso. The attack was made

on January 3rd, and with great spirit and determination, by a large body of the enemy. This was the fiercest battle during the war in Natal. The original attack was repulsed. But it was renewed in stronger force and with greater desperation. Sir George White was able to heliograph to Sir Redvers Buller that he was "very hard pressed." Then the sunlight failed. The curtain fell before the tragedy at a most dramatic and terrible situation. For England it was an agonising moment. Sir Redvers Buller did not, as was expected, relieve the pressure on Ladysmith by a grand attack upon the intervening Boer positions. He contented himself with a futile reconnaissance before Colenso. The Boer assault was concentrated upon Cæsar's Camp and Waggon Hill. On three occasions they gained the British trenches and each time were driven out at the point of the bayonet. At one part of the British position they maintained their hold throughout the day, but, after sunset, and during a heavy rainstorm, the Devonshires, under Colonel Park, charged home. To the inexpressible relief of the nation Sir George White was able to heliograph the next day that the enemy had been everywhere repulsed, and with greater loss than the garrison had suffered.

In other parts of the theatre of war there was little movement. Lord Methuen's army was ensconced in comfortable quarters on the Modder; General Gatacre's force was producing no remarkable results in the north-east of Cape Colony. The only incident to record in that quarter was the capture of a hundred and fifty men of the Suffolks, a loss due to the familiar tactics—a night march, the seizure of a hill, the opening of a deadly fire by a concealed and unexpected enemy, a momentary panic, the calling of the word "Retire" by someone, a hurried withdrawal and the leaving of a body of men to be shot at without let or hindrance until they surrendered.

Simultaneously with the arrival of Lord Roberts at Cape Town Sir Redvers Buller made another effort. "We are going to the relief of our comrades in Ladysmith," he told his men; "there will be no turning back." But he did turn back. Seizing Potgeiter's Drift, the bulk of his army, under the cover of the artillery, was placed across the Tugela. The Boers did not effectively contest the passage, putting their trust in their entrenchments on the hills parallel to the stream. On January 23rd news came from him that he would that night attempt to seize Spion Kop,

"the salient point which forms the left of the enemy's position facing Potgeiter's." The Kop was taken. On the 25th he reported that General Warren was of opinion that he had rendered the enemy's position untenable, and he added "the men splendid." On the 26th, confidence that a locally decisive victory had been gained was destroyed by the mortifying intelligence that the Kop had been abandoned, and that the entire force was to retire across the Tugela again. The hill was subjected to so terrible a fire that it was almost untenable; the artillery could not be brought, or was not brought, into position upon it in time; there was no water obtainable, as had been supposed, and at nightfall the beaten force staggered down the slopes with their burthen of wounded. But the retreat across the Tugela was, according to military critics, a masterly performance; and in that fact a bitterly disappointed nation had to take what comfort it could find.

Parliament met on January 30th. The only relief to a situation of intense gloom was the knowledge that fresh troops were being poured into South Africa, and that Lords Roberts and Kitchener were completing their preparations for a great movement which would determine the issue of the campaign, and the future of South Africa. The Queen's Speech recognised the devotion and enthusiasm with which the people here and in the Colonies had responded to the calls for service at the front. It declared that the heroism of the soldiers in the field and of the sailors and marines who had co-operated in the defence of Ladysmith had not fallen short of the noblest traditions of our military history. It made no mention of the brilliant generalship which had brought about so many disasters and filled Pretoria with British prisoners. It advised the House of Commons that the provision for military expenditure must be largely increased and added—apparently in the hope of breaking the force of expected criticism—that "the experience of a great war must necessarily afford lessons of the greatest importance to the military administrations of the country." The Debate on the Address never reached a high level either in the House of Lords or the Commons. If Parliamentary oratory, as distinct from Parliamentary action, were of any permanent interest it might be worth while to analyse the speeches and show why they added to the disappointment of the nation. Lord Kimberley complained of the want of adequate preparations for the war and disposed of the argument that if troops had been sent earlier the only result

would have been that war would sooner have occurred. His points were that, in Mr. Chamberlain's words, the policy of Mr. Kruger had led us five times to the brink of war, that the Government had nevertheless pursued a line in their diplomacy with him which was leading to war and that they had allowed him year after year to pile up enormous armaments without themselves taking corresponding action in South Africa. His view was that the Boers should have been warned against the accumulation of armaments that could only have been destined for use against Great Britain and that if they persevered in the accumulation after such a warning war should have been declared then and there. The Government had allowed matters to drift until they found themselves in such a situation that they were not prepared, in the event of the failure of their negotiations, to enforce their views.

Lord Salisbury's speech in reply was unworthy of the criticism and of the occasion. It has since been shown that the Intelligence Department of the War Office were well informed of the military resources and armaments of the Republic and quite expected that in any war the Free State as well as the Transvaal would have to be fought. This knowledge was accessible to the Government and it must be assumed was mastered by each member of the Cabinet while the negotiations were in progress. Yet Lord Salisbury denied that the Government knew of the large quantities of artillery and munitions the Boers were accumulating. How on earth were they to know? They had no power of search at Lourenço Marques; and how were they to see through the locomotives, boilers and piano cases in which he believed guns and munitions of war had been introduced? We had a very small secret service fund; the Treasury held the power of the purse; and the British Constitution was an imperfect fighting machine. Lord Salisbury had never made so inapt a speech on a great occasion. He had never so signally disappointed the nation, which looked to him, not for complaints about the Treasury—a mere instrument which any Government with the will can use as it pleases—nor for a disquisition on the defects of the Constitution, but for words of clear counsel and an announcement of measures adequate to the crisis in which the country stood. Of such plans his speech contained no hint. The obvious answers were made to it. Lord Lansdowne endeavoured to defend the War Office. He claimed that the Intelligence

Department had obtained very good information about the Boer armaments; but he did not explain why he and his colleagues in the Cabinet had not made use of it. His personal responsibility for the failure of the campaign thus far he shelved upon the "best military advice," which had been followed in sending small reinforcements in the belief that they would be sufficient to prevent invasion of the Colonies. But he offered no defence for the colossal miscalculations his Department and the whole Government had made. There was no defence.

The first day's debate in the Commons was as disappointing as that in the Lords. Mr. Balfour feebly observed, in answer to the criticism that the Government had originally sent troops in dribbles, that if he were asked how it came about that an underestimate of the Boer strength was made, he could only reply that the problem was a military one and that similar mistakes had been made by nearly all military nations. And he shifted the responsibility of the Government upon the Generals. The defensive force at first sent out was largely in excess of the number the Government were told was necessary. The Generals had been given a free hand; the Government had not interfered with them; the whole responsibility for the occupation of Ladysmith rested with the military commander; and so forth.

Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, the Liberal Member for the Cricklade Division, and a brother of the Secretary for War, moved an amendment to the Address, proposing to add these words: "But we humbly express our regret at the want of knowledge, foresight and judgment displayed by your Majesty's advisers, alike in their conduct of South African affairs since 1895 and in their preparations for the war now proceeding." His criticisms of Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy have little point or interest. They were of a pettifogging character. The issue was not whether the diplomacy was at fault but whether there had been an absence of co-operative action by those branches of the Executive which had to translate the policy of the negotiations into fact should the negotiations fail. The attack on the Government because of the insufficiency of their preparations for war was amply justified. It was as clear as anything could be that they had delayed making any special preparations whatever until the last moment, though, individually and collectively, they could not have been so unintelligent as not to know that unless Mr. Kruger executed a

volte face war was certain; also that such belated preparations as they did make were ludicrously inadequate for the defence of Natal alone, not to mention Cape Colony. As for carrying the war into the enemy's country they had acted as though that would be an operation which could be carried out at leisure and would mean little more than a movable picnic across the veldt to Pretoria. All that, however, was as plain as the proverbial pikestaff to the man in the street, with whose limitations in the matter of official knowledge and whose consequent deficiency of foresight the Government, in the person of Mr. Balfour, had associated themselves; and this notwithstanding their facilities for obtaining knowledge to which the man in the street could have no access. No criticisms that could be levelled against the Government by the Opposition could make the fact plainer than it was that Ministers had entered upon war with a deplorable lack of foresight and judgment if not of knowledge.

The nation did not want to listen to speakers whose attacks were not free from the suspicion of Party motives, but to hear from the Government what they intended to do to bring the South African campaign to a conclusion and to ensure the safety of the country against perils that might arise from possible complications with other Powers. Their disgust at the paltriness of the Debate up to this stage was lessened by a speech from Mr. Wyndham, the Under-Secretary for War, who, on the night Lord Salisbury was endeavouring to explain away his maladroit reflections on the Treasury and, inferentially, on the Chancellor of the Exchequer, frankly accepted on behalf of the Government full responsibility for the situation, and asked the country to believe that there had never been any intention to shift it upon the military authorities. Having thus left the shelter of "military advice," behind which each previous Ministerial speaker had taken cover, he made a series of admissions. The estimates as to the defensive force required in South Africa had proved to be erroneous. More mounted troops should have been sent out at first—the sending of them, it will be remembered, had been distinctly discouraged in the fatuous circular to the Colonies drawn up by the War Office. And—most damaging admission—proper maps had not been prepared of the territory between Ladysmith and the Tugela.

But by a recital of figures he showed that the Government

were at length taking adequate steps for the prosecution of the war. After Nicholson's Nek a fifth division had been sent; after Stormberg and Magersfontein a sixth; after Colenso a seventh; and an eighth was at once mobilised. The Government had sent and were sending thirty-eight siege train guns, and had thirty-eight naval guns in South Africa—seventy-four heavy guns of position. In addition they had with the army in South Africa thirty-six 5-inch howitzers, fifty-five guns of horse artillery, two hundred and thirty-four guns of field artillery, two mountain batteries—in all four hundred and ten guns without those then going out with the volunteers and the additional forces from the Colonies. As for men, 2,375 unmounted and 4,698 mounted men had been accepted from Canada and Australasia. On January 7th the totals in South Africa were 83,600 unmounted men and 19,800 mounted; and the total complement that would shortly be there, not including the eighth division or the 4th Cavalry Brigade, was 142,800 unmounted men and 37,800 mounted—in round figures 180,000 men, with four hundred and ten guns. By way of reassuring the public that these numbers were adequate he recited figures collected by the Intelligence Department showing that the two Republics could not put into the field—allowing for 4,000 disloyalists from the British Colonies there—more than 51,000 men and 110 guns of various kinds, including 19 captured British guns. Contemplation of these figures reassured the public on the question of the adequacy of the means for overcoming the Republics and interest was then thrown forward to the nature of the Government plans for creating an army for home defence. It is not worth while to follow the Address debate further than to say that Mr. Chamberlain made a striking speech—brushing aside the tangled controversy upon the diplomacy of the war and re-stating the real and only vital issue of British *versus* Dutch supremacy in South Africa. The amendment was defeated by 352 votes to 139—a majority of 213 for the Government.

While a flood of disregarded oratory in Parliament spread over the face of the newspapers, Sir Redvers Buller made another—the third—attempt to break through the ring of fire that encircled Ladysmith. He made a feint attack with General Wynne's Brigade and five batteries at Potgeiter's Drift while General Lyttleton's Brigade, the Durhams leading, crossed the river further east. The Durhams and the Rifle Brigade seized the heights known as

Vaal Krantz at the point of the bayonet. The troops bivouacked there. The Boers attempted to recapture the position but failed after a day's fighting. But ahead of the British the path was commanded by the Boer guns, and the result of observations by military balloon was that Sir Redvers Buller found that possession of Vaal Krantz was of little service. A retirement was ordered and the Tugela was once more recrossed.

The third retirement stimulated interest in the military proposals of the Government. They were disclosed in both Houses on February 12th. Mr. Wyndham showed that the country was not so greatly denuded of regulars as had been thought. There were still 98,000—though these, of course, included untrained recruits and all those who, for various reasons, had been rejected for service in South Africa. In addition there were 12,000 reservists, 7,000 yeomanry, 77,000 militia, and 215,000 volunteers, a total of 409,000, the majority, in the opinion of military experts, half trained and ill-equipped. The Government proposed to raise 30,000 additional regulars—12 battalions of the line, 17 reserve emergency battalions, 36 batteries of Field Artillery, seven batteries of Horse Artillery, four regiments of cavalry and Army Service Corps and Engineers sufficient for two more Army Corps. As for the militia, it was thirty thousand short of its full establishment and the Government hoped to attract this number by increasing the pay of that branch. Yeomanry were to be enrolled practically up to the limit of men offering for service; and the volunteers were to be invited to bring each battalion up to full strength, and to spend one month annually in camp. The capitation grants were to be increased, and the volunteer artillery armed with modern quick-firing guns. By these methods—which Sir A. Acland-Hood caustically described as trying to raise an army by invitation and by imagination—the Government expected to bring up the total of the home army—regulars, militia, yeomanry and volunteers, irrespective of all those in South Africa—to over half a million. The proposals were coldly received in the House and derided by the military party there and in the country, who held that some form of conscription should have been adopted. To conscription, however, the Government were unalterably opposed. Their firmness on this point was not to be shaken.

Attention was diverted from these proposals by the news of the relief of Kimberley. On February 11th a column under General

French left the Modder River Camp, made a detour by which the Boer position at Magersfontein was turned, and, after fighting two unimportant engagements, capturing large quantities of Boer supplies, and covering a distance of over seventy miles, entered Kimberley. The town had borne a four months' siege, for which it had been ill-prepared owing, chiefly, to the negligence of the Cape Ministry, and it had been defended with conspicuous success and gallantry by Colonel Kekewich. Among the residents throughout the investment was Mr. Rhodes, who assisted in the defence of the mines, and gave employment to numbers of native labourers who might otherwise have suffered sore distress. But Kimberley did not prove to be big enough to hold him and a military commander without mutual discomfort. General French's movement was but part of a larger plan, in which the entire army on the Modder was engaged. When the Boers, under Commandant Cronje, evacuated the trenches at Magersfontein and fell back upon those at Spytfontein they found themselves completely outflanked. Cronje determined upon a retreat towards Bloemfontein. He was caught up at Paardeberg, on the Modder, and there surrounded. Lord Roberts telegraphed on February 21st that he could not assault the position without heavy loss, and that he had therefore bombarded the camp and turned his attention to the Boer reinforcements. He had driven off the Boers who had flocked to Cronje's assistance, inflicting heavy loss upon them and capturing many prisoners. Though Cronje was in a veritable death-trap and entirely enveloped by Lord Roberts' forces he refused to surrender. On Monday, the 19th, having sustained a terrible bombardment throughout the previous day, he asked for a twenty-four hours' armistice to bury his dead. This was refused by Lord Kitchener on the ground that it was in part a device to allow time for the arrival of reinforcements. Immediate surrender was demanded. Messages were exchanged which led Lord Kitchener to believe that Cronje wished to surrender and he went towards the doomed laager to arrange a capitulation. He was informed that there was a mistake, that Cronje had not the least intention of surrendering and would fight to the death. The bombardment was thereupon resumed and continued throughout the week. Admiration in England of this stubborn but hopeless defence was tinged with fear that the whole force would have to be annihilated—that the bombardment was

but the prelude to a war of extermination. At daylight on the 27th, however, so terrible had been the British fire and so intolerable had the laager become from the stench of putrifying animals, that Cronje capitulated unconditionally. His army, to the number of about four thousand, laid down their arms and were made prisoners with their chief, Cronje and the Transvaalers among the force being subsequently transported to St. Helena.

The enthusiasm which this success excited throughout the British Empire was given greater volume and intensity by the circumstance that it had been won on the anniversary of Majuba,—to the Boers a day of festival, to the British a day of humiliation.

Meanwhile Sir Redvers Buller had been hammering away at the Boer positions on the Tugela, fighting with dogged determination but without great results. The difficulties of his task were lessened by the withdrawal of part of the Boer force, which was sent through the Free State to the assistance of Cronje. After eleven days' almost constant warfare he swept the Boers away from Pieters Hill, north of the Tugela, and having thus turned their left successfully assaulted the main position, scattering the enemy, who now took shelter upon and round about Bulwana Hill. Sir Redvers Buller gave them no rest. Whether solely because of the vigour and persistence of his attack or partly because they were required for the defence of the Republics against Lord Roberts they broke up the investing lines and retreated northward. Late in the afternoon of Wednesday, February 28th, Lord Dundonald was able to break through the heights and gallop his squadrons of mounted infantry across the flats to the south of Ladysmith. Great were the rejoicings at the relief of the town, which had come none too soon, for the garrison had suffered severe privations and much sickness and could not have held out for many weeks more. Within the next few days news came that Lord Roberts had by almost bloodless strategy turned the flank of the Boers who lay athwart his path to Bloemfontein and that the enemy in the Free State had retreated pell mell, though not with such precipitancy as to leave their guns behind. Mr. Kruger was present with the burghers here and it was in vain that he urged them to stand against the British. The flight was complete and no further resistance was experienced until Bloemfontein was reached. The Free State capital was entered on March 13th, Mr. Fraser, a former candidate for the Presidency,

the Mayor and other officials meeting Lord Roberts outside the town and tendering the keys of the public buildings. Meanwhile the forces in Cape Colony were steadily moving northward, scattering the Boers before them, and troops were pressing north from Kimberley to the relief of Mafeking and southward to that town from Rhodesia. The Boers concentrated at Kroonstadt, near the northern frontier of the State, and such of them as were south of Bloemfontein hid their Mausers, hastened to give in their old and useless arms and pretended to make their submission to the victors, swearing an oath of neutrality which the majority of them afterwards repudiated.

These successes were believed to have brought the end of the war within view. The initial incompetence of the Government, the inadequacy of the "military advice" on which they had acted in the endeavour to keep Natal inviolate from invasion, and the consequent breakdown of the plan of marching an army corps northward from Cape Colony to Pretoria, were for the moment forgotten. Admiration for the masterly strategy of Lord Roberts superseded criticism of the miscalculations by which the Government had allowed the very existence of the Empire to be imperilled. President Kruger, and the "late President" Steyn—as Lord Roberts had called the latter in his Despatches describing the entry into Bloemfontein—had given the Government an opportunity of making a declaration of policy such as the public were eager to hear. On March 5th they had made telegraphic overtures for peace. "The blood and the tears of the thousands who have suffered from this war"—ran the opening paragraph of their Despatch—"and the prospect of all the moral and material ruin with which South Africa is now threatened, make it necessary for both belligerents to ask themselves dispassionately, and as in the sight of the Triune God, for what they are fighting and whether the aim of each justifies all this appalling misery and devastation." With this object in view they "solemnly declared" that the war had been undertaken solely as a defensive measure to safeguard the threatened independence of the South African Republic and was continued in order to secure and safeguard the incontestable independence of both Republics as Sovereign International States. It was not begun, as had been asserted, with the set purpose of undermining Her Majesty's authority in South Africa and of setting up an Administration over all South Africa independent of Her Majesty's

Government. Conditional upon the recognition of the *status* of International Sovereignty for both States they were willing to end the war, but "if Her Majesty's Government is determined to destroy the independence of the Republics there is nothing left to us and to our people but to persevere to the end in the course already begun, in spite of the overwhelming pre-eminence of the British Empire, confident that that God who lighted the inextinguishable fire of the love of freedom in the hearts of ourselves and of our fathers will not forsake us, but will accomplish His work in us and in our descendants." They had hesitated, they explained, to make this declaration earlier, and while their forces held "defensive positions" far in Her Majesty's Colonies, lest such a declaration should hurt the feelings of honour of the British people; but now that the *prestige* of the British Empire could be considered to be assured by the capture of Cronje's force and the consequent evacuation of those "defensive positions" that difficulty was over, and they could no longer hesitate to inform the British Government and people, in the sight of the whole civilised world, why they were fighting and on what conditions they were ready to make peace.

Lord Salisbury replied to this communication on March 6th in a Despatch which is a compact and complete justification of the war. It is a document of historic importance. To summarise it would be an impertinence:—

"I have the honour to acknowledge your Honours' telegram dated the 5th of March from Bloemfontein, of which the purport is principally to demand that her Majesty's Government shall recognise the 'incontestable independence' of the South African Republic and Orange Free State 'as sovereign international States,' and to offer, on those terms, to bring the war to a conclusion.

"In the beginning of October last, peace existed between Her Majesty and the two Republics under the Conventions which then were in existence. A discussion had been proceeding for some months between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic, of which the object was to obtain redress for certain very serious grievances under which British residents in the South African Republic were suffering. In the course of these negotiations, the South African Republic had, to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, made considerable armaments, and the latter had, consequently, taken steps to provide corresponding reinforcements to the British garrisons of Cape Town and Natal. No infringement of the rights guaranteed by the Conventions had, up to that point, taken place on the British side. Suddenly, at two days' notice, the South African Republic, after issuing an insulting ultimatum, declared war upon Her Majesty; and the Orange Free State, with

whom there had not even been any discussion, took a similar step. Her Majesty's dominions were immediately invaded by the two Republics, siege was laid to three towns within the British frontier, a large portion of the two colonies was overrun, with great destruction to property and life, and the Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants of extensive portions of Her Majesty's dominions as if those dominions had been annexed to one or other of them. In anticipation of these operations the South African Republic had been accumulating for many years past military stores on an enormous scale, which, by their character, could only have been intended for use against Great Britain.

"Your Honours make some observations of a negative character upon the object with which these preparations were made. I do not think it necessary to discuss the questions you have raised. But the result of these preparations, carried on with great secrecy, has been that the British Empire has been compelled to confront an invasion which has entailed upon the Empire a costly war and the loss of thousands of precious lives. This great calamity has been the penalty which Great Britain has suffered for having in recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two Republics.

"In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the position which was given to them, and the calamities which their unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's dominions, Her Majesty's Government can only answer your Honours' telegram by saying that they are not prepared to assent to the independence either of the South African Republic or of the Orange Free State."

The reply was the only one that could possibly be given. The chapters in this work reviewing the *status* of the South African Republic and the diplomacy since the Raid, will have been written in vain if it is not apparent that the only vital issue between the Boers and the British was the denial by the latter of the Republic's claim to be a "Sovereign International State." What the Boer overtures meant was that we should accede to that claim notwithstanding their invasion of our territory, their defeats in the field, the failure of their investment of Ladysmith and Kimberley, and the certainty that if their independence were again conceded they would deny freedom to British subjects within their territories. The overtures were as dishonest as they were impudent. Their real purpose was to bring about intervention by other Powers. At the time they were made direct to the British Government the United States was asked through Mr. Adelbert Hay, the newly-appointed Consul at Pretoria, to use its good offices. The United States, apparently in ignorance of the fact that communication had been made direct to London, consented to act as the channel for the Boer proposals. This errand was duly discharged, but pains were taken to show that though the

United States would be willing to advance the cause of peace there was no intention of intervening in the dispute. The offer of mediation was politely but firmly declined.

The position taken up by the Imperial Government was that the war would be prosecuted until an unconditional surrender was forthcoming, that no foreign intervention would be tolerated, and that the settlement after the war should be of such a nature that never again would the Boers be in a position to contest British authority anywhere in South Africa. The Republics had appealed to the arbitrament of war and by the fortunes of war their future was to be decided. Henceforth they were to be inside and not outside the Imperial system. The Presidents cannot fail to have known that their defeat in the field could have no other result. Yet they had the effrontery to put forward as the basis of peace negotiations not the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* but a condition of things such as could only have been obtained by the failure of British arms—the disappearance of the Suzerainty over the Transvaal and with it the right of controlling the foreign relations of that Republic. They asked us, and by asking made a bid for intervention by any outside Power, not only to forego such fruits of eventual victory as would be involved in the maintenance of the Suzerainty and the settlement of the Uitlander and other questions but to accept instead a state of affairs in which the Republics would have an absolute Sovereignty, by virtue of which they would be able to expel us from South Africa whenever opportunity offered. The overtures were preposterous; and in no quarter were they so clearly recognised to be so than in the self-governing colonies, from which messages were received applauding the policy of Her Majesty's Government in declining them, and in rejecting any idea of foreign intervention, and offering further support in the form of troops for South Africa should complications arise requiring the presence of the regular army elsewhere.

After the occupation of Bloemfontein there was a lull in the operations. The time was utilised in clearing the country between Cape Colony and Bloemfontein of the Boers and in preparations for continuing the advance. Meanwhile, people in England were in momentary expectation of the relief of Mafeking, and had fresh food for thought in a message from the Queen permitting the wearing of the shamrock on St. Patrick's Day to the troops in recognition of the gallantry of the Irish regiments in South

Africa, and in the announcement that in the Spring she would pay a visit to Ireland. A three days' visit of Her Majesty to the metropolis, "to see her people," gave occasion for a remarkable outburst of loyalty and patriotism, as did also her visit later on to Dublin. Another subject that excited some attention was the publication of Correspondence with Germany respecting the seizure of vessels suspected of conveying contraband of war. The right of search had been exercised in regard to two vessels on imperfect information, and in one case the contraband consisted of food supplies. Germany had protested against the seizures with a brusqueness unusual even in German diplomacy and had endeavoured to set up the principle that vessels journeying from one neutral port to another—in this instance, to Lourenço Marques—enjoyed immunity from arrest. Lord Salisbury repudiated this doctrine and commented upon the unusual tone of the Notes from the Germany Embassy. The release of the vessels was ordered, regret expressed at their detention, and an undertaking given to pay equitable damages as determined by arbitration. Count von Bulow made a somewhat arrogant speech on the subject in the German Reichstag. He was evidently playing to the gallery, the mass of the people being intensely pro-Boer and bitterly hostile to Great Britain. His speech may also have been designed to advance the German Emperor's plans for the creation of a great navy. It served to emphasise German ill-will towards Great Britain and the Correspondence suggested that Lord Salisbury had too readily given way, for it is clear that in the opinion of the naval authorities in South African waters that at least one vessel, the *Herzog*, did contain supplies destined for the enemy. There were incidents of a somewhat similar nature with regard to vessels flying the United States flag, but here also Lord Salisbury took a conciliatory line. The fact of the matter seemed to be that Lord Salisbury was disinclined to press the right of search beyond the point of showing the subjects of any Powers disposed to traffic in contraband, that the right was held in reserve and would be exercised if the scandal of landing men and contraband reached any serious proportions. Though in the early stages of the war men and goods were landed with some freedom at the Portuguese port the effect of the seizures and the diplomatic wrangle concerning them was to put a stop to the more flagrant traffic in contraband.

The present chapter may appropriately be closed by reference to the conduct of the Government in publishing on April 17th the Official Despatches relating to the capture and relinquishment of Spion Kop. The Documents shattered any confidence the public yet retained in the ability of Sir Redvers Buller to make fitting use of the numerically powerful and splendidly equipped army at his disposal in Natal. They showed that he had failed at a most critical stage of the operations to exhibit that masterly and decisive spirit in the control of subordinates which is essential to success in war. The Documents are printed in full in the Appendix on account of their military interest and the political discussion they excited. The expert will doubtless content himself with a study of the text, and will regard them from a standpoint of his own; the reader who recognises that the details of strategy are not to be judged save by competent authorities will scarcely wish to penetrate deeper into the subject than the easily comprehended generalisations of Lord Roberts. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that the plan of operations was not very clearly described in the Despatches themselves, but that it could be gathered that the intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Tritchard's Drift, and reach the open plain north of Spion Kop by following the road past Fair View and Acton Homes. The entire force, less one brigade, was placed for this purpose under the command of Sir Charles Warren. Having crossed the Tugela, Sir Charles Warren decided, because of the insufficiency of his supplies—a point that reveals the inadequacy of the arrangements from the outset—to take a more direct road to the north-east, a course that necessitated the capture of Spion Kop. He should at once, says Lord Roberts, have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with this change of plan, but whether he did so or not Sir Redvers appears throughout to have been aware of what was happening. Spion Kop was taken almost without opposition on the morning of January 24th, and was held throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire. "It is to be regretted," says Lord Roberts, "that Sir Charles Warren did not himself visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he did that the state of affairs there was very critical and that the loss of the position would involve the failure of the operations." But he summoned Major-General Coke from the Kop to headquarters and directed Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to assume

command of the hill. Late in the evening reinforcements were sent him. They met him retiring from the summit. Lord Roberts was of opinion that this assumption of authority and responsibility by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft "was wholly inexcusable." It was made "without reference to superior authority"; it "upset the whole plan of operations, and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to carry it into effect." Lord Roberts adopted Sir Redvers Buller's words as applied to Sir Charles Warren's account of his proceedings that there was "a want of organisation and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence" of the position. Nor did the Commander-in-Chief's censures cease with Sir Charles Warren and Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. "The attempt to relieve Ladysmith described in these Despatches," he wrote, "was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy—probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command (Sir Redvers Buller) to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer."

The publication of these Despatches, with their revelation of muddle and confusion and their sweeping censure of incompetence in high quarters, created a profound sensation. Why had the Government published them after having held them back for some weeks? Was the move but a preliminary to the recall of the Generals so severely criticised? They had been officially blamed in the presence of the troops—a course that was surely fatal to discipline and to the success of the army of Natal if they were continued in their posts. Expectation was aroused that in a few hours an announcement would be made that Sir Redvers Buller was coming home, for the clear meaning of the Despatches was that whatever errors Sir Charles Warren had made Sir Redvers knew of each as it occurred and, though he remonstrated, watched the whole plan fall to pieces, taking the matter into his own hands only when all was lost, and bringing the force and authority of his position to bear upon the management of the retreat

across the Tugela instead of the accomplishment of his original design. The Government, however, seem to have issued the Despatches without any very clear purpose in view, for Lord Roberts did not relieve Sir Redvers Buller of the supreme command in Natal, and merely ordered Sir Charles Warren to take up the military administration of Griqualand—a post well within the limitations of such administrative capacity as Sir Charles had shown at Spion Kop. The mystery deepened at the absence of any intelligible explanation of an act likely to paralyse the army of Natal and destroy whatever public confidence Sir Redvers Buller retained at home after his repeated failures to reach Ladysmith. Mr. Ritchie imparted the interesting information that Lord Roberts had consented to publication, which seemed to suggest that the weeks during which the Despatches had been lying in Pall Mall had been spent in manœuvres of some kind which the Government were not particularly anxious to disclose. And Mr. Walter Long made what looked like an egregious apology for the Government by asking a public meeting whether a General was to be dismissed because he had made a mistake—the audience falling, of course, into the easy oratorical trap and, heedless of the nature and consequences of the mistake and forgetful of Lord Roberts's condemnation, shouting "No" instead of "Yes."

A sharp controversy raged upon the subject in the press, the view most widely taken being that the Government ought not to have issued the Despatches until the close of the war. The result was seen in the publication, on the eve of a debate in Parliament, of telegrams that had passed between Lord Lansdowne and Lord Roberts. In the first the Secretary for War asked Lord Roberts what he should do as to publication and made certain proposals—first, to publish some of the documents, or, as an alternative, to treat the Despatches, including that of Lord Roberts containing the censure, as confidential, and that "Buller should send through you a full narrative of the operations. This you could forward to me with any observations you desired to make." That is to say, Lord Lansdowne made the astonishing suggestion that an entirely new narrative should be concocted for public consumption and the original documents suppressed. Sir Redvers Buller declined to fall in with this enticing and deceptive idea. "I do not," he telegraphed to Lord Roberts, "at all like the idea of re-writing a Despatch for publication. I much prefer to leave it in the hands

of the Commander-in-Chief and let him select for publication whatever he thinks proper." The manliness of that reply sent Sir Redvers Buller up again in public estimation and brought down upon Lord Lansdowne a storm of criticism. The telegrams showed that the Secretary for War had informed Lord Roberts that in view of Sir Redvers' objections he abandoned the proposal that the Despatch should be re-written and would publish the selection he had originally mentioned. That was the position of the matter when the debate occurred. First, Lord Lansdowne had tried to cast the responsibility for saying what should be published upon Lord Roberts—a responsibility that rested with the War Office and the Government, whose duty it is to decide such matters from the standpoint of public interest alone; and he had suggested as an alternative that the Despatches should be suppressed and the public fobbed off with new ones that had been judiciously "cooked" in the interest of those whose military reputations had been impugned. No other deduction is possible from these extraordinary telegrams.

It would be difficult to imagine a more undignified position for a Minister of the Crown than that into which Lord Lansdowne had blundered. The Debate in Parliament does not, however, show that either he or his colleagues quite appreciated the fatuity of his proceedings. In the Lords, Lord Portsmouth accused him of having transgressed the rules of honourable tradition by making public confidential reports intended solely for the information of the superior authority, and he described the telegrams to Lord Roberts as the most extraordinary specimens of Parliamentary literature ever presented to the House. He commented with caustic severity upon Lord Lansdowne's invitation to Sir Redvers Buller to "re-write his Despatch and whitewash himself," and upon the duplicity at the expense of the public which Sir Redvers had foiled. Lord Lansdowne's defence was that no other course than publication was open to the Government—an apparent absurdity; for the Government were under no compulsion to publish at all, much less at the time they did, with an army in the field and the work the General was still retained to do remaining undischarged. The noble Marquis sought cover behind the Queen's Regulations on the subject of Despatches but could extract from them no better justification than that it was customary to publish. With considerable ingenuity he put a gloss upon his telegram to

Lord Roberts suggesting that Sir Redvers Buller should re-write his Despatch and the Commander-in-Chief his comments. All he wanted, he said, was not the cancellation of the original documents—which were, apparently, to be hidden out of sight in the archives of the War Office—but a simple and concise description of the battle of Spion Kop such as was required by the Queen's Regulations.

The explanation was so thin that it could not bear the weight and vehemence of Lord Rosebery's comments. There were, he pointed out, two results of the policy of publishing everything that was critical and injurious in order to satisfy a public curiosity of which no outward signs existed: one was that the Government had been compelled to wash their dirty linen in the presence of the world, and the other was that Sir Redvers Buller had been left to bear the stigma in the presence of his troops. The Duke of Devonshire came to the support of his colleague. He defended the publication of the Despatches and said it was greatly to be regretted that Sir Redvers Buller did not accept the invitation to re-write his Despatch. He repudiated for the Government any idea of having desired Sir Redvers to retract what he had said; all they desired was that he should confine himself to a narrative of what had occurred.

The Debate had not added to Lord Lansdowne's reputation or to the credit of the Government. No acceptable explanation or justification had been given either for the suggestion that the Despatches should be suppressed and others written, or for their publication when that suggestion was rejected. Only puerile excuses had been offered. Lord Lansdowne had asked for a "full" and new narrative of Spion Kop. Had he objected to the publication of the original Despatches on the ground that they were not in accordance with the Queen's Regulations—had he been actuated by the ideas he expressed in the Debate—he would have telegraphed not for "a full narrative of the operations" but—to use his own words in the Lords—"that simple and concise description of the battle of Spion Kop contemplated by the Queen's Regulations."

The Debate in the Commons was still more damaging to Lord Lansdowne and the Ministry. Mr. Runciman opened the attack in a maiden speech worthy of the matter in hand. Mr. Wyndham did his best with the material at his command, effectively employing a stale oratorical device by translating the impeachment of the judgment of the Secretary for War into an attack on his personal

honour. Having confused the issue by converting an indictment on the ground of stupidity into one on the basis of personal dishonour he offered various defences of the conduct of the Government in publishing the Despatches at all. Strongly critical speeches were made by several members, among others by Sir A. Acland-Hood, who expressed himself with considerable vigour and had a rather sharp passage of arms with Mr. Wyndham on the point as to whether or not Lord Lansdowne asked Sir Redvers Buller to re-write his Despatch—as Sir Redvers certainly understood the Secretary for War to do. Mr. Balfour made one of those clever and ingenious speeches which have gained for him so great a reputation as an acute debater. He industriously pursued the question of Lord Lansdowne's personal honour, warmly repudiated attacks which had not been made—though sharp criticisms had been passed upon the question of sagacity and discretion—and quite needlessly gave his colleague a testimonial of character, indignantly rejecting any suggestion that Lord Lansdowne had made any proposal unbecoming a gentleman. The Government, of course, obtained a majority—the subject had been raised on the War Office vote—but their treatment of the question did not diminish criticism outside the House. For tactical reasons Ministerial speakers had raised a false issue of personal character. Such an issue was effective enough to prevent many of their dissatisfied followers from going into the Opposition lobby; but it succeeded in befogging the public not a whit better than in befooling the members in question. From the casuistry and trivial dialectics of the politicians the nation turned with its customary indifference and again concentrated its attention upon the armies in the field.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ARMY AT ITS GOAL.

The Question of Remounts—The Military Position—A Long Wait—The Disaster at Sanna's Post—The Reddersburg Disaster—The Siege of Wepener—A Message to Mafeking—The Boer Commandoes South and East of Bloemfontein—A Relief Column for Mafeking—Advance on Kroonstadt—Retreat of the Boers—Buller Moves North of Ladysmith—Assault on Mafeking—Relief of the Town—Public Rejoicings—Baden-Powell a Popular Hero—An Imperial Tribute—Flight of Mr. Steyn to Heilbron—Boer Retreat to the Vaal River—Evacuation of Their Positions—Lord Roberts Crosses the Vaal—A Spring at Germiston—Advance Against Johannesburg—General Ian Hamilton's Battle—Lord Roberts's Compliment to the City Imperial Volunteers—Boer Retreat from Johannesburg—The Negotiations for Surrender—Lord Roberts's Entry—The Forts and the Guns—The British Army Encamped on the Road North to Pretoria—Continuation of the Advance—A Battle at Six Miles Spruit—Pretoria Almost Surrounded—A Summons to Surrender—The Boers Propose an Armistice—Unconditional Surrender Demanded—Commandant General Botha's Decision—Escape of the Boer Army and the Two Presidents.

WHEN Lord Roberts led his army into Bloemfontein on March 13th and swept the environs of that city with his cavalry the Boer forces fell away to the northward in what seemed to be a condition of hopeless demoralisation. So rapid had been the British movements that extravagant hopes were entertained in England of the speedy termination of the war. But the swiftness of the march had played such havoc with the horses of the cavalry and the transport that a delay of several weeks was imperative. Stores had to be collected, remounts obtained and arrangements for the further successful advance thought out and perfected. Meanwhile, British officers who had been scouring South-eastern Europe, the Argentine, Australia, the United States, and Canada for horses poured thousands of animals into South Africa. Three weeks passed and nothing of note occurred. Lord Roberts was stationary at Bloemfontein, his cavalry in touch with the Boer patrols coming down from Kroonstadt to the neighbourhood of the Modder and also at Ladybrand, whither a squadron of horse had been sent from Thabanchu; Mafeking was still unrelieved and hard pressed; Sir Redvers Buller's army was recruiting its exhausted energies on the hills above Ladysmith

and yielding no indications of the expected movement which was to thrust the Boers through the passes and pursue them in their own country. The long wait was trying to the nerves of people who looked for a rapid succession of victorious movements in every part of the theatre of war. The Boers gave them something to talk about. Finding that they were not pursued from Bloemfontein they assumed the offensive. Their patrols became active on the Modder and their commandoes surged back eastward past Bloemfontein between the British outposts and the Basuto frontier. In the last week in March they were in such numbers and displayed such aggressiveness in the neighbourhood of Thabanchu that the Ladybrand outpost was called in and Colonel Broadwood, who commanded the British column at Thabanchu, finding himself threatened from the north as well as the east, deemed it prudent to retire towards Bloemfontein. On the 31st the retreat was intercepted. Colonel Broadwood had evacuated the waterworks which supplied Bloemfontein—having in fact been driven thence by the shells of the enemy—and was making for the capital. A large convoy was sent on ahead, under the protection of cavalry and artillery, and for want of intelligent and effective scouting, blundered into a cleverly planned Boer ambush at Sanna's Post. Resistance was hopeless for the convoy, a large portion of which found itself trapped; the artillery and cavalry who made a dash for liberty did so under a galling fire. The convoy was lost, with seven guns, and the casualties in prisoners killed and wounded numbered about three hundred. Reinforcements were sent out in hot haste from Bloemfontein but they were unable to retrieve the disaster. The British had again been taught the folly of over confidence and the neglect of proper precautions. Encouraged by their success the Boers attempted to reach the railway line to Bloemfontein and thus cut Lord Roberts's communications with the south. In this they failed, but at Reddersburg, forty miles south of Bloemfontein, they surrounded and captured five British companies, to the intense chagrin of people at home, who could not understand how such incidents were possible with so large an army in the field. Continuing to overrun the country to the south-east the Boer commandoes met the advance guard of the British forces moving northward from the Cape Colony along the Basuto border and attacked part of General Brabant's division at Jannersberg drift.

The British column under Colonel Dalgety occupied a defensive position at Wepener and prepared to stand a siege.

Lord Roberts did not permit himself to be disturbed by these untoward events but proceeded steadily with his preparations for the main advance. He had requested Baden-Powell to hold out at Mafeking until May 18th and it was understood that steps were being taken to send a flying column to the north. Meanwhile the Boers in Natal were entrenching the Biggarsberg and inviting attack by Sir Redvers Buller, whose strong army for the time being remained inactive. By the middle of April Lord Roberts's preparations were approaching completion. Stores had been accumulated and sufficient remounts had arrived to give his army the mobility it had lost. On the 14th General Brabant had set out from Aliwal North to relieve the pressure upon Wepener. On the next day a division was moved from Reddersburg towards Dewetsdorp, where there was a strong body of Boers, with another at Thabanchu, and this division was followed in a few days by the lately arrived eighth division. On the 22nd another division, with two brigades of cavalry, started from Bloemfontein towards Dewetsdorp and mounted infantry and two brigades of cavalry were sent out towards the waterworks—the advance post of the Boers at Thabanchu. The various forces being thus deployed along the line from Bloemfontein to Wepener swept the country as they advanced and thus foiled the Boer attempt upon the communications of the army. The Boers withdrew from the waterworks and Thabanchu, were driven away from Dewetsdorp and abandoned the investment of Wepener—in each case getting away without loss of guns and stores.

Leaving sufficient forces to hold the south-eastern portion of the Free State Lord Roberts gathered his army together again for the main advance along the railway line. On April 30th General Hamilton attacked the Boers at Houtnek, inflicted considerable loss upon them and drove them away from their position to the north-east of Thabanchu—the enemy taking care to get away, as usual, in good time to avoid a severe defeat or loss of guns and material. On May 3rd Lord Roberts made a spring at Brandfort, due north of Bloemfontein, from which the Boers retreated with significant celerity. On the next day Colonel Mahon set out from Barkly West with a mixed column for the relief of Mafeking. On the 6th the retreating Boers above

Bloemfontein had been driven beyond Winburg and they then hurriedly fled from their positions on the Vet River, where it had been expected they might make a stand. On the 10th they were driven from the Zand River and the British were thus within striking distance of Kroonstadt, the place of a great Boer concentration. They evacuated the town and Lord Roberts entered it unopposed on May 12th. On the same day the long-expected movement took place in Natal, Sir Redvers Buller turning the Boer position on the Biggarsberg and thus, with but little fighting, being able to reoccupy Glencoe, Dundee and Newcastle. On the 17th he pushed forward to Laing's Nek and there his army remained, watching the Boer commandoes and holding them there until after the capture of Johannesburg and Pretoria.

Meanwhile the Boers had made a desperate effort to overcome the resistance of Mafeking before the united efforts of Colonel Mahon from the south and Colonel Plumer from the north should compel them to raise the siege. Their attack failed. Colonel Baden Powell won a brilliant little victory, inflicting heavy loss upon them and taking over a hundred prisoners. On the next day Colonel Mahon successfully met a determined Boer attack. On the 15th he effected a junction to the west of Mafeking with Colonel Plumer, who, having been reinforced with Canadians and Australians, had been sent to him *via* Beira. On the 16th they attacked the Boers lying between them and the town. There was a sharp but a brief fight. The enemy made no determined stand, and on the 17th the relieving columns entered the town. The news of the relief was made the occasion of an Imperial Demonstration—disproportionate it may be to the military importance of the siege and the rescue of the garrison, but none the less gratifying on that account. The rejoicings at the relief of Ladysmith fade into insignificance when compared with those associated with the little township on the Transvaal border. The heart of the people had been touched by the pluck and gallantry of the garrison which for over seven months had held its own against heavy odds, by the imminent peril in which it had stood so long, by the courage and cheerfulness with which privations had been endured, and last, but not least, by the ability and spirit of its commander. Baden-Powell, who, next to Lord Roberts, had been regarded as the most engaging personality on the British side, became a popular hero throughout the Empire.

Never in the history of England had affectionate enthusiasm for a military commander been more universal and more cordial and never had it extended over so vast an area, for, if that were possible, the rejoicings were more fervent in Ottawa, in Wellington, in Melbourne, in Sydney, in Adelaide, in Perth, in Brisbane and other cities and towns of the Empire than in London and the great centres of population in these islands.

As the Boers hastened from Kroonstadt the eloquent Mr. Steyn fled to Heilbron and there breathed threatenings of eternal resistance to the British power. Lord Roberts kept him and the Boers on the run. Ian Hamilton quietly obliged them to evacuate Heilbron and the commandoes disappeared in haste towards the Vaal River, leaving entrenched positions on the Rhenoster, which they dared not hold in view of Hamilton's force on their left and General French's cavalry division on their right. On May 24th Lord Roberts crossed the Vaal near Parys without opposition and by the 27th the entire army was on Transvaal soil. Within two days the main body had sprung at Germiston, six miles south of Johannesburg and the junction of the lines connecting the mining town with Natal, Pretoria and Klerksdorp. Here, again, the Boers fled, and in such haste that they had to leave behind uninjured a great quantity of rolling stock. Simultaneously with the occupation of Germiston Lord Roberts sent a swarm of cavalry and infantry east and west with the object of surrounding Johannesburg. By the 30th Generals French and Hamilton had accomplished their task. General Hamilton was to work round to the west of Johannesburg in support of French's cavalry, which went to the north by the Pretoria road. Three miles south of the Rand he found his way blocked, the enemy, with two heavy guns, several field guns and "Pom-poms," being strongly posted on the kopjes and ridges. Hamilton at once attacked. To summarise the language of Lord Roberts's Despatch the Gordons led the right and after capturing one extremity of the ridge wheeled round, worked along it until after dark, clearing it of the enemy, who fought most obstinately. The City Imperial Volunteers led on the other flank and "would not be denied." The result of the action was to bring Hamilton to Florida, due west of Johannesburg. Meanwhile General French had fought his way with very little loss to his position north of the town. Johannesburg was thus within Lord Roberts's grasp, the main body of the Boers retreating

northward, the foreign mercenaries lingering in the town. Lord Roberts summoned the town to surrender. Dr. Krause, who was in charge, agreed to the summons but pleaded that the occupation might be delayed for twenty-four hours. With the object, apparently, of avoiding fighting in the streets, Lord Roberts consented. On the 31st the Transvaal Commandant met him outside the town and rode with him to the Government offices. By night all the army had marched through the town and was encamped on the road north to Pretoria, a brigade being left in Johannesburg to preserve order. The much vaunted forts of the place were found to have been denuded of most of their guns. Only three were left.

Events were to show that no stand would be made even at Pretoria itself. At daybreak on June 4th Lord Roberts moved his forces against the Boers, who had established themselves on both banks of the Six Miles Spruit. After a ten miles' march he came up with the enemy. The mounted infantry, yeomanry, and three line regiments dislodged the enemy and drove them across the spruit. Continuing the pursuit they found themselves under a heavy fire from guns the Boers had concealed in a commanding position. Lord Roberts hurried forward his artillery and after a few rounds silenced the enemy's fire. The Boers then attempted to turn the British left flank, but this move was foiled by inclining Ian Hamilton's forces so that they filled up the gap between them and the flank column and the Boers thus driven back. Night fell; pursuit was impracticable in the exhausted condition of the troops after marching and fighting since daybreak, and the columns bivouacked on the ground they had won. The guards brigade was then within four miles of Pretoria on the south; brigades of cavalry were on the north, and the town was almost surrounded. At midnight Lord Roberts was awakened with the news that during the evening Hamilton's horsemen had pursued the Boers to within a couple of thousand yards of Pretoria, that the surrender of the town had been demanded and that officials of the South African Republic were awaiting in the British camp with a letter proposing an armistice for the purpose of arranging the terms of surrender.

"I replied," said Lord Roberts's Despatch, "that I would gladly meet Commandant General Botha the next morning, but that I was not prepared to discuss any terms, as the surrender

of the town must be unconditional. I asked for a reply by daybreak, as I had ordered the troops to march on the town as soon as it was light. In his reply Botha told me that he had decided not to defend Pretoria and that he trusted the women, children and property would be protected. At one a.m. to-day (June 5th) while on the line of march, I was met by three of the principal officials with a flag of truce, stating their wish to surrender the town. It was arranged that Pretoria should be taken possession of by Her Majesty's troops at two o'clock this afternoon. Mrs. Botha and Mrs. Kruger are both in Pretoria."

The Boer army, with Mr. Kruger and Mr. Steyn, had escaped through the gap unavoidably left in Lord Roberts's disposition of his forces round Pretoria.

CHAPTER IX.

AFTER PRETORIA.

Was the War Over? Optimism Dispelled—The British Army Again Stationary—Disposition of the Boer Forces—Mr. Kruger's New "Capital"—The Enemy in the Orange River Colony—The Rise of De Wet—Capture of Imperial Yeomanry at Lindley—Communications Cut Near Kroonstadt—Capture of a Militia Battalion—Lord Roberts Resumes the Offensive—Northern Natal Cleared by Roberts—Buller's March to Standerton—The Boer Forces Reduced to Two Bodies—The Johannesburg-Standerton Line—Two Aspects of the War—The Question of the Sick and Wounded—Mr. Burdett-Coutts's Charges—Sir William MacCormac and Mr. Treves—Their Eloquent Panegyric of the Army Medical Service Corps—The War Office and Mr. Burdett-Coutts—Publication of Correspondence—Lord Roberts's Statement of the Facts—He Suggests a Small Committee—Mr. Balfour Promises an Independent Inquiry—Mr. Wyndham's Reply—Mr. Balfour's Speech—He Makes it a Party Question—The Point at Issue—Responsibility of Lord Roberts *versus* that of the Government—Mr. Balfour's Charge—The Committee of Inquiry—Men of "Sound Common Sense" desired—The Protection of Witnesses—Mr. Balfour and Mr. Burdett-Coutts—Fall of the Schreiner Ministry—Treatment of the Rebels—Ten Thousand in the Field—How the Loyalists were Served—Views of the Schreiner Ministry—The Clemency Minute—The Prolongation of the War—Mr. Chamberlain's Views—"Justice to Loyalists"—Sir A. Milner's Plain Hint to the Schreiner Ministry—Resignation—A New Ministry under Sir Gordon Sprigg—The Cape Treason Bill—The Natal Rebels—The State of the War—Another Long Wait—The Chase of De Wet—Renewed Activity of the Enemy—The Disaster of Nitra's Nek—The British Army Moves—Lord Roberts to the East, Sir R. Buller to the North—Surrender of Prinsloo and Five Thousand Men in the Orange River Colony—Lord Kitchener sent after De Wet—Escape of De Wet—His Commando Broken Up—The Pretoria Plot—Execution of Hans Cordua—A New Proclamation—Annexation of the Transvaal—The Operations against Louis Botha's Force—Flight of Mr. Kruger—An Ignominious Ending—Lord Roberts's Proclamation of September 13th.

THOSE who were so sanguine as to believe that the war was over when the British flag was hoisted over the Government buildings at Pretoria formed an estimate of the military capacity of the Boers as egregious as that exhibited by the War Office and the Cabinet. As June, July, August and September wore on, with their tale of minor British disasters and the breakdown of the medical service in the Orange River Colony, the hopes of those who thought that Lord Roberts had almost finished his work when he rode into the Transvaal capital were rudely dispelled. The

Boer armies were still intact and whatever may have been the depletion of their numbers they still retained nearly all their guns and, in the difficult region of the Lydenburg mountains, had large reserves of supplies and ammunition. There were three forces to be dealt with by the British army, which, despite its huge numbers was, for a time, almost powerless to move any great distance because of the exhaustion of cavalry, the need of remounts and the temporary decimation of many regiments by enteric. Of the three the chief had moved eastward towards Lydenburg, with Mr. Kruger, whose seat of Government was in a railway carriage on the line at Machadodorp, whence he could make an easy flight to the coast. The second was at Laing's Nek—where it was more or less comfortably sitting down before Sir Redvers Buller, whose army, largely outnumbering that of all the Boer commandoes put together, seemed paralysed for weeks by the exertion of crossing and recrossing the Tugela. The third force, honoured by the presence of Mr. Steyn, was in the north-east portion of the Orange River Colony. This last body, which numbered several thousand and was always fluctuating because of the return to the field of burghers who had accepted British rule—in many cases taking the oath of neutrality or, if prisoners, obtaining release on parole merely for the purpose of acquainting their companions with the movements of the British—displayed unexpected activity for a long period and produced at least one man—De Wet—to whom military genius can hardly be denied. Its first notable exploit was to swoop down upon a battalion, about four hundred strong, of the Imperial Yeomanry at Lindley. When the fact that the latter were surrounded became known Lord Methuen made forced marches to the scene of action, but arrived too late to save them from the necessity of surrendering. They next cut Lord Roberts's communications near Kroonstad, destroyed the railway and telegraph lines and picked up a militia battalion of the Derbyshire Regiment at Roodeval, near the Rhenoster. When Lord Methuen came up with them in this locality he had a sharp fight, inflicting considerable loss upon the enemy but failing to recapture the prisoners. Meanwhile Lord Roberts had restored his communications and had driven Christian Botha and a large force away from a position they had entrenched fifteen miles to the east of Pretoria, the Boers following their usual tactics of fighting merely with the object of delaying the British advance and when the turning movement of the attacking forces was developed,

retiring with guns and convoys out of reach, their superior mobility and topographical knowledge making pursuit impracticable. By the middle of June Sir Redvers Buller's army was on the northward march and had driven the Boers from Almonds Nek, after an action of several hours' duration. Both sides of Laing's Nek were thus in British hands and the whole of the northern portion of Natal freed from the enemy save for small raiding parties who sought to destroy the railway. While Sir Redvers Buller was pressing on to Standerton a column was sent out under Ian Hamilton from Johannesburg to join hands with him there. This was accomplished without much fighting and the three Boer forces were thus reduced to two, those who had been at Laing's Nek falling back to the north-east to join Mr. Kruger, and those in the north-east of the Orange River Colony being prevented by the Johannesburg-Standerton line from following them up. The immediate problem before Lord Roberts and his subordinates was to coop up the commandoes in the Orange River region and compel them either to fight or surrender. They showed no disposition to do either. De Wet, however, made another attack on the railway, this time at Honing Spruit, and was only beaten off by the hurried arrival of reinforcements from Kroonstad. Then followed a dreary time of waiting while the various British columns were endeavouring to surround the commandoes, Lord Roberts remaining stationary at Pretoria until the north-east of the Orange River Colony was freed.

The work of these columns provides matter for the military historian. The general results will be noted later. While the ubiquitous De Wet was eluding his pursuers attention may be directed to two aspects of the war which directly concern the policy and conduct of the Ministry--one the provisions made for the treatment of the sick and wounded in Africa and the other the treatment of rebels in the British Colonies. The first question was raised by Mr. Burdett-Coutts in a series of letters to the *Times* giving the results of his observations at the theatre of war. In one of these communications he drew up a heavy indictment against the military authorities, in the form of a matter of fact description of a field hospital within a mile of Bloemfontein. It appeared that for ten weeks the tents were overcrowded with typhoid cases, that there were no beds or mattresses, that there were only seventy-four stretchers among three hundred and sixteen patients, that those without stretchers had to be on the

ground with only a waterproof beneath them, and a blanket over them, that the hospital staff had been reduced by one-half, that there were no nurses other than an insufficient number of untrained privates and that the sick were therefore but partially attended and suffered needlessly. This is, of course, but a paraphrase of Mr. Burdett-Coutts' letter. His conclusion was that "there were no military exigencies really involved that could necessitate, there were none so pressing that they could excuse, the sufferings and horrors to which our sick and wounded were subjected at this time and place."

The letter made a profound impression. If there was one delusion which the country had entertained in connection with the war it was that the sick and wounded were throughout being treated with all the promptitude and consideration that unlimited money and keen regard for the value of human life could command. Sir William MacCormac and Mr. Treves, who had been sent out by the Government as special surgeons during the war in Natal, had, on their return to England after the relief of Ladysmith, indulged in eloquent panegyric of the medical and surgical arrangements. And the latter gentleman had gone out of his way to make an attack upon the women who had offered their services in Africa, the inference being that their services were entirely superfluous, and that their well-meant insistence was a hindrance and an annoyance to the responsible authorities. It was not the fault of these distinguished surgeons that an eulogium that should have been confined to the scene of war in which they served was interpreted to apply to the entire area of the conflict; but such a meaning was, not unnaturally, given to their speeches. Facility in the acceptance of an agreeable delusion is seldom absent from public affairs. Mr. Burdett-Coutts had shattered a delusion; and, like most people who erect a structure of facts and bid us compare it with the beautiful castle of fancy, he was bitterly assailed. But on the whole the public believed what he had written to be true, and expected that the Government would deal with the exposure in a becoming spirit.

Replying to several questions in the House, Mr. Balfour quoted from correspondence between the Secretary of State for War and Lord Roberts on the subject. From this it appeared that early in June Lord Lansdowne telegraphed to Lord Roberts saying that the War Office was receiving private telegrams,

from Mr. Burdett-Coutts among others, complaining of a general breakdown in the hospitals, and asking whether there was any justification for criticism, and adding, "You will, of course, spare no expense to mitigate suffering." Lord Roberts replied that he was aware Mr. Burdett-Coutts had drawn attention to the medical arrangements at Kroonstad. On the arrival of the army there, he said, a very large number of sick and wounded had to be provided for and the accommodation available proved quite insufficient for them:—

"The very existence of my force depended upon the supplies coming up by train along a line of railway nearly 900 miles long, every bridge of which for the last 128 miles had been destroyed by the enemy. Notwithstanding this, I ordered that the requirements of the sick were to be first taken in hand as soon as the rail had been repaired and a few trains of supplies had been got through. The principal medical officer proceeded with the first train to Kroonstad with surgeons and nurses. The field hospital could not be utilised, as we were about to move on again, but No. 3 general and Scotch hospital had been held in readiness at Bloemfontein to be sent to Kroonstad directly the line was open; this was done, and the former received 180 patients within twenty-four hours of its arrival. I repeatedly visited the hospitals during the short time I was at Kroonstad, and I impressed upon the principal medical officer and Lord Methuen, who was on his way to Kroonstad, to do all that was possible to remedy matters. A few days after my departure I received a report from the principal medical officer that the medical arrangements there were in all respects in good order, while Lord Methuen has since informed me that everything is thoroughly satisfactory. I was deeply distressed at being unable to make suitable arrangements for the sick on our first arrival at Kroonstad; but it is obvious that a certain amount of suffering is inseparable from the rapid advance of a large army in the enemy's country, when railway communication has been destroyed; and such suffering would have been enormously increased had it not been for the prompt manner in which the medical authorities made the best of the very scanty accommodation available at a place little larger than an ordinary English village. Since leaving Kroonstad we have had no difficulty about our sick and wounded; there have been comparatively few sick, and we have found ample accommodation for them and the wounded both here and at Johannesburg. Sir William MacCormac and Mr. Treves have stated publicly their experience of the medical arrangements in South Africa, and I submit that their evidence is more reliable than that of Burdett-Coutts, to whom I would have explained what our difficulties were at Kroonstad, if he had taken the trouble to call upon me."

The above telegram was sent on June 6th. On the 20th Lord Lansdowne again telegraphed to Lord Roberts:—

"We continue to receive disquieting reports as to state of hospitals. It is alleged that there has been deficiency of medical appliances and comforts and even necessities; that there has been much overcrowding; that nurses and hospital orderlies are too few; and that the proportion of deaths has consequently been abnormal. We are told that reports made by MacCormac and Treves were optimistic, and that conditions have probably changed for the worse since their visit. You explain the circumstances owing to which the state of hospitals at Kroonstad was unsatisfactory. Can it be said that, except where these special difficulties presented themselves, the arrangements were, on the whole, sufficient; that the number of cases to be dealt with was greater than could reasonably have been anticipated; also that the state of things was confined to one or two places, and that it has now ceased to exist? Is it true that in cases requiring careful nursing and treatment proportion of deaths has been unusually high? Can we do anything now to mitigate the evil if it exists? Shall we send you more nurses?"

Lord Roberts replied on June 25th:—

"As regards hospitals at the base, before leaving Cape Town I personally assured myself that the arrangements were working satisfactorily, and I have not heard since any complaints about them. When we arrived at Bloemfontein we had an abnormal number of sick, due no doubt not only to the peculiarly exhausting nature of the march, but also to the terrible insanitary conditions of our camp at Paardeberg, where the only water available for drinking purposes flowed down from the Boer camp a mile and a half higher up the river, which was crowded with dead animals in a state of decomposition. We also had a considerable number of wounded after the fight on the 10th of March. To hastily improvise accommodation at Bloemfontein for such a large number, which gradually increased up to 2,000 before I left that town, was no easy task. Owing to the rapidity of our march from the Modder no tents could be carried with the force, and none were available until our railway communication with Cape Colony had been restored. As soon as I could arrange for such supplies being placed at Bloemfontein as were necessary for the very existence of the force, I ordered up tents and all necessary appliances for the sick, nurses, more doctors, and more hospitals. Bloemfontein is not a large town, but all suitable public buildings, schools, &c., were made into hospitals. I constantly visited these, and after a very short time they were, I considered, in good order and not overcrowded.

"To give some idea of the pressure at Bloemfontein, I would state that from the date of our arrival there on March 13 until two or three days ago, or in a little more than three months, there have been approximately 6,369 admissions from enteric fever alone. Of these 1,370 died, giving a mortality of 21 per cent. Numerous cases which were returned as simple continued fever have no doubt been cases of slight enteric; this would much

reduce the percentage of mortality. I am not aware whether 21 per cent. of enteric cases is an abnormal rate of mortality in civil hospitals in peace time in tropical climes, if so it must be ascribed to the abnormal conditions which obtained at Bloemfontein owing to the exhausted state of the men when admitted to hospital, and not, in my opinion, to neglect on the part of the Royal Army Medical Corps. The next place we had to form a hospital at was Kroonstad, 128 miles distant, and the difficulties which attended the disposal of the sick there I have already fully explained in my telegram. After Kroonstad we established no permanent hospital until we reached Johannesburg, 137 miles further on. There we had considerably less difficulties to contend with, as compared with Kroonstad, owing to the large civil hospital in existence there, in which a number of our sick and wounded were accommodated, and to the fact that several suitable buildings were available. I visited Johannesburg two days ago and found the medical arrangements in fair order. At Pretoria, though a much smaller place than Johannesburg, we have managed to make the sick comfortable in the various local hospitals, and by utilizing certain public buildings. Had our line of rail not been so frequently interrupted we should ere this have had here a number of tents, with spare doctors and nurses, who left Bloemfontein some days ago, but have been delayed by the rail being cut."

Lord Roberts proceeded to say that he could quite understand that people who had no practical experience in such matters were much concerned to hear the hardships which sick and wounded soldiers had to undergo in time of war. He had no wish to shirk responsibility or screen any shortcomings which might be proved against the Army Medical Corps and he suggested that "a small Committee, consisting of one or two medical men of recognised ability, in whom the public have full confidence, together with some men of sound common sense, should be deputed to proceed to South Africa in order to inquire into and furnish a full report on the working of the medical arrangements throughout the war." Mr. Balfour, on behalf of the Government, promised an independent inquiry such as Lord Roberts had suggested and the matter was left at that stage until the succeeding night (June 29th) when the vote for the Army Medical Establishment was to appear on the order paper.

The Government then had their chance to conciliate public opinion. They did not take it. Mr. Wyndham replied to Mr. Burdett-Coutts's charges in the usual official strain. His speech was in no sense a refutation, but an account of the difficulties

to be overcome in consequence of the rapidity of Lord Roberts's march to Bloemfontein and the impracticability of taking more than a limited number of waggons with the troops. Mr. Burdett-Coutts reiterated and amplified his complaints, extending them to other hospitals besides the one described in the single letter to the *Times*. Mr. Balfour made the fatal error of treating the subject on party lines. Instead of ignoring any observations by obscure Opposition speakers which might reasonably be taken to have been dictated by partisan motives he accused the Opposition of a desire to make party capital out of Mr. Burdett-Coutts's allegations. The debate, however, had served to make still clearer the issue underlying the correspondence between Lord Roberts and the Secretary of State—whether or not, having regard to the military exigencies of the time, due forethought had been exercised? This question is, of course, part of the larger and more difficult one of the military conduct of the war. Was Lord Roberts justified, in a military sense, in undertaking forced marches to Bloemfontein, and thence northward to Pretoria, with inadequate means for the care of the sick and wounded? That is a point upon which the Government had no voice. They could have no control over Lord Roberts's movements in the field. It was for him to judge when to march and how to strike, and to act upon that judgment. If by such action he outstripped his means of transport—his ability to get hospital equipment sufficient to prevent the state of things described by Mr. Burdett-Coutts—fault could not well be charged against the Ministry. Mr. Balfour, however, was doubtless actuated by a chivalrous desire to shield Lord Roberts from any implied attack, for the revelation of the medical breakdown was of necessity an impeachment of Lord Roberts for moving too fast or of the Army Medical Corps and transport authorities for not keeping pace with him. Except in so far as the organisation of the Army Medical Corps was in itself defective—was unequal to the strain reasonably to be expected in time of war and had been allowed to remain thus defective since the Government entered upon office—blame cannot be attached to the Ministry for the state of things described by Mr. Burdett-Coutts. The qualification is all important; but, when it is made, the conclusion follows that the Ministry did all that men could do by acting from the outset of the war in the spirit of Lord Lansdowne's message—"You

will, of course, spare no expense to mitigate suffering." No one doubted that from the first they had acted in that sense—so far as their inadequate conception of the necessities of the case guided them; and this conception was merely that of the military authorities, the Government, according to Mr. Balfour, having no better idea of what it should have been than the man in the street. What everyone wanted was to be sure that the breakdown had been remedied, that responsibility for it should be fixed on the right persons and that the true lessons from it should be drawn so that a like breakdown could be avoided in any future campaign. It was, therefore, with much surprise that the public noted Mr. Balfour's unusually awkward attempt to confuse the issues and fasten an odious—and, in the main, an undeserved—charge upon the Opposition, who had been not a whit more shocked by Mr. Burdett-Coutts's revelations than the majority of those politicians who follow Mr. Balfour.

The announcement of the names of the Committee of Inquiry gave occasion for further disagreeable controversy, which was handled by Mr. Balfour with a singular want of skill and a display of feeling keenly disappointing to many of his admirers. Early in July Mr. Balfour stated that it was proposed to appoint a Commission of three persons—Dr. Church, President of the Royal College of Physicians; Professor Cunningham, Professor of Anatomy and Physiology in Trinity College, Dublin; and Lord Justice Romer. This was not wholly satisfactory to the House. A debate was raised on a motion for adjournment and the Government pressed to include on the Committee persons who would represent the "sound common sense" which Lord Roberts had asked for. The Committee was thought to be too professional and to be overweighted with the medical element. Mr. Balfour defended its composition but gave way to the feeling of the House "against his better judgment." Two additional members were appointed—Mr. Frederick Harrison, general manager of the London and North Western Railway, and Sir David Richmond (ex-Lord Provost of Glasgow). The Commission began its work on July 24th, under a warrant issued by the Prime Minister. Under this authority no compulsory or special powers were conferred, and Lord Justice Romer, in his opening statement, said that the Commissioners did not think that the administration of an oath to witnesses would be necessary. But they had considered

the possibility that some witnesses might be hampered in giving evidence because of their obligation to keep secret such information as came to them in their official capacity. There might also be witnesses who from fear of personal consequences might be deterred from telling what they knew. As for the first class of witnesses the Government had released them from the obligation of secrecy, and as to the second the Commission proposed to hear them in private and not to allow their names to appear. Mr. Burdett-Coutts complained that insufficient protection would be afforded to witnesses by any such arrangement and that persons would hesitate to offer evidence unpalatable to their official superiors and thus prejudice their chances of promotion; and for this suggestion he was attacked by Mr. Balfour with much acerbity. On the whole the leader of the House had contrived to create the impression that the Government resented any revelation of breakdown in the conduct of the war and were not without *animus* towards Mr. Burdett-Coutts. The Commission, however, will have to be judged by its results. At the moment of writing it is pursuing its investigations in South Africa and speculations as to the conclusions to be drawn from its inquiry would be impertinent as well as fruitless. It is enough to note that Lord Roberts had himself admitted the insufficiency of the medical service subsequent to the battle of Paardeburg and that the Government—in the person of Mr. Balfour—showed themselves to be singularly inappreciative of the effect of Mr. Burdett-Coutts's disclosures upon the mind of the public.

The question of the treatment of rebels in the South African Colonies led to the dissolution of the Schreiner Ministry and the formation of a new Cabinet with Sir J. Gordon Sprigg as Prime Minister. In that part of the Cape Colony north of the Orange River almost the whole of the Dutch community joined the forces of the Republics at the moment war was declared. In the districts south of the Orange River the number who revolted was estimated at from three to four thousand. After the occupation of Colesberg by the Boers, the inhabitants of Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East and Wodehouse districts went over bodily to the enemy. The Landrosts of the Orange Free State established their authority to the unrestrained delight of the Dutch population, which "hunted British loyalists out of town after town like sheep."

Loyalists had either to serve against their country or quit; if they elected to leave they were robbed of their property before starting, and if they stayed their property was commandeered with them. Sir Alfred Milner computed that from the British districts north and south of the Orange River no fewer than 10,000 took up arms against the Queen, many of whom remained in the field throughout the war.

In these circumstances the Cape Ministry suggested in April, 1900, the appointment of a Judicial Committee for the trial of persons indicted for high treason. And they set to work to save the rebels from the consequences of their crime. In a Minute transmitted by Sir A. Milner to the Imperial Government, the Schreiner Cabinet argued that the ends of justice would be served by the selection of a number of the principal offenders for trial. As for the rank and file they believed that sound policy and public morality would be vindicated if Her Majesty's Government, as an act of grace, would issue a Proclamation under which, upon giving proper security for good behaviour, all persons chargeable for high treason, except those held for trial, might be discharged and allowed to return to their avocations. That is to say a rebel who had escaped being lodged in gaol by the British might remain with the enemy until he was tired of the war or compelled to surrender, and then return to his farm in the Cape Colony with nothing to fear at the hands of the authorities. The Cape Ministers urged that such clemency would have a good effect upon the future of the country, and they presented three arguments for the consideration of the Crown: (1) the necessity of uniting the white population in view of the increase of the blacks; (2) the majority of the Dutch population had shown commendable self-restraint and upon this loyal majority a policy of well considered clemency would have the best possible effect; and (3) the example of Lower Canada in 1837-8 when a conspicuously moderate policy was adopted and attended by the happiest results. And the Cape Rebellion, it was pointed out, was of a milder type than the Canadian rebellion, which was attended by dreadful murders and outrages.

The needless prolongation of the war,—chiefly because so many of these rebels kept the field and were joined by large numbers of burghers who retracted their submission and violated their oath of neutrality, and partly also because of the failure of

Lord Roberts's policy of clemency,—was not calculated to commend these arguments to the Imperial Government. Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that though clemency to rebels had the hearty sympathy of Her Majesty's Government justice to loyalists was an obligation of duty and of honour. It was necessary to show that rebellion could not be indulged in with impunity. While the war was proceeding was an inappropriate time for announcing that rebellion could be indulged in with absolute safety, if not with profit, even when rebellion was unsuccessful. Serious consequences would ensue upon a policy which would place rebels in a better position after the struggle than those who had risked life and property in the determination to remain loyal to their Queen and flag. Even if, as had been suggested, a great many of the rebels were the mere tools of those who had deceived them, it was important that they should individually be made aware that whatever their leaders may have told them rebellion was a punishable offence. Coming to the definite suggestion of the Cape Ministry Mr. Chamberlain said:—

“Up to this time very lenient treatment has been meted out to rebels. Although, according to the law of the Cape Colony and under martial law, the punishment of death might have been inflicted, in no case has any rebel suffered the capital penalty, and the vast majority have been permitted for the present to return to their homes and to resume their occupations. There are many degrees in the crime of rebellion. Her Majesty's Government desire that in any case means shall be found for dealing effectually with:—(1) The ringleaders and promoters; (2) Those who have committed outrages or looted the property of their loyal fellow subjects; (3) Those who have committed acts contrary to the usages of civilised warfare, such as abuse of the white flag, firing on hospitals, &c. There remain (4) Those who, though not guilty of either of those offences, have openly and willingly waged war against Her Majesty's forces; (5) Those who confined themselves to aiding Her Majesty's enemies by giving information or furnishing provisions; and (6) Those who can satisfactorily prove that they acted under compulsion. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a distinction ought to be, if possible, drawn between these different classes.

“Her Majesty's Government recognise the difficulty of indicting for high treason all who have taken part with the enemy, and they would suggest for the consideration of your Ministers the expediency of investing either the Special Judicial Commission which, as stated in your telegram of 28th April, is contemplated by your Ministers, or a separate Commission, with powers to schedule the names of all persons implicated in the rebellion under the various heads indicated above. It would be necessary

to decide beforehand how the different categories should then be dealt with. As regards 1, 2, and 3, they would, of course, be brought before the Judicial Commission and tried by them. Might not 4 and 5 be allowed to plead guilty, and be thereupon either sentenced to a fine carrying with it disfranchisement, or released on recognisances, to come up for judgment when called upon, this also to involve disfranchisement; while 6 might be subjected to disfranchisement alone? Her Majesty's Government offer these as suggestions for the consideration of your Ministers."

Mr. Chamberlain then discussed the three reasons upon which the request for a general amnesty was founded, pointing out that there was nothing in the policy outlined above to lead the natives to think that the two white races were permanently disunited. As for the third reason he said:—

"In Lower Canada in 1837-38 there was a revolt during peace against the Queen's authority, founded on grievances under constitutional conditions which were recognised as unsatisfactory by the Government of the day, and altered by subsequent legislation. In the Cape there has been adhesion to the Queen's enemies during war by those who have not even the pretext of any grievance, and who have for a generation enjoyed full constitutional liberty. In Canada the insurrection was never a formidable one from a military point of view, in the Cape it had added very largely to the cost and difficulty of the war, and has entailed danger and heavy loss on Her Majesty's troops."

In a further Despatch he pointed out that conviction and sentence for high treason carried with it disenfranchisement for life, and if offenders were spared the other and severer penalties for rebellion justice seemed to demand that they should suffer the full political penalty. Disfranchisement for life did not seem to Her Majesty's Government to be a very serious punishment.

The Cape Ministers were hopelessly divided upon the issues thus raised. Sir Alfred Milner, in a communication to Mr. Schreiner, pointed out that he must have a unanimous Cabinet and that if Ministers could not compose their differences he must seek advice elsewhere. Mr. Schreiner replied that there was no hope of achieving unanimity. He had put himself into line with the Imperial policy but could neither persuade his colleagues to do so nor see any prospect of reconstructing the Ministry. He and his associates therefore resigned office and a new Ministry was formed under Sir Gordon Sprigg, Mr. Schreiner and his friends promising to give it a loyal support. When the Cape Parliament opened in July a Treason Bill was introduced which provided for the punishment of ringleaders and those held in gaol and inflicted disfranchisement

for five years upon the rank and file ; and this Bill passed through its stages and now has the force of law. Meanwhile, it should be noted, a Special Court had been constituted under Sir Wm. Smith for the trial of rebels in Natal.

To return to the war. Though we had over two hundred thousand men in the field and the Boers probably did not, at this stage, number fifteen thousand all told the capture of De Wet and even the dispersal of his forces still proved to be beyond the ability of the British generals. Again paralysis seemed to have stricken the British army. The Boers in the north took the aggressive in the early part of July and swooped down upon Nitral's Nek, a British post on the Crocodile River about eighteen miles from Pretoria. They were allowed to seize the hills commanding the Nek and a fight ensued lasting the whole day. Reinforcements, as usual, were sent out from Pretoria and, as usual, they arrived too late. The garrison had been overpowered. The Boers captured two guns, the greater part of a squadron of Scots Greys and about ninety men of the Lincoln Regiment. Altogether there were nearly six hundred casualties. As a set-off against a disaster which to anyone but the generals on the spot would appear to have been preventable a Boer attack near Deerpoot to the north of Pretoria was repulsed and various attempts to destroy the Johannesburg Laing's Nek Railway were successfully met by Sir R. Buller's force. By the end of July, however, Lord Roberts had moved out in force and occupied Middleburg and Sir R. Buller's army was pressing northward to Ermelo—in each case the Boers leaving their positions at the right moment and merely fighting a rearguard action while the guns and stores were taken farther back. In the Orange River Colony the combined movements of Generals Hunter and Rundle resulted in the partial hemming in of the commandoes under Olivier and Prinsloo. Olivier succeeded in getting through the cordon with five guns and about a thousand men but Prinsloo was hopelessly hemmed in in the Caledon Valley. He was compelled to make an unconditional surrender and nearly five thousand men laid down their arms, while six thousand horses, a Krupp gun and many cattle were taken. Every effort was now made to capture De Wet's commando and Lord Kitchener was sent down to control the operations against him. There was an exciting hunt and De Wet led his pursuers whither he willed. He succeeded in crossing the Vaal and then

appeared to be lost. The pursuit was for the time abandoned—the British cavalry being evidently unable to keep up the race. The public were told that De Wet's commando had dispersed and had escaped because of the dispersal, but within a week it turned up within fifteen miles of Pretoria, from which a force was sent out to keep it on the run. De Wet retired before the leisurely British advance as he had done so many times before, but finally his force was broken up and he crossed the Magaliesburg Range as a fugitive with a small body of adherents. Meanwhile the military authorities in Pretoria had been engaged in court-martialing Hans Cordua, a young Boer soldier of German origin, who had broken his parole by endeavouring to gain support among the Boer residents there for a clumsy plot to seize Lord Roberts and convey him as prisoner to Christian Botha. The young man, after an exhaustive and scrupulously fair trial by court-martial, was sentenced to death and shot.

By this time it had become apparent to Lord Roberts that leniency had been carried too far—that numbers of Boers who had surrendered and taken the oath of neutrality had returned to their commandoes and that many of those who did not fight served the enemy as spies. A Proclamation was therefore issued declaring that persons who violated the oath would be punished with death, imprisonment or fine; that all burghers in districts occupied by the forces of the Queen, except those who had sworn the oath of neutrality, would be regarded as prisoners of war and transported; and that all buildings in which the enemy's scouts were harboured would be razed. This was followed by a Proclamation, issued at Belfast on September 1st, annexing the Transvaal, Lord Roberts, in the meantime, having directed joint operations against Commandant General Botha in the region north and east of the Delagoa Railway line. The Boers nowhere made any serious stand either against Sir Redvers Buller moving north, or the columns sent out by Lord Roberts to co-operate with him. A position taken up by Botha on the mountain road overlooking Lydenburg delayed the British advance for a few days until sufficient cavalry could be brought up to make a turning movement a certain success; but both Lydenburg and Barberton were occupied with scarcely any resistance, the enemy, however, succeeding in getting away with most of their guns and losing only a small portion of their wagons and stores. On September 12th it was made known that Mr.

Kruger, who had been in hiding at Nelspruit, had reached Lourenço Marques by train, having obtained "leave of absence" from the Executive Council in order to proceed to Europe for the benefit of his health. The belief of those who thought he would make an heroic end of the war by courting death on the field or by a manly surrender was dispelled by his ignominious flight. Kruger, the hero, had deserted as well as lost the Afrikander cause. Lord Roberts pointed the moral of the event in an appeal to the Boers, which fittingly brings this narrative of affairs on South Africa to a close. The Proclamation was dated Machadodorp, September 13th, and distributed in Dutch and English throughout the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony:—

The late President Kruger, with Reitz and the archives of the South African Republic, crossed the Portuguese frontier and arrived at Lorenço Marques with a view of sailing for Europe at an early date. Mr. Kruger has formally resigned the position he held as President of the South African Republic, thus severing his official connection with the Transvaal.

Mr. Kruger's action shows how hopeless, in his opinion, is the war which has now been carried on for nearly a year, and his desertion of the Boer cause should make it clear to his fellow-burghers that it is useless for them to continue the struggle any longer.

It is probably unknown to the inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony that nearly 15,000 of their fellow-subjects are now prisoners of war, not one of whom will be released until those now in arms against us surrender unconditionally.

The burghers must by this time be cognisant of the fact that no intervention on their behalf can come from any of the Great Powers, and, further, that the British Empire is determined to complete the work which has already cost so many valuable lives, and to carry to its conclusion the war declared against her by the late Governments of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, a war to which there can be but one ending.

If any further doubts remain in the minds of the burghers as to Her Britannic Majesty's intentions, they should be dispelled by the permanent manner in which the country is gradually being occupied by Her Majesty's forces and by the issue of the Proclamations signed by me on the 24th May and 1st September, 1900, annexing the Orange Free State and the South African Republic respectively in the name of Her Majesty.

I take this opportunity of pointing out that, except in the small area occupied by the Boer army under the personal command of Commandant-General Botha, the war is degenerating, and has degenerated, into operations carried on in an irregular and irresponsible manner, and in very many cases by insignificant bodies of men. I should be failing in my duty to Her Majesty's Government

and to Her Majesty's Army in South Africa if I neglected to use every means in my power to bring such irregular warfare to an early conclusion. The means which I am compelled to adopt are those which the customs of war prescribe as being applicable to such cases; they are ruinous to the country, entail endless suffering on the burghers and their families; and the longer this guerilla warfare continues the more vigorously must they be enforced.

BOOK VII.

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATION.

CHAPTER I.

PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE.

The Social Programme at the 1895 General Election—Simultaneity of Important Foreign Affairs—The *Inertia* of Governments—Sectional Interests in Parliament—The Weakness of Party Allegiance—Composition of the House of Commons—Class and Private Interests Superior to the Public Weal—The Average Member of Parliament—The House of Lords—The Attitude of the Rich—Content of the Well-to-do—The Ministry Controlled by the Character of its Following—Prosperity of the Working Classes since 1895—Strikes on a Rising Market—The Wants of the Workmen—Neglect of the Politician by the Proletariate—Loss of Interest in Social Questions—Need of Amelioration of Social Conditions less Urgent.

THE General Election had been won by the Government on a programme of constructive social legislation and opposition to constitutional change. Foreign affairs were scarcely mentioned. Except for events in Asia Minor and the possibility that they might lead to complications in Europe, the horizon was clear. It was darkened at the close of 1895 by arrogant interference in British concerns by the then President of the United States. At the New Year the gloom was deepened by the Jameson Raid and the message of the German Emperor to Mr. Kruger. Then, in rapid succession, came French encroachments in West Africa, Russian aggression in North China, the French invasion of the Nile Valley, the war in South Africa and the risk of European interference on behalf of the Boer Republics. Year after year the attention of the nation was engrossed by external affairs and the energies of Parliament to a greater or lesser degree absorbed by questions of foreign and Imperial policy. Social matters that called for legislation had little chance of obtaining predominance in a crowd of issues in each of which the future of the Empire was at stake. In any estimate of the work done by the Adminis-

tration on the lines foreshadowed on the eve of the General Election, the fact that foreign affairs of exceptional gravity held the field must be taken into account. Unless due allowance is made for their absorbing interest and for the unusual tax they made upon the intellect of the Administration, of Parliament and of the country, the work achieved in domestic legislation will seem to be wholly disproportionate to the promises upon which votes were obtained. The series of unforeseen events in foreign and colonial politics—unforeseen, at least, by the majority of the public—must be held partly, though not wholly responsible for the failure of the Administration to do all that was hoped from them in the way of domestic improvement.

On the other hand it will hardly be disputed that the Administration might have done more had their earnestness been equal to the election promises of their supporters. No Government, however, does so well as is hoped and expected. Once securely established in authority there is an inevitable diminution of reforming zeal. The enthusiasm of Governments and of Parliaments becomes chilled as the difficulties of framing new legislation are approached. And it is often the case that the larger the majority of the party in power the more rapidly do the influences that make for lethargy and inaction assert themselves. The driving force of those, in the Cabinet or out of it, who are enthusiastic for this or that measure of social amendment is neutralised by sectional influences within a party—by forces representing conflicting interests in the body politic. No great measure of social reform can be proposed in a country like this without threatening the material interests of a class. Every class is represented within the party in power as well as in an opposition; and whenever one class is threatened by legislation there is a tacit alliance between all its members, irrespective of party.

Sectional interests give way to the general weal only under *force majeure*. A Cabinet, which may be assumed to be above mere class interests and to look only to the general good, cannot impose its will even upon its own party henchmen. The measure of its strength is in the degree in which it can reconcile sectional interests within the party ranks. It can lead only at such a pace as its supporters are prepared or can be persuaded to follow. When, therefore, the legislative achievements of the Salisbury Administration are compared with the lavish promises made to the electorate

at a time when the immediate object was a party victory, and when it is charged against Ministers that they have put their magnificent majority to feeble use in questions of social legislation, the fact must be taken into account that in practical politics sectional interests have to be conciliated and reconciled. No Government can override them altogether. It cannot ask for undue sacrifices without straining party allegiance to breaking point.

The House of Commons is supposed to legislate for the good of the State as a whole. But it is not a body of experts who have no class and personal interests to serve, and regard every question with the impartial mind of a Judge to whom conflicting issues are presented for final settlement. To vary the metaphor it is not composed of a number of gentlemen who are in a position like that of medical men who meet in consultation to decide what course of treatment shall be pursued, and whose sole aim, apart from drawing their fees for attendance, is to effect the cure of a patient. Politicians do not treat the diseases of the body politic from the standpoint of the man of science whose profession it is to lessen or eradicate a physical malady. Few of them are competent to diagnose and prescribe for the ills that afflict human society. Some of them—and I write with such knowledge as comes to the journalist who has passed a few years of life in the galleries of Parliament—are blatant quacks—a description that need not be limited to any one party in Parliament; and these stand in the same relation to the competent few as does the garrulous herbalist in the market place to a learned physician. So far from either House of Parliament possessing the impartiality or the ability to give independent legislative decisions, the social organism is at the mercy of men who for the most part are not experts and have strong personal interests to serve, either in advancing the claims of their class or resisting attacks upon it from other classes.

The House of Lords is, for example, composed very largely of the landed interest—a class exceedingly tenacious of its rights and privileges. The concession may readily be made that on questions that do not involve any encroachment upon the interests of the territorial section of the community the House of Lords—or the numerically insignificant fraction of its members who do their duty in that Assembly—often gives a saner and less prejudiced judgment than the House of Commons. But that statement is not inconsistent with the fact that it is composed of a privileged

order of beings with whom their own interests stand first and those of the public second. As for the House of Commons, that is a medley of all classes, with an enormous majority of rich men whose practical interests are with the rich, however much their sympathies may be with the poor. A shipowner, for instance, may have a lively sympathy for the poorer classes in the mass; but he will vote against the inclusion of seamen in an Employers' Liability Act though it be demonstrated to him beyond dispute that a seaman's family would be better off in the event of injury or death befalling the seaman in the course of his employment if he were on the same legal footing as a worker in a factory. A great manufacturer may profess beautiful sentiments to a democratic audience when there are votes to be won or kept and may display a fiery fervour for the advancement of the masses; but when legislative proposals are made through which the social progress of the workman is to be secured partly at the expense of his profits he is convinced that the best thing to do is to do nothing. The history of our factory and workshop legislation need not be cited as proof. The point need not be laboured. The House of Commons is a fortuitous concourse of sectional interests, which, in the main, find it to their advantage to combine in resistance against bold experiment and sweeping change for the benefit of the masses of the people who elect them; and it will continue to be so until the masses produce a sufficient number of able men to make such a combination less effective, and will bear the necessary pecuniary burdens to keep them in Parliament. The House of Commons is not a democratic assembly; and because it is not it is a force in national life which operates in favour of the maintenance of the *status quo*. Searching reforms are not to be expected from it while the bulk of its members are of the classes who have inherited or acquired much wealth. Broadly speaking they are satisfied with things as they are. They would like to see the labouring classes better off; but as, apart from the ineradicable defects of human nature, the advancement of the material well-being of the masses can only be obtained either by an increase of the national wealth because of a greater output of productive energy all round, or by such a distribution of wealth as will give the masses more than they possess at the expense of those above them in the standard of comfort, they, not unnaturally, thwart legislation likely to have such a distributive tendency.

When, therefore, it is charged against the Salisbury Administration that they have not made the legislative use of their majority which it was expected they would make,—that the mountain of promises made before the Election have resulted only in a few legislative mice during each session and that, except for a few remedial measures of no striking importance, the social Millennium is as far off as ever it was—the constitution and character of that majority must be considered.

There is, also, another factor to be taken into account. Throughout the duration of the Ministry the country has enjoyed unprecedented prosperity. Trade has gone up by leaps and bounds. Employment has been active, wages,—relatively speaking—have been high. No able-bodied man willing to work has suffered hunger during the past few years. There has been a subsistence for all—skilled and unskilled, and for women as well as for men—who obeyed the natural law that by the sweat of brain and body shall a man eat his bread. Consequently the pressure from below has diminished. Indeed, it seems to have ceased altogether, except upon the question of the provision of better housing accommodation for the labouring classes. It is true that, during the lifetime of the Administration, there have been strikes and widespread labour disturbances; but these were in themselves evidence of prosperity. They were legitimate movements for an increased share in the wealth accruing to the country by the general revival of trade which set in soon after the Government came into office—a matter for which the Government can claim no credit except so far as it contributed to a feeling of confidence and security at home and abroad. They were the inevitable accompaniments of a rising market,—an expression less of discontent with the social system by the workers as of a determination to get their full share of the benefits the system conferred in a period of expanding commerce. It may even be said that these industrial disputes were evidence of contentment with the system. There was not, at any rate, any deep-seated and far-reaching democratic agitation throughout the lifetime of the Government. The masses of the people were too busy earning good wages to concern themselves with domestic politics. They ceased to be closely interested in the question of their own condition. They take short views: democratic introspection vanishes before democratic prosperity.

The average workman in full employment is satisfied with

his lot. It is, after all, very little that he asks of life—the somewhat leisurely performance of arduous physical tasks, a wage that will satisfy the requirements of the domestic larder and wardrobe, and will yet leave him with a margin for beer and baccy, a Saturday afternoon at a football match or an evening a week at a music hall or theatre. He has no fear of a destitute old age, no desire—it is the *average* working man of whom this is written—to be other than what he is; and he is content that his children shall take their chances of the future. He has few of those wearing anxieties and apprehensions that poison the lives of men whose incomes depend upon strenuous mental as well as physical exertion. He is not ambitious either for himself or for his children. His material duty towards them is done when they have passed the sixth standard and gone out into the world. The lot of the average workman when trade is good and employment regular is, from his own point of view, satisfactory. His political discontents vanish. He ceases to clamour for “something to be done.” He cannot shout to the governing classes the unanswerable argument that he is hungry while others have a superfluity and that therefore they must act so as to appease his hunger, else, if they either cannot or will not, he must help himself to the food of others. The motive force that compels Cabinets and Parliaments to legislate with the object of lightening the miseries of the poor diminish when an era of prosperity sets in. During the time of the Salisbury Government, it slackened so much that it almost ceased to operate. There was no demand for sweeping social legislation. One could go *seriatim* through such measures as were passed specially affecting the working classes, examining the circumstances attending the passage of each, and in no case would there be found important evidence that the working classes were deeply concerned either about the character of the Bills or their chances of passage through Parliament. They left their interests in the hands of the politicians. With the revival of industry they straightway forgot about domestic legislation, such attention as they could spare from wage-getting and amusements being concentrated upon the dramatic elements of affairs abroad. When this state of things is compared with that which prevailed in the early nineties light is thrown upon the comparative unimportance of the legislative achievements of the Administration. *Inertia* among the

working classes was reflected in the House of Commons. Just as the proletariat, being now well fed and clothed, ceased to look to the Government to remove the causes of hunger and raggedness, so the average Member of Parliament forgot the promises by which the Millennium was to be brought nigh, or remembered them only as matters that could be postponed without harm to anybody. That the Administration has few claims to a place in history because of the value of the legislative output and the changes introduced for the benefit of the masses of the people, must be attributed chiefly to the failure of public interest in its domestic doings. There has been no insistent, indeed no general, demand for old-age pensions, notwithstanding the number of votes obtained on that ticket; and, accordingly, there has been no serious effort to secure them for the people. The Commissions and Committees of Inquiry into that subject—as into that of Licensing Reform—have been more anxious to discover and to propound difficulties than to overcome them. Partly, therefore, by reason of the absence of popular clamour for social reforms, and partly because of the all-engrossing nature of Imperial questions unforeseen at the time of the General Election, the attention and the energies of Ministers, Parliament and the public have been diverted from domestic politics. When the Cabinet was formed it seemed that it was upon these issues that the mind of the nation would be concentrated and that within the next few years measures would be passed that would have a far-reaching effect upon the social life of these islands, greatly to the amelioration of the lot of the labouring classes. The wave of prosperity has rendered amelioration less imperative. It has allowed of a postponement without hardship to anyone. At the same time the record of the Government is far from barren. What has been done session by session will now be passed in review.

CHAPTER II.

THE FIRST SESSION.

An Indifferent Start—An Unacceptable Education Bill—The Voluntary Schools—A Financial Bill—Provisions of the Bill—The Religious Difficulty—Mr. Asquith Moves the Rejection of the Bill—Attitude of the Church Party—A Hopeless Tangle of Amendments—The Business of the Commons in Confusion—Mr. Balfour's Responsibility for this—A Hotch-Potch Measure—Ministerial Dislike of the Bill—Sir John Gorst's Attitude—Mr. Balfour Throws Over the Vice-Presidency—The Committee of Education—Carlton Club Meeting—Mr. Balfour's Speech—Two Lines Passed in Five Nights—Abandonment of the Bill—Effect of the *Fiasco*—The Naval Works Act—The Navy Estimates—Mr. Goschen's Statement—Public Satisfaction at the Naval Increases—No Additional Taxation—The Budget Statement—The Agricultural Lands Rating Act—Attacks by the Opposition—Royal Commission on Local Taxation—The Irish Land Act—The Irish Landowning Peers—Lord Londonderry's Revolt—Employers' Liability Bill Deferred—Minor Measures by the Government—Minor Legislation—Quarrels of the Irish Party—Mr. Justin McCarthy's Resignation.

THE Government made an indifferent start in the Session of 1896. An Education Bill was introduced which proved to be unacceptable to the House. Ministers failed to convince even their own supporters of the value of its provisions. They offered but a feeble defence against the first attacks made upon it and, as soon as resistance threatened to become formidable, they abandoned the Bill in a fit of fright. The subject stood third in order in the Queen's Speech. The paragraph relating to it stated that "elementary schools under voluntary management are a valuable portion of our educational system and their condition, which is in many places precarious, requires further assistance from public sources." The object of the Government therefore was to afford financial assistance to the voluntary schools, the supporters of which had failed to maintain them by sufficiently liberal subscriptions. The Bill proposed to carry out this purpose by a drastic re-organisation of the educational system. It provided for the establishment in every county and county borough of a paramount educational authority which was to be the one channel through which public money was to reach all elementary schools, whether under School Board or voluntary management. Each county and county borough was thus to have a separate Educational Department of its

own, the work of the Privy Council being thus decentralised. This paramount county authority was to be the County Council, acting through a statutory education committee whose number and constitution were to be entirely within the power of the council itself. The administration of the Imperial grants would be entirely decentralised; the code would be decentralised, the county educational authority being under no obligation to conform to the rigid curriculum hitherto applied throughout the United Kingdom but being able to adapt its system to local educational requirements; and all that the Central Imperial Authority—the Committee of Council—would do would be to send inspectors on tours of visitation, not to examine the schools, but merely to see that the county authority was properly discharging its duties. Technical instruction, poor law and industrial schools were to be handed over to the County Educational Authority—and power was given for federation by districts or denominations. As to the religious difficulty, which, as Sir John Gorst said in introducing the Bill, existed in Parliament and on the platform rather than in the schools, the Bill was supplemented by a provision that “if the parents of a reasonable number of scholars attending a school require that separate religious instruction shall be given to their children, the managers shall, as far as practicable, whether the religious instruction in the school is regulated by any trust deed, scheme or other instrument or not, permit reasonable arrangements to be made for allowing such religious instruction to be given”—the Education Department retaining the power of final decision. The age of compulsory attendance was raised from eleven years to twelve.

These were the leading principles of the measure, which abounded in contentious detail. Mr. Acland, who had been Education Minister in the Rosebery Cabinet, characterised it at once as the greatest upheaval in our education system which the country had ever seen; and when, on May 5th, the Bill came on for Second Reading, Mr. Asquith moved its rejection. The debate disclosed a hearty dislike of the Bill on both sides of the House. The upholders of the principle that the State should concern itself only with non-sectarian education read in the Bill an intention to cripple the School Board system; the Church party advanced a variety of objections to the supplement to the conscience clause and asked for rate aid, without popular representation on the boards of management for voluntary schools, instead of State aid.

Their view was that the Bill would fail in its purpose of giving the voluntary schools the additional financial help essential to their continuance. So various and so conflicting were the opinions expressed in and outside Parliament that the controversy became a hopeless tangle. Nor did any single Minister exhibit the capacity to unravel the threads. Amendment was piled upon amendment until the Order Paper of the House of Commons was bulky enough to provide a week's reading for anyone who desired to understand the bearing of each suggested addition to the main proposals. Meanwhile business in the House of Commons had fallen into some confusion, a matter for which Mr. Balfour was held personally responsible, the charge against him being one of general negligence and slackness. The truth was that the Bill was a compromise of conflicting opinions within the Cabinet and that no single member had complete confidence in it as a whole. The only thing the Government were sure about, and the only point upon which their supporters could be depended upon, was the necessity of providing money for voluntary establishments. Ministers let it be known that if this principle could be secured they were willing to jettison parts of the Bill. Sir John Gorst, however, stood for the Bill and nothing but the Bill. It would be futile to follow the debate in Committee. The Vice-President stoutly contested a proposal by Sir A. Rollit to empower every municipal borough to appoint an education committee for the purposes of the Bill; and Mr. Balfour rejected the opinions of Sir John and accepted Sir A. Rollit's proposition so far as it applied to boroughs with a population of 20,000 and upwards. By doing that he permitted a breach to be made in the cardinal principle of the Bill and the whole controversy drifted into greater confusion. By the middle of June the business of the House of Commons had become disorganised by protracted and unproductive discussion of the measure. A meeting was held at the Carlton Club to consider what should be done—whether the Bill should be closed in compartments and discussion thus stifled, or whether it should be mutilated. Mr. Balfour, who addressed the gathering, objected to either course and proposed to adjourn the House in August to an early day in January and then complete the stages of the Bill in time for the commencement of the new Session, in agreement with the necessities of Supply before the end of the financial year. On the face of it

this proposal was impracticable, for the opponents of the Bill would easily be able to wreck it after January, knowing that the Government would be compelled to begin the new Session at an early date because of the imperative requirements of Supply. The House, however, continued to work at the Bill in Committee. In five nights it passed two lines of the first clause, and there were over twelve hundred amendments yet to be moved. In these circumstances the Government abandoned the Bill, promising to fulfil their pledges to the voluntary schools by means to be determined before the next Session. The Government had thus placed themselves in a ludicrous and humiliating position. They had wasted the time of Parliament on a measure as crude as it was ambitious; and they had managed the business of the Session, in this and in other matters, with results injurious to the voluntary schools and unflattering to themselves. The Opposition, not unnaturally, gloated over the ineptitude of a Government which had been placed in the seat of authority on the assumption that their business facilities as well as their policy were immeasurably superior to those of their predecessors. As Sir Wm. Harcourt declared when Mr. Balfour announced that the Bill was dropped, the measure perished not from any factious opposition, but from its own inherent imperfections; it perished not only by the exertions of the Opposition, but also because the Government had not the united support of their own party or their own Cabinet. The *fiasco* was not without its compensating advantages. It braced up the Government. It stimulated Mr. Balfour to regain control over the House and recover a reputation for capable leadership. Henceforth the machinery ran with less jolting and creaking.

Having dealt with the conspicuous failure of the Session the record of achievements may now be reviewed. In the forefront of Her Majesty's Speech was placed the question of "the extension and improvement of the naval defences of the Empire." The Government proposals were embodied in the Naval Works Act. Under this Act the amount to be spent on harbour defence, upon naval ports and barracks was increased from the eight and a half millions, proposed to be spent under the Act of the previous year, to fourteen millions; and a further sum of two and three-quarter millions, and the surplus of income over expenditure during the year ending March, 1896 (nearly four millions and a quarter), devoted to naval purposes. The total Navy Estimates for 1896-97

amounted to £21,823,000, an increase of £3,122,000 over the figures of the previous year. Mr. Goschen's explanatory statement disclosed a further increase of 4,900 men, an expenditure of £850,000 on ordnance and ammunition. Dealing with the question of ship-building, he reviewed what had been accomplished under the Naval Defence Act of 1889 and the programme carried by Lord Spencer in 1894. By these measures the fleet had been strengthened by the addition of 105 ships and sixty-two torpedo boat destroyers. The Government now proposed to add to the ships then unfinished five battleships, four first-class cruisers, three second-class cruisers, six third-class cruisers and twenty-eight torpedo boat destroyers, at a cost, to be spread over three years, of about ten millions. The whole work of construction and defence would be completed by 1899. The estimates, said Mr. Goschen, were not framed in any spirit of provocation but on that of self-defence. As such they were cheerfully accepted by the House and the nation. And it was not in England alone that the increase in the amount to be spent on the navy was welcomed. Significant indications of approval came from the great self-governing colonies, where there had grown up a keen realisation of the fact that the maintenance of their liberties depended upon the ability of the Imperial Navy to withstand attack from any likely combination by other maritime Powers.

Two currents of opinion were noticeable in the discussion in Parliament—one which regarded even the large proposals of the Government as insufficient, and the other, whose chief exponents were Sir Wilfrid Lawson and Mr. Labouchere, being appalled at the expenditure. Neither succeeded in modifying the Government plans. The public were content to leave the matter in the strong hands of Mr. Goschen. Their view was that, at whatever cost, the nation must have a navy of such strength as the Government thought necessary. They applauded rather than criticised the courage of the First Lord in ordering on his own responsibility eight of the new torpedo boat destroyers in advance of the assent of the House. So far from being reluctant to meet the expenditure they gloried in it as evidence alike of the wealth and the spirit of the nation. That the nation should spend over twenty-one millions in one year on the maintenance of the fleet, and, on new construction, equipment and fortifications, no less than fifty-five millions since Lord Spencer met the public demand for a more powerful navy, was gratifying to the national pride. At no time throughout its career did the

Government do a more necessary and popular thing than give an incontestable supremacy to the first arm of defence. General satisfaction was, no doubt, partly due to the circumstance that the new programme did not impose any additional burdens upon the taxpayer. An expanding revenue averted the necessity of any new imposts at the time and during the three years in which the new vessels were added to the fleet. On the other hand, such was the public determination to have a navy equal to any likely combination against us, that any fresh burdens would willingly have been borne.

That there was no need to ask the taxpayer to dip deeper into his pocket was proved by the Budget Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Never, said Sir Michael Hicks Beach, had the credit of the country stood so high, and the condition of the masses, as judged by the consumption of dutiable articles, been so prosperous. The Exchequer receipts for 1895-96 were £101,974,000, against an estimated revenue of £96,162,000, and the expenditure had been £97,764,000, leaving a realised surplus of £4,210,000. His Budget estimate for 1896-97 placed the revenue at £101,755,000 and expenditure at £100,047,000, or an estimated surplus of £1,708,000. Certain changes proposed in the Finance Act, with the object of relieving hardship and injustice disclosed in the actual working of that measure, would absorb £200,000 of that estimated surplus. £100,000 would be absorbed by reduction of the Land Tax to a shilling on lands under Schedule A of the Income Tax; and £975,000 would be allotted for relief to agriculture under the proposed Agricultural Rating Act. The balance of £433,000 would be available for any additional expenditure upon education and for contingencies. It was a humdrum but eminently business-like Budget. Both Parliament and the country were content that the surplus of nearly four millions and a quarter should be allocated to the purposes defined in the Naval Works Act.

Besides the two subjects dealt with above the Queen's Speech called for legislation "of which the object will be to mitigate the distress under which the classes labour who are engaged in" agriculture. This object was effected by passing Bills allocating £975,000 to England, Scotland and Ireland, England taking 80 per cent. of the total. A lively controversy arose upon the English Bill. Mr. Chaplin did not claim that it would do more than

mitigate the distress supposed to prevail. He was almost apologetic about the proposal and was anxious that the public should not believe that the Government were unmindful of the grievances of other classes of rateable property than land. The principle of the Bill was that land was to be assessed upon a proportion only of its rateable value, instead of upon the whole value. The Opposition ridiculed the Bill and wanted to know why the owner or occupier of agricultural land should be the recipient of doles at the expense of urban populations. Sir William Harcourt assailed the measure with all the invective at his command. The relief given by the Bill would, in his view, be less than one shilling per acre, and he did not believe it would benefit agricultural industry in the least degree.

To recapitulate the points of the debates upon the measure would be useless. It is enough to say that the Government were determined to carry it, whether or not its benefits would be as great as they pretended to believe, and that Sir William Harcourt and his allies seized every opportunity in the Commons and in the country of denouncing it as unjust, odious and invidious. The arguments on one side and on the other were worn threadbare. When the Bill reached the Lords, Lord Salisbury offered a vigorous defence, his chief point being that the Bill did not relieve the agricultural class at the expense of the masses engaged in other industries. Lord Rosebery made an effective attack upon this assertion by pointing out that agriculture was not the only distressed industry and that where the farmer required relief was in the reduction of rent rather than in his share of taxation. He complained also that the relief was indiscriminate—that the prosperous farmers of Lancashire would benefit under the Bill to the same extent as their distressed fellows in Essex. To a land-owning body like the House of Lords criticism based upon the necessity of reducing rents naturally passed unheeded. The Lords preferred that the pledges upon which the votes of the agricultural classes had been obtained should be satisfied by money grants at the expense of the general public. The operation of the Bill was limited to five years and an incidental effect of its introduction was the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the whole question of local taxation. Such an inquiry should undoubtedly have preceded the Bill. Urban and borough taxpayers are the victims of inequalities as severe as any suffered

by the agricultural classes. Any redress should have been made irrespective of the demands of this or that section. The Government, however, preferred to put the cart before the horse. They thus paid their debt to the landowners, the farmers and the classes dependent upon agriculture; but the relief was so trifling that little gratitude was shown and a lively distrust created in the towns. Class legislation is at times a matter of political expediency but is not altogether creditable to the Government that carries it through.

An Irish Land Act was promised in the Queen's Speech. This was introduced by Mr. Gerald Balfour in April. It was partly founded upon the abandoned Bill of the previous Session. It may be described as an amendment in numerous particulars of the procedure and working of the Purchase Acts. Necessarily it was a compromise between the extreme views of the landlords and the claims of tenants—who would eliminate the landlords from the social system. Every line of it was highly contentious. It was debated with that wearisome reiteration which accompanies every project of Irish legislation. The discussions were chiefly remarkable for the minute knowledge displayed by the Irish Secretary, and the skill and tact with which he piloted the Bill through the House. When the measure reached the Lords there was something approaching a revolt among the Irish landowning Peers.

The attack upon the Bill was led by Lord Londonderry, a former Viceroy of Ireland. He complained that the tendency of the Bill was to further the expatriation of the landlords by reducing them to poverty. In this line of argument he was supported by several Peers on the Government side. Lord Templetown, for example, declared that the Bill had created consternation in Ireland and had welded all those who were interested in any kind of property in a compact mass against the Government. Views of this kind did not however meet with a sympathetic reception. The landowning class was roundly told in the Press that it would have to accept the Bill and would better consult its own dignity by ceasing an ineffectual protest. The revolted Peers succeeded, however, in introducing various amendments in the hope that these would be rejected by the Commons and the Bill therefore wrecked. This hope was frustrated by Mr. G. Balfour, who accepted certain of the alterations and made changes

in others. The Bill was then sent back to the Lords. Again Lord Londonderry took an aggressive line, but after some warm debates, in which the Government obtained only narrow majorities, the Bill surmounted its perils. Here again the Government had narrowly escaped disaster. It had been compelled to drop the Education Bill because of a revolt among its supporters in the Commons, and only by good fortune rather than good management was the Irish Land Bill saved from destruction by the loyalist Irish Peers. The net result, however, was the passing of of an Act highly beneficial to the Irish tenants. The Government had demonstrated that it was prepared to do justice to the claims of Ireland, even at the cost of outraging the class interests and the sentiments of its friends. Nor did Lord Londonderry's display of independence do him political injury, for, on the Duke of Norfolk's resignation of the Postmaster-Generalship, he received and accepted the offer of that position.

An Employers' Liability Bill had been promised at the opening of the Session, but because of the confusion into which the business of Parliament had been allowed to fall, its introduction was deferred until the succeeding year. The remaining Acts of the Session are relatively unimportant. A measure was passed to facilitate the settlement of labour disputes; but as no compulsory power was taken to oblige the parties to such disputes to accept the mediation of the Board of Trade, its operation has been of so limited a character that it cannot be said the Government have made any material advance in the prevention, or speedy determination, of labour conflicts. Credit can, however, be taken by the Government for the Coal Mines Regulation Act—a measure providing greater security for the workers in fiery and dusty mines. As subsequent accidents and Home Office circulars have since proved, this restrictive legislation did not go far enough. But it marked a considerable advance and was accepted by the mining class as a highly necessary and practicable reform. The legislative fruits of the Session included an Act containing various drastic amendments of the Truck Acts; an Act controlling vexatious litigants whose proceedings amounted to an abuse of the processes of the Courts; an Act providing for the construction of the Uganda railway; an Act for the better safeguarding of the public health against plague; an Act for the superannuation of Poor Law officers; an Act for the protection of cabmen against

“bilking,” or the fraudulent avoidance of the payment of fare by a hirer; an Act which liberated the motor industry from the more stringent restrictions imposed by the law regulating locomotives on highways; an Act empowering the Courts to relieve Trustees from personal liability when there has been an honest and reasonable failure to obtain the direction of the Court; an Act strengthening the provisions of the Diseases of Animals Act of 1894; and an Act for the systematic notification of the presence on the high seas of derelict vessels. The list is by no means exhaustive and no account is taken of the many local Bills passed. On the whole as much work was done as could have been expected in the circumstances, the time and other calculations of the Government having been so completely upset by the resistance offered to the principal measures. It cannot, however, he said that the Government justified the expectations of the public during the first Session, or that their management of Parliamentary affairs had done much to rescue the House of Commons from the discredit into which it had fallen during the final Session of the previous Administration. No reputations were made within the House. When the Education Bill was dropped and the differences with regard to the Irish Land Bill were composed the Unionist party regained its solidarity. During the Session the Irish party was rent by internal quarrels. Mr. Justin McCarthy resigned the leadership of the unmanageable factions and was, nominally at least, succeeded by Mr. Dillon. The quarrels of Parnellites and anti-Parnellites attracted little attention even in Ireland, where a revival of prosperity lessened the interest of the people in politics and helped to make them indifferent to the squabbles of the Nationalist representatives.

CHAPTER III.

THE OUTPUT FOR '97, '98, '99.

Points of the Queen's Speech—Voluntary Schools Bill—Necessitous Board Schools—*Hansard*: A Rubbish Heap—Silence of Sir John Gorst—Workmen's Compensation—Abolition of Common Employment—War Office Reorganisation—Some Justified Criticisms—Military Works Act—Increase of the Army—The Budget—Minor Legislation—The Jubilee Address—Lord Rosebery's Resignation—The Session of 1898—Queen's Speech—Points of Irish Local Government Bill—Mr. Morley's Criticisms—Revolt of Irish Peers—Lord Londonderry Becomes Postmaster-General—Benefices Act—Anti-Ritualist Speeches—Sir Wm. Harcourt's Attack: "Living Lie"—Vaccination Act—Criminal Evidence Act—The Vagrancy Act—The Prisons Act—Inebriates' Act—London University Act—The Budget—Session of 1899—Education Act—London Government—Department of Agriculture for Ireland—Mr. Plunkett's Work—School Attendance Act—Mr. Robson's Success—Raising of School Age—Colonial Loans Act—Minor Legislation of the Year—Working Class Dwellings (Acquisition) Act—The Budget Statement—The Chancellor's Warning—New Taxation—The Autumn or War Session—A Margin of a Million at the Close of the War!

IN 1896 the Government had attempted to do too much in one Session. The programme of 1897 showed that they had learned that lesson. The Queen's Speech mentioned only a few measures. Assistance to the Voluntary Schools was given the first place and Employers' Liability the second. The object of the Government was not to re-cast the system of education, but to provide money for the Church schools. Resolutions were therefore proposed by the First Lord of the Treasury as the basis of a Bill, and these were passed before the end of the financial year, though not before the Opposition had extracted a promise from the Government that provision should be made for the relief of necessitous Board as well as Voluntary Schools. The Government decided to deal with the subject by two Bills. The Voluntary Schools Act relieved schools from local rates, placing them upon the same basis in this respect as places of worship. It abolished the grant limit of seventeen and sixpence in Board and Voluntary Schools alike, giving to Voluntary Schools an aggregate grant of five shillings per child for the whole number of children in average attendance. The aid grant was to be distributed by the Education Department

in such manner and in such sums as it thought best for helping necessitous schools and increasing their efficiency, regard being paid to the maintenance of voluntary subscriptions. The formation of Associations of Voluntary Schools for the distribution of the grant in given areas was encouraged, provision being made in the Act for the supervision of such associations, alike in their formation and in the distribution of the grant allotted to them, by the Education Department.

The debates on the Bill were unimportant. To examine the speeches would be useless. Parliamentary oratory has no vitality beyond the moment or the day of utterance, unless it is concerned with the broad issues of policy. For the most part *Hansard* is a rubbish heap into which it would be a waste of labour to dig. Two points, however, should be put upon record — the determination of the Government to force the Bill through its stages so that the grants under it could be made during the financial year ending in March, and the efforts of the Opposition to obtain representation of the public on the management boards of schools in receipt of the grants. The Government succeeded, notwithstanding a large number of amendments, some of which were purely obstructive, and the Opposition failed to obtain acceptance of their principle of representation. Sir John Gorst took no part in the proceedings and his silence was interpreted as an ostentatious display of indifference to the fate of the measure. On the third reading the Government were vigorously attacked for the manner in which freedom of debate had been curtailed and the Bill forced through the House; but the indignation of the Opposition was not shared by the country, which rejoiced to see that Mr. Balfour had imposed some discipline upon his party and was getting work done at an expenditure of Parliamentary verbosity proportionate to the relative unimportance of the issues before the House.

Later in the Session the Government fulfilled their pledge of giving assistance to the necessitous Board Schools, by passing a Bill giving relief on the basis of a sliding scale calculated on the amount of the rate. The sum at stake was something over a hundred and ten thousand pounds per annum in the form of additional grants from the Imperial Exchequer. The discussions on this Bill were unimportant.

The Bill dealing with Employers' Liability (Workmen's Compensation for Accidents Act) is the most ambitious essay in social

legislation made by the Administration. It contained a scheme for compensation for all accidents from whatever cause arising; but applied only to railways, factories and places to which the Factory Act of 1895 applied, mines, quarries and engineering work. Workshops in which machinery was not used, agricultural labourers, seamen and domestic servants were excluded from the operation of the Act. The leading principles of the measure were that if in any employment within its scope personal injury occurred to any workman, the employer would be liable to pay compensation on the scale subjoined: (I.) Where death ensued, to the dependants of a workman a sum equal to his earnings during the three previous years, or £150, whichever was the larger, so long as the total did not exceed £300; (II.) in case of incapacity the incapacitated person to receive 50 per cent. of his wages, provided that it did not exceed £1 a week. Disputes as to amount in all cases are to be decided by arbitration. Contracting out is allowed where the Registrar of Friendly Societies certifies that any scheme of compensation or insurance is not less favourable than that under the Act. The Act abolished the doctrine of common employment as regards the classes of workmen within its limits.

The House, as a whole, was favourable to the principal of the measure, but the Opposition did what lay in their power to smother it with amendments with the object of enlarging its scope and changing its details. In Committee an unsuccessful effort was made to abolish contracting out, to include all workmen with the scheme, and, failing that, agricultural labourers and sailors; also to extend the Bill to workshops without machinery. In the course of the discussions various amendments on matters of detail were accepted by the Government, chiefly at the instance of employers on the Unionist side of the House. The Bill also met with criticism and opposition in the Lords and various amendments were introduced. The main principles of the measure, however, were retained intact, and it received the Royal Assent in August.

In the previous Session liberal provision had been made for strengthening the navy. It was now the turn of the army. When the Government entered office the War Office was reorganised in consequence of the resignation of the Duke of Cambridge. The reorganisation was on the lines recommended by the Hartington Commission. The Commander-in-Chief (Lord Wolseley) and the

heads of the four military departments (Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Inspector-General of Fortifications, and Inspector-General of Artillery) were constituted a Military Board. To this was added a War Office Consultative Council consisting of these five officers, the Secretary for War, the Financial Secretary and such other officers whose advice might be thought desirable on special occasions. All responsibility was, however, centered in the Secretary for War, who was to be called to account in Parliament. The arrangement was censured on both sides of the House, alike by military and non-military members, chiefly because responsibility was split up among the military heads of the War Office departments and the Commander-in-Chief had no decisive authority over the army as a whole. The Government, however, were proof against criticism, maintaining their proposals, apparently on the ground that a Commander-in-Chief who had to work otherwise than through a Military Board and a Consultative Council, of which it would form a part, would be too strong for the Secretary of State. Orders in Council were therefore issued carrying the changes into effect.

The legislation that followed in the Session of 1897 consisted of the Military Works Act and the Military Manœuvres Act. The first provided for the expenditure of nearly five and a half millions on defensive works at military bases and military ports at home and abroad, and at the mercantile harbours of the Clyde, Belfast and Bristol Channel. It provided for the fortification of the harbours of Berehaven, Lough Swilly, Falmouth and Scilly. The Bill also comprised a scheme of barrack construction, the expenditure of £500,000 in rifle ranges, and over a million and a quarter for the acquisition of about sixty square miles of land on Salisbury Plain for manœuvres. By the Military Manœuvres Act power was taken to make orders upon localities in which military manœuvres were to be held. In the army estimates provision was made for the increase of the army by the addition of a battery of field artillery, eleven companies of garrison artillery, two battalions of foot guards, an additional battalion of Cameron Highlanders, of the West India Regiment and the Malta Militia—or the addition of 7,385 men of all ranks and 456 horses. But it was proposed to enlist only 2,000 men during the year 1897-98. The total estimates were £18,140,500—a net increase of £98,400. The navy estimates were practically the same as in the previous

year—£21,838,000 against £21,823,000. The Budget showed a realised surplus of £2,473,000, the Exchequer receipts having been £103,950,000 and disbursements £101,477,000. The prosperity of the country had increased and the revenue had never been so large. The surplus was devoted to the purposes of the Military Works Bill instead of the liquidation of debt. The Budget estimate for 1897-98 showed a revenue of £103,360,000 and expenditure of £101,791,000 (including £716,000 under the Voluntary and Necessitous Board Schools Acts). This gave an expected surplus of £1,066,000.

Again there was no remission of taxation; but the necessity of the increases to the army—trifling though they were and utterly inadequate, as the events of 1900 were to show, even to the minor crisis—was so generally recognised that there was little discussion on the Finance Bill. The remaining work of the Session, apart from discussion on the shifting phases of foreign affairs, and Bills which were not proceeded with, admits of brevity of statement. The principal measures of social interest were an Act for the better protection of infants in the charge of persons who received them for hire; a Foreign Prison-made Goods Act prohibiting the importation of such goods unless they are of a kind not manufactured in the United Kingdom; a Land Transfer Act vesting realty as well as personalty in an executor or administrator instead of the devisee or heir-at-law; a Metropolis Water Act empowering the Railway Commission to hear complaints by consumers through the local authorities; an Act giving to necessitous Board Schools in Scotland the assistance given to English Board Schools by the English Act; and an Act giving verminous persons facilities for cleansing themselves and their clothing at the public expense. The list is not exhaustive, leaving out of account several minor but useful measures, as well as those upon which time was fruitlessly spent. On the whole the Session was more productive than its predecessor and represented a marked advance upon the redemption of election pledges. The year was that of Her Majesty's Diamond Jubilee and both Houses took fitting notice of the event by Addresses to the Throne congratulating Her Majesty on the event and assuring her that each House profoundly shared the great joy with which her people celebrated the longest, the most prosperous and the most illustrious reign in their history.

Political parties in the House of Commons underwent no marked change. The Irish groups were still at enmity with each other and powerless to influence the course of legislation. The Liberals, though capably led in the House of Commons by Sir William Harcourt, made no recovery from the disaster of 1895. They had lost the services of Lord Rosebery, who in the previous October had found himself so completely out of sympathy with his friends on the Armenian question that he notified the Liberal Whip that the leadership of the party was vacant, and that he had resumed liberty of action. In a speech a few days later he used his newly gained freedom by vigorous support of Lord Salisbury's policy on the Eastern question and condemnation of those Liberals who were clamouring for the isolated intervention of Great Britain in Turkish affairs, whether or not it resulted in a European war. This work is, however, concerned only incidentally with the fortunes of the Opposition. It is sufficient to indicate the causes that prevented the Liberals from exercising any important influence upon the legislative work of the Government. Alike in Parliament and in the country they declined rather than advanced in authority as Session succeeded Session.

During 1898 foreign affairs absorbed the attention of the public and constituted the staple of interest in the Parliamentary proceedings. There was, however, a substantial legislative output. Local Government for Ireland, Army Reform, amendments on Legal Procedure, Church Patronage, the creation of Municipalities for London, Amendment of the Vaccination Law—these were the chief subjects mentioned in Her Majesty's Speech. The Irish Local Government Bill took the principal place. This measure extended to Ireland the system of Local Government—with such modifications as were demanded by the special requirements of the country—granted to England and Scotland during the second Salisbury Administration. It set up County Councils, Urban District Councils, Rural District Councils and Boards of Guardians, each body elected by ballot triennially. To the County Councils were given the fiscal and administrative duties of the Grand Juries, and the District Authorities displaced the Baronial bodies. Financially, the principle of the Agricultural Rating Act was applied to Ireland, which would obtain £730,000 a year from the Imperial Exchequer, the occupier being relieved from payment of half the county cess and the owner from half the poor rate; and,

besides this, the proceeds of the local license duties, about £200,000 a year, were to be given to Ireland with an additional grant of £79,000 from the Imperial Exchequer, which thus gave the local authorities an excess of £35,000 over the liabilities cast upon them.

The Bill was very complicated, but it gave Ireland so liberal a measure of Local Government that it was received with marked favour in all quarters of the House, the Irish Members taking exception to it on points of detail alone, merely safeguarding their acceptance of it by declaring that it could be no substitute for Home Rule. The only quarter from which opposition came was from the north of Ireland, and this was chiefly on the ground that the new bodies would fill all the official posts with Roman Catholics to the displacement of Protestant holders. Mr. Morley, while not prepared to resist the measure, criticised it because, in his view, it would weaken the central executive. He believed that it would lead by a circuitous route to a wider extension of self-governing powers such as the "inextinguishable national sentiment" of Ireland demanded. Mr. Gerald Balfour declared that the Bill had not been brought forward to satisfy the Irish demand for Home Rule, but merely because it was administratively desirable; and he made a significant appeal to the landlord and higher classes in Ireland to take their due share in the new system of local management. The debates on the Bill were unimportant, except as showing that the alliance between the Nationalists and the Liberals no longer had reality and as revealing a disposition on the part of the landlord and loyalist element in Ireland to sulk. Pointed expression was given to this inclination in the Lords, Lord Londonderry leading the malcontents; but the amendments carried were of a trivial character, and at no stage did the Bill meet with serious difficulty. It came into operation in January, 1899, and the smoothness with which it has worked is indisputable evidence of the skill with which it was framed. Even the acerbity with which Lord Londonderry regarded the Bill became so far modified that it was possible to prevail upon him to accept the Postmaster-Generalship in the Spring of 1900, when the Duke of Norfolk, from chivalrous ideas of duty to the country, resigned that office, and took his place as an officer of the yeomanry at the seat of war in South Africa.

Acts of secondary importance were the Benefices Act, the

Vagrancy Act, the Vaccination Act, the Criminal Evidence Act, and the London University Act. The first named regulates the rights of a transfer of patronage, compelling the transfer of the whole interests of the transferor and requiring registration. It forbids the sale of any right of patronage by public auction, save in the case of an advowson to be sold in conjunction with any manor or estate of not less than 100 acres, and makes invalid any agreement for the exercise of a right of patronage in favour of any particular person, or for any payment in connection with the transfer or exercise of such patronage. It enlarges the powers of the Bishops in refusing to institute or admit a presentee to a benefice on the ground of personal or moral unfitness, or other disqualification, such refusal to be subject to appeal, and it makes a change in the constitution of the Commission under the Pluralities Act, the Bishop being empowered, on the finding of a Commission, to appoint a curate or curates against the will of the incumbent where negligence is proved. In the debates on this measure protest was made by a private member—Mr. H. S. Foster—on the ground that it confiscated private rights without compensation; and the opportunity was taken to discuss questions of clerical conduct, Mr. Samuel Smith moving an amendment directing attention to “the prevalence of Roman Catholic practices in the Church; and Sir William Harcourt declaring that there was a conspiracy in the Church to overthrow the principles of the Reformation, and that there were hundreds of the ordained clergy deliberately endeavouring to break down the law. These men he described as living examples of dishonour and falsehood, who demoralised those among whom they dwelt, and whose existence was in itself a living lie. Mr. Balfour, in reply, took the line that the clergy thus characterised were but a very small proportion of the whole. These ideas found expression also in the House of Lords, and the general effect of the discussion was to warn those clergy who indulged in illegal ritual that persistence in that course would, in the long run, bring them into conflict with the power of Parliament.

The Vaccination Act excited much discussion and some contemptuous opposition from supporters of the Government. The principal point in this measure was that no parent or other person shall be liable to any penalty if, within four months of the birth of a child, he satisfies two justices or a magistrate that he conscientiously believes that vaccination would be prejudicial to the

health of the child and obtains a certificate that he entertains such a belief. The stringency of the law was in other respects relaxed. Vaccination, in fact, ceased to be compulsory on the ignorant and fanatical. The law has not, however, been attended with the mischievous results predicted by those who contested its passage through Parliament. The conscientious objector became an object of ridicule and contempt throughout the country and the statistics of vaccination have since shown an improvement rather than a decline.

The Criminal Evidence Act marked the successful close of a prolonged agitation in favour of accused persons being allowed to give evidence. It provides, subject to certain reservations, that every person charged with an offence, and the wife or husband of a person so charged, shall be a witness, but not a compellable witness, on his or her own behalf. So important a change in the law naturally met with considerable opposition, legal opinion being somewhat sharply divided; but, so far, experience has shown the advantage of the reform, not only as reducing the risk of miscarriages of justice but also as lessening the chances of a guilty person evading conviction. The Vagrancy Act was a highly useful and much needed measure for the suppression of a dangerous section of the criminal classes. It enacts that every male person who knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution or in any public place persistently solicits or importunes for immoral purposes shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond and be punishable accordingly. It empowers the police, under a magistrate's warrant, to enter and search any house inhabited by a male person living wholly or in part on the immoral earnings of a woman living in that house, and enacts that where a male person is proved to live with or be habitually in the company of a prostitute, and has no visible means of subsistence, he shall be deemed to be living on the earnings of prostitution. The law has been in vigorous operation since October, 1898. It has enabled many women to escape from men who lived on their earnings and has lodged in gaol again many known criminals whom the police might not otherwise have been able to bring to book. In this connection mention may appropriately be made of the Prisons Act—a measure permitting of greater discrimination between prisoners, relaxing in certain cases the rigour of prison life, and allowing for the freer operation of humanising influences in convict establishments.

Another example of useful social legislation is furnished by the Inebriates Act, though it is as yet only in very partial operation because of the insufficiency of accommodation for persons affected by its provisions. This Act declares that where a person is convicted and the Court is satisfied that the offence was committed under the influence of drink and the offender admits that he or she is an habitual drunkard, or is found by a jury to be such, he or she may, in addition to or in substitution of the punishment for the offence, be sentenced to be detained for not more than three years in a State inebriate reformatory or in a certified reformatory. And it provides that any person guilty of certain specified offences such as drunkenness on a highway, when in charge of a horse or vehicle, and so forth, or having within twelve months of a previous conviction been four times convicted of one or other of these offences, or being an habitual drunkard, shall be liable on conviction or an indictment, or on a summary conviction, if he or she elects to be dealt with summarily, to be detained for a term not exceeding three years in a State or certified inebriate reformatory.

The University of London Act marked the close of a long controversy. It made provision for the reconstitution of the University of London as a teaching as well as an examining body, and created a commission for that purpose. Among the principal points of general public interest is the enactment that there is to be no adoption or imposition of a religious test and no disability is to attach on the ground of sex. In conformity with the Act the Commission—originally composed of Lord Davey, the Bishop of London, Sir William Roberts, Sir Owen Roberts, Professor Jebb, Sir Michael Foster, and Mr. E. H. Busk—have since drawn up the statutes of the reconstituted University and, these having received the approval of Her Majesty in Council, the new organisation will shortly be at work.

The chief feature of the Budget of the year was the reduction of the duty on unmanufactured tobacco by sixpence per pound, and minor abatements on the income-tax on incomes above £400. The estimated revenue for 1897-98 was £103,044,000, the expenditure £102,541,000, leaving an estimated surplus of £503,000. But the actual Exchequer receipts amounted to £106,614,000 and disbursements £102,936,000, leaving an actual surplus of £3,678,000—of which over two and a half millions had been set aside as a fund for public buildings in London, leaving £1,128,000 to play with.

The Session of 1899 was more productive than its predecessor : and it was of historic interest because it was supplemented by a short Session in the autumn in order that funds might be provided for the prosecution of the war in South Africa. The principal Acts of the year were the Board of Education Act, the London Government Act, and the Agricultural and Technical Instruction (Ireland) Act. By the first the Government introduced sweeping reforms into the system of elementary education. The Act created a Board of Education for England and Wales, consisting of the President and the Lord President of the Council, Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer—the office of Vice-President to be abolished on the next vacancy. This Board, which commenced its duties on April 1st, 1900, takes over the entire work of the Education Department, including the Science and Art Department; and to it, by Order in Council, may be transferred the educational powers exercised by the Charity Commissioners and Board of Agriculture. It provided for the establishment of a Consultative Committee, which, with the approval of the Board, was to frame regulations for a register of teachers, and advise the Board on other matters. Power was given to the Board to inspect schools supplying secondary education in England, such duties being exercised in Wales by the Central Welsh Board for Intermediate Education. The salary of the President was fixed at £2,000. A new central authority was thus created and vested with complete authority over primary, secondary and technical education and it remained only to create local authorities to make provision for, or manage any existing provision for, secondary education. The code produced by the new Board in 1900 excited some criticism but met with the approval of education experts generally.

The London Government Act, which comes into operation on November 1st, 1900, abolished the vestries and district boards and created in their place Metropolitan Borough Councils. It left the historic system of the City of London untouched. The areas of the forty-two vestries and district boards were resolved into sixteen new areas, each to have a Council with practically the same powers as those of a Provincial Municipal Council and organised on the same lines, with Mayor, Aldermen and Councillors. Each Council is distinct from the other and has no representative link with the County Council. Provision was made

for the transfer by agreement, subject to the sanction of the Local Government Board, of such powers exercised by the County Council as can be discharged by a Borough Council. The Act thus split London into sixteen local entities. It was vigorously opposed by Radical members specially interested in London questions, on the ground that its object and effect were to diminish the authority and powers of the County Council; but this opposition was in the long run ineffective. Considerable discussion took place also on the question whether women should be eligible to serve on the Council. It was the original intention of the Government that women should be eligible as Councillors only, but when the Bill left the House it contained a provision which made them eligible for the post of Aldermen as well. The House of Lords, however, on the motion of Lord Dunraven, struck this out and substituted words declaring that no woman shall be eligible for the office of Mayor, Alderman and Councillor. Members of the Government in the Upper House were divided in opinion, Lord Salisbury arguing that the decision of the House of Commons should stand and the Duke of Devonshire and the Lord Chancellor taking the contrary view. On the Bill being returned to the House Mr. Balfour made an appeal against entering into conflict with the Lords on the question, and, after some grumbles, the Lords' amendment was accepted. The new Councils therefore consist of men only.

The Agricultural and Technical Instruction (Ireland) Act was, in a certain sense, an expression of the Balfourian policy of killing Home Rule by kindness, though the view of it put forward by the Irish Members was that, if it advanced the prosperity of the country and the education of the people, the demand for Home Rule would be strengthened because of the increase of prosperity and intelligence. The Act created a new Department of Agriculture, Industries, and Technical Instruction in Ireland, the Chief Secretary to be President, with a Vice-President appointed by and removable at the pleasure of the Government. This Vice-President may sit in Ireland and is to be *ex officio* a member of the Congested Districts Board. The Act transfers to the Department various powers relating to agriculture, fisheries and education under special Acts, and gives the Lord Lieutenant the right, with the consent of the Treasury, to transfer to the Department from time to time administrative duties discharged by other

Government Departments. The salary of the Vice-President is to be £1,200 a year, with a house allowance of £150, and the Department is to establish in each county an Advisory Council of Agriculture, an Agricultural Board and a Technical Instruction Board. For these purposes the Department has at its disposal the yearly sum of £78,000 paid to the Commissioners of National Education out of the Local Taxation (Ireland) account, and various other funds, bringing the total income to about £160,000 a year. The object with which this Act was passed was to create a body which could further the growing prosperity of Ireland by assisting the development of its resources, and equipping the people to make a more effective use of their opportunities. Mr. Horace Plunkett, who had done valuable work for Ireland by founding the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society and enlisting the co-operation of men of all political parties in Ireland in the task of improving the economic condition of the country, was made Vice-President of the new Department. Under his skilful and sympathetic direction, good results are reasonably to be expected and are, indeed, already apparent. The Act is, in fact, an outcome of the movement associated with Mr. Plunkett's name, and can justly be regarded as not the least indication of the eagerness of the Government to do everything that legislation can do to ameliorate the comparative poverty of Ireland—a poverty to which, in a very marked degree, the political disaffection of the past is to be attributed.

The Elementary Education (School Attendance) Act Amendment Act was a measure of much social interest which owes its place in the Statute Book to the efforts of a private member, Mr. Robson. It substitutes the age of twelve for eleven in the original Act, thus declaring that the earliest age at which a child can be permitted to leave school shall be twelve instead of eleven years on and after January 1st, 1900. But it is provided that this is not to apply to children wholly or partially exempt under bye-laws then in force. A further proviso empowers the local educational authority to fix thirteen years as the minimum age for exemption in the case of children to be employed in agriculture; but, in order not to deprive farmers of child labour in times of pressure—such labour being in effect education in what in many cases would be the employment of life—children who have passed the age of eleven and the standard

for partial exemption, are not to be required to attend school more than 250 times in any year. By this Act England redeemed her pledge at the Labour Conference called at Berlin by the German Emperor several years previously, and carried into effect a badly needed reform that had been insistently demanded by Sir John Gorst, the Vice-President of the Council, whose caustic comments on the neglect to observe the undertaking, and upon the obstructive attitude of many landowners and farmers to village education generally, had earned him a certain unpopularity among those classes.

Other measures that may be noticed are the Colonial Loans Act, which allocates money for the financing of railways and other public works, and in aid of revenue, in various minor colonies. Details need not be given beyond those mentioned in the section of this work in which the affairs of some of the Colonies are reviewed. The Act gives practical expression to Mr. Chamberlain's opinions on the need and desirability of developing the neglected estates of Empire by pledging the Imperial credit on their behalf. Other Acts of some interest were the Metropolis Water Act which enables and requires the various metropolitan water companies to supply each other with water in times of emergency; the Royal Niger Company's Act, buying out the Niger Company as an administrative concern; the Telegraphs Act, providing a grant of £2,000,000 for the improvement of the telephone service by setting up Post Office competitive services, thus breaking into the monopoly unsuccessfully claimed by the National Telephone Company; and the Small Dwellings Acquisition Act. This measure, which was an attempt to redeem electioneering pledges to the effect that the State should assist the industrial classes to become the owners of their dwellings, empowers the local authorities to advance money to a resident in any house within the local area for purpose of purchasing the property. The advance is not to exceed four-fifths of the market value, nor is the value of the house to exceed £400. The provisions of the measure, which applies to England, Scotland and Ireland only, are of necessity elaborate. Its benefits are naturally restricted to a limited class—to those in permanent employment whose life is likely to be spent in a limited area. To the large class of migratory labour, whose great asset is mobility, the Act can be of no service except so far as it may attract individuals to settle in

one spot and more or less mortgage their future to the opportunities of employment therein.

The Budget statement again showed an expanding revenue. The total revenue was £117,857,000, of which £9,521,000 went to the Local Taxation accounts; the Exchequer receiving £108,336,000. The net expenditure was £108,150,000, showing a realisable surplus of £186,000, which was disposed of by a Local Taxation grant for Scotland, and a grant in aid of the West Indies. The total estimated revenue for 1899-1900 was £111,157,000 and the total estimated expenditure £110,927,000—a balance of £230,000 for contingencies. Commenting upon the rate of increase in expenditure—mainly due to increased armaments—the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that Parliament and the country must make up their minds not only to large increases in existing taxation but to the discovery of new and more productive sources of revenue. Special point was given to that warning by the necessity of calling Parliament together in the autumn on the outbreak of war in South Africa. Supplementary army estimates were then presented amounting to £10,000,000, for additional expenditure in consequence of the war. Bills were passed appropriating this amount from the Consolidated Fund and empowering the raising of any sums not exceeding £8,000,000 by Treasury Bills. Sir Michael Hicks Beach explained that with this ten millions the total estimated expenditure of the year 1899-1900 would be £121,205,000, but that the estimated revenue had in the first six months so far exceeded his expectations that he reckoned on a surplus of three millions for the whole year, which surplus would be applied to the purposes of the South African expenditure. As eight millions would be raised by Treasury Bills he would have a margin of a million, which he did not think, however, he should need—a remark which throws a flood of light upon the conception the Cabinet had of the nature of the task before them in the South. That question, however, is handled in another section of this book.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SESSION OF 1900.

Commonwealth of Australia—Royal Proclamation—The Duke and Duchess of York to Inaugurate the Commonwealth—The Draft Bill in Parliament—The Appeal Clause—The Australian Delegates—Mr. Chamberlain's Speech—The Companies' Acts—A Blow at Fraudulent Promotions—The Money-Lenders' Bill—Housing Legislation, Amendment Act—Agricultural Holdings Act—Workmen's Compensation Act—Minor Acts—The Budget Statement—The Cost of the War—Increase in the Income Tax—Dissolution of Parliament—The Queen's Proclamation.

THE Session of 1900 will be memorable for the passing of the Bill constituting the Commonwealth of Australia. That is the principal legislative performance of the year. It is the work of the people of Australia rather than of the Imperial Parliament, which, indeed, did nothing to it beyond amend a clause relating to appeals to the Queen in Privy Council. The Act provides for the declaration of the Commonwealth by Proclamation, which was issued from Balmoral by the Queen on September 17th, an announcement being at the same time made—to the intense gratification of Australasia and the Empire—that, if no untoward event occurred, the Duke of York, accompanied by his consort, would visit Australia to inaugurate the Commonwealth. A Governor-General is to be appointed by the Queen, and is to have a salary of £10,000 a year. A Federal Executive Council is to be chosen by him from the States originally forming the union. Provision is made for the accession of colonies not now joining. The Governor-General is to summon the Federal Parliament within six months of the date of the establishment of the Commonwealth, and there must be a session each year. The Parliament is to consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives—the Senators elected for six years, half of them retiring in rotation every three years. There are to be six Senators for each State. The Representatives are to be elected on a population basis, no State to have less than five; and the House is to be twice as numerous—as far as is practicable—as the Senate. The members are to be paid at the rate of £400 a year. The House is to continue for three years,

but to be subject to dissolution. Federal Ministers must be members either of the House or the Senate. Money bills must originate in the House. The Senate may suggest amendments; but the power of the purse rests with the House. In other matters the powers of the two Houses are much the same. Should the Senate refuse assent to a Bill twice proposed by the House, both Houses are dissolved; if thereafter the Senate again withholds assent there is to be a joint meeting of the two Houses, and an absolute majority determines the issue. The Bill defines the powers committed to the Federal Parliament. What is not defined is therefore a matter of internal State Government. Among these definitions are provisions for absolute free trade within the Commonwealth limits; common postal, telegraphic and telephonic service; control of naval and military forces; uniform law on specified subjects. A uniform federal tariff is to be imposed within two years, and for at least ten years after three-quarters of the net Customs and Excise revenue must be returned to the States. The seat of Government is to be ten square miles within the Colony of New South Wales, not less than 100 miles distant from Sydney; but, temporarily, the Federal Parliament is to sit at Melbourne. As to the Judicature, there is to be a High Court of Justice, which is to determine appeals from the High Courts of the States and interpret the Constitution.

In the draft Bill as approved by the referendum in Australia and urged upon Parliament by the delegates sent to this country—Mr. C. C. Kingston, Mr. E. Barton, Mr. A. Deakin, Mr. S. A. Parker, Sir P. Fysh and Mr. J. R. Dickson—a clause appeared doing away with the right of appeal to the Queen in Council “in any matter involving the interpretation of this constitution, or of the constitution of a State unless the public interests of some part of Her Majesty’s Dominions, other than the Commonwealth or a State are involved,” and empowering the Federal Parliament to make laws limiting the matters in which leave to appeal may be asked. Such a restriction was held—alike in England and among Constitutionalists in Australia—to impair the functions of the Privy Council as a connecting link between the Judicature of the Colonies and the Mother Country and as a means for securing uniformity of law throughout the Empire. Discussion on the Bill, both in Parliament and outside, was limited to this issue. The delegates fought stoutly for the retention of the clause as it stood in

the Bill but eventually they were won over by Mr. Chamberlain to the acceptance of a compromise, and a new clause was inserted which provided that no appeal should be permitted to the Queen in Council from a decision of the High Court of the Commonwealth upon any question as to the limits *inter se* of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of any State, or as to the limits *inter se* of the constitutional powers of any two States, unless the High Court should certify that the question was one which ought to be determined by the Privy Council. With this amendment the Bill passed through its stages and the machinery was created by which Australia—in Mr. Chamberlain's language,—will no longer be a congeries of separate States but an indissoluble Commonwealth united for many of the most important functions of Government. How far this confederation may prepare the way for that Federation of the Empire, when British South Africa shall be welded into a constitutional whole, remains to be seen; but that a great advance towards Imperial unity in form as well as in spirit has been made, is recognised by all parties at home and in the Colonies. For this result the gratitude of the Empire is due to those Australian statesmen who for many years advocated the policy of a federated Australia and succeeded at last in producing a plan as acceptable to the Parent State as to the people of those great Colonies.

Another important measure amended the Companies' Acts in a variety of ways. It dealt principally with the position of directors who acted without qualification or took gifts of paid-up shares, and provided against bogus or fictitious subscriptions. Under this Act no Company can be formed unless the minimum subscription on which the directors are prepared to go to allotment is stated on the prospectus; and the prospectus must contain statements of the amounts paid to parties concerned in the promotion. The Bill underwent considerable discussion in Committee and its general effect is further to curtail the opportunities of persons who have used the Limited Liability Acts as a cloak for defrauding the public. An Act was also passed empowering the Courts to review the transactions of professional moneylenders—transactions which had been abundantly proved in Select Committee to be in some cases fraudulent and in many extortionate and oppressive. A more important but still far from

ambitious attempt at social legislation was an Amending Act to the legislation on the houses of the working classes. The object of the new measure is to confer upon local authorities the power to establish or acquire lodging-houses outside their boundaries and to simplify the procedure for carrying out the principal Act in rural districts. The measure was objected to because of the narrowness of its scope and particularly because it did not amend the law relating to the assessment of compensation for slum property and give specific power to compel railway companies to provide adequate means of travel; but it was made clear that the Government were not prepared to enlarge the Bill and the House and the country had to accept it as a full discharge of one of the leading pledges upon which the General Election of '95 was won.

Agricultural interests in England were served by an Act amending the law relating to agricultural holdings by providing for compensation for disturbance; and in Ireland by an Act amending the law relating to tithe rent-charge. Further progress was also made in the redemption of the election pledges of many Members by the passing of an Act extending the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 to agricultural labourers. Acts were also passed enabling volunteers to become liable for service in any part of the world, for facilitating intermediate education in Ireland, and for a variety of minor purposes which it is needless to particularise. Altogether the Session bore out the passage in the Queen's Speech which said that the time was not propitious for any domestic reforms which involved a large expenditure—or, it might have been added, any severe tax upon the mental energies of Parliament. These were, as had been the case in the four previous Sessions, concentrated upon Foreign and Colonial affairs—affairs in South Africa and China naturally exciting more interest than the details of domestic legislation, which were neglected by the House at large and ignored except by those sections of the public directly affected by this or that legislative project. Intense interest was, however, shown in the financial aspect of the work of the Session. The Budget statement for the year appears in the Appendices and only a few details need here be given from the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The estimates provided for the expenditure of £38,000,000 for the war in South Africa. The Chancellor's estimate of the Exchequer revenue of

the year was £116,040,000 and expenditure £110,927,000. But for the war the surplus would have been $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions. Against this had to be set the supplementary army estimates of £23,000,000 and interest on the Treasury Bills of the previous autumn. The total expenditure was thus raised to £133,810,000, showing a deficit of £17,770,000, of which £8,000,000 had been temporarily provided by the Treasury Bills. As for 1900-91 the total estimated expenditure was £154,082,000—an increase of £43,155,000. Taking into account the uncertain duration of the war he thought a provision of £60,000,000 ought to be made for special needs. A large part of the war fund he proposed to obtain by a special loan; but the Government also intended to ask the taxpayers to make an immediate sacrifice. Income tax would be increased by 4d. in the £; an additional shilling per barrel would be imposed on beer, 6d. per gallon on spirits, 4d. per lb. on foreign cigars and 2d. per lb. on tea. By a suspension of the sinking fund expenditure would be reduced by £4,640,000. The estimated deficiency for 1899-1900 was £17,770,000; that for 1900-1901 £20,225,000. With £50,000 it was desirable to find for contingencies the total would be £43,000,000. Of this sum £30,000,000 would be raised by the issue of stock or bonds, £8,000,000 by the renewal of the Treasury Bills and £5,000,000 reserved for a further issue of these Bills. No provision would be made for paying off the loan until it was seen what the total liabilities would be on account of the war and how much could afterwards be made good by the Transvaal. When the Bill for the loan of £30,000,000 came on Sir Michael Hicks Beach said it would be right for the Transvaal to provide for the loan, especially as the value of South African mining shares would ultimately be greatly enhanced; the Transvaal, indeed, was the first source from which ultimately to obtain the money; but there were other sources—which he did not indicate—if that should fail.

To deal with the legislative—and oratorical—work of Parliament, with any approach to the thoroughness which the author hopes will be found in the other sections of this work, would not have been possible in a volume of reasonable compass. The main features of each of the seven Sessions have alone been touched upon. The Parliament—which was the fourteenth of Her Majesty Queen Victoria—was dissolved by the following Proclamation, in the *London Gazette*, which appropriately closes the present chapter:—

By the Queen.—A Proclamation, for Dissolving the present Parliament and declaring the calling of another.

Victoria, R.—Whereas we thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to dissolve, as from Tuesday, the twenty-fifth day of September instant, this present Parliament which stands prorogued to Saturday, the twenty-seventh day of October next: We do, for that end, publish this our Royal Proclamation, and do hereby dissolve the said Parliament accordingly; and the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, and the Commissioners for shires and burghs, of the House of Commons, are discharged from their meeting and attendance on the said Saturday, the twenty-seventh day of October next: And we, being desirous and resolved, as soon as may be, to meet our people, and to have their advice in Parliament, do hereby make known to all our loving subjects our Royal will and pleasure to call a new Parliament: And do hereby further declare, that, with the advice of our Privy Council, we have given order that our Chancellor of that part of our United Kingdom called Great Britain and our Chancellor of Ireland do respectively, upon notice thereof, on the said Tuesday, the twenty-fifth day of September instant, issue out Writs, in due form and according to law, for calling a new Parliament. And we do hereby also, by this our Royal Proclamation under our Great Seal of our United Kingdom, require Writs to be issued accordingly by our said Chancellors respectively, for causing the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons who are to serve in the said Parliament to be duly returned to, and give their attendance in, our said Parliament on the first day of November next, which Writs are to be returnable in due course of law.

Given at our Court at Balmoral, this seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred, and in the sixty-fourth year of our reign.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

AN attempt having been made in the sections of this book to give a narrative of the principal subjects which have engaged the attention of the Empire since the summer of 1895, there now remains the task of drawing up a general statement of results and conclusions. The number, importance and variety of the foreign and Colonial questions dealt with by the Third Salisbury Administration will have impressed the most casual student of affairs. The political history of the century furnishes no parallel, either in quantity or in character, to the work that has been crowded into the past five years.

China claims first attention because of the present urgency of the new questions that have arisen in that region, and the important bearing a settlement will have upon the commercial prosperity of our Empire. Have the Government done well or ill in the Far East since 1895? Notwithstanding the unfortunate events of the summer of the present year the answer is that, on the whole, they have done as well as circumstances permitted. If it be assumed that it would not have been good policy for Great Britain to prevent by force of arms the acquisition of Chinese territory,—first by Germany and then by Russia,—the conclusion follows that the policy of adaptation to new and changing conditions was the only one to be pursued. It is useless to discuss the might have beens of history. Germany might possibly have consented to forego territorial compensation for the murder of her missionary in Shantung had she been told that, by the seizure of Kiao Chau Bay, she would incur the hostility of England. Russia might possibly have abandoned her designs upon Port Arthur and the Liao Tung Peninsula, had she been informed that the filching of Chinese territory would be followed by a declaration of war. On the other hand it is more than likely that one or both of these Powers would have disregarded our warnings and waged war with us without any misgiving. Lord Salisbury came to the momentous decision not to

press his objections to the spoliation of China in such a way as to lead to war between us and the despoilers. He refused to fight the battle of China against those who took advantage of her inability to withstand their threats. If it be admitted that the Russian diplomacy on the subject of Port Arthur and an ice-free outlet for the Siberian Railway was not mere bluff, Lord Salisbury had to choose between two courses: one would have brought England into collision with Russia and France—and possibly Germany—and the other, very possibly, into collision with China, for her resentment was to be expected not only against the Powers who despoiled her but also against all Europeans. Either course would have led to unknown eventualities; but, of the two, the avoidance of war with a European Power or Powers about China was the more advantageous to England, whatever the consequences of European aggression towards China might prove to be—whether it brought about the collapse and partition of that Empire or met with a tame acquiescence.

The decision not to make war in the interests of the integrity of China having been taken, Lord Salisbury's task resolved itself into one of upholding British rights under the Treaty of Tientsin against China herself and against any Power which, either by itself or through China, sought to curtail or nullify them. This obligation the Administration discharged with almost complete success up to the time of the Boxer outbreak. Lord Salisbury showed that, though he was not prepared to wage war to prevent Kiao Chau Bay and the Liao Tung peninsula passing to Russia, he was quite willing to fight for the principle of the "open door" and equality of commercial opportunity, against Russia or any other Power. And the "open door" has been kept open as between the Powers. Talienwan and Kiao Chau are free ports in the sense that there is no differential treatment of British vessels, subjects and goods. After much diplomatic warfare Lord Salisbury won that battle. Nominally, at least, Russia and Germany are with him in agreement on the principle. They have no designs upon British Treaty rights; and the United States is heartily with him. Its attitude is not merely negative. It has obtained from all the Powers interested in China formal pledges—of somewhat uncertain value—that the principle shall be respected. If those pledges are at any time repudiated the United States is, apparently, prepared to fight on England's side to secure their

observance. The chief result of Lord Salisbury's policy is, therefore, that the principle of the inviolability of the Treaty of Tientsin is recognised throughout Europe, and that no European Power dare go back upon it except at the risk of an Anglo-Saxon combination or alliance which, so far as can be seen, would not hesitate to enforce a continuance of that recognition.

Other results to be noted are that the strategic advantage Russia has obtained in North China by the extortion of Port Arthur from the Emperor is partially counterbalanced by British possession of Wei-hai-wei; that Russia has formally recognised the Yangtze Basin as, in a special sense, a British sphere of interest; that territory has been obtained by which Hong Kong can be made proof against attack on the land side; that great progress—on paper—has been made in opening out the interior of China to western commerce, and that many potentially valuable concessions have been obtained for British railway, mining and other enterprises.

At the moment the work of the Administration in China seems to have been undone. The Treaty of Tientsin has been flagrantly violated by China. An international army is in occupation of Peking, and is to remain there or within striking distance until punishment is awarded to the guilty and a suitable Chinese Government can be set up in place of that which co-operated with the anti-foreign movement of the Boxers. Whether the Powers will succeed in reconstructing the native Government of the Empire, or whether present events are the beginning of a process of partition such as Central Africa has undergone during this generation, it is impossible to say; but it can at least be foretold with some certainty that civilisation will never confess itself beaten by the problems presented by Chinese barbarism, and that, sooner or later, wider political and commercial privileges will be won there by Western nations because of the attempt to expel the foreigner. But the future rests with the next Administration, which will not, it is to be hoped, hesitate to uphold British interests in the Far East by force of arms either against China or any Power whatsoever which may seek to do them injury.

The annexation of the Boer Republics represents an important territorial addition to the Empire and will alone give the Third Salisbury Administration a prominent place in English history. That the criminal conspiracy which resulted in the Raid made war

with the Transvaal inevitable is one of the many conclusions to be drawn from a study of the negotiations with Mr. Kruger. Our relations with the Boers have been mismanaged from the first; and mismanagement has characterised the doings of the Salisbury Government in this connection from the moment Mr. Chamberlain allowed himself to be duped into giving the Raid conspirators an easy "jumping-off place" for the invasion of the Transvaal. The negotiations on behalf of the Uitlanders do not furnish a conspicuously good example of diplomacy, though it would be unjust to say they were mismanaged on our side so badly as they were on the side of Mr. Kruger; and, for several months, the war itself was sadly mismanaged, partly because of the incompetence of the Government and their military advisers to judge what a war with the Republics would be like and what steps it was necessary to take, and partly because of the incompetence of generals in the field. If Lord Roberts be excepted the war has at least shown the country that few of the men who had reached high command in the army are possessed of military genius. But the end in view has been attained. The Republics are annexed; Mr. Kruger is a fugitive and organised resistance on any appreciable scale has ceased. But to achieve that result the military resources of the country have been subjected to enormous strain and the Empire exposed to the perils of foreign attack—attack which in the darkest hours of the war would gladly have been made from the Continent had not the peoples been held back by their Governments. Having regard to our military failures during the early stages of the war, and that the public opinion of Europe, if not also of the United States, was against us on its moral aspects it is, indeed, a matter for congratulation that there has been no foreign intervention in South Africa. No finer tribute to Lord Salisbury's authority in Europe and greatness in diplomacy can be paid than to point to this fact of non-intervention.

Further results in the field of Foreign Policy are the settlement of the Guiana-Venezuela boundary at the instance of the United States; the exaction from Turkey of autonomy for Crete; the reconquest of the Soudan; the delimitation of the French and English spheres in the Central Soudan and in West Africa; the Anglo-German Treaty concerning Samoa and other parts of the Pacific; the tentative settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute.

In all these questions the Government have pursued a most pacific course. Not the least of the many dangers the Administration had to confront was that of war with France. It was met unflinchingly; and, though Fashoda still rankles in the French mind, there is no responsible statesman across the Channel who is not heartily grateful to Lord Salisbury as well as to M. Delcassé for managing the Nile Valley difficulty in such manner as to avoid the war that seemed so near to us in the autumn of 1898. Lord Salisbury is essentially a pacific statesman. War is abhorrent to him; the Peace Proposals of the Czar and the subsequent Conference at The Hague had no more attentive and sympathetic student in Europe. The active personal interest he displayed in the work of that body; the earnestness with which he endeavoured through Lord Pauncefote to obtain a General Treaty of Arbitration with the United States, of themselves show that an instinct for peace dominates his mind and acts.

Speaking broadly—and always with the reservation that the immediate future of China may produce a crop of disputes between the Powers—it is just to say that England's position in the world is one of greater strength and dignity than it was at the birth of the Third Salisbury Administration. She no longer stands in "splendid"—or dangerous—isolation. Though without formal alliances she is in peculiarly intimate relationship with the United States of America, and has a very important though not a determining voice in the Concert of Europe. It will not have passed unobserved that there now exists a somewhat loosely constituted but more or less effective Federation of Europe for securing the interests of Europeans: there is, indeed, a Federation, in which the United States has a limited part, equivalent to a union of the Christian and civilised Powers to obtain from non-Christian and partially civilised States respect for the claims of Christianity and the rights of civilisation. Though the credit for the genesis of that Concert lies with Lord Kimberley and the Rosebery Government, the Salisbury Cabinet has found in the Concert a potent instrument for accomplishing its designs. Lord Salisbury has used the weapon forged for him by his predecessors. The Concert failed in many things, notably in the prevention of the shocking massacres of Armenians; but it succeeded in preserving the *status quo* in Turkey, in localising the war in Greece and in liberating Crete from Ottoman misrule. That the members

of it did not quarrel among themselves in the process is due to Lord Salisbury's subordination of his own views — of what he would have liked to do and what England would also have liked — to the wishes of the other parties to the Concert. He had either to work with them or without them — which would have meant against them; and time has strengthened the conclusion that he did best in working with them even though the slaughter of the Armenians went forward unchecked and retribution has not been exacted from the guilty.

It remains to be seen whether the Concert will be more successful in China than in Turkey. The fact that it has accomplished the rescue of the Legations gives ground for hope that latent rivalries will not be allowed to interfere with the joint and harmonious performance of the gigantic task of reconstructing the Government of China or the gradual partition of that Empire. That, however, is a question of the near future. The facts of the present are that there *is* a Concert of Europe and that it is using, and is willing to use at all hazards, the material strength of the Powers in compelling China to act in harmony with the commercial interests of European nations and in accordance with the rules that regulate intercourse between civilised and Christian States. It is not, of course, claimed here that the revival and continued activity of this "inchoate Federation" is the direct outcome of the work of the Salisbury Cabinet; many causes have made common action necessary in China. But it *is* claimed that Lord Salisbury, in holding fast to the principle of such a Concert, in the Far as well as the Near East, has served his country well. In the affairs of China at least, two advantages have resulted — the reduction, if not the elimination, of friction as between the Powers; and the moral, if not also the material, support of the Powers in enforcing upon China a line of conduct agreeable to the interests of Europe and therefore of England — the Power whose intercourse with the Chinese as measured by her trade with them, is greater than that of all other Powers together.

Equality of commercial opportunity is a principle upon which the Administration have acted in other than Chinese quarters. In Tunis and in Madagascar Lord Salisbury has made concessions to the French spirit of trading exclusiveness which are open to criticism. But in the French Soudan and in French

West Africa equality of commercial opportunity has been won. For thirty years British subjects and British protected persons and goods are to enjoy the same tariff, fiscal and taxation treatment as French subjects and French protected persons. The trade routes of the French Soudan are open to all, as are the rivers of the French West African Colonies: there is no differential treatment. The importance of this principle in international arrangements it would not be easy to over-rate: it is the keynote of British policy in Asia and Africa—two markets of great present value to England and of possibilities that can as yet be but dimly appreciated.

At no time during the past five years have domestic politics been of absorbing interest or comprehensive importance. In shaping the course of diplomacy Parliament has had but little share. Its influence upon Foreign Policy has been slight. The work has been done—as it necessarily must be done—with small regard for the shifting and uncertain opinions of the popular Assembly. Nor, if we except educational legislation, has Parliament done more than register the decrees of the Cabinet as to the number, purpose and scope of the additions to the Statute Book. The new legislation is not remarkable. It is, indeed, far less noteworthy than everyone expected it would be when the Government took office. The pursuit of the Millennium by Act of Parliament has tacitly been abandoned by all parties—though, doubtless, it will be resumed when a period of bad trade comes again and the masses are suffering from lowered rates of wages and partial employment. Old-age pensions, comprehensive plans for the rehousing of the working classes, the overhauling of the licensing system—these and other measures which were to bring about a social reformation are still to seek. And while Foreign Affairs continue to be of such engrossing interest little progress is likely to be made with them—at any rate until there is an Opposition in fact as well as in name.

The past few years have added to the confusion of the Liberal party. Since Lord Rosebery resigned the leadership in 1897 the process of disintegration has gone on unchecked. The party is now broken up into groups under the nominal leadership of Lord Kimberley in the Lords and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in the Commons. Those amongst them who call themselves Imperialists are politically indistinguishable from Liberal Unionists: many of those who worship at the shrine of Little

Englandism are likely to receive their *quietus* in the coming general election. There will, apparently, be no Liberal party left. The new House of Commons will doubtless contain an overwhelming majority who, whether they call themselves Conservatives, Liberal Unionists, or Imperialist Liberals, will, in point of fact, be members of a great National party. Whether such a party will grow in solidarity, or whether the old division of Tory and Liberal will again assert itself, is a subject for speculation. But at present the Liberal party appears to have no future. The better elements of it seem destined to become absorbed by that National party whose watchword is the maintenance and perfection of the unity of the Empire. However that may be, the Liberal party has at the moment fallen into public discredit as deep as that which their policy of Irish separatism has incurred: it has as little prospect of return to popular favour as the policy to which it owes its decline. The disappearance of Home Rule is not less remarkable a feature of the lifetime of the Third Salisbury Administration than the ruin—though it may not yet be irretrievable—which has overtaken its advocates. Even in Ireland the Separatist agitation has died down. Now and again an Irreconcilable dashes across the political stage and raises the familiar cry of Independence for Ireland; and—as was the case in the debates in the Commons at various times during the war in South Africa—Nationalist members of Parliament have expressed what they would have us believe is the inextinguishable hate of Ireland for English rule; but it would seem that as little attention is now paid in Ireland as in England to these and like theatricalities. The bulk of the people in the Sister Isle are too intelligent, too generous, and too just to credit the version of our quarrel with the Boers with which certain half-traitorous and semi-irresponsible buffoons of Nationalist politics have sought to delude them. They have, indeed, a more kindly feeling towards England and a prouder consciousness of their share in the making of a great Empire than they have ever had—a circumstance to be attributed to the visit of the Queen as well as to the present equity of English rule and the skill and patience with which Mr. Gerald Balfour has controlled their legislative and administrative affairs.

APPENDICES.

THE QUEEN'S SPEECHES, 1895-1900.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

*Delivered by the Lords' Commissioners to both Houses of Parliament, on Tuesday,
February 5th, 1895.*

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

My relations with foreign Powers remain on a friendly and satisfactory footing.

An Agreement has been concluded, after protracted negotiations, between my Government and that of the French Republic for the settlement of the frontier between my Colony of Sierra Leone and the neighbouring French possessions.

I regret to say that the war between China and Japan still continues. I have maintained a close and cordial understanding with the Powers interested in those regions, and shall lose no favourable opportunity of promoting a peaceful termination of the contest.

In consequence of reports which reached my Government of excesses committed by Turkish troops, regular or irregular, on Armenians in a district of Asia Minor, I thought it right, in conjunction with other Powers, to make representations to the Porte. The Sultan has declared his intention of severely punishing any of his officers or soldiers who have been guilty of such acts, and has sent a Commission to conduct an investigation on the spot. Delegates from the Powers which have Consuls at Erzeroum will accompany this Commission.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

The Estimates for the year will be laid before you without delay.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

I am happy to observe the striking fact that in Ireland offences of all kinds against the law have sunk during the past year to the lowest level hitherto marked in official records.

Proposals will be submitted to you for remedying defects which experience has brought to light in the working of the Law of Landlord and Tenant in Ireland; and for dealing with certain evicted tenants, whose situation still constitutes a peril to social order.

A Bill will be presented to you dealing with the Church Establishment in Wales.

Bills will also be laid before you having for their object the popular control of the Liquor Traffic; the abolition of Plural Voting; and provision for the payment of the charges of the Returning Officers at elections.

The Commission which I issued in 1893 to report on the best means of unifying the government of the Metropolis has presented its Report, and a Bill will be laid before you founded on its recommendations.

I regret that agriculture continues in a seriously depressed condition. This subject is still under the consideration of the Commission which I appointed in the autumn of 1893.

In the meantime, a proposal will be submitted to you for facilitating the construction of Light Railways, a measure which will, I trust, be found beneficial to the rural districts.

Bills will also be presented for the promotion of conciliation in trade disputes, and for the amendment of the Factory Acts.

You will be asked to consider measures for the completion of the system of County Government in Scotland, and for further legislation in respect of the Crofter population in that country.

I pray that the blessing of Almighty God may rest upon your arduous and responsible labours.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

August 15th, 1895.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

The communications which I receive from foreign Powers assure me of the continuance of their good-will. I am happy to say that no international complication has arisen in any quarter which is calculated to endanger the peace of Europe.

The war between China and Japan, which was in progress at the opening of the last Session, has been brought to a conclusion by a peace which I trust will be enduring. I have observed a strict neutrality during the war, and have taken no action in respect to it except such as appeared to me likely to be favourable to the termination of hostilities.

I deeply regret to say that most atrocious outrages upon a body of English Missionaries have been reported from the Province of Fukien, in China. In reply to earnest representations addressed to the Chinese Government by my directions, active measures, which I trust will prove effective, are being taken for the punishment of the murderers and of all persons who are in any degree responsible for these crimes.

Internal troubles have broken out in the Armenian districts of Asiatic Turkey, and have been attended with horrors which have moved the indignation of the Christian nations of Europe generally, and of my people especially. My Ambassador, and the Ambassadors of the Emperor of Russia and of the President of the French Republic, acting together, have suggested to the Government of the Sultan the reforms which, in their opinion, are necessary to prevent a recurrence of constant disorder. These proposals are now being considered by his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and I am anxiously awaiting his decision.

A Resolution has been passed by both Houses of the Parliament of my Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, proposing that the adjacent Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland should be incorporated with the Cape Colony. I have, in reply, signified my willingness to consider favourably an Act passed for that purpose, provided it contains proper safeguards for my interests and for those of my native subjects, especially in the matter of their lands, the liquor traffic, and the maintenance of their own system of justice.

I have received satisfactory assurances on these points, and an Act has been passed by the Cape Parliament which I have every reason to expect will be found to fulfil my requirements.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

The Estimates for the service of the year which were not voted in the last Parliament will be laid before you.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

At this season of the year it will probably be found more convenient to defer to another Session the consideration of any important legislative measures except those which are necessary to provide for the administrative charges of the year.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

Tuesday, February 11th, 1896.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

I continue to receive from other Powers assurances of their friendly sentiments.

An Agreement has been concluded between my Government and that of the French Republic, having for its principal object the more secure establishment of the independence of the Kingdom of Siam. A copy of it will be laid before you.

The Commissioners for the delimitation of the frontier separating my Indian Empire and the territory of Afghanistan from the dominions of the Emperor of Russia have agreed upon a line which has been accepted by myself and by the Emperor.

The Government of the United States have expressed a wish to co-operate in terminating differences which have existed for many years between my Government and the Republic of Venezuela upon the boundary between that country and my Colony of British Guiana. I have expressed my sympathy with the desire to come to an equitable arrangement, and trust that further negotiation will lead to a satisfactory settlement.

The Sultan of Turkey has sanctioned the principal reforms in the government of the Armenian provinces, for which, in conjunction with the Emperor of Russia and the President of the French Republic, I have felt it my duty to press. I deeply regret that a fanatical outbreak on the part of a section of the Turkish population has resulted in a series of massacres in those provinces which have caused the deepest indignation in this country. Papers on these transactions will be laid before you.

A sudden incursion into the South African Republic by an armed force from the territories under the control of the British South Africa Company resulted in a deplorable collision with the Burgher forces.

My Ministers, at the earliest possible moment, intervened to prohibit, through the High Commissioner, this hostile action, and to warn all my subjects throughout South Africa against taking part in aid thereof.

The origin and circumstances of these proceedings will form the subject of a searching inquiry.

The President of the Republic, acting in this matter with moderation and wisdom, agreed to place the prisoners in the hands of my High Commissioner, and I have undertaken to bring to trial the leaders of the expedition.

The conduct of the President on this occasion, and the assurances which he has voluntarily given, lead me to believe that he recognises the importance of redressing the legitimate grievances of which complaint has been made by a majority of the persons now inhabiting the Transvaal.

The condition of affairs in Ashanti, and the violation by the King of Kumasi of the provisions of the Treaty of 1874 in regard to the suppression of human sacrifices, the freedom of trade, and the maintenance of communications, have for some years past engaged the serious attention of my Government. All endeavours to induce the King to observe his engagements having proved fruitless, it became necessary to send an armed expedition to Kumasi to enforce the conditions which he had been called upon to fulfil.

While I rejoice to be able to announce that the objects of the expedition have been achieved without bloodshed, I have to deplore the loss from the severities of the climate of some valuable lives, including that of my beloved son-in-law, His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Battenberg, who voluntarily placed his services at the disposal of myself and his adopted country.

I and my dear daughter are greatly touched and comforted in this heavy bereavement by the widespread sympathy that has been shown by my subjects throughout the Empire at home and abroad.

I trust that the establishment of an efficient British control at Kumasi will put a stop to the barbarous customs which have hitherto prevailed there, and, by preventing the inter-tribal conflicts which have interfered with the development of the country, will tend to the benefit of the people, and to the interests of peace and commerce.

Papers on the above subjects will shortly be laid before you.

On the north-west frontier of my Indian Empire the measures taken last year to secure an effective control over Chitral have been successful, and the engagements entered into by the border tribes for the maintenance and protection of the road from Peshawur have been loyally carried out without molestation or disturbance.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I have directed the Estimates for the service of the year to be laid before you. They have been prepared with the utmost regard to economy; but the exigencies of the time require an increased expenditure.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

The extension and improvement of the Naval Defences of the Empire is the most important subject to which your efforts can be directed, and will doubtless occupy your most earnest attention.

I regret to say that the condition of agriculture is disastrous beyond any recent experience. Measures will be laid before you, of which the object will be to mitigate the distress under which the classes labour who are engaged in that industry.

Elementary schools under voluntary management are a valuable portion of our educational system, and their condition, which is in many places precarious, requires further assistance from public resources.

The compensation to workmen for injuries received in the course of their ordinary employment has been under the consideration of Parliament upon several occasions. A measure dealing with the subject will be laid before you.

Legislation will be submitted to you for the amendment of the defects which experience has shown to exist in the provisions of the various Land Acts which have been passed in respect to Ireland.

A measure for amending and consolidating the Law relating to public health in Scotland will be laid before you.

Measures have also been prepared for the avoidance and settlement of trade disputes, for facilitating the construction of Light Railways in the United Kingdom, for the regulation of Public Companies, for checking the importation of destitute Aliens, for amending the Law with respect to the supply of water to the metropolis, for the institution of a Board of Agriculture in Ireland, and for amending the Law of Evidence.

I commend these weighty matters to your experienced judgment, and pray that your labours may be blessed by the guidance and favour of Almighty God.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

August 4, 1896.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

My relations with other Powers continue to be friendly.

The hostile movements of the Dervish forces in Egypt along the Valley of the Nile, and against the positions in the occupation of Italy to the east of that river, convinced me that it had become necessary for the Egyptian Government to take steps for arresting their advance.

By my advice, therefore, and under my sanction, an expedition has been undertaken for the purpose of restoring to the Government of the Khedive, as far as Dongola, the territory

which was lost to Egypt ten years ago. The operations are still proceeding, but, by a short and brilliant action at Ferkeh, a considerable proportion of the territory indicated has already been recovered.

The condition of some portions of the Turkish Empire continues to furnish cause for much anxiety. At present, the Island of Crete is the principal centre of disturbance. I have observed a strict neutrality between the Government and the insurgents; but, in conjunction with the other Powers of Europe, I have endeavoured to bring about a reconciliation by proposing the establishment of a system of government that shall be equitable and acceptable to both the Christian and the Mussulman inhabitants of the island.

I regret that a serious rebellion, signalised by many cruel murders, suddenly broke out in Matabeleland, and that the rising afterwards extended to Mashonaland, where it was accompanied by similar atrocities.

The work of defence and repression was immediately undertaken by the settlers, who displayed great courage and self-reliance in this emergency.

They have since been reinforced both by Imperial troops and by Colonial and Native levies, and the supreme military command has been confided to Major-General Sir Frederick Carrington.

His operations have hitherto been uniformly successful, although, owing to very grave difficulties of transport and supply, caused by an outbreak of rinderpest which has destroyed almost all the cattle in the country, he has been compelled to restrict the number of men employed in the field.

The latest reports show that his efforts and those of the forces under his command are telling on the resistance of the rebels, and I trust that they will shortly avail themselves of the offer of clemency which has been made to them.

The peaceful delimitation of the north-western frontier of my Indian Empire has proceeded, and further Agreements have been made with the Shah of Persia and the Ameer of Afghanistan, fixing their territorial limits. Friendly relations have been maintained with the tribes on the road to Chitral, and the relief of the garrisons in that country has been effected without difficulty, and with the cordial co-operation of the tribesmen in the neighbourhood.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I thank you for the satisfactory provision which you have made for the Services of the year.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

I have given my consent, with much pleasure, to measures for completing the naval defences of my Empire; for lightening the fiscal burdens which press upon the agricultural population; and for protecting the flocks and herds of these islands from the importation of disease. Important measures have also received my sanction, for the settlement of trade disputes, for the prevention of explosions in mines, which have caused the loss of many valuable lives, for amending the Truck Act, for the construction of light railways, for the amendment of the Irish Land Laws, and for facilitating the creation, by purchase, of a larger class of occupying freeholders in Ireland.

In bidding you farewell, I pray that the blessing of Providence may rest upon all your labours.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

On Tuesday, January 19th, 1897.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

My relations with all the other Powers continue to be of a friendly character.

The appalling massacres which have taken place in Constantinople and in other parts of the Ottoman Dominions have called for the special attention of the Powers who were

Signatories to the Treaty of Paris. Papers will be laid before you showing the considerations which have induced the Powers to make the present condition of the Ottoman Empire the subject of special consultation by their Representatives at Constantinople. The conferences which the Six Ambassadors have been instructed to hold are still proceeding.

The action undertaken by His Highness the Khedive of Egypt against the Khalifa, with my approval and assistance, has so far been entirely successful. His forces, supported by my officers and troops, have won back the fertile Province of Dongola to civilization by operations conducted with remarkable skill, and the way has been opened for a further advance whenever such a step shall be judged to be desirable.

My Government have discussed with the United States, acting as the friend of Venezuela, the terms under which the pending questions of disputed frontier between that Republic and my Colony of British Guiana may be equitably submitted to arbitration. An arrangement has been arrived at with that Government which will, I trust, effect the adjustment of existing controversies without exposing to risk the interests of any Colonists who have established rights in the disputed territory.

It is with much gratification that I have concluded a Treaty for General Arbitration with the President of the United States, by which I trust that all differences that may arise between us will be peacefully adjusted. I hope that this arrangement may have a further value in commending to other Powers the consideration of a principle by which the danger of war may be notably abated.

The rebellion in Matabeleland and Mashonaland has been repressed by the steadfastness and courage of the settlers, reinforced by my troops and by volunteers, both of English and Dutch race, from other parts of South Africa. I deplore the loss of valuable lives which these operations have entailed.

The depressed condition of the sugar industry in my West Indian Colonies has seriously affected their prosperity, and I have appointed a Commission to investigate its causes, and, if possible, to suggest means for its amelioration.

It is with much regret and with feelings of the deepest sympathy that I have heard that, owing to the failure of the autumn rains, scarcity and famine affect a large portion of my dominions in India. My Government in that country are making every effort to mitigate suffering and to lessen the calamity. The development of railways and irrigation works, and the forethought given through a long series of years to the preparation of the most effective arrangements for alleviating distress caused by famine, make their task more hopeful than in previous visitations. My people throughout my dominions at home and in India have been invited to second with their liberality the exertions of my Government. Papers showing the extent of the famine, and the measures taken to relieve suffering, will be laid before you.

Plague has also made its appearance in the seaport towns of Bombay and Karachi, and, notwithstanding the precautions adopted by the local authorities, shows no signs of decrease. I have directed my Government to take the most stringent measures at their disposal for the eradication of the pestilence.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

The Estimates for the year will be laid before you. While desirous of guarding against undue expenditure, I have felt that the present condition of the world will not permit you to depart from the spirit of prudent foresight in which you have during recent years provided for the defence of my Empire.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

A measure for the Promotion of Primary Education, by securing the Maintenance of Voluntary Schools, will be laid before you. If time permits, you will be invited to consider further proposals for Educational Legislation.

It is desirable to make better provision for the compensation of workpeople who suffer from accidents in the course of their employment, and a Bill, having that object in view, will be submitted to you.

Your consent will be asked to provisions which, in the judgment of the military authorities, are required for adding to the efficiency of the military defences of the Empire.

A Bill will be submitted to you to improve the arrangements for water supply in this metropolis.

In order to promote the interests of agriculture, which are of paramount importance in Ireland, you will be asked to consider a Bill for the establishment of a Board of Agriculture in that country.

Further legislative proposals will be brought before you, if the time at your disposal suffices for the purpose.

Bills for admitting the evidence of accused persons, for amending the law with respect to bills of sale and the registration of land, for revising the Acts with respect to the formation and administration of limited Companies, for the amendment of the Agricultural Holdings Act in Great Britain, for the exclusion of the goods manufactured in the prisons of other countries, for the establishment of Reformatories for Inebriates, and for amending the existing procedure with respect to private Bills coming from Scotland and Ireland, have been prepared, and, if opportunity for considering them should be found, will be laid before you.

I heartily commend your important deliberations to the guidance of Almighty God.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

August 6th, 1897.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

At the close of a Session during which there has been disturbance and conflict in Europe, I am glad to be able to inform you that the cordiality of my relations with foreign Powers remains unchanged.

The united influence of the Six Powers, Signatories to the Treaty of Paris, was earnestly exerted early in the year to dissuade the King of Greece from the war upon which he unhappily desired to enter. Though they failed in this endeavour, they were able to bring about an early suspension of hostilities between the two belligerents, and to open negotiations for peace. These proceedings have been protracted, and a formal Treaty has not yet been signed. But there is good ground for believing that all the more important matters in controversy have been adjusted, and that, in return for an adequate indemnity, the territory conquered by Turkey will, with a slight modification of frontier, be restored to Greece.

I have given notice to the King of the Belgians and the German Emperor to terminate the Treaties of Commerce of 1862 and 1865, by which I am prevented from making with my Colonies such fiscal arrangements within my Empire as seem to me expedient.

In consequence of the infraction by the Chinese Government of certain stipulations of the Convention of 1894, a fresh Convention has been concluded, establishing a frontier between Burmah and China more advantageous to my Empire, and opening the West River in China to European commerce.

I have concluded a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship with Menelek, the Emperor of Abyssinia.

The presence of the Representatives of the Colonies and of the Indian Empire at the ceremonies held in celebration of the sixtieth year of my reign has contributed to strengthen the bond of union between all parts of my Empire, and an additional proof of the attachment of the Colonies to the Mother Country has been furnished by the fiscal legislation of Canada, and by the contribution which the Cape Colony, following the example of Australasia, has offered to our naval defence.

The famine which, to my profound grief, has prevailed throughout large portions of my Indian dominions since the autumn of last year has taxed severely the resources of that country. I gladly acknowledge the energy and self-sacrifice of my officers of all ranks, both Europeans and natives, and of many private persons, who, with untiring zeal, and with an anxious desire to avoid offence to native feeling, have laboured to save life and to relieve suffering. An appeal to the sympathy of my subjects in all parts of my Empire has been responded to in a most generous manner; and I rejoice to learn that, owing to a satisfactory rainfall, there is now every prospect that the area of distress will be very greatly diminished.

The Plague, which caused a large number of deaths in certain districts in India during the earlier part of the year, has now almost disappeared. This improvement is mainly due to the energetic and judicious steps which were taken by the Local Governments to prevent it from spreading. Every precaution will be adopted in view of the possibility of its recurrence, but at present there is a steady decrease both in its prevalence and in its fatal effects.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I am grateful to you for the liberal provision to which you have assented for increasing the maritime forces of my Empire.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

It has given me great pleasure to sanction the arrangements you have made for enlarging the important harbours of Dover and Gibraltar, and for strengthening the military defences of the Empire. I anticipate that the facilities you have given for the practice of military manœuvres will conduce to the greater efficiency of the army. The assistance which your legislation has given to the support of necessitous schools will secure an adequate provision for education in the localities where it is most required, and will, I trust, close for some time a difficult and anxious controversy. The measure which you have passed for the compensation of workmen who are injured by accidents in the course of their employment will confer great benefits on a large section of the population.

I recognise with satisfaction the steps you have taken to facilitate the transfer of land, to protect the interests of the consumers of water in the metropolis, to relieve distress in the congested districts of Scotland, and to reform the law of public health in that country.

I am rejoiced that you have been able to provide a more efficient and economical system for the judicial institutions of Ireland.

I pray that the fruit of your labours may be assured by the protection and blessing of Almighty God.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

On February 8th, 1898.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

My relations with other Powers continue to be friendly.

The negotiations between the Sultan of Turkey and the King of Greece have been brought to a conclusion by the signature of a Treaty of Peace between them, under which the territorial relation of the two Powers is practically unchanged.

The question of an autonomous Government for the Island of Crete has occupied the attention of the Powers. The difficulty of arriving at an unanimous agreement upon some points has unduly protracted their deliberations, but I hope that these obstacles will before long be surmounted.

Intelligence, which is apparently trustworthy, has been received of the intention of the Khalifa to advance against the Egyptian army in the Soudan, and I have therefore given

directions that a contingent of British troops should be dispatched to Berber to the assistance of His Highness the Khedive.

I have concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with His Majesty the Emperor of Abyssinia.

The Report of the Commission which I appointed in December, 1896, to inquire into the condition of certain of my West Indian Colonies has conclusively established the existence of severe depression in those Colonies caused by a heavy fall in the price of sugar, which is mainly attributable to the reduction in the cost of production and the great increase in its extent during recent years.

But this fall has been artificially stimulated by the system of bounties to the producers and manufacturers of beetroot sugar maintained in many European States. There are signs of a growing opinion in those States that this system is injurious to the general interests of their population; and communications are now in progress between my Government and the Governments principally concerned, with a view to a Conference on the subject, which I trust may result in the abolition of the bounties.

In the meantime, measures will be proposed to you for the relief of the immediate necessities of the West Indian Colonies, for encouraging other industries, and for assisting those engaged in sugar cultivation to tide over the present crisis.

On the north-western borders of my Indian Empire an organised outbreak of fanaticism, which spread in the summer along the frontier, induced many of the tribes to break their engagements with my Government, to attack military posts in their vicinity, and even to invade a settled district of my territory. I was compelled to send expeditions against the offending tribes for the punishment of these outrages, and to insure peace in the future. A portion of the Afridi tribes have not yet accepted the terms offered to them, but elsewhere the operations have been brought to a successful close.

The courage and endurance exhibited by my troops, British and native, have overcome the almost insuperable difficulties of the country in which they were operating; but I have to deplore the loss of many valuable lives both amongst my own troops and those whose services were voluntarily and loyally placed at my disposal by the Native Princes of my Indian Empire.

Papers on this subject will be laid before you.

The plague, which appeared more than a year ago in Western India, returned in the autumn; and, although the mortality is less alarming than it was at this time last year, it is still such as to cause anxiety. No effort will be spared by my Government in the endeavour both to limit its extent and to mitigate its effects; and I am confident that they will receive the loyal assistance of my Indian subjects in this arduous task. I rejoice, on the other hand, to inform you that the famine, which prevailed for many months over several large districts, may now be said to be at an end excepting within a small tract in Madras; and that there is reason to anticipate a prosperous year, both for agriculture and commerce, throughout my Indian dominions.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

The Estimates for the service of the year will be laid before you. They have been framed with the utmost desire for economy; but in view of the enormous armaments which are now maintained by other nations, the duty of providing for the defence of the Empire involves an expenditure which is beyond former precedent.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

A measure will be introduced for the organisation of a system of Local Government in Ireland substantially similar to that which within the last few years has been established in Great Britain.

Proposals having for their object to secure increased strength and efficiency in the army, and for amending the present conditions of military service, will be submitted to you.

Bills for enabling accused persons to be heard as witnesses in their own defence, and for cheapening and improving the procedure of Scottish Private Bill legislation, have been before

Parliament on many previous occasions. I trust that in the course of the present Session a final decision may be given upon these important questions.

A measure for facilitating the creation of municipalities in the Administrative County of London will be brought before you.

A measure for the Amendment of the Vaccination Law will be recommended to your earnest attention.

Proposals for the prevention of certain recognised abuses in connection with Church Patronage, for the constitution of a Teaching University for London, for the Amendment of the Law relating to Prisons, for dealing in part with the subject of Secondary Education, for amending the Law relating to the Mercantile Marine Fund, for guarding against fraud in the management of Limited Companies, for the better ascertainment of the rights of landlord and tenant on the termination of an agricultural tenancy, and for preventing the adulteration of drugs and food, will be laid before you in case the time at your disposal should permit you to proceed with them.

I heartily commend your momentous deliberations to the care and guidance of Almighty God.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

On August 12th, 1898.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

My relations with other nations continue to be friendly. I have witnessed with the deepest sorrow the hostilities that have taken place between Spain and the United States, two nations to whom my Empire is bound by many ties of affection and tradition. The negotiations which have recently been opened give a fair ground for hoping that this deplorable conflict will speedily be brought to a termination by the conclusion of an honourable and enduring peace.

Changes which have taken place in the territorial relations of other Powers with the Chinese Empire have induced me to conclude Agreements by which the Harbour of Wei-hai-Wei and certain positions adjacent to my Colony of Hong Kong have been leased to me by the Emperor of China. I trust that these arrangements will conduce to the maintenance of his independence and the security of his Empire, and will be favourable to the development of the extensive commerce which is carried on between the people of Great Britain and China.

In concert with the Emperor of Russia and the President of the French Republic, I have consented to guarantee a loan to enable the King of Greece to satisfy the stipulations of the recent Treaty of Peace between himself and the Sultan. The evacuation of Thessaly has, in pursuance of that Treaty, been duly carried into effect.

After lengthened negotiations, I have had great satisfaction in concluding with the Government of the French Republic a Convention by which the numerous questions of territorial and commercial rights in West Africa, which had been for years in dispute between the two countries, have been finally settled.

This Convention is subject to ratification by the French Chambers, but, in the meantime, both Governments have instructed their officials to confine their occupation to the places and territories which, under the Convention, have been recognised as belonging to their respective countries.

Arrangements have been made for the establishment at an early date of a penny postage between the United Kingdom, my Dominion of Canada, my Colonies of Newfoundland, the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, and other parts of my Empire.

In certain portions of Western India, and in a small district of the Punjaub, the plague, though it has abated during the hot weather, still exists, and a few cases have occurred in other parts of the country. My officers have done all that lies in their power to relieve the victims of the epidemic and to arrest its growth. I am thankful that bountiful harvests have been gathered throughout the greater part of India, and that the internal and external trade of the country is rapidly recovering from the depression caused by the famine of the preceding year.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I thank you for the liberal provision which you have made for the defence of my Empire. The sacrifices which have been asked of you are severe, but they are not greater than the exigencies of the present time require. I am glad to recognise the value of the provisions to which you have assented for increasing the strength and efficiency of the Army.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

I have seen with much gratification that you have this year added to the Statute Book an important measure for assimilating the local institutions of Ireland to those of England and Scotland. I trust that this valuable reform will tend to strengthen the bonds which unite the people of Great Britain and of Ireland, and to increase their common affection to the fundamental institutions of the Realm.

I have seen also with satisfaction that among the many important Bills which you have passed are to be found the Bill for the reconstitution of the University of London, the Bill for enabling accused persons to be heard as witnesses, and the Bill for preventing abuse in the patronage and occupation of benefices in the Established Church. The principles on which these measures rest have been generally accepted for many years; but an opportunity has not till now been found for passing them into law.

I pray that the blessing of Almighty God may attend you.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

On February 7th, 1899.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

My relations with other Powers continue to be friendly.

The expedition against the Dervishes, conducted with brilliant ability by Sir Herbert Kitchener and the officers serving under him, has resulted in the fall of Omdurman, and the complete subjugation of the territories which had been brought under the dominion of the Khalifa. I am proud to acknowledge the distinguished bravery and conduct of the British and Egyptian troops who have won this victory. My officers are engaged, in conjunction with those of His Highness the Khedive, in the establishment of order in the conquered provinces.

The Powers who have been in the occupation of Crete have delegated the authority necessary for the government of the island to His Royal Highness Prince George of Greece. The restoration of peace and order resulting from the establishment of His Royal Highness' Government has been gladly welcomed by the Cretans of both religions.

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia has summoned a Conference to consider the possibility of limiting the vast armaments which impose so heavy a burden on every nation. I have gladly signified my willingness to take part in its deliberations.

A profound impression has been created by the appalling crime which has robbed the people of Austria-Hungary of their beloved Empress. A Conference, at which my Delegates were present, was summoned at Rome to consider the dangers of the Anarchist conspiracy.

Though I was not able to concur in all the Resolutions proposed at the Conference, some amendments in the present laws of the realm upon this subject appear to be required, and will be submitted for your consideration.

Some of my West Indian Colonies have been visited by a hurricane of extraordinary violence, causing loss of life and great destruction of houses and other property. The consequent distress of the poorer inhabitants was promptly relieved as far as possible by the strenuous exertions of the local authorities, aided by contributions of money from other Colonies and from the United Kingdom.

I have learned with great satisfaction that the Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope has recognised the principle of a common responsibility for the naval defence of my Empire by providing for a permanent annual contribution towards that object.

In parts of my Indian Empire, I grieve to say, the plague still continues; and though it has diminished in some districts previously affected, it has spread to fresh places in Southern and Northern India. Unremitting efforts continue to be made to relieve sufferers from the disease, to check its spread in India, and to prevent its transmission to other lands. I am glad to be able to inform you that the harvests of the past year have been abundant, and that the trade and revenue of the country have recovered with a rapidity and completeness that has surpassed all expectation.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

The Estimates for the service of the ensuing year will be laid before you. They have been framed with the utmost economy that the circumstances of the present time permit.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

A Bill for more fully organising the government of the Metropolis will be commended to your careful consideration.

A measure for the establishment of a Board for the administration of primary, secondary, and technical education in England and Wales will again be laid before you.

You have already partially considered provisions for simplifying the process of private legislation for Scotland. They will be again brought before you.

A measure will be submitted to you for enabling local authorities to assist the occupiers of small dwellings in the purchase of their houses.

Bills will also be introduced for encouraging agriculture and technical instruction in Ireland, and for the relief of the tithe-rent-charge payer in that country; for providing a more complete distribution of water supply in cases of emergency in the Metropolis; for the regulation of Limited Companies; for the prevention of the adulteration of articles of food; for controlling the contracts of money-lenders; for amending the Factory Acts in certain respects; and for amending the law in respect to Agricultural Holdings.

I pray that Almighty God may have you in His keeping, and guide your deliberations for the good of my people.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

On August 9th, 1899.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

My relations with other Powers continue to be friendly.

The Conference summoned by the Emperor of Russia to consider measures for promoting the maintenance of peace has completed its sittings. Although the result of its deliberations has not fully corresponded with the lofty aims which it was summoned to accomplish, it has met with a considerable measure of success. The institution of a permanent Tribunal of Arbitration cannot fail to diminish the frequency of war, while the extension of the Geneva Convention will mitigate its horrors.

I have concluded a Convention with the President of the French Republic, by which the spheres of influence of the two Powers over a large portion of Northern Africa have been determined. Such an Agreement had become necessary, especially in respect to the Valley of the Nile, in consequence of the successful operations of the Anglo-Egyptian army during last autumn. I have concluded an Agreement with the Emperor of Russia for regulating the conditions under which either Government will encourage the development of railway enterprise by its own subjects in China.

I have received a Petition from a considerable number of my subjects residing in the South African Republic praying for my assistance to obtain the removal of grievances and disabilities of which they complain. The position of my subjects in the South African Republic is inconsistent with the promises of equal treatment on which my grant of internal independence to that Republic was founded, and the unrest caused thereby is a constant source of danger to the peace and prosperity of my dominions in South Africa. Negotiations on this subject with the Government of the South African Republic have been entered into and are still proceeding.

From my Indian Empire I have continued to receive satisfactory reports of the rapid recovery of agriculture and trade from the depression caused by the late famine; but during the last few weeks the rainfall has been insufficient over a portion of Western and Central India, and fears are entertained as to the prospects of the harvest in those regions. My officers are carefully watching the situation, and timely precautions to meet any scarcity, should it occur, will be adopted. I regret to add that the plague, though still confined to the areas affected last winter, shows no sign of abatement.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I thank you for the liberality with which you have provided for the naval and military defence of my Empire.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

The formal inclusion within my Empire of the territories occupied by the Royal Niger Company will facilitate the good administration of that region and the effective defence of its frontier.

I have had great satisfaction in giving my assent to a Bill for completing the organisation of Municipal Government in London. I do not doubt that the inhabitants of the various portions of this Metropolis will derive from it the benefits which similar institutions have conferred upon other cities and towns in this country.

I have also gladly sanctioned Bills for the simplification of private legislation in Scotland, for the encouragement of agricultural and technical education in Ireland, for the better distribution of the supply of water in the Metropolis, for the removal of an injustice in regard to the incidence of rates under which the benefited owners of tithe rent-charge have too long suffered, and for securing the purity of certain articles of food and drugs.

I trust that the Bill which you have passed for consolidating the Educational Departments, and extending their powers, will tend to the improvement and completion of our educational system.

The measures you have passed for facilitating the acquisition of the ownership of small houses by those who occupy them will be of considerable advantage to the working classes in many parts of the country.

I pray that the blessing of Almighty God may attend upon the fruit of your labours for the benefit of my people.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

On October 17th, 1899.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

Within a very brief period after the recent prorogation, I am compelled by events deeply affecting the interests of my Empire to recur to your advice and aid. The state of affairs in South Africa has made it expedient that my Government should be enabled to strengthen the military forces of this country by calling out the Reserves. For this purpose the provisions of the law render it necessary that Parliament should be called together.

Except for the difficulties that have been caused by the action of the South African Republic, the condition of the world continues to be peaceful.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

Measures will be laid before you for the purpose of providing for the expenditure which has been or may be caused by events in South Africa. The estimates for the ensuing year will be submitted to you in due course.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

There are many subjects of domestic interest to which your attention will be invited at a later period, when the ordinary season for the labours of a Parliamentary Session has been reached. For the present I have invited your attendance in order to ask you to deal with an exceptional exigency, and I pray that, in performing the duties which claim your attention, you may have the guidance and blessing of Almighty God.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

On October 27th, 1899.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

I am happy to be able to release you from the exceptional duties which have been imposed upon you by the exigencies of the public service.

I congratulate you on the brilliant qualities which have been displayed by the brave regiments upon whom the task of repelling the invasion of my South African Colonies has been laid. In doing so, I cannot but express my profound sorrow that so many gallant officers and soldiers should have fallen in the performance of their duty.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I acknowledge with gratitude the liberal provision which you have made to defray the expenses of military operations in South Africa.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

I trust that the Divine blessing may rest upon your efforts and those of my gallant army to restore peace and good government to that portion of my Empire, and to vindicate the honour of this country.

HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH,

On January 30th, 1900.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

The peace which had recently been broken in South Africa when last I addressed you has unhappily not been restored; but otherwise my relations with other States are friendly.

In resisting the invasion of my South African Colonies by the South African Republic and by the Orange Free State my people have responded with devotion and enthusiasm to the appeal which I have made to them; and the heroism of my soldiers in the field, and of my sailors and marines who were landed to co-operate with them, has not fallen short of the noblest traditions of our military history. I am deeply grieved that so many valuable lives should have fallen a sacrifice. But I have witnessed with pride and with the heartiest gratification the patriotic eagerness and spontaneous loyalty with which my subjects in all parts of my dominions have come forward to share in the common defence of their Imperial interests. I am confident that I shall not look to them in vain when I exhort them to sustain and renew their exertions until they have brought this struggle for the maintenance of the Empire and the assertion of its supremacy in South Africa to a victorious conclusion.

A Treaty has been concluded with the German Emperor for the adjustment of rights claimed by the two countries in Samoa, Tonga, and other islands in the Pacific. To a portion of these stipulations the Government of the United States has also been a party.

A Bill will be introduced at an early date to give effect to the scheme of federation which has been adopted after the most careful consideration by five of my Australian Colonies. I have watched with cordial satisfaction the gradual development of my greater Colonies into self-governing communities. I feel confident that the establishment of the great federation of Australia will prove advantageous, not only to the Colonies immediately concerned, but also to the Empire at large.

The brilliant courage and the soldier-like qualities of the Colonial Forces engaged in South Africa have already earned high admiration. Patriotic offers of assistance, which it was not possible to accept, have come from many other Colonies with populations of various races.

I have received from the Ruling Chiefs of Native States in India numerous offers to place their troops and the resources of their States at my disposal for service in South Africa. These proofs of their loyalty to myself and of their devotion to the cause of my Empire have afforded me much gratification.

I regret that owing to insufficient rainfall in the autumn over a great part of Western and Central India the harvests and pasturage have failed to such an extent as to create a famine. Timely measures have been taken by my Government, and by the Rulers of the Native States affected, to relieve suffering and to prevent starvation.

I regret to add that the epidemic of plague continues, and that although its severity has not increased since last year, there is at present no prospect of its diminution.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

The Estimates for the Public Service of the year will be laid before you. The provision for military expenditure must be largely increased on account of the charge for military operations in South Africa.

The experience of a great war must necessarily afford lessons of the greatest importance to the military administrations of the country. You will not, I am convinced, shrink from any outlay that may be required to place our defensive preparations on a level with the responsibilities which the possession of so great an Empire has laid upon us.

At a time when several other nations are perfecting their naval preparations at the cost of increasing efforts and sacrifices, the solicitude with which you have provided for the efficiency of our navy and of our coast defences will assuredly not be relaxed.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

The time is not propitious for any domestic reforms which involve a large expenditure.

Proposals, however, will be made to you for several important changes which are not open to this objection. Amendments are required in the laws which govern Limited Liability Companies, and in those which relate to Agricultural Tenancies. Measures for amending the law of Ecclesiastical Assessments, and in regard to Education in Scotland, and for the relief of Tithe Rent payers in Ireland, will also be laid before you. Your attention will also

be invited to proposals for better enabling local authorities to aid Secondary and Technical Education in England and Wales; for controlling the contracts of money lenders; for the amendment of the Factory Law, of the Law of Lunacy, and of the Housing of the Working Classes Act.

The labours of the Commission appointed by me to inquire into the nature and causes of accidents to railway servants are now completed. A Bill, framed with the object of lessening the number of such accidents, will be laid before you.

It appears that service in South Africa may have the effect of disfranchising those who are taking part in it. You will be asked to sanction a measure by which this injustice will be prevented.

I commend your deliberations in this anxious time to the blessing and guidance of Almighty God.

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH

At the Prorogation of Parliament on August 8th, 1900, was as follows:—

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

My relations with the Powers of Europe and America continue to be friendly.

I have given my assent with sincere pleasure to the Act establishing the Commonwealth of Australia, which will weld together in close and indissoluble union the federating Colonies, and will add to the strength and resources of this portion of my Empire.

The war in South Africa into which this country has been forced by the aggressive action of the two Dutch Republics has not yet reached its conclusion; but my armies have driven back the invaders beyond the frontiers they had crossed, and have occupied the two capitals of the enemy, and much of his territory. The operations which have been conducted for this purpose have in many parts been marked by brilliant skill and success, and have placed in the strongest light the heroism and the high military qualities of the troops who have been brought together under my banner from this country, from Canada, from Australasia, and from my South African Possessions.

Believing that the continued political independence of the two Republics would be a constant danger to the peace of South Africa, I have authorised the annexation of the Orange Free State to my Empire. I trust that this will be the first step towards the union of races under institutions which, while establishing from the outset good and just government for all, may be in time developed so as to secure equal rights and privileges in my South African dominions.

The British and other Legations at Peking have been unexpectedly attacked by an insurgent mob, and it is feared that many of their inmates have been murdered. How far Chinese authorities were accomplices in this atrocious crime, and whether the British Minister and his family have been among the victims, are matters that are still in some uncertainty. The utmost efforts will be made by myself and my Allies to visit with worthy punishment the authors of this unexampled crime. I have sent a considerable force of British and Indian troops to assist in protecting the interests of Europeans in that country, and have largely reinforced my squadron in those waters.

I regret that a rising of the Ashanti and other tribes in the neighbourhood of Coomassie has made it necessary to despatch an expedition for the relief of that place, where the Governor of the Colony was besieged by overwhelming numbers. I have learned with satisfaction that my troops, which consist entirely of local levies under British officers, have effected the object of the expedition, in spite of the stubborn resistance of the insurgent tribes and the great difficulties of climate and season with which they have had to contend.

In my Indian dominions the failure of the rains last autumn has caused intense and prolonged distress over a large part of the country. Strenuous and persistent endeavour has

been made by my Governments to relieve suffering and prevent starvation. The self-denying efforts of my officers, and of the many private persons who have joined in the relief operations, deserve the highest commendation.

Though the fall of rain this season has been abnormally late, it is hoped that its volume may be sufficient to rapidly curtail the present area of distress, and restore to the people their previous means of livelihood.

The epidemic of plague continues, but the extent and virulence of the disease have decreased, and there has been a marked diminution in the mortality.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I thank you for the liberality with which you have responded to the unwonted demands I have been compelled to make on you. The satisfactory progress of the campaign in South Africa gives fair ground for hoping that the excessive requirements of military expenditure will be soon abated.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

Though the time has not been favourable to legislation upon internal questions, I congratulate you on having added to the Statute Book several enactments which will be advantageous to industry and commerce. The passage of a measure for increasing the security of tenant farmers in the value of their own improvements, and for extending the law of compensation for accidents to the farm labourer, will have a beneficial influence upon agriculture. A valuable Bill has been passed with the object of preventing the accidents to which railway servants have been exposed in the performance of their duty.

The Bill for the regulation of Limited Companies, and for the discovery of fraud in the conduct of them, will supply a want that has long been keenly felt. The Bill that has been passed for regulating the business of money-lenders will also tend to check transactions of an oppressive and injurious character.

The Measure you have passed for facilitating the erection of dwellings for the working classes will afford some assistance in the solution of a problem of which the difficulty appears to increase with every succeeding year.

The Ecclesiastical Assessments (Scotland) and the Tithe Rent-Charge (Ireland) Acts will remove long-standing causes of friction and injustice. Measures have also been passed for augmenting our Naval Reserves, and for rendering our Volunteer Forces more available for purposes of home defence.

I pray that Almighty God may have you in His keeping, and that His blessing may be with you.

The reading of the Speech having been concluded, the Lord Chancellor brought the seventh Session of the fourteenth Parliament of Her Majesty to a close by declaring Parliament prorogued till Saturday, the 27th of October next.

TURKEY AND GREECE.

THE PEACE TREATY.

THE Treaty of Peace between Turkey and Greece was signed at Constantinople on 22nd November (4th December), 1897, and was as follows:—*Article I.*—The Turco-Hellenic frontier is rectified in accordance with the line marked on the map, accompanied by a detailed description annexed to the preliminaries of Peace as follows:—The new frontier starts from the Gulf of Salonica, at the mouth of the River Potamoul; it follows that river as far as Pappapouli, then turns to the north-west in the direction of the old frontier, which it joins on the summit of Karagatsia (1,063 feet), leaving Kalyvia and Aigamotika to Greece. It then

runs in the direction of Krania and Rapsani, leaving those two villages to Greece. It skirts the southern flank of the summits of Analypsis Rapsaniotikos (3,263 feet) and Sopoto (4,072 feet). From the summit of Sopoto it runs in the direction of Nezeros, following nearly the bottom of the slopes on the east of Lake Nezeros, and joins the old line at the convent of Athanasius, to the north of the village of Nezeros. From the convent of Athanasius, it runs down in a southerly direction, following the bottom of the slopes on the west of Lake Nezeros until it reaches the stream of Kodrisiotiko; from there it runs to the heights of Kokkinopetra, to the south-east of Godamon. From Kokkinopetra it takes a westerly direction, crosses the valley of Argyropoli, and reaches the spur to the east of Valetziko (3,671 feet) at a distance of about two kilom. from that summit. From that point it follows a line nearly parallel to the old frontier, and about two miles distant, skirting the summit of Menexé and the hill of Melouna as far as a point north of the village of Ligaria. About one kilom. to the west of Ligaria it takes a southerly direction for a distance of about three kilom., then resumes a westerly direction, and joins the old frontier to the north of Kourtsiovali (1,900 feet). From there it skirts the village of Kourtsiovali on the west, and to the south of that village resumes an easterly direction, passing to the north of the summit of Agios-Georgios (2,066 feet); it then skirts the range of Losfaki, following the bottom of the slopes of that range to the east, and leaving to Greece the road from Tirnavo to Melouna. It joins the old frontier at the summit (1,200 feet) about three kilom. north-west of Tirnavo. It again leaves the old frontier at Beydeirmeni, on the banks of the River Xerias, skirts on the east the range of Sideropalouki (1,694 feet), and touches the River Salambria one kilom. to the west of Gounitza; from there it runs towards the south, and changes its direction towards the west to the north-east of Koutzokhero, passing about one kilom. to the north of that village. It again crosses the Salambria, and follows the bottom of the slopes on the left bank of the river, turning to the west as far as the summit of Babou (2,147 feet), which it skirts on the south side; it then turns again towards the north, following the line of the perpendicular heights, leaves the summit of Babou on the east, and continues in a northerly direction to a distance of one kilom. to the south-west of the summit (1,600 feet); it then takes a westerly direction, and follows a line about two kilom. distant from the old frontier, which it joins at the angle formed by it to the north of the Gritzanou. The new line cuts to the west of Eleutherokhorion, the angle of which the point is on the height (1,742 feet). The frontier follows the old line as far as the summit of Gorza (3,196 feet); from there it turns towards the north to the trigonometrical point of Barberi, where it joins the old frontier. It follows that frontier as far as Pikuada, and then runs to the summit of Mitriza (4,418 feet). From Mitriza it follows the old line as far as the summit of Nasadico, situated to the north-west of the village of Kerassia Sinou; from Nasadico it turns towards the west to the summit of the Kutzuru (1,916 feet), where it joins the old line, passing half-way between the village of Kritsotades and the summit (2,555 feet), which it leaves to Turkey. From the summit of Kutzuru it follows the old line as far as the summit of Agios Elias; starting from that point, it runs straight towards the summit of Djuma-Psiti, passing to the north of the village of Kerassia. From Djuma-Psiti it follows the old line as far as the summit of Bulgarie; from there it runs almost straight towards the summit of Djumanalta (3,091 feet) to the north-west of Nostrovo, where it joins the old line, which it follows as far as the angle formed by it one kilom. to the south-west of the village of Saghia. From that angle the new frontier runs south-west towards the summit of Gribovo (4,786 feet), which it skirts on the south; it then turns west, passes 500 metres to the north of the village of Generalis one kilom. to the north of the summit (4,000 feet), runs along the plateau, at the end of which this summit rises, passes one kilom. to the south of the summit (4,200 feet), then comes straight down towards the south, passing 500 metres to the west of the village of Malakasi, crosses the Salambria one kilom. to the west of the bridge near the hill (2,180 feet), passes one kilom. to the east of the summit (3,700 feet), and comes back to the river, running down from the summit of Dokimi, to the west of the summit of Kizil-Tepe. It follows the course of that river as far as the summit of Dokimi (6,244 feet), where it joins the old line, and where the rectification of the frontier stops. This delimitation shall be settled on the spot by a

Commission composed of Delegates of the two interested Parties and of Military Delegates of the Embassies of the Mediating Powers. The Delimitation Commission shall meet without delay, proceed to the spot, and commence its work at once, and will arrive at its decisions by a majority of the votes of the three Parties concerned. When the line is being settled on the spot, slight strategical modifications may be introduced to the advantage of the Ottoman Empire by agreement between the Delegates of the Sublime Porte and of the Powers. The Definitive Act of Delimitation, with the map annexed to it, which shall be drawn up and signed by the Delimitation Commission, shall be an integral part of the present Treaty. *Article II.*—Greece shall pay to Turkey a war indemnity of £T4,000,000 in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article II. of the Preliminaries of Peace. *Article III.*—The evacuation of Thessaly shall be effected in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article VI. of the Peace Preliminaries. It will take place within a month from the moment when the Powers shall have recognised as fulfilled the conditions set forth in the last two paragraphs of Article II. of the Peace Preliminaries, and when the time of the publication of the war indemnity loan shall have been fixed by the International Commission in conformity with the provisions of the financial arrangement mentioned in that Article. The mode of evacuation and of the delivery to the Hellenic authorities of the evacuated places shall be fixed by the Delegates of the two Parties interested, with the co-operation of the Delegates of the Great Powers. *Article IV.*—The prisoners of war shall be exchanged immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty. *Article V.*—A full and complete amnesty is granted by both sides to all persons who have been implicated in events which preceded and followed the declaration of war. *Article VI.*—The subjects of each of the two States, whose position is a regular one in the eyes of the law, may reside and move freely, as in the past, in the territory of the other, each of the High Contracting Parties reserving to itself the right of refusing admission into its territory to any subjects of the other Party, who may have been sentenced for a criminal offence, or who may have been the object of a decree of expulsion owing to their antecedents or to breaches of the common law. Previous notice of refusal shall be given to the respective Legations. *Article VII.*—Mussulmans who are inhabitants or natives of Thessaly, and who, in virtue of Article XIII. of the Convention of the 24th May, 1881, had acquired or not acquired Greek nationality, are free to emigrate or become domiciled in Turkey. Those who have become Greek naturalised subjects will have the right of adopting Ottoman nationality by making a declaration to that effect to the competent authorities within the space of three years after the exchange of ratifications of the present Act. All these emigrants will, conformably with the said Convention, remain in full and unrestricted enjoyment of their real property situated in Greece, and will continue to administer it. The same advantages will be reciprocally granted to the inhabitants and natives of the territories retroceded to Turkey as a result of the new rectification of the frontier and to all persons at present domiciled in those localities. These same inhabitants and natives of the territories ceded to Turkey, as well as the representatives of the Institutions or Communes situated in those localities who may possess real property in Thessaly, will be free to cross the frontier in order to cultivate it as in the past without let or hindrance. Identical advantages will be accorded to the inhabitants or natives of Thessaly, and to the representatives of Institutions and Communes there who may possess landed property in the territories retroceded to the Ottoman Empire. *Article VIII.*—In execution of Article IV. of the Peace Preliminaries, Greece shall pay Turkey for the indemnification of private persons for losses caused by the Greek forces the sum of £T100,000. The payment of this sum will be made simultaneously with the payment of the war indemnity. *Article IX.*—Without affecting the principle of the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the Greeks before the war on the same footing as the subjects of the other States, special arrangements will be concluded between Greece and Turkey in order to avoid the abuse of Consular immunities, to prevent interference with the regular course of justice, to assure the execution of sentences passed, and to safeguard the interests of Ottoman subjects and foreigners in their differences with Greek subjects, these differences including cases of bankruptcy.

Pending the conclusion and the execution of the Convention provided for in Article V. (paragraph *b*) of the Peace Preliminaries, the Hellenic Consuls in Turkey and the Ottoman Consuls in Greece will exercise their administrative functions on the same bases as before the war. As regards suits between Hellenic subjects and Ottoman subjects, such matters as came before the Tribunals at a date anterior to the declaration of war will continue to be dealt with in Turkey conformably to the *régime* in force before the war. Matters which have arisen after the declaration of war will be treated in conformity with the principles of European law, on the basis of the Turco-Servian Convention of the 26th February (9th March), 1896. *Article X.*—The stipulations of the Convention of the 24th May, 1881, for the cession of Thessaly are maintained, with the exception of those modified by the present Act. The Sublime Porte reserves to itself the right of submitting its proposals for the settlement of the questions arising from the said Conventions to the Powers who are the Signatories to it, and whose decisions must be accepted by Greece. *Article XI.*—The two High Contracting Parties agree to conclude, within three months of the ratification of the present Treaty, the following arrangements:—(*a*) A Convention regulating the questions of contested nationalities on the basis of the draft negotiated in 1876 between Greece and Turkey; (*b*) A Consular Convention on the conditions set forth in the first paragraph of Article IX. (Article III. of the Peace Preliminaries); (*c*) An Extradition Treaty for the reciprocal rendition of offenders against the common law; and (*d*) A Convention for the repression of brigandage on the common frontier. The two Parties reserve to themselves the right of concluding subsequently a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Pending the conclusion of this last-named Treaty, freedom of commerce and navigation is re-established in a reciprocal manner. *Article XII.*—The postal relations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, which have been interrupted for some years, shall be re-established, in conformity with the general agreements regulating the matter, as soon as the Postal Administrations of the two countries shall have concluded a special Convention on the subject. Meanwhile the two Postal Administrations may exchange directly, in places which they will select for the purpose, their mail-bags and post parcels duly sealed and transmitted by land and sea to destinations in the two countries or for transit. *Article XIII.*—The Telegraph Administrations of the two countries shall take the necessary measures for the restoration of communication between their respective systems in such a manner as to ensure a rapid and uninterrupted exchange of telegrams. *Article XIV.*—With a view to assuring the maintenance of good neighbourly relations between the two States, the Governments of Greece and Turkey undertake not to tolerate in their territory any proceedings of a nature to disturb security or order in the neighbouring State. *Article XV.*—In the event of differences in the course of negotiations between Greece and Turkey the disputed points may be submitted by one or the other of the interested Parties to the arbitration of the Representatives of the Great Powers in Constantinople, whose decisions will be binding upon the two Governments. This arbitration may be exercised collectively or by special designation on the part of the interested Parties, either directly or through the medium of special Delegates. In the event of an equal division of votes the Arbitrators will choose an additional Arbitrator.

LOAN (INDEMNITY) CONVENTION BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, GREECE
AND RUSSIA.

The more important of the Articles of the Convention (signed at Paris, March 29th, 1898) guaranteeing the issue of a loan to Greece, for the payment of the Turkish indemnity, are as follows:—*Article I.*—The Hellenic Government may issue, under the guarantee resulting from the present Convention, at an actual rate of interest which shall not exceed 2½ per cent., and for a period not exceeding sixty years, a sufficient number of securities to produce an actual maximum sum of 170,000,000 fr., £6,800,000, or 63,750,000 roubles, which shall be applied as provided in Articles 7 and 10 of the Law regarding the Control. The conditions of this loan shall be fixed, by common consent, by the three Guaranteeing

Powers and by the Hellenic Government. They shall form the subject of a Regulation, which shall be sanctioned by Royal Decree, issued in the Council of Ministers, under special legislative authority. *Article II.*—Out of the capital fixed by Article I. there shall be issued immediately the number of securities necessary to produce an actual sum of 150,000,000 fr., £6,000,000, or 25,250,000 roubles. The obligations destined eventually to cover the deficits of 1898 and subsequent years up to a maximum of 23,000,000 fr., shall be issued at intervals, as required by virtue of special legislative authorisations, previously submitted to the approval of the International Commission in conformity with Article 10 of the Law regarding the Control. The right of issuing these obligations shall not extend beyond the year 1903. *Article IV.*—The service of the loan shall be secured by means of a fixed annuity, calculated, including the amortization, at 3·60 per cent. of the nominal capital, and furnished by the revenues assigned to the service of the Hellenic Public Debt, in accordance with the provisions of the Law regarding the Control. The amortization shall, however, not begin until the year 1903, and during the first five years the annuity payable by the Hellenic Government shall be 2·50 per cent. of the nominal capital of the loans issued. *Article V.*—The coupons shall be paid in gold on the 1st April and the 1st October in each year, at the places which will be hereafter indicated. *Article VII.*—The proceeds of the loan shall be employed by the International Commission under the conditions laid down by Articles 7 and 10 of the Law regarding the Control. *Article VIII.*—The conditions of the conversion or of the repayment of the floating debt in gold shall be dealt with by a Royal Decree, previously submitted for the approval of the International Commission. The obligations intended to safeguard the banks of issue for the sums in gold which have been borrowed from them by virtue of the laws relating to forced currency, as well as for their other gold advances, shall remain deposited in the Bank of France, which shall not part with them without notice of concurrence on the part of the International Commission. The coupons of these obligations shall be detached and forwarded to the banks of issue. *Article IX.*—The British, French, and Russian Governments undertake either to guarantee jointly and severally, or to apply to their Parliaments for authority to guarantee jointly and severally the regular service of the annuity fixed by Article IV. *Article XI.*—The Hellenic Government shall have the right, with the assent of the three Guaranteeing Powers, to effect the conversion of the loan at any time from the 1st April, 1918, forwards. It shall be bound to exercise this power at the collective request of the three Guaranteeing Powers who will come to an understanding as to the circumstances under which this request should be addressed to it.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES OF VENEZUELA RESPECTING THE SETTLE-
MENT OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE COLONY
OF BRITISH GUIANA AND THE UNITED STATES OF
VENEZUELA.

Signed at Washington, February 2, 1897.

[*Ratifications exchanged at Washington, June 14, 1897.*]

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the United States of Venezuela, being desirous to provide for an amicable settlement of the question which has arisen between their respective Governments concerning the boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela, have resolved to submit to arbitration the question involved, and to the end of concluding a Treaty for that purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries :

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Sir Julian Pauncefote, a Member of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath and of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, and Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States ;

And the President of the United States of Venezuela, Señor José Andrade, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Venezuela to the United States of America ;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to and concluded the following Articles :—

Article I. An Arbitral Tribunal shall be immediately appointed to determine the boundary line between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela.

Article II. The Tribunal shall consist of five Jurists : two on the part of Great Britain nominated by the Members of the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council, namely, the Right Honourable Baron Herschell, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, and the Honourable Sir Richard Henn Collins, Knight, one of the Justices of Her Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature ; two on the part of Venezuela, nominated, one by the President of the United States of Venezuela, namely, the Honourable Melville Weston Fuller, Chief Justice of the United States of America, and one nominated by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, namely, the Honourable David Josiah Brewer, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States of America ; and of a fifth Jurist to be selected by the four persons so nominated, or in the event of their failure to agree within three months from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the present Treaty, to be selected by His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway. The Jurist so selected shall be President of the Tribunal.

In case of the death, absence, or incapacity to serve of any of the four Arbitrators above named, or in the event of any such Arbitrator omitting or declining or ceasing to act as such, another Jurist of repute shall be forthwith substituted in his place. If such vacancy shall occur among those nominated on the part of Great Britain, the substitute shall be appointed by the members for the time being of the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council, acting by a majority, and if among those nominated on the part of Venezuela, he shall be appointed by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, acting by a majority. If such vacancy shall occur in the case of the fifth Arbitrator, a substitute shall be selected in the manner herein provided for with regard to the original appointment.

Article III. The Tribunal shall investigate and ascertain the extent of the territories belonging to, or that might lawfully be claimed by, the United Netherlands or by the Kingdom of Spain respectively at the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the Colony of British Guiana, and shall determine the boundary line between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela.

Article IV. In deciding the matters submitted, the Arbitrators shall ascertain all facts which they deem necessary to a decision of the controversy, and shall be governed by the following Rules, which are agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties as Rules to be taken as applicable to the case, and by such principles of international law not inconsistent therewith as the Arbitrators shall determine to be applicable to the case :—

RULES.

(a) Adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good title. The Arbitrators may deem exclusive political control of a district, as well as actual settlement thereof, sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to make title by prescription.

(b) The Arbitrators may recognise and give effect to rights and claims resting on any other ground whatever valid according to international law, and on any principles of international law which the Arbitrators may deem to be applicable to the case, and which are not in contravention of the foregoing rule.

(c) In determining the boundary line, if territory of one Party be found by the Tribunal to have been at the date of this Treaty in the occupation of the subjects or citizens of the other Party, such effect shall be given to such occupation as reason, justice, the principles of international law, and the equities of the case shall, in the opinion of the Tribunal, require.

Article V. The Arbitrators shall meet at Paris, within sixty days after the delivery of the printed arguments mentioned in Article VIII., and shall proceed impartially and carefully to examine and decide the questions that have been, or shall be, laid before them, as herein provided, on the part of the Governments of Her Britannic Majesty and the United States of Venezuela respectively.

Provided always that the Arbitrators may, if they shall think fit, hold their meetings, or any of them, at any other place which they may determine.

All questions considered by the Tribunal, including the final decision, shall be determined by a majority of all the Arbitrators.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall name one person as its Agent to attend the Tribunal, and to represent it generally in all matters connected with the Tribunal.

Article VI. The printed Case of each of the two Parties, accompanied by the documents, the official correspondence, and other evidence on which each relies, shall be delivered in duplicate to each of the Arbitrators and to the agent of the other Party as soon as may be after the appointment of the members of the Tribunal, but within a period not exceeding eight months from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty.

Article VII. Within four months after the delivery on both sides of the printed Case, either Party may in like manner deliver in duplicate to each of the said Arbitrators, and to the Agent of the other Party, a Counter-Case, and additional documents, correspondence, and evidence, in reply to the Case, documents, correspondence and evidence so presented by the other Party.

If in the Case submitted to the Arbitrators either Party shall have specified or alluded to any report or document in its own exclusive possession, without annexing a copy, such Party shall be bound, if the other Party thinks proper to apply for it, to furnish that Party with a copy thereof, and either Party may call upon the other, through the Arbitrators, to produce the originals or certified copies of any papers adduced as evidence, giving in each instance notice thereof within thirty days after delivery of the Case, and the original or copy so requested shall be delivered as soon as may be, and within a period not exceeding forty days after receipt of notice.

Article VIII. It shall be the duty of the Agent of each Party, within three months after the expiration of the time limited for the delivery of the Counter-Case on both sides, to deliver in duplicate to each of the said Arbitrators, and to the Agent of the other Party, a printed argument showing the points, and referring to the evidence upon which his Government relies, and either Party may also support the same before the Arbitrators by oral argument of counsel; and the Arbitrators may, if they desire further elucidation with regard to any point, require a written or printed statement or argument, or oral argument by counsel upon it; but in such case the other Party shall be entitled to reply either orally or in writing, as the case may be.

Article IX. The Arbitrators may, for any cause demand by them sufficient, enlarge either of the periods fixed by Articles VI., VII., and VIII. by the allowance of thirty days additional.

Article X. The decision of the Tribunal shall, if possible, be made within three months from the close of the argument on both sides.

It shall be made in writing and dated, and shall be signed by the Arbitrators who may assent to it.

The decision shall be in duplicate, one copy whereof shall be delivered to the Agent of Great Britain for his Government, and the other copy shall be delivered to the Agent of the United States of Venezuela for his Government.

Article XI. The Arbitrators shall keep an accurate record of their proceedings, and may appoint and employ the necessary officers to assist them.

Article XII. Each Government shall pay its own Agent and provide for the proper remuneration of the counsel employed by it, and of the Arbitrators appointed by it or in its behalf, and for the expense of preparing and submitting its case to the Tribunal. All other expenses connected with the Arbitration shall be defrayed by the two Governments in equal moieties.

Article XIII. The High Contracting Parties engage to consider the result of the proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration as a full, perfect, and final settlement of all the questions referred to the Arbitrators.

Article XIV. The present Treaty shall be duly ratified by Her Britannic Majesty and by the President of the United States of Venezuela, by and with the approval of the Congress thereof, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London or in Washington within six months from the date hereof.

In faith whereof we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this Treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate, at Washington, the second day of February, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven.

(L.S.)

JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE.

(L.S.)

JOSE ANDRADE.

THE GUIANA-VENEZUELA BOUNDARY.

THE ARBITRATORS' AWARD.

THE Award of the Arbitration Tribunal created under the provisions of the Treaty of Washington was pronounced on October 3rd, 1899, and was in the following terms:—

“Now we, the undersigned arbitrators, do hereby make and publish our decision, determination, and award of, upon, and concerning the questions submitted to us by the said Treaty of Arbitration, and do hereby, conformably to the said Treaty of Arbitration, finally decide, award, and determine that the boundary line between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela is as follows:—

Starting from the coast at Point Playa, the line of boundary shall run in a straight line to the River Barima at its junction with the River Muruma, and thence along the mid-stream of the latter river to its source, and from that point to the junction of the River Haiowa with the Amakuru, and thence along the mid-stream of the Amakuru to its source in the Imataka ridge, and thence in a south-westerly direction along the highest ridge of the spur of the Imataka mountains opposite to the source of the Barima, and thence along the summit of the main ridge of the Imataka mountains in a south-easterly direction to the source of the Acarabisi, and thence along the mid-stream of the Acarabisi to the Cuyuni, and thence along the northern bank of the River Cuyuni westward to its junction with the Wenamu, and thence following the mid-stream of the Wenamu to its westernmost source, and thence in a direct line to the summit of Mount Roraima, and from Mount Roraima to the source of the Cotinga and along the mid-stream of that river to its junction with the Takutu, and thence along the mid-stream of the Takutu to its source, thence in a straight line to the westernmost point of the Akarai mountains, and thence along the ridge of the Akarai mountains to the source of the Corentin, called the Cutari river.

Provided always that the line of delimitation fixed by this award shall be subject and without prejudice to any questions now existing or which may arise to be determined between

the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and the Republic of Brazil, or between the latter Republic and the United States of Venezuela.

In fixing the above delimitation the arbitrators consider and decide that in times of peace the Rivers Amakuru and Barima shall be open to navigation by the merchant ships of all nations, subject to all just regulations and to the payment of light or other like dues. Provided that the dues charged by the Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Colony of British Guiana in respect of the passage of vessels along the portions of such rivers respectively owned by them shall be charged at the same rates upon the vessels of Venezuela and Great Britain, such rates being no higher than those charged to any other nation; provided also that no Customs duties shall be chargeable either by the Republic of Venezuela or by the Colony of British Guiana in respect of goods carried on board ships, vessels, or boats passing along the said rivers, but Customs duties shall only be chargeable in respect of goods landed in the territory of Venezuela or Great Britain respectively.

Executed and published in duplicate by us in Paris this 3rd day of October, A.D. 1899.—
F. DE MAARTENS; RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN; R. HENN COLLINS; MELVILLE WESTON FULLER; DAVID J. BREWER."

ALASKA.

THE *MODUS VIVENDI*.

On October 20th, 1899, Notes were exchanged between Mr. Hay, Secretary of the State Department, and Mr. Reginald Tower, in charge of the Embassy at Washington in Lord Pauncefote's absence, providing for a provisional boundary to be observed by the United States and Great Britain, "between the territory of Alaska and the Dominion of Canada in the region about the head of Lynn Canal." The text is as follows:—

"It is hereby agreed between the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain that the boundary line between Canada and the territory of Alaska in the region about the head of Lynn Canal shall be provisionally fixed as follows, without prejudice to the claims of either party in the permanent adjustment of the international boundary.

In the region of the Dalton Trail, a line beginning at the peak west of Porcupine Creek, marked on the Map No. 10 of the United States' Commission, December 31st, 1895, and on sheet No. 18 of the British Commission, December 31st, 1895, with the number 6500; thence running to the Klehini (or Kilaheela) River in the direction of the peak north of that river, marked 5020 on the aforesaid United States' Map and 5025 on the aforesaid British Map; thence following the high or right bank of the said Klehini River to the junction thereof with the Chilkat River, a mile and a half, more or less, north of Klukwan—provided that persons proceeding to or from Porcupine Creek shall be freely permitted to follow the trail between the said creek and the said junction of the rivers, into and across the territory on the Canadian side of the temporary line wherever the trail crosses to such side, and, subject to such reasonable regulations for the protection of the revenue as the Canadian Government may prescribe, to carry with them over such part or parts of the trail between the said points as may lie on the Canadian side of the temporary line, such goods and articles as they desire, without being required to pay any customs duties on such goods and articles; and from said junction to the summit of the peak east of the Chilkat River, marked on the aforesaid Map No. 10 of the United States' Commission with the number 5410, and on the Map No. 17 of the aforesaid British Commission with the number 5490.

On the Dyea and Skagway Trails, the summits of the Chilkoot and White Passes.

It is understood, as formerly set forth in communications of the Department of State of the United States, that the citizens or subjects of either Power, found by this arrangement

within the temporary jurisdiction of the other, shall suffer no diminution of the rights and privileges which they now enjoy.

The Government of the United States will at once appoint an officer or officers in conjunction with an officer or officers to be named by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, to mark the temporary line agreed upon by the erection of posts, stakes, or other appropriate temporary marks.

It shall be understood that the foregoing Agreement is binding upon the two Governments from the date of this, my written acceptance of its terms."

CONVENTION BETWEEN HER MAJESTY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE CONVENTION OF APRIL 19, 1850, RELATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNICATION BY SHIP CANAL BETWEEN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS.

Signed at Washington, February 5, 1900.

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and the United States of America being desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship-canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and to that end to remove any objection which may arise out of the Convention of the 19th April, 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, to the construction of such canal under the auspices of the Government of the United States, without impairing the "general principle" of neutralization established in Article VIII. of that Convention, have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries :

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the Right Honourable Lord Pauncefote of Preston, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; and

The President of the United States of America, the Honourable John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles :—

Article I. It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or Corporations or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present Convention, said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal.

Article II. The High Contracting Parties, desiring to preserve and maintain the "general principle" of neutralization established in Article VIII. of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, adopt, as the basis of such neutralization, the following rules, substantially as embodied in the Convention between Great Britain and certain other Powers, signed at Constantinople, 29th October, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, that is to say :—

1. The canal shall be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise.

2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised, nor any act of hostility be committed within it.

3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service.

Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as vessels of war of the belligerents.

4. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch.

5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to waters adjacent to the canal, within three marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours at any one time except in case of distress, and in such case shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent.

6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all works necessary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal shall be deemed to be part thereof, for the purposes of this Convention, and in time of war as in time of peace shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal.

7. No fortifications shall be erected commanding the canal or the waters adjacent. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder.

Article III. The High Contracting Parties will, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Convention, bring it to the notice of other Powers and invite them to adhere to it.

Article IV. The present Convention shall be ratified by Her Britannic Majesty, and by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or at London within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention, and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at Washington, the fifth day of February, in the year of our Lord 1900.

(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE. (L.S.)
JOHN HAY. (L.S.)

Article VIII. of the Convention between Her Majesty and the United States of America, relative to the Establishment of a Communication by Ship-Canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, signed at Washington, April 19, 1850, is as follows:—

“The Governments of Great Britain and the United States having not only desired, in entering into this Convention, to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection by Treaty stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications, should the same prove to be practicable, whether by canal or railway, which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama. In granting, however, their joint protection to any such canals or railways as are by this Article specified, it is always understood by Great Britain and the United States that the parties constructing or owning the same shall impose no other charges or conditions of traffic thereupon than the aforesaid Governments shall approve of as just and equitable, and that the same canals or railways, being open to the subjects and citizens of Great Britain and the United States on equal terms, shall also be open on like terms to the subjects and citizens of every other State which is willing to grant thereto such protection as Great Britain and the United States engage to afford.”

THE SAMOA CONVENTION.

A CONVENTION was signed by Lord Salisbury and Count Hatzfeldt, in London, on November 14th, 1899, for the settlement of the Samoan and other questions. The text is as follows :—

“The Commissioners of the three Powers concerned having in their report of the July 18th last expressed the opinion, based on a thorough examination of the situation, that it would be impossible effectually to remedy the troubles and difficulties under which the islands of Samoa are at present suffering, as long as they are placed under the joint administration of the three Governments, it appears desirable to seek for a solution which shall put an end to these difficulties, while taking due account of the legitimate interests of the three Governments.

Starting from this point of view, the Signatories, furnished with full powers to that effect by their respective Sovereigns, have agreed on the following points :—

Article I.—Great Britain renounces in favour of Germany all her rights over the islands of Upolu and of Savaii, including the right of establishing a naval and coaling station there, and her right of extra-territoriality in these islands. Great Britain similarly renounces, in favour of the United States of America, all her rights over the island of Tutuila and the other islands of the Samoan group east of 171° longitude east of Greenwich. Great Britain recognises as falling to Germany the territories in the eastern part of the neutral zone established by the arrangement of 1888 in West Africa. The limits of the portion of the neutral zone falling to Germany are defined in Article V. of the present Convention.

Article II.—Germany renounces in favour of Great Britain all her rights over Tonga Islands, including Vavau, and over the Savage Island, including the right of establishing a naval station and coaling station, and the right of extra-territoriality in the said islands. Germany similarly renounces, in favour of the United States of America, all her rights over the island of Tutuila and over the other islands of the Samoan group east of longitude 171° east of Greenwich. She recognises as falling to Great Britain those of the Solomon Islands, at present belonging to Germany, which are situated to the east and south-east of the island of Bougainville, which latter shall continue to belong to Germany, together with the island of Buka, which forms part of it. The western portion of the neutral zone in West Africa, as defined in Article V. of the present Convention, shall also fall to the share of Great Britain.

Article III.—The Consuls of the two Powers at Apia and in the Tonga Islands shall be provisionally recalled. The two Governments will come to an agreement with regard to the arrangements to be made during the interval in the interest of their navigation and of their commerce in Samoa and Tonga.

Article IV.—The arrangement at present existing between Germany and Great Britain and concerning the right of Germany to freely engage labourers in the Solomon Islands belonging to Great Britain shall be equally extended to those of the Solomon Islands mentioned in Article II., which fall to the share of Great Britain.

Article V.—In the neutral zone the frontier between the German and English territories shall be formed by the River Daka as far as the point of its intersection with the 9th degree of north latitude, thence the frontier shall continue to the north, leaving Morozugu to Great Britain, and shall be fixed on the spot by a mixed Commission of the two Powers in such manner that Gambaga and all the territories of Mamprusi shall fall to Great Britain, and that Yendi and all the territories of Chakosi shall fall to Germany.

Article VI.—Germany is prepared to take into consideration, as much and as far as possible, the wishes which the Government of Great Britain may express with regard to the development of the reciprocal tariffs in the territories of Togo and of the Gold Coast.

Article VII.—Germany renounces her rights of extra-territoriality in Zanzibar, but it is at the same time understood that this renunciation shall not effectively come into force till

such time as the rights of extra-territoriality enjoyed there by other nations shall be abolished.

Article VIII.—The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible, and shall come into force immediately after the exchange of ratifications.”

An Explanatory Declaration was exchanged at the same time :—

“It is clearly understood that by Article II. of the Convention signed to-day, Germany consents that the whole group of the Howe Islands, which forms part of the Solomon Islands, shall fall to Great Britain.

It is also understood that the stipulations of the Declaration between the two Governments signed at Berlin on April 10th, 1886, respecting freedom of commerce in the Western Pacific apply to the islands mentioned in the aforesaid Convention.

It is similarly understood that the arrangement at present in force as to the engagement of labourers by Germans in the Solomon Islands permits Germans to engage those labourers on the same conditions as those which are or which shall be imposed on British subjects non-resident in those islands.”

CHINA.

LEASES AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS.

YANG-TSZE REGION (NON-ALIENATION OF).

NOTES were exchanged with the Chinese Government respecting the non-alienation of the Yang-tsze Region. The note sent by Sir Claude to the Tsung-li-Yamèn is dated February 9th, 1898, and says that their Highnesses and Excellencies have more than once intimated that the Chinese Government were aware of the great importance that has always been attached by Great Britain to the retention in Chinese possession of the Yang-tsze region, now entirely hers, as providing security for the free course and development of trade. It asks to be placed in a position to communicate to Her Majesty's Government a definite assurance that China will never alienate any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yang-tsze to any other Power, whether under lease, mortgage, or any other designation. The translation of the reply of the Tsung-li-Yamèn (dated February 11th), after reciting the terms of Sir Claude's Note, is as follows :—“The Yamèn have to observe that the Yang-tsze region is of the greatest importance as concerning the whole position (or interests) of China, and it is out of the question that territory (in it) should be mortgaged, leased, or ceded to another Power. Since Her Britannic Majesty's Government has expressed its interest (or anxiety), it is the duty of the Yamèn to address this Note to the British Minister for communication to his Government. They avail themselves, &c.”

THE WEI-HAI-WEI LEASE.

The terms of the Convention (signed July 1st, 1898, and ratified in London, October 4th, 1898), by which China granted a lease of Wei-hai-Wei to Great Britain, are as follows :—

“In order to provide Great Britain with a suitable naval harbour in North China, and for the better protection of British commerce in the neighbouring seas, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of China agree to lease to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland Wei-hai-Wei, in the province of Shantung and the adjacent waters, for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia.

The territory leased shall comprise the Island of Liu-kung and all islands in the Bay of Wei-hai-Wei, and a belt of land ten English miles wide along the entire coast line of the Bay of Wei-hai-Wei. Within the above-mentioned territory leased Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction.

Great Britain shall have, in addition, the right to erect fortifications, station troops, or take any other measures necessary for defensive purposes, at any points on or near the coast of the region east of the meridian $121^{\circ} 40'$ east of Greenwich, and to acquire on equitable compensation with that territory such sites as may be necessary for water supply, communications, and hospitals. Within that zone Chinese administration will not be interfered with, but no troops other than Chinese or British shall be allowed therein.

It is also agreed that within the walled City of Wei-hai-Wei, Chinese officials shall continue to exercise jurisdiction except so far as may be inconsistent with naval and military requirements for the defence of the territory leased.

It is further agreed that Chinese vessels of war, whether neutral or otherwise, shall retain the right to use the waters herein leased to Great Britain.

It is further understood that there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants of the territory herein specified, and that if land is required for fortifications, public officers, or any official or public purpose, it shall be bought at a fair price.

This Convention shall come into force on signature. It shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of the two countries, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible."

HONG KONG EXTENSION (MIRS BAY).

The following is the text of the Convention between the United Kingdom and China, signed at Peking, June 9th, 1898, and ratified at London, August 6th of that year :—

"Whereas it has for many years past been recognised that an extension of Hong Kong territory is necessary for the proper defence and protection of the Colony.

It has now been agreed between the Governments of Great Britain and China that the limits of British territory shall be enlarged under lease to the extent indicated generally on the annexed map. The exact boundaries shall be hereafter fixed when proper surveys have been made by officials appointed by the two Governments. The term of this lease shall be ninety-nine years.

It is at the same time agreed that within the city of Kowloon the Chinese officials now stationed there shall continue to exercise jurisdiction except so far as may be inconsistent with the military requirements for the defence of Hong Kong. Within the remainder of the newly-leased territory Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction. Chinese officials and people shall be allowed as heretofore to use the road from Kowloon to Hsinan.

It is further agreed that the existing landing-place near Kowloon city shall be reserved for the convenience of Chinese men-of-war, merchant, and passenger vessels, which may come and go and lie there at their pleasure; and for the convenience of movement of the officials and people within the city.

When hereafter China constructs a railway to the boundary of the Kowloon territory under British control, arrangements shall be discussed.

It is further understood that there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants of the district included within the extension, and that if land is required for public offices, fortifications, or the like official purposes, it shall be bought at a fair price.

If cases of extradition of criminals occur, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the existing Treaties between Great Britain and China and the Hong Kong Regulations.

The area leased to Great Britain . . . includes the waters of Mirs Bay and Deep Bay, but it is agreed that Chinese vessels of war, whether neutral or otherwise, shall retain the right to use those waters.

This Convention shall come into force on the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, being the thirteenth day of the fifth moon of the twenty-fourth year of Kuang Hsü. It shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of the two countries, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

Done at Peking in quadruplicate (four copies in English and four in Chinese) the ninth day of June, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, being the twenty-first day of the fourth moon of the twenty-fourth year of Kuang Hsü."

THE RUSSO-CHINESE AGREEMENT.

Sir Claude Macdonald furnished the British Government with a translation of a Chinese document which he believed to be in conformity with the Convention between Russia and China. The text of this translation is as follows:—

"On the 6th day of the 3rd moon of the 24th year of Kuang Hsü 27th (March, 1898), His Majesty the Emperor of China especially deputed the Grand Secretary, Li, and the Vice-President of the Board of Revenue, Chang, as Plenipotentiaries to settle the matter connected with the loan of Port Arthur and Talienwan with the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires*,* Pavloff.

The Convention drawn up is as follows:—

Article I. In order for the protection of the Russian Fleet, and (to enable it) to have a secure base on the north coast of China, His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to lease to Russia Port Arthur, Talienwan, and the adjacent waters. But this lease is to be without prejudice to China's authority † in that territory.

Article II. The boundary of the territory leased in pursuance of the foregoing extends from Talienwan northward in accordance with the requirements (of the situation) on land, and of the protection of the territory, and permission shall be given for its being placed at whatever distance may be necessary.

The exact boundary and the other details of this Convention shall be jointly arranged at St. Petersburg with Hsü Ta-jên, after the signature of this Convention, with all possible expedition, and a separate special Article drawn up. After the boundary has been decided, all the territory included in it, and the adjacent waters, shall be entirely handed over to Russia to use under lease.

Article III. The term of lease is fixed as twenty-five years from the date of signature. On expiration an extension of the term may be arranged between the two countries.

Article IV. Within the term fixed, in the territory leased to Russia, and in the adjacent waters all movements of forces, whether naval or military, and (the appointment of) high officials to govern the districts, shall be entirely left to Russian officers, one man being made responsible,‡ but he is not to have the title of Governor-General or Governor.

No Chinese troops of any kind whatever are to be allowed to be stationed within this boundary. Chinese within the boundary may leave or remain at their pleasure, and are not to be driven away.

Should any criminal cases occur, the criminal is to be handed over to the nearest Chinese official to be punished according to law, in accordance with the arrangement laid down by the VIIIth Article of the Russian-Chinese Treaty of the 10th year of Hsien Fêng (1860).

Article V. To the north of the territory leased there shall be left a piece of territory, the extent of which is to be arranged by Hsü Ta-jên and the Russian Foreign Office. This piece is to be entirely left to Chinese officials, but no Chinese troops are to enter it, except after arrangement with the Russian officials.

Article VI. The Governments of the two countries agree that, as Port Arthur is solely a naval port, only Russian and Chinese vessels are to be allowed to use it, and it is to be

* The form of reference to the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* shows beyond any doubt that this is not the original text.

† Probably 'sovereign rights' are meant.

‡ Text requires amendment.

considered a closed port as far as the war and merchant vessels of the other Powers are concerned.

As to Talienwan, with the exception of a part within the port which, like Port Arthur, is to be reserved for the use of Russian and Chinese men-of-war, the remainder is to be a trading port, where the merchant vessels of all countries can freely come and go.

Article VII. Russia definitely recognises the territory leased,* but Port Arthur and Talienwan are of special importance. (As to) provision of funds, she will herself erect what buildings are required for the naval or military forces, for the erection of batteries, or barracks for the garrisons, and generally provide all the funds required.

Article VIII. The Chinese Government agrees† that the principle of the permission given in the 22nd year of Kuang Hsü (1896) to the Manchurian Railway Company for the construction of a railway shall now, from the date of signature, be extended to the construction of a branch line from a certain station on the aforesaid main line to Talienwan, or, if necessity requires, the same principle shall be extended to the construction of a branch line from the main line to a convenient point on the sea coast in the Liaotung Peninsula, between Ying Tzu (Newchwang) and the Yalu River.

The provisions of the Agreement of the 8th September, 1896, between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank shall be strictly observed with regard to the branch line above mentioned. The direction of the line and the places it is to pass shall be arranged by Hsü Ta-jên and the Manchurian Railway Company. But this railway concession is never to be used as a pretext for encroachment on Chinese territory, nor to be allowed to interfere with Chinese authority or interests.

Article IX. This Convention shall come into force from the date of exchange [*sic*] by the Plenipotentiaries of both countries. After Imperial ratification exchange shall take place at St. Petersburg.

RUSSIAN DECLARATION AS TO TALIENTWAN.

In August, 1898, the following Imperial Order declaring Talientwan a Free Port was communicated by order of the Czar to the Ambassadors of the Powers:—

“Owing to the great possessions of Russia in Europe and Asia, it has been possible with God’s help to effect a *rapprochement* between the peoples of the West and East. Through the friendly attitude of China we have succeeded in obtaining our historic aim, having obtained the use of two Chinese harbours, Talientwan and Port Arthur, with large territory whereby an outlet for the Great Siberian Railway to the Yellow Sea has been secured. Thanks to the wise decision of the Chinese Government, we shall, through the railway lines in course of construction, be united with China—a result which gives to all nations the immeasurable gain of easy communication and lightens the operations of the world’s trade. In our unwearying care for the general weal, we have deemed it necessary, after the completion of the railway line as far as the harbour of Talientwan, to declare that harbour a free port for the whole period of the Treaty and lease concluded between Russia and China on the 27th (O.S., 15) of March, 1898, for the merchant ships of all nations, and to build a new city in the neighbourhood of the said port.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN RAILWAY AND SPHERES OF INTEREST AGREEMENT.

The Text of the Declaration exchanged by Russia and Great Britain as to Railways and Spheres of Interest is as follows:—

“Great Britain and Russia, animated by a sincere desire to avoid in China all cause of conflict on questions where their interests meet, and taking into consideration

* There is certainly some omission here in the text.

† This appears to be the meaning of the text, but the construction throughout this Article is very incoherent.

the economic and geographical gravitation of certain parts of that Empire, have agreed as follows :—

1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government.

2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yang-tsze, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the British Government.

The two contracting parties having nowise in view to infringe in any way the sovereign rights of China or existing treaties, will not fail to communicate to the Chinese Government the present arrangement, which, by averting all cause of complications between them, is of a nature to consolidate peace in the Far East, and to serve the primordial interests of China herself."

Notes signed respectively by Sir C. Scott and Count Mouravieff were exchanged at St. Petersburg, April 28th, 1899; and on the same date the following additional Note was also signed and exchanged :—

"In order to complete the Note exchanged this day respecting the partition of spheres for concessions for the construction and working of railways in China, it has been agreed to record in the present additional Note the arrangement arrived at with regard to the line Shan-hai-kwan-Newchwang, for the construction of which a loan has been already contracted by the Chinese Government with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, acting on behalf of the British and Chinese Corporation.

The general arrangement established by the above-mentioned Notes is not to infringe in any way the rights acquired under the said loan contract, and the Chinese Government may appoint both an English engineer and an European accountant to supervise the construction of the line in question, and the expenditure of the money appropriated to it.

But it remains understood that this fact cannot be taken as constituting a right of property or foreign control, and that the line in question is to remain a Chinese line, under the control of the Chinese Government, and cannot be mortgaged or alienated to a non-Chinese Company.

As regards the branch line from Hsiao-hei-Chan to Sinminting, in addition to the aforesaid restrictions, it has been agreed that it is to be constructed by China herself, who may permit European—not necessarily British—engineers to periodically inspect it, and to verify and certify that the work is being properly executed.

The present special Agreement is naturally not to interfere in any way with the right of the Russian Government to support, if it thinks fit, applications of Russian subjects or establishments for concessions for railways which, starting from the main Manchurian line in a south-westerly direction, would traverse the region in which the Chinese line terminating at Sinminting and Newchwang is to be constructed."

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SOUDAN CONVENTION.

THE Text of the Convention between the British and Egyptian Governments (dated January 19th, 1899) relating to the Soudanese Provinces, is as follows :—

"Whereas certain provinces in the Soudan which were in rebellion against the authority of the Khedive have now been reconquered by the joint military and financial efforts of Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Khedive; and whereas it has become necessary to decide upon a system for the administration and for the making of laws for the

said reconquered provinces, under which due allowance may be made for the backward and unsettled conditions of large portions thereof, and for the varying requirements of different localities; and whereas it is desired to give effect to the claims which have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Government by right of conquest to share in the present settlement and future working and development of the said system and legislation; and whereas it is conceived that for many purposes Wady Halfa and Suakin may be most effectively administered in conjunction with the reconquered provinces to which they are respectively adjacent. Now it is hereby agreed and declared by and between the undersigned duly authorised for that purpose as follows:—I.—The word Soudan in this agreement means all the territories south of the 22nd parallel of latitude which have never been evacuated by the Egyptian troops since the year 1882, or which, having before the late rebellion in the Soudan been administered by the Government of His Highness the Khedive, were temporarily lost to Egypt, and have been reconquered by Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government acting in concert, or which may hereafter be reconquered by the two Governments acting in concert. II.—The British and Egyptian flags shall be used together both on land and water throughout the Soudan, except in the town of Suakin, in which locality the Egyptian flag alone shall be used. III.—The supreme military and civil command in the Soudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the Governor-General of the Soudan. He shall be appointed by Khedivial decree with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and shall be removed only by Khedivial decree, with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government. IV.—Laws, as also orders and regulations, with the full force of law for the good government of the Soudan and for the regulating, holding, disposal and devolution of property of every kind therein situate, may from time to time be made, altered, or abrogated by proclamation of the Governor-General. Such laws, orders, and regulations may apply to the whole or to any named part of the Soudan, and may, either explicitly, or by necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing law or regulation. All such proclamations shall be forthwith notified to the Britannic agent in Cairo and to the President of the Council of Ministers of the Khedive. V.—No Egyptian law, decree, or ministerial arrete, or other enactment hereafter to be made or promulgated, shall apply to the Soudan or any part thereof, save in so far as the same shall be applied by proclamation of the Governor-General in the manner hereinbefore provided. VI.—In the definition by proclamation of the conditions under which Europeans, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with or reside in the Soudan, or to hold property within its limits, no special privileges shall be accorded to the subjects of any one or more Power. VII.—Import duties on entering the Soudan shall not be payable on goods coming from Egyptian territory. Such duties may, however, be levied on goods coming from elsewhere than Egyptian territory; but in the case of goods entering the Soudan at Suakin, or any other port on the Red Sea littoral, they shall not exceed the corresponding duties for the time being leviable on goods entering Egypt from abroad. Duties may be levied on goods leaving the Soudan at such rates as may from time to time be prescribed by proclamation. VIII.—The jurisdiction of the mixed tribunals shall not extend nor be recognised for any purpose whatsoever in any part of the Soudan, except in the town of Suakin. Until, and save so far as it shall be otherwise determined by proclamation, the Soudan, with the exception of the town of Suakin, shall be and remain under martial law. No Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents shall be accredited in respect of nor allowed to reside in the Soudan without the previous consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government. IX.—The importation of slaves into the Soudan, as also their exportation, is absolutely prohibited. Provision shall be made by proclamation for the enforcement of this regulation. It is agreed between the two Governments that special attention shall be paid to the enforcement of the Brussels Act of 2nd July, 1890, in respect to the import, sale and manufacture of firearms and their munitions, and distilled or spirituous liquors."

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND ETHIOPIA.

*Signed by the Emperor Menelek II., and by Her Majesty's Envoy,
at Adis Abbaba, May 14, 1897.*

[Ratified by the Queen, July 28, 1897.]

ENGLISH VERSION.*

HER MAJESTY VICTORIA, by the grace of God, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty Menelek II., by the grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, being desirous of strengthening and rendering more effective and profitable the ancient friendship which has existed between their respective kingdoms;

Her Majesty Queen Victoria having appointed as her Special Envoy and Representative to His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II., James Rennell Rodd, Esq., Companion of the Most distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, whose full powers have been found in due and proper form, and His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, negotiating in his own name as King of Kings of Ethiopia, they have agreed upon and do conclude the following Articles, which shall be binding on themselves, their heirs and successors:—

Article I. The subjects of or persons protected by each of the Contracting Parties shall have full liberty to come and go and engage in commerce in the territories of the other, enjoying the protection of the Government within whose jurisdiction they are; but it is forbidden for armed bands from either side to cross the frontier of the other on any pretext whatever without previous authorisation from the competent authorities.

Article II. The frontiers of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast recognised by the Emperor Menelek shall be determined subsequently by exchange of notes between James Rennell Rodd, Esq., as Representative of Her Majesty the Queen, and Ras Maconen, as Representative of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, at Harrar. These notes shall be annexed to the present Treaty, of which they will form an integral part, so soon as they have received the approval of the High Contracting Parties, pending which the *status quo* shall be maintained.

Article III. The caravan route between Zeyla and Harrar by way of Gildessa shall remain open throughout its whole extent to the commerce of both nations.

Article IV. His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, on the one hand, accords to Great Britain and her Colonies, in respect of import duties and local taxation, every advantage which he may accord to the subjects of other nations.

On the other hand, all material destined exclusively for the service of the Ethiopian State shall, on application from His Majesty the Emperor, be allowed to pass through the port of Zeyla into Ethiopia free of duty.

Article V. The transit of fire-arms and ammunition destined for his Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia through the territories depending on the Government of Her Britannic Majesty is authorised, subject to the conditions prescribed by the General Act of the Brussels Conference, signed the 2nd July, 1890.

Article VI. His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II., King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of Her Britannic Majesty to do all in his power to prevent the passage through his dominions of arms and ammunition to the Mahdists, whom he declares to be the enemies of his Empire.

* The Amharic version signed by King Menelek appeared in the left column of the original Treaty.

The present Treaty shall come into force as soon as its ratification by Her Britannic Majesty shall have been notified to the Emperor of Ethiopia, but it is understood that the prescriptions of Article VI. shall be put into force from the date of its signature.

In faith of which His Majesty Menelek II., King of Kings of Ethiopia, in his own name, and James Rennell Rodd, Esq., on behalf of Her Majesty Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, have signed the present Treaty, in duplicate, written in the English and Amharic languages identically, both texts being considered as official, and have hereto affixed their seals.

Done at Adis Abbaba, the 14th day of May, 1897.

(L.S.)

(Signed)

JAMES RENNELL RODD.

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelik II.)

ANNEXES TO TREATY SIGNED AT ADIS ABBABA ON THE 14TH MAY, 1897, BY HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR MENELEK, AND BY MR. JAMES RENNELL RODD.

ANNEX 1.

Mr. Rodd to the Emperor Menelek.

Your Majesty,

Adis Abbaba, May 14, 1897.

With reference to Article II. of the Treaty which we are to sign to-day, I am instructed by my Government, in the event of a possible occupation by Ethiopia of territories inhabited by tribes who have formerly accepted and enjoyed British protection in the districts excluded from the limits of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast, as recognised by your Majesty, to bring to your knowledge the desire of Her Majesty the Queen to receive from your Majesty an assurance that it will be your special care that these tribes receive equitable treatment, and are thus no losers by this transfer of suzerainty.

In expressing the hope that your Majesty will enable me to give this assurance, I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

The Emperor Menelek to Mr. Rodd.

(Translation.)

The Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Menelek II., by the Grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, to Mr. Rennell Rodd, Envoy of the Kingdom of England.

Peace be unto you.

Your letter, written in Genbot, 1889, respecting the Somalis, has reached me. With regard to the question you have put to me, I give you the assurance that the Somalis who may by boundary arrangements become subjects of Ethiopia shall be well treated and have orderly government.

Written at Adis Abbaba, the 6th Genbot, 1889 (14th May, 1897).

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II.)

ANNEX 2.

The Emperor Menelek to Mr. Rodd.

(Translation.)

From Menelek II., by the Grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah.

May this reach James Rennell Rodd.

Peace be unto you.

With reference to the Treaty which we have written in the Amharic and English languages at Adis Abbaba, as I have no interpreter with me who understands the English

language well enough to compare the English and Amharic version, if by any possibility in the future there should ever be found any misunderstanding between the Amharic and English versions in any of the Articles of this Treaty, let this translation, which is written in the French language, and which I inclose in this letter, be the witness between us, and if you accept this proposal, send me word of your acceptance by letter.

Dated 7th Genbot, 1889 (14th May, 1897).

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II.)

Mr. Rodd to the Emperor Menelek.

Your Majesty,

Adis Abbaba, May 14, 1897.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Majesty's letter inclosing the French translation of the Treaty which we are to sign this day in English and Amharic, and I agree, on behalf of my Government, to the proposal of your Majesty, that, in case a divergency of opinion should arise hereafter as to the correct interpretation to be given either to the English or Amharic text, the French translation, which has been agreed to on both sides as adequate, should be accepted as furnishing a solution of the matter under dispute.

In recording this assurance, I have, &c.

(Signed)

RENNELL RODD.

ANNEX 3.

Mr Rodd to Ras Makunan.

Peace be unto you.

Harrah, June 4, 1897 (28 Genbot, 1889).

After friendly discussion with your Excellency, I have understood that His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia will recognise as frontier of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast the line which, starting from the sea at the point fixed in the Agreement between Great Britain and France on the 9th February, 1888, opposite the wells of Hadou, follows the caravan-road, described in that Agreement, through Abbassouen till it reaches the hill of Somadou. From this point on the road the line is traced by the Saw mountains and the hill of Egu to Moga Medir; from Moga Medir it is traced by Eylinta Kaddo to Arran Arrhe, near the intersection of latitude 44° east of Greenwich with longitude 9° north. From this point a straight line is drawn to the intersection of 47° east of Greenwich with 8° north. From here the line will follow the frontier laid down in the Anglo-Italian Protocol of the 5th May, 1894, until it reaches the sea.

The tribes occupying either side of the line shall have the right to use the grazing-grounds on the other side, but during their migrations it is understood that they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial authority. Free access to the nearest wells is equally reserved to the tribes occupying either side of the line.

This understanding, in accordance with Article II. of the Treaty signed on the 14th May, 1897 (7th Genbot, 1889), by His Majesty the Emperor Menelek and Mr. Rennell Rodd, at Adis Abbaba, must be approved by the two High Contracting Parties.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

RENNELL RODD.

Ras Makunan to Mr. Rodd.

(Translation.)

Sent from Ras Makunan, Governor of Harrar and its dependencies:

May this reach the Honourable Mr. Rennell Rodd, Envoy of the British Kingdom.

I inform you to-day that, after long friendly discussion, the boundary of the British Somali Protectorate upon which we have agreed is as follows:—

Starting from the sea-shore opposite the wells of Hadou (as on which the French and the English Governments agreed in February, 1888), it follows the caravan-road by Abbassouen

till Mount Somadou; from Mount Somadou to Mount Saw; from Mount Saw to Mount Egu; from Mount Egu to Moga Medir; starting from Moga Medir, it goes in a direct line to Eylinta Kaddo and Arran Arrhe on 44° east of Greenwich and 9° north, and again in a direct line until 47° east and 8° north. After this the boundary follows the line on which the English and the Italians agreed on the 5th May, 1894, until the sea.

The subjects of both the Contracting Parties are at liberty to cross their frontiers and graze their cattle, but these people, in every place where they go, must obey the Governor of the country in which they are, and the wells which are in the neighbourhood shall remain open for the two parties.

These two letters on which we have agreed, according to Article II. of the Treaty of His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia and Mr. Rennell Rodd of the 7th Genbot, 1889 (14th May, 1897), the two Sovereigns having seen them, if they approve them, shall be sealed again (ratified).

Written at Harrar, the 28th Genbot, 1889 (4th June, 1897).

(Signed) RAS MAKUNAN.

Mr. Rodd to the Emperor Menelek II.

Cairo, August 30, 1897.

From Mr. Rennell Rodd, Special Envoy of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, to His Majesty Menelik II., by the grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia.

Peace be unto your Majesty.

I have the honour to announce that The Queen, my gracious Sovereign, has been pleased to approve and ratify the Treaty which I had the honour to sign with your Majesty on the 14th May last.

Her Majesty has also been pleased to approve of the arrangement which, in accordance with the terms of Article II. of the Treaty, was agreed upon between Ras Makunan, as Representative of your Majesty, and myself by exchange of notes relative to the frontier of the British Protectorate in the Somali Coast; and it is presumed by Her Majesty's Government that your Majesty has also approved of it, as they have received no notification to the contrary.

The notes exchanged have accordingly been annexed to the Treaty which has received ratification, signifying Her Majesty's approval of all these documents.

I have now the honour to return herewith the copy of the Treaty intrusted to me by your Majesty, with its ratification in due form.

When I shall have received from your Majesty a letter signifying that this Treaty, thus ratified and approved, has come safely to your Majesty's hands, it will be made public by the Government of the Queen, that all her subjects may observe it and abide by it, and that it may strengthen the ties of friendship between our countries, and increase the feelings of esteem and good-will towards your Majesty which the reception of the British Mission in Ethiopia has awakened in my country.

I pray that your Majesty's life and health may long be preserved, and that your people may have peace and prosperity.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

The Emperor Menelek to the Queen.

(Translation.)

Menelek II., Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, to Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and Empress of India, Upholder and Keeper of the Christian Religion.

May peace be unto you.

Your Majesty's letters of the 28th Hamlé (3rd August) and 22nd (23rd) Mascarem (1st (2nd) October), 1897, and the Treaty with the Great Seal, dated the 28th Hamlé (3rd August),

1897, have reached me, and We received it with joy. The Treaty of Peace which is now between your Government and our Government, We hope it will ever increase in firmness and last for ever.

We ask God to give your Majesty health, and to your kingdom quietness and peace.

Written at Adis Abbaba, the 8th December, 1897, A.D.

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II.)

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
FRANCE FOR THE DELIMITATION OF THEIR RESPEC-
TIVE POSSESSIONS TO THE WEST OF THE NIGER,
AND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POSSESSIONS AND
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE TO THE EAST OF THAT
RIVER.

Signed at Paris, June 14, 1898.

[Ratifications exchanged at Paris, June 13, 1899.]

THE Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and the Government of the French Republic, having agreed, in a spirit of mutual good-will, to confirm the Protocol with its four Annexes prepared by their respective Delegates for the delimitation of the British Colonies of the Gold Coast, Lagos, and the other British possessions to the west of the Niger, and of the French possessions of the Ivory Coast, Sudan, and Dahomey, as well as for the delimitation of the British and French possessions and the spheres of influence of the two countries to the east of the Niger, the undersigned, His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Edmund Monson, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, accredited to the President of the French Republic; and His Excellency M. Gabriel Hanotaux, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic; duly authorised to this effect, confirm the Protocol with its Annexes, drawn up at Paris the 14th day of June, 1898, the text of which is as follows:—

PROTOCOL.

The undersigned, Martin Gosselin, Minister Plenipotentiary and Secretary of Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Paris; William Everett, a Colonel in Her Britannic Majesty's land forces and an Assistant Adjutant-General in the Intelligence Division of the War Office; René Lecomte, Minister Plenipotentiary, Assistant Sub-Director in the Department of Political Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Louis Gustave Binger, Colonial Governor, unattached, Director of African Affairs at the Ministry of the Colonies; delegated respectively by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and by the Government of the French Republic in order to draw up, in conformity with the declarations exchanged at London on the 5th August, 1890, and the 15th January, 1896, a draft of definitive delimitation between the British Colonies of the Gold Coast, Lagos, and the other British possessions to the west of the Niger, and the French possessions of the Ivory Coast, the Sudan, and Dahomey, and between the British and French possessions and the spheres of influence of the two countries to the east of the Niger, have agreed

to the following provisions, which they have resolved to submit for the approval of their respective Governments:—

Article I. The frontier separating the British Colony of the Gold Coast from the French Colonies of the Ivory Coast and Sudan shall start from the northern terminal point of the frontier laid down in the Anglo-French Agreement of the 12th July, 1893, viz., the intersection of the thalweg of the Black Volta with the 9th degree of north latitude, and shall follow the thalweg of this river northward up to its intersection with the 11th degree of north latitude. From this point it shall follow this parallel of latitude eastward as far as the river shown on Map No. 1, annexed to the present Protocol, as passing immediately to the east of the villages of Zwaga (Soauga) and Zebilla (Sebilla), and it shall then follow the thalweg of the western branch of this river up stream to its intersection with the parallel of latitude passing through the village of Sapeliga. From this point the frontier shall follow the northern limits of the lands belonging to Sapeliga as far as the River Nuhau (Nouhau), and shall then follow the thalweg of this river up or down stream, as the case may be, to a point situated 2 miles (3,219 metres) eastward of the road which leads from Gambaga to Tenkrûgu (Tingourkou), *via* Bawku (Baukou). Thence it shall rejoin by a straight line the 11th degree of north latitude at the intersection of this parallel with the road which is shown on Map No. 1 as leading from Sansanné-Mango to Pama, *via* Jebigu (Djebiga).

Article II. The frontier between the British Colony of Lagos and the French Colony of Dahomey, which was delimited on the ground by the Anglo-French Boundary Commission of 1895, and which is described in the Report signed by the Commissioners of the two nations on the 12th October, 1896, shall henceforward be recognised as the frontier separating the British and French possessions from the sea to the 9th degree of north latitude.

From the point of intersection of the River Ocpara with the 9th degree of north latitude, as determined by the said Commissioners, the frontier separating the British and French possessions shall proceed in a northerly direction, and follow a line passing west of the lands belonging to the following places, viz., Tabira, Okuta (Okouta), Boria, Tere, Gbani, Ashigere (Yassikéra), and Dekala.

From the most westerly point of the lands belonging to Dekala the frontier shall be drawn in a northerly direction so as to coincide as far as possible with the line indicated on Map No. 1 annexed to the present Protocol, and shall strike the right bank of the Niger at a point situated 10 miles (16·093 metres) upstream from the centre of the town of Gere (Guiris) (the port of Ilo), measured as the crow flies.

Article III. From the point specified in Article II., where the frontier separating the British and French possessions strikes the Niger, viz., a point situated on the right bank of that river, 10 miles (16·093 metres) up-stream from the centre of the town of Gere (Guiris) (the port of Ilo), the frontier shall follow a straight line drawn therefrom at right angles to the right bank as far as its intersection with the median line of the river. It shall then follow the median line of the river, up-stream, as far as its intersection with a line drawn perpendicularly to the left bank from the median line of the mouth of the depression or dry water-course, which, on Map No. 2 annexed to the present Protocol, is called the Dallul Mauri, and is shown thereon as being situated at a distance of about 17 miles (27·359 metres), measured as the crow flies, from a point on the left bank opposite the above-mentioned village of Gere (Guiris).

From this point of intersection the frontier shall follow this perpendicular till it meets the left bank of the river.

Article IV. To the east of the Niger the frontier separating the British and French possessions shall follow the line indicated on Map No. 2, which is annexed to the present Protocol.

Starting from the point on the left bank of the Niger indicated in the previous Article, viz., the median line of the Dallul Mauri, the frontier shall follow this median line until it meets the circumference of a circle drawn from the centre of the town of Sokoto with a radius of 100 miles (160·932 metres). From this point it shall follow the northern arc of this circle

as far as its second intersection with the 14th parallel of north latitude. From this second point of intersection it shall follow this parallel eastward for a distance of 70 miles (112·652 metres); then proceed due south until it reaches the parallel of 13° 20' north latitude, then eastward along this parallel for a distance of 250 miles (402·230 metres); then due north until it regains the 14th parallel of north latitude; then eastwards along this parallel as far as its intersection with the meridian passing 35' east of the centre of the town of Kuka, and thence this meridian southward until its intersection with the southern shore of Lake Chad.

The Government of the French Republic recognises, as falling within the British sphere, the territory to the east of the Niger, comprised within the above-mentioned line, the Anglo-German frontier, and the sea.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty recognises, as falling within the French sphere, the northern, eastern, and southern shores of Lake Chad, which are comprised between the point of intersection of the 14th degree of north latitude, with the western shore of the lake and the point of incidence on the shore of the lake of the frontier determined by the Franco-German Convention of the 15th March, 1894.

Article V. The frontiers set forth in the present Protocol are indicated on the annexed Maps, which are marked 1 and 2 respectively.

The two Governments undertake to appoint within a year as regards the frontiers west of the Niger, and within two years as regards the frontier east of that river, to count in each case from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the convention which is to be concluded between them for the purpose of confirming the present Protocol, Commissioners who will be charged with delimiting on the spot the lines of demarcation between the British and French possessions, in conformity and in accordance with the spirit of the stipulations of the present Protocol.

With respect to the delimitation of the portion of the Niger in the neighbourhood of Ilo and the Dallul Mauri, referred to in Article III., the Boundary Commissioners shall, in determining on the spot the river frontier, distribute equitably between the two Contracting Powers such islands as may be found to interfere with the delimitation of the river as defined in Article III.

It is understood between the two Contracting Powers that no subsequent alteration in the position of the median line of the river shall affect the ownership of the islands assigned to each of the two Powers by the *procès-verbal* of the Commissioners, after being duly approved by the two Governments.

Article VI. The two Contracting Powers engage reciprocally to treat with consideration ("bienveillance") the native Chiefs who, having had Treaties with one of them, shall, in virtue of the present Protocol, come under the sovereignty of the other.

Article VII. Each of the two Contracting Powers undertakes not to exercise any political action in the spheres of the other, as defined by Articles I., II., III. and IV. of the present Protocol.

It is understood by this that each Power will not, in the spheres of the other, make territorial acquisitions, conclude Treaties, accept sovereign rights or Protectorates, nor hinder nor dispute the influence of the other.

Article VIII. Her Britannic Majesty's Government will grant on lease to the Government of the French Republic, for the objects, and on the conditions specified in the form of lease annexed to the present Protocol, two pieces of ground to be selected by the Government of the French Republic in conjunction with Her Britannic Majesty's Government, one of which will be situated in a suitable spot on the right bank of the Niger between Leaba and the junction of the River Moussa (Mochi) with the former river, and the other on one of the mouths of the Niger. Each of these pieces of land shall have a river frontage not exceeding 400 metres in length, and shall form a block, the area of which shall not be less than 10 nor more than 50 hectares in extent. The exact boundaries of these pieces of land shall be shown on a plan annexed to each of the leases.

The conditions upon which the transit of merchandise shall be carried on on the Niger,

its affluents, its branches and outlets, as well as between the piece of ground between Leaba and the junction of the River Moussa (Mochi) mentioned above, and the point upon which the French frontier to be specified by the Government of the French Republic, will form the subject of Regulations, the details of which shall be discussed by the two Governments immediately after the signature of the present Protocol.

Her Britannic Majesty's Government undertake to give four months' notice to the French Government of any modification in the Regulations in question, in order to afford to the said French Government the opportunity of laying before the British Government any representations which it may wish to make.

Article IX. Within the limits defined on Map No. 2, which is annexed to the present Protocol, British subjects and British protected persons and French citizens and French protected persons, as far as regards their persons and goods, and the merchandise the produce or the manufacture of Great Britain and France, their respective colonies, possessions, and Protectorates, shall enjoy for thirty years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the Convention mentioned in Article V. the same treatment in all matters of river navigation, of commerce, and of tariff and fiscal treatment and taxes of all kinds.

Subject to this condition, each of the two Contracting Powers shall be free to fix, in its own territory, and as may appear to it most convenient, the tariff and fiscal treatment and taxes of all kinds.

In case neither of the two Contracting Powers shall have notified twelve months before the expiration of the above-mentioned term of thirty years its intention to put an end to the effects of the present Article, it shall remain in force until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the Contracting Powers shall have denounced it.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Delegates have drawn up and signed the present Protocol.

Done at Paris, in duplicate, the 14th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1898.

(Signed)	MARTIN GOSSELIN.
	WILLIAM EVERETT.
	RENE LECOMTE.
	G. BINGER.

ANNEXES 1 AND 2.

Maps Nos. 1 and 2. [Not reproduced in this volume. See map.]

ANNEX 3.

Although the delineation of the lines of demarcation on the two maps annexed to the present Protocol are supposed to be generally accurate, it cannot be considered as an absolutely correct representation of those lines until it has been confirmed by new surveys.

It is therefore agreed that the Commissioners or local Delegates of the two countries, hereafter appointed to delimit the whole or part of the frontiers on the ground, shall be guided by the description of the frontier as set forth in the Protocol.

They shall, at the same time, be permitted to modify the said lines of demarcation for the purpose of delineating them with greater accuracy, and also to rectify the position of the watersheds, roads, or rivers, as well as of towns or villages indicated on the maps above referred to.

Any alterations or corrections proposed by common consent by the said Commissioners or Delegates shall be submitted for the approval of their respective Governments.

(Signed)	MARTIN GOSSELIN.
	WILLIAM EVERETT.
	RENE LECOMTE.
	G. BINGER.

ANNEX 4.

Form of Lease.

1. The Government of Her Britannic Majesty grants in lease to the Government of the French Republic the piece of land situated _____ of the Niger River, having a river frontage _____ in length, and forming a block of _____ hectares in extent, the exact boundaries of which are shown on the plan annexed to this lease.

2. The lease shall run for thirty years uninterruptedly, commencing from the _____, but in case neither of the two Contracting Powers shall have notified twelve months before the expiration of the above-mentioned term of thirty years its intention to put an end to the present lease, it shall remain in force until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the Contracting Powers shall have denounced it.

3. The said land shall be subject to the laws for the time being in force in the British Protectorate of the Niger districts.

4. A portion of the land so leased, which shall not exceed 10 hectares in extent, shall be used exclusively for the purposes of the landing, storage, and transhipment of goods, and for such purposes as may be considered subsidiary thereto, and the only permanent residents shall be the persons employed in the charge and for the security of such goods, their families, and servants.

5. The Government of the French Republic binds itself—

(a.) To fence in that portion of the said land referred to in Article 4 of this lease (with the exception of the side which faces the River Niger) by a wall, or by a stockade, or by any other sort of continuous fence, which shall not be less in height than 3 metres. There shall be one door only on each of the three sides of the fence.

(b.) Not to permit on the said portion of land the receipt or exit of any goods in contravention of the British Customs Regulations. Any act in violation of this stipulation shall be considered as evasion of customs duties, and shall be punished accordingly.

(c.) Not to sell nor allow the sale of any goods in retail in the said portion of land. The sale of quantities less in weight or measure than 1,000 kilog., 1,000 litres, or 1,000 metres is held to be sale in retail. It is understood that this stipulation shall not apply to goods in transit.

(d.) The Government of the French Republic, or its sub-lessees or agents, shall have the right to build on the said portion of land, warehouses, houses for offices, and other buildings necessary for the operations of landing, storing, and transhipping goods, and also to construct on that part of the foreshore of the River Niger comprised in the lease, quays, bridges, and docks, and any other works required in connection with the said operations, provided that the designs of all works so to be constructed on the foreshore of the river are furnished to the British authorities for examination, in order to ascertain that these works would not in any way inconvenience the navigation of the river, or be in conflict with the rights of others or with the Customs system.

(e.) It is understood that the shipping, landing, and storing of goods on the said portion of land shall be conducted in all respects in accordance with the laws for the time being in force in the British Protectorate of the Niger districts.

6. The Government of the French Republic binds itself to pay annually to Her Majesty's Government, on the 1st January of each year, a rent of 1 fr.

7. The Government of the French Republic shall have the right to sublet the whole or any portion of the land passing under this lease, provided that the sub-lessees shall not use the land for any other purposes than those stipulated in this lease, and that the said Government shall remain responsible to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty for the observance of the stipulations of this lease.

8. The Government of Her Britannic Majesty binds itself to fulfil towards the lessee all duties incumbent upon it as owner of the said land.

9. At the expiration of the term of thirty years specified in Article 2 of this lease, the French Government, or its sub-lessees, may remain in possession and in the enjoyment for a period of time which, together with the said terms of thirty years, shall not exceed ninety.

nine years, of the constructions and installations which shall have been made on the leased land. Nevertheless, the Government of Her Britannic Majesty reserves to itself, on the expiration or determination of the lease, in accordance with the conditions specified in Article 2, the right of purchasing such constructions and installations at a valuation to be determined by experts who will be appointed by the two Governments, on the understanding that notification of their intention be furnished to the French Government ten months, at latest, before the expiration or determination of the lease. In case of disagreement between them, the experts shall choose a referee, whose decision shall be final.

In calculating the value of the above-mentioned constructions and installations, the experts shall be guided by the following considerations:—

(a.) In the event of the lease expiring at the end of the first thirty years, the purchase value of the property to be sold shall be the full market value.

(b.) In the event of the lease being determined at any time after thirty years, the value of the property to be sold shall be the full market value less a fraction, whose numerator shall be the number of years the lease has run, minus thirty, and whose denominator shall be sixty-nine.

10. The land comprised in the lease shall be measured and marked out without delay.

11. If a difference of opinion should arise between the two Governments as to the interpretation of the lease, or as to any matter arising in connection therewith, it shall be settled by the arbitration of a juriconsult of third nationality, to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

(Signed)

MARTIN GOSSELIN.
WILLIAM EVERETT.
RENE LACOMTE.
G. BINGER.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Paris within the period of six months, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the Undersigned have signed the present Convention and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate, at Paris, the 14th June, 1898.

(Signed)

EDMUND MONSON.
G. HANOTAUX.

PROTOCOL PROLONGING THE PERIOD FOR THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS.

Signed at Paris, December 8, 1898.

The Undersigned, his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Edmund Monson, G.C.B., Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, to the President of the French Republic; and his Excellency M. Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, duly authorised to this effect, have agreed as follows:—

The delay of six months, fixed by the Convention of the 14th June, 1898, for the exchange of the ratifications of the said Convention, is extended by six months and increased to one year.

Done at Paris, in duplicate, this 8th day of December, 1898.

(L.S.) (Signed)

EDMUND MONSON.
DELCASSE.

DECLARATION.

*Signed at London, March 21, 1899.**[Ratifications exchanged at Paris, June 13, 1899.]*

The undersigned, duly authorised by their Governments, have signed the following Declaration :—

The IVth Article of the Convention of the 14th June, 1898, shall be completed by the following provisions, which shall be considered as forming an integral part of it :—

1. Her Britannic Majesty's Government engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the west of the line of frontier defined in the following paragraph, and the Government of the French Republic engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the east of the same line.

2. The line of frontier shall start from the point where the boundary between the Congo Free State and French territory meets the water-parting between the watershed of the Nile and that of the Congo and its affluents. It shall follow in principle that water-parting up to its intersection with the 11th parallel of north latitude. From this point it shall be drawn as far as the 15th parallel in such manner as to separate, in principle, the Kingdom of Wadai from what constituted in 1882 the Province of Darfur; but it shall in no case be so drawn as to pass to the west beyond the 21st degree of longitude east of Greenwich (18° 40' east of Paris), or to the east beyond the 23rd degree of longitude east of Greenwich (20° 40' east of Paris).

3. It is understood, in principle, that to the north of the 15th parallel the French zone shall be limited to the north-east and east by a line which shall start from the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich (13° 40' east of Paris), shall run thence to the south-east until it meets the 24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich (21° 40' east of Paris), and shall then follow the 24th degree until it meets, to the north of the 15th parallel of latitude, the frontier of Darfur as it shall eventually be fixed.

4. The two Governments engage to appoint Commissioners who shall be charged to delimit on the spot a frontier line in accordance with the indications given in paragraph 2 of this Declaration. The result of their work shall be submitted for the approbation of their respective Governments.

It is agreed that the provisions of Article IX. of the Convention of the 14th June, 1898, shall apply equally to the territories situated to the south of the 14° 20' parallel of north latitude, and to the north of the 5th parallel of north latitude, between the 14° 20' meridian of longitude east of Greenwich (12th degree east of Paris) and the course of the Upper Nile.

Done at London, the 21st March, 1899.

(L. S.)	(Signed)	SALISBURY.
(L. S.)	(Signed)	PAUL CAMBON.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT (1895-96).

COPY "of STATEMENT of REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before
The House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening
the BUDGET."

Treasury Chambers,
2 May 1895.

JOHN T. HIBBERT.

STATEMENTS of the REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before The
House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening the
BUDGET.

EXPENDITURE, 1894-95.

Exchequer Issues in 1893-94.		Budget Estimate for 1894-95.	Exchequer Issues in 1894-95.
	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.		
£		£	£
25,000,000	National Debt Services :	25,000,000	25,000,000
200,000	(a) Inside the Fixed Charge	—	—
1,429,000	(b) Outside the Fixed Charge	—	—
1,681,000	Naval Defence Fund	1,653,000	1,642,000
28,310,000	Other Consolidated Fund Services	£26,653,000	26,642,000
	Total Consolidated Fund Services		
	II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
17,940,000	Army (including Ordnance Factories) ...	18,006,000	17,900,000
14,048,000	Navy	17,296,000	17,545,000
18,226,000	Civil Services	18,688,000	18,915,000
2,671,000	Customs and Inland Revenue	2,677,000	2,646,000
6,721,000	Post Office	7,038,000	6,869,000
2,664,000	Telegraph Service	2,777,000	2,674,000
723,000	Packet Service	749,000	727,000
10,108,000	Total Postal Services	£10,564,000	10,270,000
62,993,000	Total Supply Services	£67,231,000	67,276,000
91,303,000	Total Expenditure	£98,884,000	98,918,000

REVENUE, 1894-95.

Exchequer Receipts in 1893-94.		Budget Estimate for 1894-95.	Exchequer Receipts in 1894-95.
£ 19,707,000	Customs	£ 20,010,000	£ 20,115,000
	Inland Revenue :		
25,200,000	Excise	26,240,000	26,050,000
12,860,000	Stamps	14,080,000	14,440,000
1,035,000	Land Tax	1,030,000	1,015,000
1,425,000	House Duty	1,440,000	1,435,000
15,200,000	Property and Income Tax	15,530,000	15,600,000
55,720,000	Total Inland Revenue	£58,320,000	58,540,000
75,427,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	£78,330,000	78,655,000
10,470,000	Post Office	10,570,000	10,760,000
2,540,000	Telegraph Service	2,620,000	2,580,000
13,010,000	Total Postal Services	£13,190,000	13,340,000
420,000	Crown Lands	420,000	410,000
218,000	Interest on Suez Canal Shares, &c.	396,000	413,000
2,058,000	Miscellaneous	1,839,000	1,866,000
15,706,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue	£15,845,000	16,029,000
91,133,000	Total Revenue	£94,175,000	94,684,000

THE ACCOUNT FOR 1894-95 BALANCED.

	£
The Revenue (Exchequer Receipts) amounted to	94,684,000
The Expenditure (Exchequer Issues) amounted to	93,918,000
Therefore, the Revenue exceeded the Expenditure by	<u>£766,000</u>

NOTE.

It must be borne in mind that the National Account is an *Exchequer Account*, and the figures of Revenue given in this Paper refer to the sums received into the *Exchequer*. The Revenue is actually collected day by day in all parts of the country, and is remitted to head-quarters, *i.e.*, to the Chief Officers of Customs, Inland Revenue, &c., in London and Dublin, whence it is transferred day by day in round sums to the *Exchequer*. The exact heads and items of Revenue to which the Cash received belongs are not known until later, and hence the amounts paid into the *Exchequer* do not and cannot exactly tally with the accounts of *net receipts*, which gives the produce of each tax.

EXPENDITURE, 1895-96.

ESTIMATE ON BASIS OF EXISTING LIABILITY.

Exchequer Issues in 1894-95.		Budget Estimate for 1894-95.	Budget Estimate for 1895-96.
I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.			
£		£	£
25,000,000	National Debt Services	25,000,000	25,000,000
1,642,000	Other Consolidated Fund Services ...	1,653,000	1,625,000
26,642,000	Total Consolidated Fund Services £	26,653,000	26,625,000
II. SUPPLY SERVICES.			
17,900,000	Army (Including Ordnance Factories) ...	18,006,000	17,984,000
17,545,000	Navy	17,296,000	18,701,000
18,915,000	Civil Services	18,688,000	19,298,000
2,646,000	Customs and Inland Revenue	2,677,000	2,702,000
6,869,000	Post Office	7,038,000	7,134,000
2,674,000	Telegraph Service	2,777,000	2,805,000
727,000	Packet Service	749,000	732,000
10,270,000	Total Postal Services ... £	10,564,000	10,671,000
67,270,000	Total Supply Services ... £	67,231,000	69,356,000
93,918,000	Total Expenditure ... £	93,884,000	95,981,000

REVENUE, 1895-96.

ESTIMATE ON BASIS OF EXISTING TAXATION.

	Exchequer Receipts in 1894-95.	Estimate for 1895-96.
	£	£
Customs	20,115,000	20,240,000
Inland Revenue :		
Excise	26,050,000	25,450,000
Stamps	14,440,000	15,800,000
Land Tax	1,015,000	1,020,000
House Duty	1,435,000	1,450,000
Property and Income Tax	15,600,000	15,530,000
Total Inland Revenue	£ 58,540,000	59,250,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	78,655,000	79,490,000
Post Office	10,760,000	10,900,000
Telegraph Service	2,580,000	2,620,000
Total Postal Services	£ 13,340,000	13,520,000
Crown Lands	410,000	415,000
Interest on Suez Canal Shares, &c.	413,000	687,000
Miscellaneous	1,866,000	1,550,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Nox-Tax Revenue	£16,029,000	16,172,000
Total Revenue	£ 94,684,000	95,662,000

ACCOUNT for 1895-96, Balanced on the Basis of the present Law.

	£
Estimated Expenditure	95,981,000
Estimated Revenue	95,662,000
Estimated deficit	<u>£319,000</u>

No. V.
FINAL BALANCE SHEET, 1895-96, as proposed by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

ESTIMATED REVENUE.			1895-96.	ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE.		1895-96.
Customs	£	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.		£
Inland Revenue:	20,240,000	National Debt Services ...		25,000,000
Excise, as in Table IV.	...	25,450,000		Other Consolidated Fund Services ...		1,625,000
Renewal of additional 6d. per barrel on beer	...	500,000		Total Consolidated Fund Services		26,625,000
Stamps	25,950,000	II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
Land Tax	15,800,000	Army (including Ordnance Factories)		17,984,000
House Duty	1,020,000	Navy ...		18,701,000
Property and Income Tax	1,450,000	Civil Services ...		19,298,000
	15,530,000	Customs and Inland Revenue ...		2,702,000
Total Inland Revenue	59,750,000	Post Office...		7,134,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	79,990,000	Telegraph Service ...		2,805,000
Post Office...	10,900,000	Packet Service ...		732,000
Telegraph Service	2,620,000	Total Postal Services		10,671,000
Total Postal Services	13,520,000	Total Supply Services		69,356,000
Crown Lands	415,000	Total Estimated Expenditure		95,981,000
Interest on Suez Canal Shares, &c.	687,000	Balance for Contingencies		181,000
Miscellaneous	1,550,000			96,162,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue	16,172,000			
Total Estimated Revenue	96,162,000			

Treasury Chambers, }
2 May, 1895.

JOHN T. HIBBERT.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT (1896-97).

COPY "of STATEMENT of REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before
The House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening
the BUDGET."

Treasury Chambers,
16 April 1896.

R. W. HANBURY.

STATEMENTS of the REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before The
House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening the
BUDGET.

EXPENDITURE, 1895-1896.

Exchequer Issues in 1894-95.		Budget Estimate for 1895-96.	Exchequer Issues in 1895-96.
	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.		
£		£	£
25,000,000	National Debt Services	25,000,000	25,000,000
1,643,000	Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,625,000	1,601,000
26,643,000	Total Consolidated Fund Services ...	£26,625,000	26,601,000
	II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
17,900,000	Army (including Ordnance Factories) ...	17,984,000	18,460,000
17,545,000	Navy	18,701,000	19,724,000
18,915,000	Civil Services	19,298,000	19,800,000
2,646,000	Customs and Inland Revenue	2,702,000	2,702,000
6,869,000	Post Office	7,134,000	7,018,000
2,674,000	Telegraph Service	2,805,000	2,744,000
727,000	Packet Service... ..	732,000	715,000
10,270,000	Total Postal Services	£10,671,000	10,477,000
67,276,000	Total Supply Services	£69,356,000	71,163,000
93,919,000	Total Expenditure	£95,981,000	97,764,000

REVENUE, 1895-96.

Exchequer Receipts in 1894-95.		Budget Estimate for 1895-96.	Exchequer Receipts in 1895-96.
£		£	£
20,115,000	Customs	20,240,000	20,756,000
	Inland Revenue :		
26,050,000	Excise	25,950,000	26,800,000
8,719,000	Estate, &c., Duties	10,140,000	11,600,000
5,721,000	Stamps	5,660,000	7,350,000
1,015,000	Land Tax	1,020,000	1,015,000
1,435,000	House Duty	1,450,000	1,495,000
15,600,000	Property and Income Tax	15,530,000	16,100,000
58,540,000	Total Inland Revenue	£59,750,000	64,360,000
78,655,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	£79,990,000	85,116,000
10,760,000	Post Office	10,900,000	11,380,000
2,580,000	Telegraph Service	2,620,000	2,840,000
13,340,000	Total Postal Services	£13,520,000	14,220,000
410,000	Crown Lands	415,000	415,000
413,000	Interest on Suez Canal Shares, &c	687,000	690,000
1,866,000	Miscellaneous	1,550,000	1,533,000
16,029,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue	£16,172,000	16,858,000
94,684,000	Total Revenue	£96,162,000	101,974,000

THE ACCOUNT FOR 1895-96 BALANCED.

	£
The Revenue (Exchequer Receipts) amounted to	101,974,000
The Expenditure (Exchequer Issues) amounted to	97,764,000
Therefore, the Revenue exceeded the Expenditure by	£4,210

NOTE.

It must be borne in mind that the National Account is an *Exchequer Account*, and the figures of Revenue given in this Paper refer to the sums received into the *Exchequer*. The Revenue is actually collected day by day in all parts of the country, and is remitted to head-quarters, *i.e.*, to the Chief Officers of Customs, Inland Revenue, &c., in London and Dublin, whence it is transferred day by day in round sums to the *Exchequer*. The exact heads and items of Revenue to which the Cash received belongs are not known until later, and hence the amounts paid into the Exchequer do not and cannot exactly tally with the accounts of *net receipts*, which give the produce of each tax.

EXPENDITURE, 1896-97.

ESTIMATE ON BASIS OF EXISTING LIABILITY.

Exchequer Issues in 1895-96.		Budget Estimate for 1895-96.	Budget Estimate for 1896-97.
	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.		
£ 25,000,000	National Debt Services	£ 25,000,000	£ 25,000,000
1,601,000	Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,625,000	1,660,000
26,601,000	Total Consolidated Fund Services	£ 26,625,000	26,660,000
	II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
18,460,000	Army (including Ordnance Factories) ...	17,984,000	18,056,000
19,724,000	Navy	18,701,000	21,823,000
19,800,000	Civil Services	19,298,000	19,795,000
2,702,000	Customs and Inland Revenue	2,702,000	2,735,000
7,018,000	Post Office	7,134,000	7,242,000
2,744,000	Telegraph Service	2,805,000	3,009,000
715,000	Packet Service	732,000	727,000
10,477,000	Total Postal Services ...	£ 10,671,000	10,978,000
71,163,000	Total Supply Services ...	£ 69,356,000	73,387,000
97,764,000	Total Expenditure ...	£ 95,981,000	100,047,000

REVENUE, 1896-97.

ESTIMATE ON BASIS OF EXISTING TAXATION.

	Exchequer Receipts in 1895 96.	Estimate for 1896-97, at present Rate of Taxation.
	£	£
Customs	20,756,000	21,020,000
Inland Revenue :		
Excise	26,800,000	27,000,000
Estate, &c., Duties	11,600,000	10,950,000
Stamps	7,350,000	6,700,000
Land Tax	1,015,000	1,000,000
House Duty... ..	1,495,000	1,475,000
Property and Income Tax	16,100,000	16,200,000
Total Inland Revenue	£ 64,360,000	63,325,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	85,116,000	84,345,000
Post Office	11,380,000	11,660,000
Telegraph Service	2,840,000	2,940,000
Total Postal Services	£ 14,220,000	14,600,000
Crown Lands	415,000	415,000
Suez Canal Share Receipts	* 674,000	695,000
Miscellaneous	* 1,549,000	1,700,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue £	16,858,000	17,410,000
Total Revenue	£ 101,974,000	101,750,000

ACCOUNT for 1896-97, Balanced on the Basis of the present Law.

	£
Estimated Expenditure	100,047,000
Estimated Revenue	101,755,000
Estimated Surplus	£1,708,000

* Adjusted for comparison.

No. V.
FINAL BALANCE SHEET, 1896-97, as proposed by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

ESTIMATED REVENUE.		1896-97.	ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE.	1896-97.
Customs		£ 21,020,000	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES. National Debt Services	£ 25,000,000
Excise		27,000,000		
Estate, &c., Duties		£ 10,950,000	Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,660,000
Deduct estimated loss by :—				
1. Proposed amendment of Estate Duty Law		£ 200,000	Total Consolidated Fund Services	26,660,000
2. Amount required for the Agricultural Rates Bill in England, and for proportionate grants to Scotland and Ireland...		975,000		
Stamps		1,175,000	I SUPPLY SERVICES. Army (including Ordnance Factories)...	18,056,000
Land Tax		1,000,000		
Deduct estimated loss by proposed amendments of Land Tax Law		100,000	Navy	21,823,000
House Duty			Civil Services	19,795,000
Property and Income Tax			Customs and Inland Revenue	2,735,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes		£ 83,070,000	Post Office... ..	7,242,000
Post Office... ..			Telegraph Service	3,009,000
Telegraph Service			Packet Service	727,000
Crown Lands			Total Supply Services	73,387,000
Suez Canal Share Receipts			Total Estimated Expenditure	100,047,000
Miscellaneous			Balance for Contingencies (including any additional Charge under the Education Bill)	433,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue		£ 17,410,000		
Total Estimated Revenue		£ 100,480,000		100,480,000

Treasury Chambers, 16 April, 1896. R. W. HANBURY.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT (1897-98).

COPY "of STATEMENT of REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before
The House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening
the BUDGET."

Treasury Chambers,
29 April 1897.

R. W. HANBURY.

STATEMENTS of the REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before The
House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening the
BUDGET.

EXPENDITURE, 1896-97.

CHARGED AGAINST REVENUE.

	Total Estimated Expenditure. [Supple- mentary Esti- mates marked thus *]	Exchequer Issues.
I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.		
National Debt Services	£ 25,000,000	£ 25,000,000
Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,660,000	1,643,000
Total Consolidated Fund Services	£ 26,660,000	26,643,000
II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
Army (including Ordnance Factories)	{ 18,055,000 400,000*	} 18,270,000
Navy	{ 21,823,000 513,000*	} 22,170,000
Civil Services	{ 19,795,000 560,000*	} 20,045,000
Customs and Inland Revenue	{ 2,735,000 7,000*	} 2,716,000
Post Office	7,242,000	7,150,000
Telegraph Service	3,009,000	2,961,000
Packet Service	727,000	723,000
Egyptian Government, Grant in Aid	799,000*	799,000
Total Supply Services	£ { 73,386,000 2,279,000*	} 74,834,000
Total Expenditure	£ { 100,046,000 2,279,000*	} 101,477,000

REVENUE, 1896-97.

PAID INTO THE EXCHEQUER.

Exchequer Receipts in 1895-96.		Budget Estimate for 1896-97.	Exchequer Receipts in 1896-97.
£		£	£
20,756,000	Customs	21,020,000	21,254,000
	Inland Revenue :		
26,800,000	Excise	27,000,000	27,460,000
11,600,000	Estate, &c., Duties	9,775,000	10,830,000
7,350,000	Stamps	6,700,000	7,350,000
1,015,000	Land Tax	900,000	920,000
1,495,000	House Duty	1,475,000	1,510,000
16,100,000	Property and Income Tax	16,200,000	16,650,000
64,360,000	Total Inland Revenue ...	£ 62,050,000	64,720,000
85,116,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	£ 83,070,000	85,974,000
11,380,000	Post Office	11,660,000	11,860,000
2,840,000	Telegraph Service	2,940,000	2,910,000
415,000	Crown Lands	415,000	415,000
674,000	Suez Canal Share Receipts	695,000	694,000
1,549,000	Miscellaneous	1,700,000	2,097,000
16,858,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue ...	£ 17,410,000	17,976,000
101,974,000	Total Revenue	£ 100,480,000	103,950,000

THE EXCHEQUER ACCOUNT FOR 1896-97 BALANCED.

	£
The Revenue (Exchequer Receipts) amounted to	103,950,000
The Expenditure (Exchequer Issues) amounted to	101,477,000
Therefore, the Revenue exceeded the Expenditure by	<u>£2,473,000</u>

NOTE.

It must be borne in mind that the National Account is an *Exchequer* Account, and the figures of Revenue given in this Paper refer to the sums received into the *Exchequer*. The Revenue is actually collected day by day in all parts of the country, and is remitted to head-quarters, *i.e.*, to the Chief Officers of Customs, Inland Revenue, &c., if London and Dublin, whence it is transferred day by day in round sums to the *Exchequer*. The exact heads and items of Revenue to which the Cash received belongs are not known until later, and hence the amounts paid into the Exchequer do not and cannot exactly tally with the accounts of *net receipts*, which give the produce of each tax.

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE, 1897-98.

ON BASIS OF ESTIMATES PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT.

Budget Estimate for 1896-97.		Budget Estimate for 1897-98.
£	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.	£
25,000,000	National Debt Services	25,000,000
1,660,000	Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,650,000
26,660,000	Total Consolidated Fund Services £	26,650,000
	II. SUPPLY SERVICES.	
18,056,000	Army (including Ordnance Factories)	18,141,000
21,823,000	Navy	21,838,000
19,795,000	Civil Services ... { Original ... £20,168,000 Additional ... 1,000	20,169,000
2,735,000	Customs and Inland Revenue	2,762,000
7,242,000	Post Office ... { Original ... £7,467,000 Additional ... 110,000	7,577,000
8,009,000	Telegraph Service ... { Original ... £3,149,000 Additional ... 29,000	3,178,000
727,000	Packet Service	750,000
73,887,000	Total Supply Services £	74,415,000
100,047,000	Total Expenditure... .. £	101,065,000

REVENUE, 1897-98.

ESTIMATE ON BASIS OF EXISTING TAXATION.

	Exchequer Receipts in 1896-97.	Estimate for 1897-98, at present Rate of Taxation.
	£	£
Customs	21,254,000	21,500,000
Inland Revenue:		
Excise	27,460,000	27,750,000
Estate, &c., Duties... ..	10,830,000	9,700,000
Stamps	7,350,000	7,000,000
Land Tax	920,000	900,000
House Duty... ..	1,510,000	1,500,000
Property and Income Tax... ..	16,650,000	16,900,000
Total Inland Revenue	£ 64,720,000	63,750,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	£ 85,974,000	85,250,000
Post Office	11,860,000	12,210,000
Telegraph Service	2,910,000	2,960,000
Crown Lands	415,000	415,000
Interest on Suez Canal Shares, &c.	694,000	750,000
Miscellaneous	2,097,000	1,775,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue	£ 17,976,000	18,110,000
Total Revenue... ..	£ 103,950,000	103,360,000

ACCOUNT PROVISIONALLY BALANCED.

Revenue as in Table V.... ..	£	103,360,000
Expenditure as in Table IV.	£ 101,065,000	
Add,—Estimated Amounts to be provided for—		
<i>a.</i> Voluntary Schools	616,000	
<i>b.</i> Board Schools	110,000	
Total	£ 101,791,000	
Disposable Surplus	£.	1,569,000

FINAL BALANCE SHEET, 1897-98, as proposed by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

ESTIMATED REVENUE.		1897-98.	ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE.		1897-98.
Customs	£ 21,500,000	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.	...	£
Inland Revenue:	...		National Debt Services	25,000,000
Excise	27,750,000	Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,650,000
Estate, &c., Duties	9,700,000	Total Consolidated Fund Services	£	26,650,000
Stamps	7,000,000	II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
Land Tax	900,000	Army (including Ordnance Factories), as in Table IV.	£ 18,141,000	
House Duty	1,500,000	Supplementary Estimate to be presented	200,000	
Property and Income Tax	16,900,000	Navy, as in Table IV.	£ 21,838,000	18,341,000
Total Inland Revenue... ..	£	63,750,000	Supplementary Estimate to be presented	500,000	
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	£	85,250,000	Civil Services, as in Table IV.	20,169,000	22,338,000
Post Office Services as in Table V.	£ 15,170,000		Addition on account of Voluntary and Board Schools Grants	726,000	
Estimated Loss due to Proposed Changes	316,000		Customs and Inland Revenue	20,895,000
Crown Lands	14,854,000	Post Office... ..	£ 7,577,000	2,762,000
Interest on Suez Canal Shares, &c.	415,000	Telegraph Service	3,178,000	
Miscellaneous	750,000	Packet Service	750,000	
Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue	£	1,775,000	Total as in Table IV.	11,505,000	
			Estimated Addition due to Proposed Changes	50,000	
			Total Supply Services	11,555,000
			Total Estimated Expenditure	£	75,891,000
			Balance for Contingencies	£	102,541,000
					503,000
					103,044,000

Treasury Chambers, 29 April, 1897.

R. W. HANBURY.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT (1898-99).

COPY "of STATEMENT of REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before
The House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening
the BUDGET."

Treasury Chambers,
21 April, 1898.

R. W. HANBURY.

STATEMENTS of the REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before The
House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening the
BUDGET.

EXPENDITURE, 1897-98.

CHARGED AGAINST REVENUE.

	Total Estimated Expenditure. [Supple- mentary Esti- mates marked thus *]	Exchequer Issues.
I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.	£	£
National Debt Services	25,000,000	25,000,000
Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,650,000	1,886,000
Total Consolidated Fund Services	£ 26,650,000	26,886,000
II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
Army (including Ordnance Factories)	18,141,000 1,490,000*	19,330,000
Navy	21,838,000 500,000*	20,850,000
Civil Services	20,895,000 921,000*	21,560,000
Customs and Inland Revenue	2,762,000	2,745,000
Post Office	7,575,000 95,000*	7,592,000
Telegraph Service	3,178,000 96,000*	3,226,000
Packet Service	750,000	747,000
Total Supply Services	£ { 75,141,000 3,102,000*	76,050,000
Total Expenditure	£ { 101,791,000 3,102,000*	102,936,000

REVENUE, 1897-98.

PAID INTO THE EXCHEQUER.

Exchequer Receipts in 1896-97.		Budget Estimate for 1897-98.	Exchequer Receipts in 1897-98.
£		£	£
21,254,000	Customs	21,500,000	21,798,000
	Inland Revenue :		
27,460,000	Excise	27,750,000	28,300,000
10,830,000	Estate, &c., Duties	9,700,000	11,100,000
7,350,000	Stamps	7,000,000	7,650,000
920,000	Land Tax	900,000	940,000
1,510,000	House Duty	1,500,000	1,510,000
16,650,000	Property and Income Tax	16,900,000	17,250,000
64,720,000	Total Inland Revenue ... £	63,750,000	66,750,000
85,974,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes £	85,250,000	88,548,000
11,860,000	Post Office	11,935,000	12,170,000
2,910,000	Telegraph Service	2,919,000	3,010,000
415,000	Crown Lands	415,000	415,000
731,000	Interest on Suez Canal Shares, &c.	750,000	734,000
2,060,000	Miscellaneous	1,775,000	1,737,000
17,976,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue £	17,794,000	18,066,000
103,950,000	Total Revenue £	103,044,000	106,614,000

THE EXCHEQUER ACCOUNT FOR 1897-98 BALANCED.

	£
The Revenue (Exchequer Receipts) amounted to	106,614,000
The Expenditure (Exchequer Issues) amounted to	102,936,000
Therefore, the Revenue exceeded the Expenditure by	<u>£3,678,000</u>

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE, 1898-99.

ON BASIS OF ESTIMATES PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT.

Budget Estimate for 1897-98.		Budget Estimate for 1898-99.
	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.	
£		£
25,000,000	National Debt Services	25,000,000
1,650,000	Other Consolidated Fund Services	2,010,000
26,650,000	Total Consolidated Fund Services ... £	27,010,000
	II. SUPPLY SERVICES.	
18,341,000	Army (including Ordnance Factories)	19,221,000
22,338,000	Navy	23,778,000
20,895,000	Civil Services	21,793,000
2,762,000	Customs and Inland Revenue	2,836,000
7,627,000	Post Office	8,002,000
3,178,000	Telegraph Service	3,365,000
750,000	Packet Service	824,000
75,891,000	Total Supply Services £	79,819,000
102,541,000	Total Expenditure £	106,829,000

ESTIMATED REVENUE, 1898-99.

ON BASIS OF EXISTING TAXATION.

	Exchequer Receipts in 1897-98.	Estimate for 1898-99, at present Rate of Taxation.
	£	£
Customs	21,798,000	22,200,000
Inland Revenue:		
Excise	28,300,000	28,950,000
Estate, &c., Duties	11,100,000	10,950,000
Stamps	7,650,900	7,600,000
Land Tax	940,000	930,000
House Duty	1,510,000	1,570,000
Property and Income Tax... ..	17,250,000	17,800,000
Total Inland Revenue	£ 66,750,000	67,800,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	£ 88,548,000	90,000,000
Post Office	12,170,000	12,600,000
Telegraph Service	3,010,000	3,140,000
Crown Lands	415,000	430,000
Interest on Suez Canal Shares, &c.	734,000	715,000
Miscellaneous	1,737,000	1,730,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue	£ 18,066,000	18,615,000
Total Revenue	£ 106,614,000	108,615,000

ACCOUNT for 1898-99 Balanced on the Basis of the present Law.

Estimated Revenue as in Table V.	£
Estimated Expenditure as in Table IV.	108,615,000
Surplus	106,829,000
	£1,786,000

FINAL BALANCE SHEET, 1898-99, as proposed by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

ESTIMATED REVENUE.		1898-99.	ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE.	1898-99.
Customs, as in Table V.		£		£
Reduction of Duty on unmanufactured Tobacco	...	22,200,000		
Inland Revenue:				
Excise...	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.	
Estate, &c., Duties, as in Table V.	...	10,950,000	National Debt Services
Revision of Legacy and Succession Duties	...	280,000	Other Consolidated Fund Services
Stamps	Total Consolidated Fund Services	£
Land Tax, as in Table V.	...	980,000		27,010,000
Exemption extended	...	5,000		
House Duty	II. SUPPLY SERVICES.	
Property and Income Tax as in Table V.	...	17,800,000	Army (including Ordnance Factories)	...
Extended Abatements	...	100,000	Navy	...
Total Inland Revenue	...	£	Civil Service	...
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes	...	£	Customs and Inland Revenue	...
Post Office	Post Office	...
Telegraph Service	Telegraph Service	...
Crown Lands	Packet Service	...
Interest on Suez Canal Shares, &c.	Total Supply Services	...
Miscellaneous	Total Estimated Expenditure	£
Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue	...	£	Balance for Contingencies	...
Total Estimated Revenue	...	£		£
				107,110,000

Treasury Chambers,
21st April 1898.

R. W. HANBURY.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT (1899-1900).

COPY "of STATEMENT of REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before
The House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening
the BUDGET."

Treasury Chambers,
13 April, 1899.

R. W. HANBURY.

STATEMENTS of the REVENUE and EXPENDITURE as laid before The
House by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER when opening the
BUDGET.

EXPENDITURE, 1898-99.
CHARGED AGAINST REVENUE.

	Total Estimated Expenditure. [Supple- mentary Esti- mates marked thus *]	Exchequer Issues.
I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.	£	£
National Debt Services	25,000,000	25,000,000
Other Consolidated Fund Services	2,010,000	2,044,000
Total Consolidated Fund Services	£ 27,010,000	27,044,000
II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
Army (including Ordnance Factories)	{ 19,221,000 885,000*	} 20,000,000
Navy	{ 23,778,000 350,000*	} 24,068,000
Civil Services	{ 21,793,000 649,000*	} 22,025,000
Customs and Inland Revenue	{ 2,836,000	} 2,816,000
Post Office	{ 8,002,000 97,000*	} 8,030,000
Telegraph Service	{ 3,365,000 5,000*	} 3,347,000
Packet Service	{ 824,000	} 820,000
Total Supply Services	£ { 79,819,000 1,986,000*	} 81,106,000
Total Expenditure	£ { 106,829,000 1,986,000*	} 108,150,000

REVENUE, 1898-99.

PAID INTO THE EXCHEQUER.

Exchequer Receipts in 1897-98.		Budget Estimate for 1898-99.	Exchequer Receipts in 1898-99.
£		£	£
21,798,000	Customs	21,080,000	20,850,000
	Inland Revenue:		
28,300,000	Excise	28,950,000	29,200,000
11,100,000	Estate, &c., Duties	10,670,000	11,400,000
7,650,000	Stamps	7,600,000	7,630,000
940,000	Land Tax	925,000	770,000
1,510,000	House Duty	1,570,000	1,600,000
17,250,000	Property and Income Tax	17,700,000	18,000,000
66,750,000	Total Inland Revenue ... £	67,415,000	68,600,000
88,548,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes £	88,495,000	89,450,000
12,170,000	Post Office	12,600,000	12,710,000
3,010,000	Telegraph Service	3,140,000	3,150,000
415,000	Crown Lands	430,000	430,000
736,000	Receipts from Suez Canal Shares and sundry Loans	715,000	713,000
1,735,000	Miscellaneous	1,730,000	1,883,000
18,066,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue £	18,615,000	18,886,000
106,614,000	Total Revenue £	107,110,000	108,336,000

THE EXCHEQUER ACCOUNT FOR 1898-99 BALANCED.

	£
The Revenue (Exchequer Receipts) amounted to ...	108,336,000
The Expenditure (Exchequer Issues) amounted to ...	108,150,000
Therefore, the Revenue exceeded the Expenditure by ...	<u>£186,000</u>

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE, 1899-1900.

ON BASIS OF ESTIMATES PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT.

	Budget Estimate for 1898-99.	Budget Estimate for 1899-1900.
I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.	£	£
National Debt Services	25,000,000	25,000,000
Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,605,000	1,603,000
Payments to Local Taxation Accounts	405,000	1,147,000
Total Consolidated Fund Services ... £	27,010,000	27,750,000
II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
Army (including Ordnance Factories)	19,221,000	20,617,000
Navy	23,778,000	26,595,000
Civil Services	21,793,000	22,180,000
Customs and Inland Revenue	2,836,000	2,813,000
Post Office	8,002,000	8,553,000
Telegraph Service	3,865,000	3,638,000
Packet Service	824,000	781,000
Total Supply Services £	79,819,000	85,177,000
Total Expenditure £	106,829,000	112,927,000

ESTIMATED REVENUE, 1899-1900.

ON BASIS OF EXISTING TAXATION.

	Exchequer Receipts in 1898-99.	Estimate for 1899-1900, at present Rate of Taxation.
	£	£
Customs	20,850,000	21,350,000
Inland Revenue :		
Excise	29,200,000	29,850,000
Estate, &c., Duties... ..	11,400,000	11,150,000
Stamps	7,630,000	7,600,000
Land Tax	770,000	800,000
House Duty... ..	1,600,000	1,650,000
Property and Income Tax	18,000,000	18,300,000
Total Inland Revenue £	68,600,000	69,350,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes £	89,450,000	90,700,000
Post Office... ..	12,710,000	13,200,000
Telegraph Service	3,150,000	3,300,000
Crown Lands	430,000	450,000
Receipts from Suez Canal Shares and sundry Loans	713,000	787,000
Miscellaneous	1,883,000	1,850,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue £	18,886,000	19,587,000
Total Revenue £	108,336,000	110,287,000

FINAL BALANCE SHEET, 1899-1900, as proposed by the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

ESTIMATED REVENUE.		1899-1900.	ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE.		1899-1900.
Customs as in Table V.		£ 21,350,000	I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.		£
Add:			National Debt Services as in Table IV. ...		£ 25,000,000
Amount receivable from Wine duty proposals		420,000	Deduct:		
Inland Revenue:			Proposed Diminution		2,000,000
Excise...	Other Consolidated Fund Services ...		23,000,000
Estate, &c., Duties	Payments to Local Taxation Accounts ...		1,603,000
Stamps as in Table V.	7,600,000	Total Consolidated Fund Services ...		1,147,000
Add:					25,750,000
Amount receivable from Stamp duty proposals	450,000	II. SUPPLY SERVICES.		
Land Tax	Army (including Ordnance Factories)...		20,617,000
House Duty	Navy		26,595,000
Property and Income Tax	Civil Services		22,180,000
Total Inland Revenue	£	Customs and Inland Revenue ...		2,813,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes...	...	£	Post Office... ..		8,553,000
Post Office...	Telegraph Service		3,638,000
Telegraph Service	Packet Service		781,000
Crown Lands	Total Supply Services ...		£ 85,177,000
Receipts from Suez Canal Shares and sundry Loans	Total Estimated Expenditure ...		£ 110,927,000
Miscellaneous	Balance for Contingencies ...		£ 230,000
Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue	£	19,587,000			
Total Estimated Revenue	£	111,157,000			

Treasury Chambers, 13 April, 1899.

R. W. HANBURY.

TABLE I. showing how the Amount issued from the Exchequer to meet the Expenditure in 1899-1900 compares with the Estimated Expenditure, (1) exclusive, and (2) inclusive of War Charges.

1899-1900.					
	Total Expenditure provided for in the Budget.	Additional Expenditure for which Supplementary Estimates were presented.	Total Estimated Expenditure.	Amount issued to meet Total Expenditure.	Exchequer Issues. — More (+) or Less (—) than Total Estimated Expenditure.
I. EXCLUSIVE OF WAR CHARGES.					
I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.					
1. National Debt Services	£ 23,000,000	£ —	£ 23,000,000	£ 23,000,000	£ —
2. Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,603,000	—	1,603,000	1,584,000	19,000
3. Payments to Local Taxation Accounts	1,147,000	—	1,147,000	1,150,000	3,000
Total Consolidated Fund Services	25,750,000	—	25,750,000	25,734,000	16,000
II. SUPPLY SERVICES.					
1. Army (including Ordnance Factories)	20,617,000	47,000	20,664,000	20,600,000	64,000
2. Navy	26,595,000	—	26,595,000	26,000,000	595,000
3. Civil Services	22,180,000	698,000	22,878,000	22,530,000	348,000
4. Customs	847,000	—	847,000	840,000	7,000
5. Inland Revenue	1,966,000	—	1,966,000	1,960,000	6,000
6. Post Office	8,533,000	—	8,533,000	8,480,000	53,000
7. Telegraph Service	3,638,000	—	3,638,000	3,601,000	37,000
8. Packet Service	781,000	—	781,000	760,000	21,000
Total Supply Services	85,177,000	745,000	85,922,000	84,771,000	1,151,000
Grand Total (exclusive of War Charges)	110,927,000	745,000	111,672,000	110,505,000	1,167,000

	1899-1900.				
	Total Expenditure provided for in the Budget.	Additional Expenditure for which Supplementary Estimates were presented.	Total Estimated Expenditure.	Amount issued to meet Total Expenditure.	Exchequer Issues. — More (+) or Less (—) than Total Estimated Expenditure.
2. INCLUSIVE OF WAR CHARGES.					
Grand Total (as above)	£ 110,927,000	£ 745,000	£ 111,672,000	£ 110,505,000	£ — 1,167,000
I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.					
Interest on Treasury (War) Bills	—	—	—	217,000	+ 217,000
II. SUPPLY SERVICES.					
Grants to meet War Charges	—	23,000,000	23,000,000	23,000,000	—
Grand Total (inclusive of War Charges)	£ 110,927,000	£ 23,745,000	£ 134,672,000	£ 133,722,000	£ — 950,000
In order to show the entire expenditure for which the State was responsible in 1899-1900, there have to be added (1) the expenditure to which the Public Revenue paid into the Local Taxation Accounts is devoted, and (2) the expenditure chargeable to Capital Account. These additions are made in the following statement.					
I. Expenditure chargeable against Exchequer Revenue as in above table					
II. Expenditure chargeable against Local Taxation Revenue	£ 133,722,000	£ 9,917,000	£ 143,639,000	£ 4,847,000	£ 148,486,000
III. Expenditure chargeable against Capital					
Total	£ 133,722,000	£ 9,917,000	£ 143,639,000	£ 4,847,000	£ 148,486,000

TABLE II.—Showing how the Exchequer Receipts in 1899-1900 compare with the Budget Estimate and with the Exchequer Receipts of the previous year (1898-99).

Exchequer Receipts in 1898-99.		Budget Estimate for 1899-1900.	Exchequer Receipts in 1899-1900.
£		£	£
20,850,000	Customs	21,770,000	23,800,000
29,200,000	Excise	29,850,000	32,100,000
11,400,000	Estate, &c., Duties	11,150,000	14,020,000
7,630,000	Stamps	8,050,000	8,500,000
770,000	Land Tax	800,000	790,000
1,600,000	House Duty	1,650,000	1,670,000
18,000,000	Property and Income Tax	18,300,000	18,750,000
89,450,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Taxes £	91,570,000	99,630,000
12,710,000	Post Office	13,200,000	13,300,000
3,150,000	Telegraph Service	3,300,000	3,350,000
430,000	Crown Lands	450,000	450,000
713,000	Receipts from Suez Canal Shares and sundry Loans	787,000	834,000
1,883,000	Miscellaneous	1,850,000	2,276,000
18,886,000	Total Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue £	19,587,000	20,210,000
108,336,000	Totals £	111,157,000	119,840,000

TABLE IV.—Giving the National Balance Sheet of 1899-1900 (1) exclusive and (2) inclusive of War Charges.

1. EXCLUSIVE OF WAR CHARGES.

Revenue.	Expenditure.
£	£
I.—Exchequer Receipts from Taxes (as in Table II.) ... 99,630,000	I.—Consolidated Fund Services (as in Table I.) ... 25,734,000
II.—Exchequer Receipts from Non-Tax Revenue (as in Table II.) 20,210,000	II.—Supply Services (as in Table I.) 84,771,000
	Total 110,505,000
	Surplus 9,335,000
Total 119,840,000	Total 119,840,000

2. INCLUSIVE OF WAR CHARGES.

£	£
Total Revenue (as above) ... 119,840,000	Total Expenditure (as above) 110,505,000
Deficiency 13,882,000	Add War Charges :
	(1) Interest on Treasury Bills 217,000
	(2) Army Grants 23,000,000
Total 133,722,000	Total 133,722,000

1900-1901.

TABLE V.—Showing how the Provision to be made in the Budget of 1900-1 (according to Estimates presented) compares with the provision made in the Budget of 1899-1900 (1) exclusive, and (2) inclusive of War Charges.

Service.	Provision made in Budget of 1899-1900.	Provision to be made in Budget of 1900-1 according to Original Estimates presented.	More (+) or less (—) than the Budget Estimate for 1899-1900.
1. EXCLUSIVE OF WAR CHARGES.			
I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.	£	£	£
1. National Debt Services	23,000,000	23,000,000	—
2. Other Consolidated Fund Services... ..	1,603,000	1,600,000	— 3,000
3. Payments to Local Taxation Accounts	1,147,000	1,150,000	+ 3,000
Total Consolidated Fund Services	25,750,000	25,750,000	—
II. SUPPLY SERVICES.			
1. Army (including Ordnance Factories)	20,617,000	23,703,000	+ 3,086,000
2. Navy	26,595,000	27,523,000	+ 928,000
3. Civil Services (Miscellaneous)	22,180,000	22,839,000	+ 659,000
4. Customs and Inland Revenue	2,813,000	2,833,000	+ 20,000
5. Post Office	8,553,000	8,844,000	+ 291,000
6. Telegraph Service	3,638,000	3,770,000	+ 132,000
7. Packet Service	781,000	773,000	— 8,000
Total Supply Services	85,177,000	90,285,000	+ 5,108,000
Grand Total (exclusive of War Charges)	110,927,000	116,035,000	+ 5,108,000
2. INCLUSIVE OF WAR CHARGES.			
	£	£	£
Grand Total (as above)	110,927,000	116,035,000	+ 5,108,000
I. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERVICES.			
National Debt Services:			
1. Interest on Treasury (War) Bills	—	250,000	+ 250,000
2. Interest on War Loan	—	619,000	+ 619,000
II. SUPPLY SERVICES.			
Army (Extraordinary Charges to meet War Expenditure)	—	37,797,000	+ 37,797,000
Grand Total (inclusive of War Charges)...	110,927,000	154,701,000	+ 43,774,000

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

THE UITLANDERS' PETITION.

The HUMBLE PETITION (Signatures: 21,684. Transmitted March, 1899) of BRITISH SUBJECTS resident on the Witwatersrand, South African Republic, to HER MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY QUEEN VICTORIA,

Sheweth that:—

1. For a number of years, prior to 1896, considerable discontent existed among the Uitlander population of the South African Republic, caused by the manner in which the Government of the country was being conducted. The great majority of the Uitlander population consists of British subjects.

2. It was, and is, notorious that the Uitlanders have no share in the government of the country, although they constitute an absolute majority of the inhabitants of this State, possess a very large proportion of the land, and represent the intellect, wealth and energy of the State.

3. The feelings of intense irritation which have been aroused by this state of things have been aggravated by the manner in which remonstrances have been met. Hopes have been held out and promises have been made by the Government of this State from time to time, but no practical amelioration of the conditions of life has resulted.

4. Petitions, signed by large numbers of Your Majesty's subjects, have been repeatedly addressed to the Government of this State, but have failed of their effect, and have even been scornfully rejected.

5. At the end of 1895 the discontent culminated in an armed insurrection against the Government of this State, which, however, failed of its object.

6. On that occasion the people of Johannesburg placed themselves unreservedly in the hands of Your Majesty's High Commissioner, in the fullest confidence that he would see justice done to them.

7. On that occasion also President Kruger published a proclamation, in which he again held out hopes of substantial reforms.

8. Instead, however, of the admitted grievances being redressed, the spirit of the legislation adopted by the Volksraad during the past few years has been of a most unfriendly character, and has made the position of the Uitlanders more irksome than before.

9. In proof of the above statement, Your Majesty's petitioners would humbly refer to such measures as the following:—

The Immigration of Aliens Act (Law 30 of 1896);

The Press Law (Law 26 of 1896);

The Aliens Expulsion Law of 1896.

Of these, the first was withdrawn at the instance of Your Majesty's Government, as being an infringement of the London Convention of 1884.

By the second the President is invested with the powers of suppressing wholly, or for a stated time, any publication which in his individual opinion is opposed to good manners or subversive of order. This despotic power he has not hesitated to exercise towards newspapers which support British interests, while newspapers which support the Government have been allowed to publish inflammatory and libellous articles, and to advocate atrocious crimes without interference.

The Aliens Expulsion Act draws a distinction between the burghers of the State and Uitlanders which, Your Majesty's petitioners humbly submit, is in conflict with the Convention of 1884. Thus, whilst burghers of the State are protected from expulsion, British subjects can be put over the border at the will of the President, without the right of appealing to the High Court, which is, nevertheless, open to the offending burgher. This law was repealed, only to be re-enacted in all its essential provisions during the last session of the Volksraad.

10. The promise made by the President with regard to conferring municipal government upon Johannesburg was to outward appearance kept; but it is an ineffective measure, conferring small benefit upon the community, and investing the inhabitants with but little additional power of legislating for their own municipal affairs. Of the two members to be elected for each ward, one at least must be a burgher. Besides this, the Burgomaster is appointed by the Government, not elected by the people. The Burgomaster has a casting vote, and, considering himself a representative of the Government and not of the people, has not hesitated to oppose his will to the unanimous vote of the Councillors. The Government also possess the right to veto any resolution of the Council. As the burghers resident in Johannesburg were estimated at the last census at 1,039 in number, as against 23,503 Uitlanders, and as they belong to the poorest and most ignorant class, it is manifest that these burghers have an undue share in the representation of the town, and are invested with a power which neutralises the efforts of the larger and more intelligent portion of the community. Every burgher resident is qualified to vote, irrespective of being a ratepayer or property owner within the municipal area.

11. Notwithstanding the evident desire of the Government to legislate solely in the interests of the burghers, and impose undue burdens on the Uitlanders, there was still a hope that the declaration of the President on the 30th December, 1896, had some meaning, and that the Government would duly consider grievances properly brought before its notice. Accordingly, in the early part of 1897, steps were taken to bring to the notice of the Government the alarming depression in the mining industry, and the reasons which, in the opinions of men well qualified to judge, had led up to it.

12. The Government at last appointed a Commission consisting of its own officials, which was empowered to inquire into the industrial conditions of the mining population, and to suggest such a scheme for the removal of existing grievances as might seem advisable and necessary.

13. On the 5th of August the Commission issued their report, in which the reasons for the then state of depression were fully set forth, and many reforms were recommended as necessary for the well-being of the community. Among them it will be sufficient to mention the appointment of an Industrial Board, having its seat in Johannesburg, for the special supervision of the Liquor Law and the Pass Law, and to combat the illicit dealing in gold and amalgam.

14. The Government refused to accede to the Report of the Commission, which was a standing indictment against its administration in the past, but referred the question to the Volksraad, which in turn referred it to a Select Committee of its own members. The result created consternation in Johannesburg, for, whilst abating in some trifling respects burdens which bore heavily on the mining industry, the Committee of the Raad, ignoring the main recommendations of the Commission, actually advised an increased taxation of the country, and that in a way which bore most heavily on the Uitlander. The suggestions of the Committee were at once adopted, and the tariff increased accordingly.

15. At the beginning of 1897 the Government went a step further in their aggressive policy towards the Uitlander, and attacked the independence of the High Court, which, until then, Your Majesty's subjects had regarded as the sole remaining safeguard of their civil rights. Early in that year Act No. 1 was rushed through the Volksraad with indecent haste. This high-handed Act was not allowed to pass without criticism, but the Government, deaf to all remonstrance, threatened reprisals on those professional men who raised their voices in protest, and finally, on the 16th of February, 1898, dismissed the Chief Justice, Mr. J. G. Kotze, for maintaining his opinions. His place was filled shortly afterwards by Mr. Gregorowski, the Judge who had been especially brought from the Orange Free State to preside over the trial of the Reform prisoners in 1896, and who, after the passing of the Act above referred to, had expressed an opinion that no man of self-respect would sit on the Bench whilst that law remained on the Statute Book of the Republic. All the Judges at the time this law was passed condemned it in a formal protest, publicly read by the Chief

Justice in the High Court, as a gross interference with the independence of that tribunal. That protest has never been modified or retracted, and of the five Judges who signed the declaration three still sit on the Bench.

16. The hostile attitude of the Government towards Your Majesty's subjects have been accentuated by the building of forts, not only around Pretoria, but also overlooking Johannesburg. The existence of these forts is a source of constant menace and irritation to British subjects, and does much to keep alive that race-feeling which the Government of this State professes to deprecate. This feeling of hostility has infected the general body of burghers. Most noticeable is the antagonistic demeanour of the police and of the officials under whom they immediately act.

17. The constitution and *personnel* of the police force is one of the standing menaces to the peace of Johannesburg. It has already been the subject of remonstrance to the Government of this Republic, but hitherto without avail. An efficient police force cannot be drawn from a people such as the burghers of this State; nevertheless, the Government refuses to open its ranks to any other class of the community. As a consequence, the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants is confided in a large measure to the care of men fresh from the country districts, who are unaccustomed to town life and ignorant of the ways and requirements of the people. When it is considered that this police force is armed with revolvers in addition to the ordinary police truncheons, it is not surprising that, instead of a defence, they are absolutely a danger to the community at large.

17A. Trial by jury exists in name, but the jurors are selected exclusively from among the burghers. Consequently in any case where there is the least possibility of race or class interests being involved, there is the gravest reason to expect a miscarriage of justice.

18. Encouraged and abetted by the example of their superior officers, the police have become lately more aggressive than ever in their attitude towards British subjects. As, however, remonstrances and appeals to the Government were useless, the indignities to which Your Majesty's subjects were daily exposed from this source had to be endured as best they might. Public indignation was at length fully roused by the death at the hands of a police-constable of a British subject named Tom Jackson Edgar.

19. The circumstances of this affair were bad enough in themselves, but were accentuated by the action of the Public Prosecutor, who, although the accused was charged with murder, on his own initiative reduced the charge to that of culpable homicide only, and released the prisoner on the recognizances of his comrades in the police force, the bail being fixed originally at £200, or less than the amount which is commonly demanded for offences under the Liquor Law, or for charges of common assault.

20. This conduct of a high State official caused the most intense feeling to prevail in Johannesburg. It was then thought that the time had arrived to take some steps whereby British subjects might for the future be protected from the indignities of which they had so long complained. It was therefore decided to make an appeal direct to Your Most Gracious Majesty, setting forth the grievances under which Your Majesty's subjects labour. A petition was accordingly prepared and presented to Your Majesty's Vice-Consul on the 24th of December, 1898, by some 4,000 or 5,000 British subjects. The behaviour of those present was orderly and quiet, and everything was done to prevent any infringement of the Public Meetings Law.

21. Owing to a technical informality, Your Majesty's Representative declined to transmit the petition to Your Majesty.

22. Immediately it became known that the petition would not go forward to Your Majesty, the Government ordered the arrest of Messrs. Clement Davies Webb and Thomas Robery Dodd, respectively the Vice-President and Secretary of the Transvaal Province of the South African League, under whose auspices the petition had been presented, on a charge of contravening the Public Meetings Act by convening a meeting in the open air. They were admitted to bail of £1,000 each, five times the amount required from the man charged with culpable homicide.

23. Thereupon Your Majesty's subjects, considering the arrest of these two gentlemen a gross violation of the rights of British subjects and an attempt to strain unduly against them a law which had already been represented to the Government as pressing most heavily upon the Uitlander population, decided to call a public meeting in an enclosed place, as permitted by the law, for the purpose of ventilating their grievances, and endorsing a fresh petition to Your Majesty.

24. Prior to holding the meeting the South African League ascertained from the Government, through the State Attorney, that, as in their opinion the meeting was perfectly legal in its objects, the Government had no intention of prohibiting it.

25. The meeting took place on the 14th of January, 1899, at the Amphitheatre, a large iron building capable of holding from 3,000 to 4,000 people. Prior to the advertised hour of opening, an overwhelmingly large body of Boers, many of whom were police in plain clothes and other *employees* of the Government, forced an entrance by a side door, and practically took complete possession of the building. They were all more or less armed, some with sticks, some with police *bâtons*, some with iron bars, and some with revolvers.

26. The mere appearance of the speakers was the signal for disorder to commence; the Boers would not allow the meeting to proceed, but at once commenced to wreck the place, break up the chairs, and utilise the broken portions of them as weapons of offence against any single unarmed Englishman they could find.

27. There were present several Government officials, Justices of the Peace, and Lieutenants of Police in uniform, and the Commandant of Police, but they were appealed to in vain, and the work of destruction proceeded, apparently with their concurrence. Several Englishmen were severely injured by the attacks of the rioters, but in no case was an arrest effected, although offenders were pointed out and their arrest demanded; nor, indeed, was any attempt made by the police to quell the riot. Up to the present time no steps have been taken by the Government towards prosecuting the ringleaders of the disturbance, nor has a single arrest been made, notwithstanding the fact that the police officials who were present at the meeting admitted that some of the rioters were well known to them.

28. Those of Your Majesty's subjects who were present at the meeting were unarmed and defenceless, and seeing that the rioters had the support of the police and of some of the higher officials of the State, they refrained from any attempt at retaliation, preferring to rely upon more constitutional methods, and to lay a full statement of their grievances before Your Most Gracious Majesty.

29. The condition of Your Majesty's subjects in this State has indeed become well nigh intolerable.

30. The acknowledged and admitted grievances of which Your Majesty's subjects complain prior to 1895 not only are not redressed, but exist to-day in an aggravated form. They are still deprived of all political rights, they are denied any voice in the government of the country, they are taxed far above the requirements of the country, the revenue of which is misapplied and devoted to objects which keep alive a continuous and well founded feeling of irritation, without in any way advancing the general interest of the State. Mal-administration and peculation of public moneys go hand in hand, without any vigorous measures being adopted to put a stop to the scandal. The education of Uitlander children is made subject to impossible conditions. The police afford no adequate protection to the lives and property of the inhabitants of Johannesburg; they are rather a source of danger to the peace and safety of the Uitlander population.

31. A further grievance has become prominent since the beginning of the year. The power vested in the Government by means of the Public Meetings Act has been a menace to Your Majesty's subjects since the enactment of the Act in 1894. This power has now been applied in order to deliver a blow that strikes at the inherent and inalienable birthright of every British subject, namely, his right to petition his Sovereign. Straining to the utmost the language and intention of the law, the Government have arrested two British subjects

who assisted in presenting a petition to Your Majesty on behalf of 4,000 fellow subjects. Not content with this, the Government, when Your Majesty's loyal subjects again attempted to lay their grievances before Your Majesty, permitted their meeting to be broken up and the objects of it to be defeated by a body of Boers, organised by Government officials and acting under the protection of the police. By reason, therefore, of the direct, as well as the indirect, act of the Government, Your Majesty's loyal subjects have been prevented from publicly ventilating their grievances, and from laying them before Your Majesty.

32. Wherefore Your Majesty's humble petitioners humbly beseech Your Most Gracious Majesty to extend Your Majesty's protection to Your Majesty's loyal subjects resident in this State, and to cause an inquiry to be made into grievances and complaints enumerated and set forth in this humble petition, and to direct Your Majesty's Representative in South Africa to take measures which will secure the speedy reform of the abuses complained of, and to obtain substantial guarantees from the Government of this State for a recognition of their rights as British subjects.

And Your Most Gracious Majesty's petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray, &c., &c.

THE SPION KOP DESPATCHES.

THE *London Gazette* of April 17th, 1900, published the subjoined Despatch, with its enclosures, which had been received from Lord Roberts:—

“To the Secretary of State for War.

Army Headquarters, South Africa, Camp, Dekiel Drift, Riet River, 13th February, 1900.

My Lord,—I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship's information, Despatches from General Sir Redvers Buller, describing the advance across the Tugela River on the 17th and 18th January, 1900, and the capture and evacuation of the Spion Kop position on the 23rd and 24th January, as well as certain minor operations between the 19th and 24th January on the right or eastern line of advance.

2. The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the Despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the accompanying documents themselves that the original intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichardt's Drift, and thence by following the road past “Fair View” and “Acton Homes,” to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter's Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Buller had mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly decided to advance by the more direct road leading north-east and branching off from a point east of “Three Tree Hill.” The selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary to occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir Redvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should at once have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with the course of action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice to his subordinate Commander, and on the day after the withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command.

3. As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spion Kop position, which, though occupied almost without opposition in the early morning of the 24th January, had to be held throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire, and the retention of which had become

essential to the relief of Ladysmith, I regret that I am unable to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire. Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made for strengthening the position during the night, reorganising the defence, and bringing up artillery—in regard to which Sir Charles Warren's report does not altogether bear out Sir Redvers Buller's contention—admitting also that the senior Officers on the summit of the hill might have been more promptly informed of the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's assumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy's fire, if it did not cease altogether, could not have been formidable, and, though lamp signalling was not possible at the time, owing to the supply of oil having failed, it would not have taken more than two or three hours at most for Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger with Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to receive a reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop, at 9.30 p.m., for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet almost immediately after Major-General Coke's departure Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order, without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations, and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to carry it into effect.

On the other hand, it is only right to state that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner throughout the day, and it was doubtless due, in a great measure, to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the summit of the hill until directed to retire.

4. The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade-Major of the 10th Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving of high commendation. He did his best to rectify the mistake which was being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was not re-established until 2.30 a.m. on the 25th January, and by that time the naval guns could not have reached the summit of the hill before daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return, and Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft had gone away. Moreover, most of the troops had begun to leave the hill, and the working parties, with the half company of Royal Engineers, had also withdrawn.

5. It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he did that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that the loss of the position would involve the failure of the operations. He was, consequently, obliged to summon Major-General Coke to his head-quarters in the evening in order that he might ascertain how matters were going on, and the command on Spion Kop thus devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft; but Major-General Coke was not aware of this. About mid-day, under instructions from Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren had directed Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, but this order was not communicated to Major-General Coke, who, until he left the position at 9.30 p.m., was under the impression that the command had devolved on Colonel Hill, as senior officer, after Colonel Crofton had been wounded. Omissions or mistakes of this nature may be trivial in themselves, yet may exercise an important influence on the course of events; and I think that Sir Redvers Buller is justified in remarking that 'there was a want of organisation and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence.'

6. The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these Despatches, was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy—probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer.

7. The gratifying feature in these Despatches is the admirable behaviour of the troops throughout the operations.

I have, &c.,

ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, Commander-in Chief,
South Africa.

FROM GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.
(Through Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Cape Town.)

Spearman's Hill, 30th January, 1900.

Sir,—I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren's Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions, 10th Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it moved to Frere on the 9th.

The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the 9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took 650 ox wagons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to Springfield there were three places at which all the wagons had to be doubled spanned, and some required three spans, some idea may be formed of the difficulties, but these were all successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops.

The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th in support of the mounted troops, who had surprised and seized the important position of Spearman's Hill, commanding Potgieter's Drift on the 11th.

By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman's Hill, and supply was well forward.

On the 16th a reserve of 17 days' supply having been collected, General Sir C. Warren, in command of the 2nd Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield to Trichardt's Drift, which is about six miles west of Potgieter's.

I attach Sir C. Warren's report of his operations.

On the night of the 23rd, General Warren attacked Spion Kop, which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren's force; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in circumstances entailing considerable hardships, there had been very heavy losses on Spion Kop. I consequently assumed the command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule transports on the 25th; this was completed by midday the 26th; by double spanning the loaded ox wagons got over the drift at the rate of about eight per hour. The mule wagons went over the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and the vehicles passed over by hand. For about seven hours of the night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the dark, but the use of the pontoon went on day and night. In addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field Artillery, and four howitzers, the following vehicles were passed:—ox wagons, 232, 10-span mule wagons, 98, 6-span, 107, 4-span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these, the ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the sick and wounded.

By 2 p.m. the 26th, all the ox wagons were over, and by 11.30 p.m. all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear for the troops. By 4 a.m. the 27th, all the troops were over, and by 8 a.m. the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The troops had all reached their new camps by 10 a.m. The marches averaged for the mounted troops, about 7 miles, and for the Infantry and Artillery an average of 5 miles.

Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic, that I do not think they would have lasted another half hour.

Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have succeeded. We have suffered very heavy losses, and lost many whom we can ill spare; but, on the other hand, we have inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly disheartened; while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say, in excellent fettle.

I have, &c.,

REDVERS BULLER,

General Officer Commanding.

FROM LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR C. WARREN TO THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF.

Hatting's Farm, 29th January, 1900.

Sir,—I have the honour to make the following report on the operations on the north side of Tugela, west of Spion Kop, from the 17th to the 27th of January, 1900:—

1. On the 8th January field orders were published constituting the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and placing the 4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division thus constituted marched from Frere on the 10th instant, arriving at Springfield on the 12th instant.

2. On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt's Drift to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward, refusing my right (namely Spion Kop) and bringing my left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the 10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman's Hill.

3. I was provided with 4 days' rations with which I was to cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and join your column opposite Potgieter's.

4. On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day; and on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less one brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt's Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of the Tugela.

5. On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela, passed the Infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The Commander-in-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave some verbal directions to General Woodgate.

The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and went over the country as far as Acton Homes, and on the following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.

During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole of the wagons belonging to the force were brought across the Tugela, and the Artillery were in position outside of Wright's Farm.

6. On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the adjoining hills on the right, and the wagons were successfully brought to Venter's Spruit.

In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the two roads by which we could advance the eastern one by Acton Homes must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and with this all concurred. I then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking 3 or 4 days' food in our haversacks, and sending all our wagons back across the Tugela; but before we could do this we must capture the position in front of us.

7. On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and six batteries of Artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F. Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a series of outflanking movements, and by the end of the day, after fighting for

12 hours, we were in possession of the whole part of the hills, but found a strongly entrenched line on the comparatively flat country beyond us.

8. On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and telegraphed for four from Potgieter's. These arrived early on the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving about the same time, directed me to place two of these howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be impossible to get wagons through by the road leading past Fair View, unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies within about 2,000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing to an absence of sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that the attack might be put off for a day.

9. On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel à Court, of the Headquarter Staff, was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.

10. On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct command. The whole of the wagons of the 5th Division were got down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before 2 p.m. on the 26th January.

11. The arrangements for the retirement of the 5th Division were exceedingly well got out, and the retirement was made in good order during the night of the 26th, the whole of the troops crossing to the south side of the Tugela before daylight, and the wagons were packed, and the troops bivouacked near the spruit about two miles to the east of the pontoon bridges. About 10 p.m., previous to the retirement, heavy musketry was heard to the north of our position, which has been attributed to a Boer commando thinking we were going to make a night attack.

12. I propose to forward as soon as possible a more detailed report of the movements of brigades and units, and acts of individuals.

C. WARREN, Lieut.-General, Commanding 5th Division.

FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, NATAL, TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR WAR.

(By the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Cape Town.)

Spearman's Hill, 30th January, 1900.

Sir,—In forwarding Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren's report on the capture and evacuation of Spion Kop, I have the honour to offer the following observations:—

Sir C. Warren is hardly correct in saying that he was only allowed 3½ days' provisions. I had told him that transport for 3½ days would be sufficient burden to him, but that I would keep him filled up as he wanted it. That he was aware of this is shown by the following telegram which he sent on the day in question. It is the only report I had from Sir C. Warren:—

(Sent 7.54 p.m. Received 8.15 p.m.)

'Left Flank, 19th January.

'To the Chief of the Staff,

'I find there are only two roads by which we could possibly get from Trichardt's Drift to Potgieter's, on the north of the Tugela, one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too long, the second is a very difficult road for a large number of wagons, unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some special arrangement which will involve my stay at Venter's Laager for 2 or 3 days. I will send in for further supplies and report progress.—WARREN.'

The reply to this was that 3 days' supply was being sent.

I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th, that for 4 days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations and that a panic or sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left. He said that he had the night before ordered General Coke to assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected to undertaking a night attack on a position the road to which he had not reconnoitred, and added that he intended to assault Spion Kop that night.

I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.

As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were received by our signallers at Spearman and telegraphed to Sir C. Warren; thus I saw them before he did, as I was at the signal station. The telegram Sir C. Warren quotes did not give me confidence in its sender, and at the moment I could see that our men on the top had given way and that efforts were being made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C. Warren:—'Unless you put some really good hard fighting man in command on the top you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.'

The statement that a staff officer reported direct to me during the day is a mistake. Colonel á Court was sent down by General Woodgate almost as soon as he gained the summit.

I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, entrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line the hills would have been held, I am sure.

But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been ordered away just when he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant that guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the defence.

It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the situation. Preparations for the second day's defence should have been organised during the day and have been commenced at nightfall.

As this was not done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion.

Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and though we were not successful in retaining the position, the losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had a marked effect upon them.

I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops, the endurance shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the efforts of the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles and the 3rd Battalion King's Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters fought gallantly.

I am writing to catch the mail, and have not any particulars yet to enable me to report more fully on details.

I have, &c.,

REDVERS BULLER.

REPORT BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WARREN, K.C.B., UPON THE
CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT EVACUATION OF SPION'S KOP.

Chief of the Staff,

I make the operations against Spion Kop in a separate report, because they did not enter into my original plans.

Under the original instructions of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, of 15th January, 1900, I was to act as circumstances required, but according to instructions was generally to continue throughout refusing my right and throwing my left forward until I gained the open plain north of Spion Kop.

Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter's Laager, I assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal Artillery, and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers, together. I pointed out to them that, with the three-and-a-half ($3\frac{1}{2}$) days' provisions allowed, it was impossible to advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and attempted to march through with our rations in our haversacks—without impedimenta.

The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong entrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by wagons, without first taking Spion Kop.

Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with the officers commanding battalions to be sent there.

On 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and told me that there were two courses open—(1) to attack, (2) to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous day.

The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieut.-Colonel à Court to accompany him as Staff Officer.

The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft's Horse and half company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by Trichardt's Drift.

The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he had entrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without casualties, other than three men wounded.

Lieut.-Colonel à Court came down in the morning and stated that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton (Rôyal Lancaster). The message was, 'Reinforce at once or all lost. General dead.'

He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the troops. He started at once and was accompanied by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.

I replied to Colonel Crofton, 'I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.'

This occurred about 10 a.m.

Shortly afterwards, I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had heliographed:—'With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.'

For some hours after this message I could get no information from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.

I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view of the situation. At 1.20 p.m. I heliographed to ascertain whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of the situation. He stated that, unless the Artillery could silence the enemy's guns the men on the summit could not stand another complete day's shelling, and that the situation was extremely critical.

At 6.30 p.m. I asked if he could keep two battalions on the summit, removing the remainder out of the reach of shells, also whether two battalions would suffice to hold the summit; this was in accordance with a telegram on the subject sent me by the Commander-in-Chief. Later in the evening I made arrangements to send two (Naval) 12-prs. and the Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, to the summit, together with half-company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the entrenchments and provide shell covers for the men. I may here mention that the 17th Company, Royal Engineers, proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate's force, and were employed until daylight upon the entrenchments, then upon road making and water supply.

Sandbags were sent up early on the 24th instant.

While Colonel Sim was with this party, ascending the hill, he met Colonel Thorneycroft descending, having evacuated the position.

I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one expression of the admirable conduct and bravery shown by Officers and men suffering under a withering Artillery fire on the summit of the slopes, and also of those who, with so much endurance, persisted in carrying up water and food and ammunition to the troops during this day.

During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarter Staff was present on the summit, and reported direct to the Commander-in-Chief.

At sunset I considered that the position could be held next day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled, as already mentioned.

In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the vigorous protests of General Coke's Brigade-Major, the Officer commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.

It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether there should be an investigation into the question of the unauthorised evacuation of Spion Kop.

CHARLES WARREN, Lieut.-General."

THE WEST INDIES ROYAL COMMISSION.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.

The following is the Summary of Conclusions in the Report of the Royal Commissioners (1898) on the economic condition of the West India Colonies.

(a.) The sugar industry in the West Indies is in danger of great reduction, which in some colonies may be equivalent or almost equivalent to extinction. (b.) The depression of the industry is due to the competition of other sugar-producing countries and in a special degree to the competition of beet sugar produced under a system of bounties. It is also affected by high protective tariffs, and by the competition of cane-sugar, the production of which is specially encouraged by the Governments concerned. The causes of the depression may be described as permanent, inasmuch as they are largely due

to the policy of foreign countries, and there is no indication that that policy is likely to be abandoned in the immediate future. (c.) It is not due in any considerable degree to extravagance in management, to imperfection in the process of manufacture, or to inadequate supervision consequent on absentee ownership, and the removal of these causes, wherever they exist, would not enable it, generally, to be profitably carried on under present conditions of competition. In many places in the West Indies sugar is not manufactured according to the best and latest processes, but even the estates which have introduced the best machinery suffer from the depression, and we have little doubt that the latest machinery would be much more generally employed but for the general and apparently well-founded conviction that even with the assistance of such machinery the business could not be properly carried on. In places where large factories equipped with the best machinery cannot be established owing to local causes, it is doubtful if the sugar industry could, under any circumstances, be restored to a condition of permanent prosperity, except, possibly, in localities which enjoy very special advantages in soil, climate, and labour supply. (d.) The depression in the industry is causing sugar estates to be abandoned, and will cause more estates to be abandoned, and such abandonment is causing, and will cause, distress among the labouring population, including a large number of East Indian immigrants, and will seriously affect, for a considerable time, the general prosperity of the sugar-producing colonies, and will render it impossible for some, and perhaps the greater number of them, to provide, without external aid, for their own government and administration. (e.) If the production of sugar is discontinued or very largely reduced, there is no industry or industries that could completely replace it in such islands as Barbadoes, Antigua, and St. Kitts, and be profitably carried on, and supply employment for the labouring population. In Jamaica, in Trinidad, in British Guiana, in St. Lucia, in St. Vincent, and to some extent in Montserrat and Nevis, the sugar industry may in time be replaced by other industries, but only after the lapse of a considerable period and at the cost of much displacement of labour and consequent suffering. In Dominica the sugar industry is not at the present day of great importance. We think it right to add that in all Colonies where sugar can be completely, or very largely, replaced by other industries, the Colonies in question will be in a much sounder position, both politically and economically, when they have ceased to depend wholly, or to a very great extent, upon the continued prosperity of a single industry. (f.) The total or partial extinction of the sugar industry would, in most places, very seriously affect the condition of the labouring classes for the worse, and would largely reduce the revenue of the Colonies. In some places the loss of revenue could be met to a limited extent by economies, but this could not be done universally nor in a material degree in most of the Colonies. Some of the Colonies could not provide the necessary cost of administration, including the relief of distressed and necessitous persons, or of the support and repatriation (when necessary) of the East Indian immigrants, without subventions from the mother country. Jamaica, Trinidad, and Grenada may be expected to meet from their own resources the whole of the expenditure that is likely to fall on them. (g.) The best immediate remedy for the state of things which we have shown to exist would be the abandonment of the bounty system by continental nations. This change would in all probability enable a large proportion of the sugar-cane cultivation to be carried on successfully, and would certainly reduce the rate at which it will diminish. Looking, however, to what appears to be the policy of the United States of America, to the great cheapening of the cost of production of beet sugar, and the fact that many countries appear to have singled out the sugar industry as one which ought to be artificially stimulated in various ways, it is not clear that even if the bounties were abolished another crisis of a similar character might not arise in the West Indies at a future day. (h.) A remedy which was strongly supported by witnesses interested in the West Indian sugar estates was the imposition of countervailing duties on bounty-fed sugar when imported into the United Kingdom. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 75 to 81 of our Report the majority have been unable to support this course. The Chairman is of a different opinion, and has stated his views separately on this point. (i.) The special remedies or measures of relief which we unani-

mously recommend are—(1.) The settlement of the labouring population on small plots of land as peasant proprietors. (2.) The establishment of minor agricultural industries, and the improvement of the system of cultivation, especially in the case of small proprietors. (3.) The improvement of the means of communication between the different islands. (4.) The encouragement of a trade in fruit with New York, and, possibly, at a future time, with London. (5.) The grant of a loan from the Imperial Exchequer for the establishment of central factories in Barbados. The subject of emigration from the distressed tracts also requires the careful attention of the various Governments, though we do not find ourselves at the present time in a position to make recommendations in detail. (j.) We estimate the cost of the special remedies recommended in (2), (3) and (4), of (i.) at £27,000 a year for ten years, the expenditure to be borne by the mother country. We estimate the amount of the loan to Barbados for the erection of central factories at £120,000. This measure no doubt involves the risk of loss. Grants will be required in Dominica and St. Vincent for roads, and to enable the settlement of the labouring population on the land to be carried out, and their amount may be taken at £30,000. A further grant of about £60,000 is required to clear off the floating debt in some of the smaller islands. In addition, the smaller islands should receive grants to enable them to meet their ordinary expenditure of an obligatory nature. The amount may be placed at £20,000 a year for five years, and possibly a reduced amount for a further period of five years. The expenditure which we are able to estimate may be summarised as follows:—(1.) A grant of £27,000 a year for ten years. (2.) A grant of £20,000 a year for five years. (3.) Immediate grants of £60,000 and £30,000, or £90,000 in all. (4.) A loan of £120,000 to Barbados for the establishment of central factories. (k.) As to the amount of expenditure which it may be necessary to incur in relieving distress (especially in British Guiana and Barbados), in promoting emigration, and in supporting and repatriating East Indian immigrants, we are unable at the present time to form any estimate, but it might be very great if there occurred a sudden and general failure of the sugar industry in Barbados and British Guiana, where the population is comparatively large, and the people depend so greatly upon the cultivation of the sugar-cane. In such a contingency neither British Guiana nor Barbados would be able to meet the necessary cost of administration for, probably, a considerable number of years.



INDEX.

	PAGE		PAGE
A BERDARE, Lord	229	Lord Salisbury on Turkey, 19 ;	
Absenteeism (West Indies)	252	A Mixed Commission, 19 ; Powers	
Aberdeen (Lord), Negotiations with		and the Sultan, 20 ; Sultan's	
Venezuela	82	Letter to Lord Salisbury, 21 ; Lord	
Abyssinia (Soudan Frontier)	180	Salisbury's laconic comment, 21 ;	
Acland-Hood, Sir A., "Army by invita-		Events Precedent to General	
tion and imagination" Speech . . .	347	Election, 21 ; Sasoan massacres, 21 ;	
Acland, Mr. on Education Bill 1896 . .	393	Kurdish attacks on Armenians, 22 ;	
Afrikaner Republic Ideal	301	Antok-Dagh (Flight of Armen-	
Afghanistan	202-3	ians), 22 ; Abominable conduct of	
Afridis, etc. (Conclusion of Peace) . .	208	Turkish troops, 23 ; Lord Kimber-	
Age Limit, Schools Act	414	ley's Protests, 23 ; Sultan's views on	
Agricultural Holdings Act	420	Armenian "revolt," 24 ; European	
Agricultural Instruction Act, Ireland . .	413	Protests, 24 ; Treaty of Berlin, 24 ;	
Aliens Law (Transvaal)	306	Lord Kimberley forms the Concert,	
Alaska Boundary :—		24 ; Commission of Inquiry, 24 ;	
Gold Discoveries in the Yukon,		Consular Representatives on Com-	
94 ; Anglo-Russian Treaty, 95-96 ;		mission, 24 ; Conclusions from work	
Lynn Canal (Canada's Claims), 97 ;		of the Commission, 25 ; Sir P.	
Breakdown of Negotiations, 98-99 ;		Currie's Memorandum of Reforms,	
<i>Modus Vivendi</i> , November, 1899,		25 ; Sultan's treatment of it, 26 ;	
99.		Sultan's complaints of English Press,	
Adowa (Battle of)	166	26 ; Imprisoned Armenians, 26 ;	
Alliance (South African Republic and		Sir P. Currie's interview with the	
Orange Free State)	301	Sultan, 26 ; Sultan on the Armenians,	
Akashah (Advance to, 1896)	167-168	26 ; New Commission of Inquiry,	
Ameer, Afghanistan	203-4	27 ; Renewed disorders in Asia	
Amir-ul-Mulk	201	Minor, 27 ; The Ambassadors'	
Anglo-Egyptian Convention (Soudan) . .	189	scheme, 27 ; Sultan asks for time,	
Anglo-French Agreement, 1890	191	27 ; Recurrence of barbarities, 27 ;	
Anglo-French Agreement, 1895 (Sierra		Sultan again warned, 28 ; Agitation	
Leone)	222	among Russian Armenians, 28 ;	
Anglo-French Convention, 1898	192	Prince Lobanoff alarmed, 28 ; The	
Anglo-Russian Treaty, 1825	96	Sultan's attitude, 28 ; Sultan's answer	
Anglo-German Syndicate (China) . . .	163	to the Ambassadors' scheme, 28 ;	
Anglo-German Convention (Pacific) . .	100	Russian views on Sultan's reply, 29 ;	
Annexation of Ashanti	220	Concert stationary, 29 ; Lord Kim-	
Annexation of Transvaal	382	berley proposes coercion of the Sultan,	
Appeal Clause, Australian Federation	417	30 ; Downfall of the Rosebery Minis-	
Arbitration :—		try, 30 ; Lord Salisbury takes up the	
Treaty of Washington, February		question, 30 ; M. Hanotaux's inter-	
2nd, 1897, 87-88 ; Proposals for		vention, 30 ; Tribute to Lord Kimber-	
General Treaty with the United		ley, 31 ; Autonomy for the Armenians,	
States, 91 ; Terms of the Treaty,		31 ; Lord Salisbury's views on, 31 ;	
92 ; The Queen and Lord Salisbury		Right of surveillance under Art. LXI.	
on the Treaty, 92 ; Treaty Wrecked		of Berlin Treaty, 32 ; Sultan and	
by the Senate, 92 ; Refusal of		Christian Valis, 32 ; Minor Reforms	
United States to Arbitrate <i>re</i> Alaska		granted, 32 ; Should England act alone,	
Boundary, 98 ; Mr. Kruger's Pro-		32 ; Opinion in England, 33 ;	
posals, 310-317 ; With Orange Free		Sultan's threat to England, 33 ;	
State element, 317.		Sultan's Withdrawal of Reforms,	
Armenian Question :—		33 ; Negotiations resumed, 34 ;	
English Indignation against the		Proposals of Mixed Commission, 34 ;	
Sultan, 18 ; Lord Salisbury's Policy,		The Powers in Line, 34 ; Acceptance	
18 ; Reported Ultimatum to the		of Scheme of Reform by the Sultan,	
Sultan, 19 ; Reform Guarantees, 19 ;		34 ; Points of Reform Project, 34 ;	

- Sultan's Irade, 35; Vizerial Order, 36; Lord Salisbury's distrust of the Sultan, 36; Renewal of the Massacres, 37-38; The Hintchak, 37; Further Protests by the Powers, 39; Sultan's Attitude, 39; "Stationnaires" for the Bosphorus, 40; Inactivity of the Concert, 40; State of Constantinople, 40; Lord Salisbury in Manacles, 40; Defeat of the Druses, 42; Russian-Armenian Invasion of Turkey, 42; Hintchak Attack on Galata Bank and the Constantinople Massacres, 42; Its effect on the Powers, 43; Complicity of the authorities, 44; Protests by the Ambassadors, 44; A policy of extermination, 44; The Sultan defies the Concert, 45; Negative Results of English policy, 46.
- Argungu (French force at) 192
- Arnold, Major (His work in Nigeria) . . . 231
- Army Estimates, Supplementary 328
- Army Reorganisation 404
- Ashanti Hinterland and France 191
- Ashanti Prospects 219-222
- Asquith, Mr. :—
Supports Government *re* Fashoda, 186; Attacks Indian frontier policy of Government, 210; On Education Bill, 1896, 393.
- Atbara (Battle of) 173
- Austin, Capt. (Macdonald Mission) . . . 197
- Australian Federation 417
- Autonomy for the Rand 286, 316
- Ayerst, Lieut. (Murder of) 213
- BAGUAR** (Aggression by Ameer) 203
- Bai Bureh 223
- Baden-Powell, Colonel 364
- Balfour, Mr. A. :—
Speech on the Concert of Europe, 54; Controversy with Sir H. Fowler on Indian Frontier Policy, 212-3; Defends Retention of Chitral, 202; Negotiations *re* Anglo-Russian Railway Agreement (China), 137; Replies to Mr. Burdett-Coutts's Charges, 371-376; Education Bill Muddle, 1896, 392-395.
- Bahr-el-Ghazal 181-189
- Bara Valley (Retirement of Indian Army to Datoi) 207
- Baratieri (General) 166
- Baron Ketteler's Views on China 149
- Baron Ketteler, Murder of 155
- Barbour, Sir D., Report on Jamaica Finances 254
- Battenburg, Prince Henry of, Death from Fever 220
- Benin Massacres 236
- Berber (Dervishes threaten) 167
- Beit Mr., Reproof by Select Committee . . . 291
- Berthollet (Father), Murder of 161
- Beach, Sir M. Hicks :—
" Worried out of Egypt " speech, 172; Warning to France *re* Fashoda, 186; Financial Statement at Outbreak of War, 328-9; On Cost of Indian Frontier War, 213.
- Bechuanaland—Strip for Railway 271-299
- Berkeley, Mr. :—
Management of Mwanga 244
- Behring Sea :—
Mr. Sherman and Pelagic Sealing, 98; Professor D'Arcy Thompson's Report, 93; Lord Salisbury's Contention, 93; Canadian Fishers, 93; Mr. Chamberlain Replies to Mr. Sherman's Attack, 93; Lord Salisbury Agrees to a Conference of Experts, 93; United States Legislation, 93; Report of the Expert Commission, 94; Damages Awarded to Canadian Fishers, 94.
- Benefices Act 409
- Bida (Battle of) 222-3
- Bilotti (Sir Alfred), His conduct during Cretan troubles 57
- Bloemfontein Conference 309-312
- Bloemfontein Convention 261
- Bloemfontein, Occupation of, by Lord Roberts 349
- Blood, Sir Bindon (Relief of Malakand and Chakdara) 203
- Blue Nile and Abyssinia 180
- Board of Education Act 412
- Borgu (French designs) 190
- Borgu (French invasion of) 233
- Bor (Dervishes at) 197
- Bower, Sir Graham :—
His secret cognisance of the conspiracy against the Transvaal, 272; Censured by Select Committee, 291.
- Boussa 234-5
- Boer Republics, *vide* War in South Africa 259-268
- Bond, The Afrikander 302-4
- Botanical Department (West Indies) . . . 251
- Bowles, Mr. T. G., opposes reconquest of Soudan 169
- Boxers, Edict against 146
- Bounties (on Sugar—India) 216
- Bonvalot, M., Mission to Abyssinia . . . 196
- " Breach of Faith " (Indian frontier) . . . 207-213
- Brodrick, Mr. :—
States British Policy in China, 157; Cordite Vote, 2.
- Brooks, Mr., Murder of 146
- British Guiana 246-255
- Brass (Natives of) 231
- Brussels Conference on Sugar Bounties . . . 250
- Bryce, Mr., Supports Government *re* Fashoda 186
- Burdett-Coutts's, Letters *re* South African Hospitals 370
- Burmah-Yangtze Railway 163
- Burmah-Chinese boundary 217
- Burgers, President 263
- Budda Revolt 243-5
- Buller, Sir Redvers, Arrival at Capetown 334
- Bülow, Count von, On Seizure of

	PAGE
German Vessels in South African Waters..	354
Budget Statements: Session 1897, 406; Session 1898, 411; Session 1899, 416; Session 1900, 420.	
C ABINET Appointments..	5
<i>Caisse de la Dette</i> ..	168
Cabmen, "Bilking" Act ..	400
Cape Parliament:—	
Supporters of Messrs. Kruger and Steyn, 320; Supporters of Imperial Policy, 320.	
Carnarvon, Lord, His South African Policy ..	262
Carles, Consul ..	151
Canton Kowloon Railway ..	163
Caravan Routes (Soudan) ..	194
Cardew, Sir F. (Sierra Leone Revolt) ..	222
Carlton Club, Meeting at, June, 1896..	394
Cambridge, Duke of, Resignation ..	2
Carrington, Sir F. (Matabele Rising)..	289
Campbell-Bannerman, Mr.:—	
Reduction of Salary, 3; Resignation as Secretary for War, 4; Seals Incident, 5-6.	
Canada:—	
Questions before Joint High Commission, 97; <i>Modus Vivendi</i> (Alaska), 99-100.	
Cape Ministry:—	
Views on Draft Franchise Law, 314; General Election, 1898, 304.	
Cetewayo and the Boers ..	263
Chakdara Beleagured ..	203
Chalmers, Sir D. P. (Report on Sierra Leone Rising ..	223-226
Ch'ing, Prince, <i>vide</i> China.	
China:	
Treaty of Shimonoseki, 106; Help refused to Japan, 106; Russian understanding with China, 107; Lord Salisbury on Russian aims, 107; An invitation to Russia, 107; Anti-Foreign Movement in China, 108; Ultimatum to China, 108; Appointment of Sir Claude MacDonald, 108; The State of China in 1896, 109; Russification of Manchuria, 110; Russian attempts to oust Mr. Kinder, 110; Sir Claude MacDonald's first Victory, 110; Russian designs on Port Arthur, 111; German Seizure of Kiao-Chau Bay, 111; Lord Salisbury and Shantung, 112; The "Mailed Fist," 112; German Assurances to England, 113; Russia to Winter at Port Arthur, 113; The Chinese invitations and Russian explanations, 114; Russian Complaints about British Men-of-War in Port Arthur, 114; Lord Salisbury apologetic, 115; Chinese Loan Negotiations, 115; The Yamén Frightened, 115; " <i>Le droit du premier Mouillage</i> ," 116; The Question of Talienwan, 116; Russian threats to	

	PAGE
China, 116; The Iphigenia, 117; Lord Salisbury's weakness, 117; English threats to China <i>re</i> Loan, 118; Concessions to Great Britain, 119; Port Arthur and Talienwan again, 120; Lease of the Ports granted to Russia, 120; Chinese offer of Wei-hai-Wei to England, 120; Lord Salisbury's Policy, 121; Czar and Count Mouravieff, 122; Russian Assurances to Great Britain, 122-3; The Russian pledges as to a "Free Port," 123; Lord Salisbury's views on the new situation caused by the Russian Lease, 124; Instructions that Wei-hai-Wei should be acquired, 125; Russian intrigue to prevent Wei-hai-Wei passing to England, 127; Friendly Attitude of Japan, 127; Voluntary Assurances by England to Germany <i>re</i> Wei-hai-Wei, 128; Russo-Chinese Agreement (<i>Times</i> version), 129; Protests by China, 130; Passports for Talienwan, 131; Talienwan Declared a Free Port, 132; Northern Railways Loan, 132; Renewed Russian Intrigues, 133; Another Deadlock, 133; Yangtze Basin (pledge of non-alienation), 134-5; Northern Railways Extension (<i>M. Lesar's</i> suggestion), 137; Mr. Balfour's negotiations, 137; Spheres of Interest, 137; Preferential Railway Rates, 137; Definition of Spheres, 138; Efforts to Wreck Agreement, 138; Disappearance of Non-Preferential and Boundary Definition Clauses, 138; Points of the Agreement, 138; Lord Salisbury on the Agreement, 139; Northern Railways Extension Loan, 139; Guarantee to British Investors, 139; The Additional Note, 139; Sovereignty of China, 139; A Solemn Pretence, 140; M. de Witte on Railway Agreement, 140; Shanghai Extension, 142; United States and the "Open Door," 142; Assurances by the Powers <i>re</i> Open Door in Leased Areas, 143; <i>Coup d'Etat</i> of 1898, 143; Attack on Wei-hai-Wei, 144; Boxer Rising (The), 144; Mr. Fleming (Murder of), 145; Edict against Boxers, 146; Piracy on West River, 146; Kenning Riots, 146; Manchurian Banditti, 146; Mr. Brooks, Murder of, 146; Boxers in Shantung and Chihli, 146; Joint Naval Demonstration asked for, 147-149; Warships sent to Taku, 147; Suppression Edict (Boxers), 147; Emperor's Position and Edict, 147; Paotung-fu (anti-missionary excesses), 148; Yunan-fu (Missionaries in peril), 148; M. Pichon's Apprehensions, 149; Count Mouravieff's Op-	

- timism, 149 ; Baron Ketteler's Views, 149 ; Prince Ch'ing (interview with Sir C. MacDonald), 149-51 ; Guards sent for, 149 ; Prince Tuan, Attitude of, 150 ; Robinson, Mr., Murder of, 150 ; Norman, Mr., Murder of, 150 ; Danger at Tientsin, 151 ; Lord Salisbury gives Sir C. MacDonald a free hand, 151 ; Composite Force for Pekin, 152 ; Railway Destroyed, 152 ; Attack on Legations, 152 ; Kansu Soldierly Mutiny, 152 ; Seymour's force attacked and cut off, 152-3 ; Legations isolated, 153 ; Destruction of Taku Forts, 153 ; Viceroy of Central South China (Attitude of), 154 ; Troops Ordered from India, 155 ; A Mandate for Japan, 155 ; Objections of the Powers, 155 ; Baron Ketteler Murdered, 155 ; Message from Sir R. Hart, 155 ; Alarmist Stories of Massacre, 156 ; Reinforcements for China, 156 ; News from the Legations, 157 ; Dr. Morrison's Message, 157 ; Mr. Brodick on British Policy, 157 ; Second Advance on Pekin, 157 ; Relief of the Legations, 158 ; Factors in the Situation after Relief, 158 ; Evacuation Note by Russia, 158-60 ; Flight of Chinese Court, 158-9 ; Attitude of Powers on Withdrawal from Pekin, 158-60 ; Appointment of Count von Waldersee, 160 ; Hong Kong Defences, 161 ; Nanning Opened, 161 ; Wuchow (opening of), 162 ; Samshui (opening of), 162 ; Kongkên (opening of), 162 ; West River Ports, 162 ; Inland Navigation, 162 ; Railway Concessions, 163 ; Pekin Syndicate, 163 ; Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Interests, 163 ; Jardine Mathieson Concessions, 163 ; Anglo-German Syndicate, 163 ; Burmah-Yangtze Railway, 164.
- Chagru Valley 206
 Chad (Lake) 190-199
 Charter (of Niger Company) 229
 Chitral (retention question) 200-202
 Chartered Company British South Africa 271-29
 Chihli (*see* China).
 Chamberlain, Mr. :—
 Appointed Secretary of Colonies, 5-7 ; On Home Rule Party, 9 ; His Opinion of Mr. Balfour, 10 ; Replies to Mr. Sherman's Attack on Canadian Seal Fishers, 93 ; French Aggression in West Africa, 192 ; Defends Reconquest of Soudan, 168 ; Mauritius and India Sugar Market, 216 ; Ultimatum to Prempeh, 220 ; Action on Sir D. P. Chalmer's Report, Sierra Leone, 224-26 ; Speeches on Colonial Topics, 246 ; Action on Report of West Indies Commission, 248-255 ; Despatch on Elective System in Jamaica, 253-4 ; Attitude on Reid Contract (Newfoundland), 255-8 ; His Interviews with Dr. Rutherford Harris, 271-299 ; Orders recall of Dr. Jameson, 275 ; His Dissatisfaction with Lord Rosmead, 282 ; Despatch to Lord Rosmead on Franchise, 282 ; The *London Gazette* Despatch to Mr. Kruger, 285-6 ; Was he privy to the Raid? 292 ; Views of the Select Committee, 292 ; Charter not to be taken away, 296 ; Government will not prosecute Mr. Rhodes, 296 ; His testimony to Mr. Rhodes's honour, 296 ; His patience after Raid, 300 ; A Duel by Despatches, 301 ; Asserts Suzerainty over Transvaal, 302 ; Repudiates Transvaal Claim for Damages, 303 ; Attacks Dynamite Monopoly, 306 ; Views on Uitlanders' Petition, 308-9 ; Reminds Mr. Kruger of his 1881 Pledges as to equal rights for Uitlanders, 315 ; Rejects further Arbitration Proposals by Mr. Kruger, 316-17 ; accepts Five Years Franchise without accompanying conditions, 317 ; Must reconsider situation *de novo*, 318 ; Closes discussion on Franchise and promises further and final Proposals, 319 ; Self-defence Speech in Debate on Address, 327 ; Action with regard to Defence of Natal, 331 ; Public opinion upon his conduct of the negotiations, 324-325 ; Despatch on Treatment of Rebels, 379 ; On Australian Federation Bill, 419.
- Clarke, Sir Edward, His attitude towards the War 325-328
 Clayton Bulwer Treaty, *vide* Nicaragua Canal.
 Cleveland (President) :—
 Message *re* Venezuela, 64 ; Special Message, 65.
 Clarke, Sir E., Speech on Address Debate, 1899 328
 Coal Mines Regulation Act 400
 Colonial Loans Act 414
 Conspiracy against Transvaal 270
 Conyngham Greene, "Breach of Faith" Charge 318
 Commission, Royal, On West Indies, 274-255 ; on Newfoundland, 257.
 Commonwealth of Australasia 417
 Companies' Act 419
 Conference at Bloemfontein 309-312
 Conventions :—
 Nicaragua Canal, 101-105 ; London Convention, 1884, 267 ; Samoa, 101 ; Pretoria, 1881, 264, *et seq.* ; Sand River, 260 ; Orange River 261
 Coventry, John C., Trial of 238
 Conger, Mr., Message from 156
 Cordite Vote 2-5
 Courcel, Baron de, discussion *re* Nile Valley, 178 ; Interviews with Lord Salisbury *re* Fashoda, 183-184.

	PAGE
Concessions (Chinese) to Great Britain, <i>vide</i> China	
Contraband of War, Dispute with Germany	354
Courtney, Mr., Opposes Soudan recon- quest	167
Committee, Select (Jameson Raid) ..	290-297
Countervailing Duties ..	246-255
Criminal Evidence Act ..	410
Crete:—	
Insurrection of 1894, 47; Demands of the Christians, 48; Lord Salisbury intervenes, 48; Convention agreed upon, 48; Renewed warfare in the island, 49; Greek intervention and raid by Prince George and Colonel Vassos, 49; Proposed blockade de- clined by Lord Salisbury, 49-50; Views of the Greek Government, 50; Admirals of the Powers and Prince George, 50; Mobilisation of Turkish and Greek armies, 51; Lord Salis- bury and Greece, 51; Demands by the Powers, 51; Greek refusal to comply, 52; War on the Greek frontier, 52; Localisation of the war, 53; Attitude of English Liberals, 53; Defeats of the Greek Army, 54- 55; Mediation of the Powers, 55; German views on Mediation, 55; Greek acceptance of autonomy for Crete, 56; Armistice arranged, 56; Peace demands by the Sultan, 56; Strategical rectification of Greek frontier, 56; The Greek indemnity, 57; A Loan Convention, 57; With- drawal of Colonel Vassos, 57; Auto- nomy for Crete, 57; Candidates for the Governorship of Crete, 57-58; Civil war renewed in the Island, 58; Proposed landing of Turkish rein- forcements, 58; The British Admiral to oppose, 58; Russia proposes Prince George as Governor, 58; Germany and Austria withdraw from the Con- cert, 58-59; Concert again Powerless, 59; Attitude of the English Opposi- tion, 60; German Emperor "lays down his flute," 60-61; The Admi- rals and the Turkish troops, 61; Moslem Attack on British troops at Candia, 61; Admiral Noel's action, 61; Ultimatum to the Sultan, 62; Withdrawal of Turkish forces, 62; Russia revives the candidature of Prince George, 63; Conditions of Prince George's appointment, 63; Crete under autonomous rule, 63.	
Cromwell Statue ..	1
Crown Colony System (West Indies)	257
Cromer, Lord, Nile Valley ..	180
Cronje, Commandant ..	348
Cunningham, Major, expedition against Kabarega ..	241
Curzon, Mr., Statement on Soudan affairs, 1896 ..	167
Curzon, Lord, India Sugar Bounties Bill	216

	PAGE
DARGAI, Highlanders' Charge ..	206
Dato, Sir W. Lockhart in Winter quarters ..	207
Dahomey Hinterland ..	191
Delagoa Bay Railway Operations ..	332
Delagoa Bay, Railway opened ..	269
Davies, W. D., Mr., Release of ..	298
De Wet ..	370, 381
Derby, Lord, Negotiates London Con- vention ..	266
Devonshire (Duke of) Speech on Unionist Party, 1895 ..	9
Dyke, Sir W. Hart ..	290
Dissolution ..	421
Dongola occupied by Anglo-Egyptians	170
Dissolution, 1895 ..	3-5
Dilke, Sir C.:—	
Criticises Treaty of Adis Abbaba ..	196
Delcassé, M.:—	
Views on Naval Demonstration (China), 147; Admits presence of M. Marchand at Fashoda, 181; His dilemma <i>re</i> Fashoda, 186; His moral courage and adroitness, 188; Denies invasion of Sokoto, 192.	
Delegates, Appointment of (Transvaal Franchise Law) ..	316
"Diversion up the Nile" ..	165
Dir, Khan of ..	201
Dowager Empress, <i>vide</i> China ..	
Drifts (Vaal) closed ..	269
Durand Agreement ..	203
Dynamite monopoly, Attack on ..	306
EAST Indian Immigration, West Indies ..	248
Edict against Boxers ..	146
Edgar Incident, Transvaal ..	306
Education:—	
Voluntary Schools Bill, 402; Necessitous Board Schools, 403; Act creating new Board, 412; School Attendance Act, 414.	
Education Bill, 1896 ..	392-395
Effective Occupation Doctrine ..	184-190
Egypt ..	165-199
Relation of to Upper Nile Val- ley, 177-189; British Protectorate Question, 188; Soudan Convention, 189.	
Ellis, Mr. John ..	290
Ellis, General ..	205
Elandslaagte, Battle at ..	332
Elgin, Lord, on Indian Sugar Bounties	216
Employers' Liability Bill ..	403
Employers' Liability Act extended to Agricultural Labourers ..	420
Equal Rights, Transvaal, Mr. Kruger's 1881 pledges ..	315
Erythrea Protectorate ..	166
FAIRFIELD, Mr., His Part in South African Question ..	272-299
Famine (India) ..	213-215
Famine Code (India) ..	214

	PAGE		PAGE
Fashoda, 177-189; Preparations for War, 187; Political Position of M. Marchand, 187; Withdrawal of Expedition, 187.		15-16; Absence of effective Opposition, 17.	
Factories Bill, 1895	10	German Emperor's message to Mr. Kruger	279
Farrar, George	273	Gladstone, Mr. :—	
Ferguson, Mr. (Murder of)	221	His Pair with Mr. Villiers, 1; Message to America <i>re</i> Venezuela, 90; Denunciation of Annexation of Transvaal, 263.	
Federation (South Africa)	261-3	Glencoe, <i>vide</i> Natal Defence.	
Federation of Australia	417	Gold Currency (India)	216
Ferkeh (Battle of)	170	Gold Coast	219-222
Fischer, Mr., Peace Mission to Pretoria	314	Goldie, Sir George	227-237
Five Years Franchise (Transvaal)	310-317	Gourma Country	192
Fort Goldie	193	Grants in Aid of Colonial Revenues and Public Works	255
"Forget and Forgive" (Mr. Kruger's Appeal to Uitlanders)	281	Grey, Sir E. :—	
Fowler, Sir H. :—		Supports Lord Salisbury's policy in Eastern Europe: "An Unfriendly Act" Declaration, 178; Criticises Treaty of Adis Abbaba, 196; His South African Federation policy, 261.	
Supports Government <i>re</i> Fashoda, 186; Speech on Indian Frontier Policy, 212.		Greece (War with Turkey), <i>vide</i> Crete.	
Fitzmaurice, Lord E. :—		Greene, W. Conyngham, Mr., appointment of	299
Supports Government <i>re</i> Fashoda, 186; War Amendment to Address	344	Grey, Raleigh, Trial of	288
Flag, Question of British, in Transvaal	273	Griqualand West	262
Fleming Mr. (Murder of)	145	Guards, Pekin Legations	149
Flying Squadron, The, Reply to German Emperor's Message to Mr. Kruger	280	Guiana-Venezuela Boundary :—	
Franchise Proposals :—		President Cleveland's Message, 64; An unheeded warning, 65; The Special Message to Congress, 65; New version of the Monroe Doctrine, 66; Mr. Olney's Despatch, 67; The Monroe Doctrine, 68; Lord Salisbury's Despatches, 70-72; The deadlock on Arbitration, 72; Coolness of the English people, 72; American Hostility, 73; Panic in Wall Street, 73; Discovery of Guiana, 74; Dutch and Spanish Treaties, 75; Spanish Settlement at St. Thomé, 75; The Dutch counties, 76; Dutch colonists and Franciscan and Capuchin missionaries, 76-78; Extent of Dutch Settlement, 78; Great Britain as the successor to Dutch rights, 78-79; Barmia Point, 79; Difficulties with Venezuela, 80; Agreement of 1850, 80; Venezuelan Concessions in violation of the Agreement, 80-81; Schomburgk Posts, 81; Venezuela's claim, 82; The Aberdeen negotiations, 82; Salisbury, Granville and Rosebery negotiations, 82-83; Rupture of diplomatic relations, 83; Conciliatory attitude of British Government, 83; Subsidence of American rancour, 85; Mr. Cleveland's Commission, 86; Lord Salisbury announces removal of the deadlock, 86; Treaty of Washington, 87; Rules safeguarding the settlements, 88; The Arbitration, 88; Effect of the Award, 89; Messages by Mr. Gladstone and the Prince of Wales, 90.	
Transvaal, 310-317; Delegates Proposed, 316; Joint Inquiry by Delegates agreed to by Mr. Kruger, 318; Withdrawal of Five Years Proposal by Mr. Kruger, 318.		Guiana (British)	246-255
France :—			
Objections to Advance from Caisse <i>re</i> Soudan, 168-172; Fashoda Affair, 177-189; An Outlet on the Nile, 184; Fashoda Crisis, 177-189; Designs on Borgu, 190; Niger Agreement of 1890, 191; Dahomey hinterland, 191; Occupation of Nikki, 191; Ashanti hinterland, 191; Sokoto Invasion Denied, 192; Convention of 1898 signed, 192; Access to Upper Nile, 193; Unpublished Negotiations, 194; Addition to Article IV. of Niger Convention delimitating Soudan, 194; Sugar Bounties Question, 250.			
Frere, Sir Bartle	263-4		
Fruit Industry—West Indies	248		
Fulah Empire	228		
GATACRE, General, Stormberg disaster	336		
Gee, Mr., Attack on	203		
General Election of 1895, 13; Uncontested Seats, 13; Borough Constituencies, 13; Effects of Saturdays Voting, 13-14; Defeat of prominent Liberals, 14; In Ireland, 14; Harcourt ejected from Derby, 14; Government majority, 14; Nature of majority, 14; Significance of Election,			

- HAFIR**, Battle at 171
 Hamilton, Lord George:—
 On Cost of Indian Garrisons for Suakim, etc., 169; Despatch on Indian Frontier Policy, 208; Replies to Attacks on Indian Frontier Policy, 211.
 Hammond, John Hay 273
 Hemming, Sir Augustus 254
 Henderson, Lt. (Prisoner of Samory) 221
 Herschell (Lord):—
 Joint High Commission, 97; Death of, 98.
 Herbert, S. R. G. W.:—
 Recollections *re* Suzerainty, Transvaal 266
 Hanotaux, M.:—
 Statement on the Blockade of Crete; Action *re* Armenians, 30; Marchand Expedition, 173; Senate Speech Nile Valley, April 5th, 1895, 179; Congratulations after Omdurman, 181.
 Hans Cordua, Execution of 382
 Harcourt, Sir W.:—
 Local Veto and the General Election of 1895, 12; Criticises the Concert of Europe, 53; Condemns Sudan Campaign, 167; Supports Government *re* Fashoda, 186; Speech on Address, Debate, 1899, 328; On Education Bill *fiasco*, 1896, 395; Naval Works Act, 395; Navy Estimates, Session 1896, 395; Budget Statements, Session 1896, 397; Attack on Ritualist Clergy, 409.
 Hospitals, South African Committee 372-376
 Hart, Sir R.:—
 Message from 155
 Harris, Dr. Rutherford 271-299
 Harrington, Lieutenant, Resident at Court of King Menelik 196
 Hofmeyer, Mr., suggests Conference to Mr. Kruger 309
 Home Rule—The Unionist issue before the Electorate in 1895 13
 Home Rule for the Rand 285-287
 Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, *vide* China.
 Hong Kong Defences 161
 House of Lords:—
 Lord Rosbery's Accusation, 10; Annihilation of, 10; Duke of Argyll's Defence of, 10; Legislative Preponderance of, 10; Lord Salisbury's reply to Lord Rosebery, 10; "Real Crime of Lords," 11.
 Housing of Working Class Amendment Act 420
 Hsia-mi-hsien, Missionaries massacre 160
 Hurricanes (West Indies) 251
 Hut Tax (Sierra Leone) 222-226
- LORIN** 230-233
 Income Tax, Increase of 421
 Industrial Commission (Rand) 305
- Independence of Boer Republics 259-268
 Indian Frontier Policy 209-210
 Indian Sugar Bounties 216
 India, Garrison for Suakim 169
 India 200-218
 Indies, West 246-255
 Inebriates' Act 411
 Intervention, Transvaal, Sir A. Milner's Views 307-8
 "Irreducible Minimum," Sir A. Milner's 309-314
 Irish Local Government Bill 407
 Irish Land Act 399
 Irish Peers, Revolt of 399
 Irish Peers Revolt against Local Government Bill, Ireland 408
 Ilo 192-193
 Italy and Soudan 165-168
- JACKSON**, Mr. W. L. 290
 Jacobus de Wet, Sir 278
 Jamaica 248-255
 Japan: Troops for China 155-160
 Jameson, Dr., 271-299; Ordered not to move, 274; Disobeys Orders, 274; Trial of, 288.
 Jamrud, Railway to 208
Jehad (Ameer of Afghanistan's warning) 204
 Johannesburg Rising, 271-299; Unconditional Surrender demanded, 278; Municipal Council promised, 281; The "Pothouse Conspiracy," 309; Occupation of, by Lord Roberts, 366.
 Joint High Commission (United States and Great Britain):
 Constitution agreed upon, 97; Scope of the Commission, 97; Nature of the Deadlock 98
 Jorissen, Dr., Pledges at Newcastle, 1881 31
 Johnston, Sir H. H. 245
 Joubert, Mr. (Candidate for Presidency, S.A.R.) 305
 Juba River 197
 Justin McCarthy, Mr., Resignation of Irish Leadership 401
- KABAREGA** 238-245
 Kafirisian (Subjection by Ameer) 202
 Kano (Opened from South) 233
 Kassala (Italian Garrison) 166
 Ketteler, Baron:—
 Views on China, 149; Murder of 155
 Khalifa, 165-199; Death of, 176.
 Khedivial Decree—Soudan 189
 Kiao-Chau Bay: *vide* China.
 Kienning Riots 146
 Kimberley (Lord):—
 Action *re* Armenians, 23-30; Creates the Concert, 24; Checked by Russia, 29; Rustem Pacha and, 29; The Proposal of Coercion, 30; Russia Rejects Proposal, 30; Speech on Outbreak of War, 326.
 Action *re* Nile Valley 178

- | | | | |
|--|------|--|--------------------|
| | PAGE | | PAGE |
| Kimberley Diamond Discoveries | 262 | Krugersdorp, fight at | 276 |
| Kimberley, Relief of | 348 | Kumasi | 219-222 |
| Kinder (Mr.), <i>vide</i> China. | | Kwangsi Rebellion | 161 |
| Kitchener, Lord, 165-199; Instructions
on Reaching Khartoum, 180;
Awarded a Peerage, 187; Arrival
at Cape Town, 340. | | Kyber Pass | 204-208 |
| Kowloon-Canton Railway | 163 | | |
| Kroonstadt Hospitals | 372 | | |
| Kruger, Mr. :— | | L ABOUCHERE, Mr. :— | |
| First Mission on Annexation, 263;
Conference with Sir B. Frere, 264;
Independence Proclaimed, 264; On
Suzerainty in 1881, 265; Elected
President, 265; Mission to London,
1884, 266; Report on New Conven-
tion, 267; Mr. Chamberlain's good
wishes to, 269; Gives way on Drifts,
270; Hostility to the Uitlanders, 270;
Confers with Lord Rosmead, 277;
Denies Jameson would be shot,
279; German Emperors Message to,
279; Reply to Message, 279;
Appeal and promises to Uitlanders,
281; "Forget and Forgive," 281;
A Compliment on Queen's Speech,
285; Takes offence at Mr. Cham-
berlain's <i>London Gazette</i> Despatch,
287; Reproof to the "New Diplo-
macy," 287; Increased distrust of
Colonial Office because of Report of
Select Committee, 293; Refusal to
visit England, 298; Appoints Mining
Commission, 298; Three years Mis-
used, 300; Alliance with Orange
Free State, 300; His Afrikaner
Republic ideal, 301; Arbitration
asked for, 302; Refusal to act on
Report of Mining Commission, 305;
Again elected President, 305; A
deaf ear to Mr. Chamberlain, 305;
The Uitlanders' Petition, 306; Mr.
Chamberlain suggests personal Con-
ference, 309; Agrees to Conference,
309; His attitude on Franchise Arbi-
tration, 310-317; War foreseen, 313;
Franchise Law of Volksraad, 313-314;
Demands Arbitration as to existence
of Suzerainty, 314; His pledges in
1881, 315; Refusal to appoint
Delegates to study the Franchise
Law, 316; The offer of a Five Years
Franchise, with conditions attached,
317; Withdrawal of Five Years
offer, 317; Black's report of Industrial
Commission, 305; Re-elected to
Presidency, 305; Dislike of Uitlan-
ders, 305; Pledges at Newcastle,
1881, 315; Again proposes Arbitra-
tion, 316; Agrees to joint inquiry
by Delegates into Franchise Law,
318; Breach of faith charge, 318;
Again asserts doctrine of "Sovereign
International State," 319; Ultimatum
to British Government, 321; Over-
tures for Peace, 351; Flight to
Lourenço Marques, 382. | | Protest Soudan Campaign, 167;
Report Select Committee on Raid,
293; Charge of "Bearing" Shares,
294.
Lado, Anglo-Belgian Agreement | 198 |
| | | Ladysmith Entanglement | 330-334 |
| | | Ladysmith, Siege of | 303 <i>et seq.</i> |
| | | Ladysmith, "Very hard pressed" .. | 241 |
| | | Lagos, Hinterland and France .. | 193 |
| | | Laing's Nek, <i>vide</i> Natal Defence. | |
| | | Lake Chad | 190-199 |
| | | Land Rating Bill | 398 |
| | | Land Transfer Act | 406 |
| | | Lands Bill (Ashanti) | 222 |
| | | Latuka Sultanate | 197 |
| | | Leaba | 193 |
| | | Legations, Peking, Guards for .. | 150 |
| | | Leyds, Dr. | 300 |
| | | Leonard, Mr. | 271 |
| | | Letter, Concocted, Johannesburg .. | 273 |
| | | Liao-Tung Peninsular, <i>vide</i> China. | |
| | | Liberal Ministry, Defeat of | 3 |
| | | Liberal Unionists—Relations with Con-
servatives | 8-9 |
| | | "Light Soil" for France | 199 |
| | | Lindley, Capture of Yeomanry .. | 369 |
| | | Loan (West Indies Hurricane) .. | 251 |
| | | Loan, War | 421 |
| | | Lobanoff (Prince) :— | |
| | | His Views on Armenian Question,
27-28-30; Refusal to Act after
renewed Massacres, 41. | |
| | | Local Government Bill, Ireland .. | 407 |
| | | Lockhart, General Sir William .. | 205 |
| | | Lockhart, Sir W., Ultimatum Indian
Frontier | 208 |
| | | Local Veto | 12 |
| | | London Convention | 267 <i>et seq.</i> |
| | | London Government Act | 412 |
| | | London University Act | 411 |
| | | Londonderry, Lord :— | |
| | | Attack on Irish Land Bill, 399;
Attacks Local Government Bill,
Ireland | 408 |
| | | Low, Sir R., Relief of Chitral .. | 201 |
| | | Lubwas, Escape of Soudanese .. | 243-5 |
| | | Lundi Kotal | 208 |
| | | Lugard, Colonel, Niger Treaties, 1894 | 192 |
| | | M ACKINNON, Sir Wm. | 239 |
| | | Molesworth, Sir G., Uganda Rail-
way | 240 |
| | | Macgregor, Dr., leaves the House .. | 2 |
| | | Manchuria, <i>vide</i> China. | |
| | | MacCormac, Sir W., South African
Hospitals | 371 |
| | | McCarthy, Mr. Justin, Resignation
Irish Leadership | 401 |
| | | MacDonald (Sir Claude), <i>vide</i> China. | |
| | | Macdonald, Mission of Uganda .. | 197-198 |

- | | PAGE | | PAGE |
|---|-------------------|---|---------|
| Madagascar, Concessions by Lord Salisbury | 428 | Mouravieff: Optimism <i>re</i> Boxers .. | 149 |
| Mafeking, Relief of | 354 | Mullah, The Mad | 203 |
| Magersfontein, Battle of | 335-6 | Municipal Council Johannesburg .. | 281 |
| Malakan, Attack on | 203 | Murray, Sir H. H. | 256 |
| Manchuria Banditti | 146 | Mwanga, King, revolt of | 241-5 |
| Mauritius, India Sugar Bounties .. | 216 | NANNING opened | 161 |
| Mansion House Fund, India | 214-215 | National African Company | 229 |
| Marchand, M. | 172-199 | Nawagai, Khan of | 203 |
| Saved by Lord Kitchener's forces, | | Natal, Defence of | 330-333 |
| 182; His version of his orders, 182; | | Necessitous Board Schools Bill .. | 403 |
| Peril from starvation, 182; Report | | Neglected Estates of Empire .. | 216-256 |
| called for, 182; Suggested retreat by | | Newcastle Programme | 12 |
| west, 184. | | Newcastle Conference, 1881 .. | 315 |
| Martin, Sir Richard, Administrator | | Netherlands Railway | 269 |
| Rhodesia | 289 | Newton, Mr.:— | |
| Martyr, Major, on the White Nile .. | 197 | His Secret Cognisance of Con- | |
| Matthias, Colonel, Dargai | 206 | spiracy against Transvaal, 273; | |
| Mataafa, <i>vide</i> Samoa | 100 | Censured by Select Committee, 291. | |
| Matabele Rising | 289 | Newfoundland | 255-8 |
| Matoppos Hills, Fighting in | 289-290 | Neutral Zone (Gold Coast) | 258 |
| McKinley, President:— | | Nicaragua Canal:— | |
| Treaty of General Arbitration with | | Convention of 1900, 101; Clay- | |
| England, 93; Agrees to appoint the | | ton Bulwer Treaty, 101-102; Oppo- | |
| Joint High Commission, 95; Sub- | | sition to the Treaty, 104. | |
| servency to British Policy, 101. | | Nicholson's Nek Disaster | 333 |
| Mehtar, Chitral | 200 | Niger:— | |
| Metemneh, Occupation of | 173 | Joint Commission on, 179; Treaties | |
| Methuen, Lord, Magersfontein .. | 335-6 | of 1894, 192; Convention of June, | |
| Menelik:— | | 1898, 192-3; (Lower), 190-199; | |
| Peace overtures to Italy, 166; | | Lease Areas for France, 193; Com- | |
| Rennell Rodd Mission, 195; Neu- | | pany, Royal, 227-237; Coast Pro- | |
| trality in Soudan, 195; Somali-Abys- | | tectorate, 227-237; Act, buying out | |
| sinia Frontier, 195. | | Company, 415. | |
| Milner, Sir A.:— | | Nikki, French Senegalese at | 191 |
| Appointment to South Africa, 299; | | Nile, White, and Abyssinian Boun- | |
| Reviews statement in Petition and | | dary | 196 |
| asks Intervention, 307-8; His in- | | Nile, Valley of | 165-199 |
| structions, 303; Reviews situation | | Nine Years Franchise, Transvaal .. | 310-314 |
| Johannesburg, 306-7; Bloemfontein | | Nitrals Nek Disaster | 381 |
| Conference, 309-312. | | Noel, Admiral, Bombardment of | |
| Mining Commission, Transvaal .. | 298 | Candia | 62 |
| Mints, India | 217 | Norman, Sir W. H., and West Indian | |
| "Missing Telegrams" Raid | 296 | Problem | 247-255 |
| Military Manœuvres Act | 405 | Norman, Mr., Murder of | 150 |
| Military Works Act | 405 | Northcott, Colonel, Ashanti | 221 |
| Mittai Valley | 203 | Nupé:— | |
| Mixed Tribunals | 189 | Emir of, 230-231-232; Treaties, | |
| Mossi | 193 | 228. | |
| Mohmand rising | 203-8 | OLIFANT , Mr. D., killed in Pekin .. | 157 |
| Money Lenders' Act | 419 | Olney (Mr. R.), Despatch <i>re</i> | |
| Monson, Sir E., Plain talk to M. | | Guiana | 67 |
| Delcassé <i>re</i> Fashoda | 181 | Omdurman, Battle of | 174-175 |
| Monson, Sir E., Nile Valley negotia- | | Opposition, Attitude of towards | |
| tions | 180-89 | Soudan), 167-173; Condemnation | |
| Monroe doctrine | 66 <i>et seq.</i> | of Indian Frontier Policy, 210; | |
| Morley, Mr. J.:— | | Attitude towards the War, 325-328 | |
| Cromwell statue, 1; Home Rule | | Orakzais Rising, 203-4; Submis- | |
| and General Election, 12; Defeat at | | sion of, 207. | |
| Newcastle, 14; Speech on the Con- | | Orange Free State | 258 |
| cert, 60; Opposes Soudan Campaign, | | Orange River Convention | 261 |
| 167-168; Debate on Indian garri- | | Orleans, Prince Henri d', Mission to | |
| sons for Suakim, 169; Condemns | | Abyssinia | 196 |
| Indian Frontier policy, 210; On cost | | PAARDEBURG , Defeat of Cronje .. | 348 |
| of Indian Frontier war, 213. | | Pacific Ocean, <i>vide</i> Samoa, Pago- | |
| Morris, Dr., and West Indies .. | 247-255 | Pago | 100 |
| Morrison, Dr., Message from Pekin | 157-160 | | |

- | | PAGE | | PAGE |
|--|---------|--|-------|
| Palmerston (Lord), Anglo-Venezuela Agreement of 1850 | 160 | Reitz, Y. W., Mr., 300 ; Becomes Transvaal State Secretary, 306. | |
| Paotung-fu, missionary massacres 148, 160 | | Reid, Mr. (of Montreal) | 255-8 |
| Peace Overtures, Boer Presidents, Lord Salisbury's reply | 351 | Reid Contract (Newfoundland) | 255-8 |
| Pease, Mr. A. E., Criticises Treaty of Adis Abbaba | 196 | Reitfontein, Battle at | 332 |
| Pekin Syndicate | 163 | Rejaf, Major Martyr at | 198 |
| Penny Postage, India | 217 | Retention of Chitral | 202 |
| Petition to Queen, Uitlanders' | 306 | Rhodes, Mr. Cecil, 270-299 ; To "face the Music," 288 ; Negotiates with Matabele, 289 ; Censured by Select Committee, 291 ; His "Statesmanship," 295. | |
| Phillips, Consul, Benin massacre | 236-237 | Rhodes, Colonel F. | 273 |
| Phillips, Mr. Lionel | 271 | Rinderpest | 289 |
| Pichon, M., Fears of Chinese risings | 149 | Roberts, Lord :— | |
| Pieters Hill, Battle at | 349 | Annexes Transvaal, 382 ; Arrival at Cape Town, 340 ; Despatches re Hospitals, 372 ; Proclamation on Flight of Mr. Kruger, 383. | |
| Pilkington, Mr., Death of | 244 | Robertson, Mr., Chitral | 201 |
| "Pin Pricks" policy (France) | 185 | Robinson, Mr., murder of | 150 |
| Plague, India | 213-215 | Robson, Mr., Age Limit Bill | 414 |
| Plumer, Colonel, Matabele | 289 | Rodd, Sir Rennell, Mission to Menelik | 195 |
| Playfair, Lord, Unofficial negotiations of Guiana | 87 | Robinson, Sir Hercules, <i>vide</i> Rosmead. | |
| Plunkett, Mr. Horace, Appointment of | 414 | Rosmead, Lord :— | |
| Poona murders | 213 | Efforts to recall Jameson, 274 ; Goes to Pretoria, 277 ; Negotiations with Mr. Kruger after Raid, 280-283 ; Reasons for refraining from pressing reforms, 283 ; Comments on by Select Committee, 291. | |
| Port Arthur, <i>vide</i> China. | | Rosebery (Lord) :— | |
| Port Novo to Say boundary | 191 | Vote of Censure "pretty but fatal," 3 ; Resigns Office, 4 ; Honours List, 1895, 6 ; His Leadership Challenged, 12 ; Negotiations with Venezuela, 83 ; Rosebery Government and the Chino-Japanese War, 106 ; Supports Government <i>re</i> Fashoda, 185 ; Responsibility for Grey Declaration, 1895, 185 ; Warning to France, 185 ; Attitude <i>re</i> Chitral, 201 ; Speech on Land Rating Bill, 398 ; Supports Lord Salisbury's Armenian Policy, 407. | |
| "Pothouse conspiracy," The Johannesburg | 309 | Rose-Innes, Mr., Q.C., watches Johannesburg Trial | 297 |
| Prempeh, King, Overthrow of | 219 | Royal Commission :— | |
| Press Law, Transvaal | 306 | West Indies, 247-255 ; Newfoundland (French Shore), 257. | |
| Protoria, Occupation of, by Lord Roberts | 366 | Rudini, Marquis of, Statement on English relations | 168 |
| Pretoria Plot | 382 | Rudolph, Lake | 197 |
| Prince of Wales's Island | 96 | Russia and Chitral Question, 202 ; Sugar Bounties Question, 250. | |
| Prison-made Goods Act, Foreign | 406 | | |
| Privy Council, Right to Appeal to | 418 | | |
| Proclamation Dissolving Parliament | 422 | | |
| Protectorate, Egypt | 188 | | |
| Protectorate, Sierra Leone | 223 | | |
| Programme of third Salisbury Administration | 11 | | |
| Pu-Chiin, Succession to Throne of China | 147 | | |
- QUEEN (The) :—**Reference to United States Treaty of Arbitration, 92 ; Expresses satisfaction with Mr. Kruger, 279 ; Speech promising searching inquiry into invasion of Transvaal, 285 ; Petition from Uitlanders, 306 ; Speech Autumn Session, 1899, 326 ; Proclamation Dissolving Fourteenth Parliament, 422.
- RAILWAYS :—**
- Ashanti, 221 ; Uganda, 239-240 ; Rand, Mr. J., murder of 213
- Raid, the Jameson, 269-284 ; Jameson Report of Select Committee, 290-2 ; Claim for Damages, 303.
- Rand, Report Industrial Commission 305
- Ras Mangasiea Revolt 196
- Rawson, Admiral (punitive expedition, Benin) 236
- Rebels, South African, Treatment of 377-379
- Reform Committee :—
- Johannesburg, 278 ; Sentences on, 297.
- SALISBURY (Lord) :—**
- Formation of Government, 5 ; A Plain Warning to Rustem Pacha *re* Reforms in Asia Minor, 31 ; Will Russia coerce? 31 ; Article LXI. of Berlin Treaty and right of Surveillance, 32 ; Should Lord Salisbury act alone? 32-3 ; His decision, 33 ; Obtains acceptance of Reforms, 33-35 ; Distrust of the Sultan, 36 ; Views on Prince Lobanoff's Memorandum,

	PAGE
41; Negative Results of Armenian Policy, 45-6; Mediation on behalf of Greece, 55; Choice of a Governor for Crete, 57; Instructs British Admiral to oppose landing of Turkish forces in Crete, 58; Speech on Crete and the Concert, 59; Despatches, Guiana boundary, 70-72; Accepts Arbitration <i>re</i> Guiana, 87; Proposes General Treaty of Arbitration with United States, 91; Declines to re-open the Sealing Question, 93; Efforts to Establish Friendly Relations with United States, 105; Deprecates Alarm about Russian Aims in Far East, 107; Views on the Seizure of Kiao-Chau, 112-113; Treatment of Russian Complaints <i>re</i> Presence of British Men of War at Port Arthur, 114-117; "No Designs on Chinese Territory, 121; Views on the Liao-Tung Lease, 124; Assurances to Germany <i>re</i> Wei-hai-Wei, 128; Northern Railway, China, Loan 133; Despatch on Anglo-Russian Railway Agreement (China), 139-140; Declines to Agree to a Joint Naval Demonstration (China), 147; Agrees to Naval Demonstration, 149; Gives Sir C. MacDonald a Free Hand, 151; His Work in China, 154; Invitation to Millionaires <i>re</i> Soudan, 171; Consents to Report being obtained from Marchand, 182; Interviews with Baron de Courcel <i>re</i> Fashoda, 183-184; Announces Withdrawal of M. Marchand, 187; Denies Rumour of Protectorate for Egypt, 189; "Stricken Field" Argument, 189; Superb Management of Soudan Difficulties with France, 195; Defends Retention of Chitral, 202; Replies to Attack on Indian Frontier Policy, 211; Warns Powers Against Intervening in South Africa, 334; "We Seek Neither Gold nor Territory" Speech, 334; Warning against Foreign, 334; On the War, 343; Despatch to Boer Presidents in answer to Peace Overtures, 351; Declines United States Offer of Mediation in South Africa, 352; Resents German Despatches <i>re</i> Contraband, 354.	
Slave Trade:—	
Checked in Ashanti, 220; Uganda, 239.	
Samoa:—	
Tripartite Arrangement, 100;	
Mataafa and the Kingship, 100;	
A Joint Commission, 100; Report of Commissioners, 100; Convention of November, 1899, 101.	
Samory	221
Samana Range, Operations against . .	205
Sanna's Post Disaster	362
Sand River Convention	260
Save: Base of MacDonald Mission . .	197
Say to Port Novo Boundary	191
Schreiner, Mr., becomes Prime Minister, 304; Views <i>re</i> Conference with Mr. Kruger, 309; Resignation of Ministry, 330.	
Schalk Burger, Mr., Candidate for Presidency S. A. R.	305
Schomburgk, Sir R., Work in Guiana . .	79
Sealing Question, <i>vide</i> Behring Sea.	
Seals Incident	5-6
Sedition in India	214
Sempagbar Pass, Storming of	207
Selborne, Lord:—	
His Part in South African Question, 271-299; Select Committee (Jameson Raid), 290-297.	
Session, Winding up of, 1895	10
Sessions	385-423
Seven Years Franchise, Transvaal . .	314
Seymour, Admiral Sir E.	152-55
Shaw, Miss, Her part in Jameson Raid affair	275
Shantung, <i>see</i> China.	
Shendy, Capture of	173
Shepstone, Sir T., Annexes Transvaal .	263
Shimonoseki, Treaty of	106
Shilluk country	182
Shilluk Chiefs, M. Marchand's Treaty .	182
Shoans	166
Sierra Leone	222-226
Slavery, West Indies	247
Small Dwellings Acquisition Act . . .	415
Sokoto boundary, 191-192; (Reported invasion by France), 191; (Understanding with Emperor of), 231.	
Somali Coast Protectorate	195
South Africa, War in, <i>vide</i> War in South Africa	259-358
South African League	304
South African Republic	259 <i>et seq.</i>
Soudan, Reconquest of, 165-199; Expeditions, Cost of, 176; Anglo-Egyptian Convention, 189.	
Soudan, Central, 193-199; Delimitation of, 194; Spheres of Interest, 194; Freedom of Trade in, 194.	
Soudanese, grievances of, Uganda . .	242
"Sovereign International State," Transvaal	268
Spanish-American War	95
Spencer, Lord, Supports Government <i>re</i> Fashoda	186
Speech, The Queen's Autumn Session, 1899	326
Spheres of Interest, Soudan	194
Spion Kop, 342; Despatches, 355-360.	
Stanhope, Mr. Phillip, Motion condemning Report of Select Committee on Raid, 296; Amendment to Address Condemning War Negotiations, 327.	
Standard, Tientsin Despatch	160
Stanley, Sir H., Supports Soudan Campaign	169
Steyn, President:—	
Invites parties to Conference, 309;	
Complains of movements of Imperial	

	PAGE		PAGE
Troops, 319-321; Expels British subjects, 321; Ultimatum to British Government, 324.		Uitlanders' Petition to Queen, 306; Mr. Kruger's hostility to, 270.	
Stock Exchange and likelihood of war	324	Ultimatum to Johannesburg Uitlanders, 278; S. A. R. to British Government, 321; to Prempeh, King, 220.	
St. Vincent	251	Umra Khan	201
Stormberg, Disaster at	336	Undeveloped Estates of Empire ..	246-256
Swakim, Indian garrison	169	United States:—	
"Substantial and Immediate Representation" for Uitlanders	311	War with Spain, 95; Attitude of England, 95; The Samoan Question, 100; Relations with Great Britain, 100-105; Offer of Mediation in South Africa, 352.	
Sugar, India Bounties question, 216; Planters, West Indies, 246-255.		University of London Act	411
Sultan of Turkey, Supposed influence on Indian frontier risings	204	Unyoro, Soudanese Mutineers	197
Supplementary Army Estimates	328	Unyoro	238-245
Suzerainty, Transvaal, 265 <i>et seq.</i> ; Arbitration as to its existence, 314.			
Swat and Baguar, pledges to tribesmen	201		
Swat Valley rising	203		
Swaziland, Mr. Kruger's demands at Bloemfontein	311		
TAI-YUEN-FU , Missionaries massacred	160	VAAL Drifts closed	269
Taku:—		Valley of the Nile	177-199
British Warships sent, 147; Forts destroyed by the allies, 153.		Vaal Krantz, Battle at	347
Talienwan, <i>vide</i> China.		Vaccination Act	409
Talana Hill, Battle at	332	Vernacular Press Ravings, India ..	214
Technical Instruction Act, Ireland ..	413	Venezuela, <i>vide</i> Guiana.	
Telegraphs Act <i>re</i> Telephones	415	Verminous Persons Act	406
Telephone Service Act	415	Viceroy, Central Southern and China ..	154
Thurston, Major, Murder of	243	Volskraad ratifies Convention of Pretoria	265
Tientsin, <i>vide</i> China.		Voluntary Schools Bill	402
<i>Times</i> , Dr. Morrison's messages after relief of Pekin	157-160		
Tirah, Sir W. Lockhart's advance ..	206	WA , British Flag planted	221
Tochi Valley	203	Waganda, Revolt of	243-5
Tokar	169	Waldersee, Count von, Appointed <i>Generalissimo</i>	160
Transvaal <i>vide</i> War in South Africa		War Office Reorganisation Proposals, 1895	2
Transvaal, Industrial Commission Report	305	War in South Africa	259-358
Transvaal Annexed	382	War Loan	421
Treason Bill, Cape Colony	380	Warren, Pelham, Consul, and the Viceroy	154
Treaty of Washington, September 2nd, 1897	87-88	Warren, Mr., Killed in Pekin	157
Treaty of Amity (Transvaal)	266	Waran Valley, Stronghold taken	207
Treves, Mr., South African Hospitals	371	Waterboer	262
Trinidad	246-255	Webster, Sir R.	290
Truck Acts, Amendment	400	Wei-hai-Wei, <i>vide</i> China.	
Trustees' Act, Relief of	401	Welsh Disestablishment Bill	2
Tuan, Prince	150	Wepener, Siege of	363
Tunis, Lord Salisbury's Concessions ..	428	West Indies	246-255
Turkey, Sultan of, Supposed influence on Indian risings	204-209	West India Botanical Department ..	251
Turkey, <i>vide</i> Armenian question and Crete.		West India Committee	252
Tweedmouth, Lord, Supports Government <i>re</i> Fashoda	186	West River:—	
		Piracy, 146; New Ports Opened, 162.	
		Wet, Sir Jacobus de	278
		Wharton, Mr.	290
		Wyndham, Mr. G., 290; Admissions <i>re</i> War, 345-6.	
		White Nile—Fight with Dervishes ..	182
		White, Henry, Trial of	288
		White, Sir George	331-334
		Willoughby, Sir J. G., Trial of	288
		Wilhelm, Emperor, Message to Mr. Kruger	279
UBANGHI , Upper	181	Wolseley, Lord, on Transvaal	264
Ucciali, Treaty of	166	Wools-Sampson, Release of	298
Uganda	238-245		

	PAGE		PAGE
Workmen's Compensation Act, 403 ;		Yen-Chau-Fu ; Missionaries Massa-	
Extended to Agricultural Labourers,		cred	160
420.		Yünan-Fu (Anti-Missionary Excesses)	148
		Yukon, <i>vide</i> Alaska.	
YANGTSZE VALLEY, <i>vide</i> China		ZANZIBAR, extra territorial rights	
Yeatman Biggs, Genl.	205	abolished	258

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missioners recommended the abolition of the kingship and of consular jurisdiction and a general reorganisation of the Tripartite system of administration. They drew up an elaborate draft of an Amended Act* to be substituted for the Berlin Act of 1889; but, at the same time, they said that international animosity was so rife among the subjects of the Powers and that the intrigues indulged in had proved so inimical to authority, that the best solution of the difficulties of the group would be government by one Power.

The Commissioners' Report was drawn up in July. On November 14th a Convention was signed by Lord Salisbury and Count Hatzfeldt, by which Great Britain renounced her rights over Upolu and Savaii to Germany and over Tutuila to the United States, subject to freedom of commerce. The Convention will be found in the Appendix and other features of it are discussed elsewhere. For the purposes of the present chapter it is sufficient to note that Lord Salisbury gave away the English right to prevent any other Power from establishing a naval and coaling station in the archipelago, and thus, in effect, made a free gift of the finest harbour in the Pacific to the United States; getting nothing in exchange except such goodwill in other matters as the United States found it in their interests to give. There was no remarkable outburst of gratitude in the United States. The Agreement was ratified in the Senate as though it was quite in the natural order of things that the United States should obtain possession without cost of the finest naval base in the mid-Pacific. Oddly enough, at the very time Lord Salisbury made this important concession to American sentiment influential politicians in the United States attacked Mr. McKinley for his supposed subserviency to British policy.

A further proof of English friendship towards the United States was furnished early in 1900 by a Convention which partially abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. Under the latter instrument the Governments of Great Britain and the United States declared that neither the one nor the other would ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over any ship canal across the Nicaraguan or any other portion of the Central American

* An exhaustive account of the work of the Joint Commission and of the provisions of the proposed Amended Act will be found in the Author's Review and Digest of Current State Papers—THE POLITICIAN'S HANDBOOK, issue for 1900.

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008 69390 SER 10 			BINDER USE ONLY <table border="1"> <tr> <td>OR</td> <td>NF</td> <td>HF</td> <td>CF</td> <td>PF</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AR</td> <td>AF</td> <td>RR</td> <td>RF</td> <td>TR</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TOP</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>4</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>BOTTOM</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>4</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FRONT</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>4</td> <td>4</td> </tr> </table>		OR	NF	HF	CF	PF	AR	AF	RR	RF	TR	TOP	0	1	4	4	BOTTOM	0	1	4	4	FRONT	0	1	4	4
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INSTRUCTIONS																													
RETAIN SEWING SEW THRU FOLD ADHESIVE BIND OVERSEW		DO NOT TRIM BIND AS IS MOUNT COVER POCKET																											
MANUAL		BINDER COPY 1																											